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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past decade, fragile states has become a resonant term in the development 
lexicon, frequently employed to draw attention to the need to assist these countries.  
Among other reasons, external intervention has been justified by their lagging 
performance in the achievement of development outcomes and the threats they impose 
to global security and stability. 
Still, fragile states impose a dilemma. Although they are in great need of development 
assistance, aid towards these countries is expected to be less effective. This is the starting 
point of this thesis, which contributes to the understanding of the effect of foreign aid on 
economic development in fragile states, using political economy theory and standard 
econometric techniques. 
A review of existing measures of state fragility highlights that most of them lack a strong 
theoretical grounding, thus confusing causes and outcomes of fragility. This thesis 
suggests an alternative measurement approach that draws on Besley and Persson’s 
(2011a) theoretical model, and uses principal component analysis to derive an index for 
each of the two core dimensions of fragility: state ineffectiveness and political violence. 
This distinction follows a recent call for using multidimensional approaches and finds 
support in an exploratory cluster analysis. 
This thesis then contributes to the quantitative studies examining the fragility-growth 
link by replacing the CPIA with the two obtained indices as proxies for fragility and 
considering the effects of distinct dimensions separately. Using data for the period 1993-
2012, the results from regression analysis show distinct effects for each dimension and 
find no significant impact of fragility on growth when employing a single index. 
Finally, inspired by the empirical aid effectiveness literature, this thesis tests the 
proposition that aid is less effective in promoting growth in countries with higher levels 
of state ineffectiveness or political violence. The results show no support for this 
hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Ascriptions of fragility are often warnings for they are understood to mean 
that breakage is easily brought about. An accidental dropping or knocking 
[of objects such as vases and panes of glass] is very likely to result in 
smashing. It seems that although virtually all objects are breakable, it is only 
those which break easily, under very little force of impact and in a wide 
variety of circumstances, that are called fragile.  
(…) 
In the case of fragility, the typical manifestation is breakage. (…) A vase may 
be fragile and may have been so for centuries though it has never manifested 
its fragility in an actual breakage.” 
Mumford, S. 2003. “Threats and Promises” in Dispositions, Oxford Scholarship Online.  
 
1.1. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
The term “fragile states” has assumed a prominent position in the development 
discourse over the recent decades. Despite its criticism as a “portmanteau word”, a 
“catch-all phrase”, an “all-encompassing label”, and ultimately a “wicked problem”1, the 
expression remains ubiquitous in the development lexicon. Often used in relation to, or 
interchangeably with, other related expressions, such as “weak”, “failing”, “failed”, or 
“collapsed” states,2 the phrase has been employed by academic institutions and different 
development organisations to describe situations where there is a lack of capacity 
and/or willingness of the state to perform a predetermined set of core functions. 
Concepts such as “state failure” and “state collapse” had been applied before within the 
field of international relations. However, it was only after a change in the views 
regarding human and global security, and the link between conflict and development, 
that international organisations and academics started to employ the term “fragile 
                                                             
1 In order of appearance, these expressions have been employed by Nay (2013), Patrick (2007), 
Bertoli and Ticci (2012), and Brinkerhoff (2014). See their work, as well as Gutierrez Sanin 
(2011), for recent reviews of the concept. 
2 As well as “difficult partnerships”, “difficult environments”, “poor performers”, and “situations 
of fragility”. 
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states” with development concerns. More specifically, three main reasons have 
contributed to the prominent position of the term in the development discourse. Firstly, 
a series of events in the 1990s, namely the Cold War and the failure of the Soviet Union, 
resulted in an increasing concern with the dissolution of state institutions and the 
implications of internal conflict to international security. Second, the attacks of the 9/11 
contributed to a new understanding of the relation between underdevelopment and 
conflict. Finally, the view that good policies and institutions are crucial for development 
that emerged at the end of the 1990s - and which served as the basis for aid selectivity 
during this period - created a “Samaritan’s Dilemma” for development assistance: poor 
performers in policy and institutional indicators received less aid, but at the same time 
they were those that needed it the most. The following paragraphs explore the effects of 
these events in more detail.3 
 
1.1.1. The dissolution of the state and internal conflict 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the failure of the Soviet Union were two important 
marks for the debate around failure and collapse. With the end of Cold War came a new 
understanding of state collapse as having an impact on the international system as whole 
instead of having limited, easily controlled effects (Clapham, 2002: 784). In addition to 
that, the emergence of new forms of conflict, different from the conventional model of 
warfare – such as the outbreak of wars in Bosnia and Croatia or the factional conflicts in 
Somalia (Nay, 2013: 327) –, triggered the beginning of a new focus on intrastate conflict 
and on different conceptualisations of state failure (Carment, Samy and Prest, 2008: 
352). The failure of the Soviet Union undermined the view of the solid character of 
statehood, given that one of the two superpowers, with great surface area and large 
population, had just collapsed (Clapham, 2002: 784).  
Thus, the term emerged to describe the proliferation of new sorts of armed conflicts, 
and, in some cases, their impact on the disintegration of state institutions and on 
deteriorated security conditions (Nay, 2013: 327; Call, 2010: 305). This is particularly 
apparent in political science accounts in the 1990s and early 2000s. For instance, 
Helman and Ratner (1993: 3) describe a “new phenomenon” of “failed nation-state, 
utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community”, 
characterised by civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation. Similarly, 
                                                             
3 I refer to Wennmann (2010) for a more extensive overview of the evolution of the fragile 
states discourse.  
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Rotberg (2002, 2004) describes failed states as “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and 
bitterly contested by warring factions” (Rotberg, 2002: 85).  It also became clear at this 
point that the traditional response from the international community had not been 
successful or adequate. 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 gave a new impetus to these concerns, especially for 
the governments of the United States (US) and Western European countries, which also 
had reflections on the academic field of international security. The fact that Afghanistan, 
regarded as a failed state, had provided a safe haven for the planning of the attacks 
indicated that these states were a potential threat for international security as they were 
places where terrorism and crime could flourish. At this point, the attention was less 
focused on the extreme cases of state failure or state collapse, referred to above, but 
instead on how to identify the malfunctions that could lead to those situations. 
This concern with security stems from a change in the views of the international 
community on how development and international security were linked.  According to 
this new perspective, the inability of states to provide essential services and security to 
their citizens alongside continuing political tensions would create obstacles to sustained 
development, and therefore potentially threaten regional or global security (Nay, 2013: 
327). According to Bhuta (2012a: 235), state-funded development agencies introduced 
the notion of “fragile state” to designate a broad-ranging development-programming 
agenda that recast development assistance as an instrument to promote political 
stability and peace. Some even suggest that “the topic of fragile states only gained major 
prominence when – and because – it was framed in the contexts of the security discourse 
of the major developed states” (Boege et al., 2008: 17). 
 
1.1.2. The role of the state in development performance 
Following the crises in the 1970s, the ‘structural adjustment programmes’ were imposed 
to many developing countries with the aim of “correcting” the mistakes made by 
governments in these countries. According to the influential Berg Report (World Bank, 
1981: 4), Africa’s “disappointing performance” had been influenced by “internal 
constraints based on ‘structural’ factors” and “a set of external factors”, both 
“exacerbated by economic policy inadequacies”.  In order to remedy this damage, 
neoliberal reforms would contribute to a sound macroeconomic management but, some 
argued, at the cost of undercutting the mechanisms used by governments to maintain 
their power and their fragile state authority (Clapham, 2002: 783). 
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However, it was not long before the focus was shifted from the free functioning of the 
markets to the importance of the state in promoting growth. The disappointing record 
of the results of the structural adjustment programmes led, by the end of the 1980s, to 
an increased debate around the relationship between institutions and patterns of 
development. Countries were facing problems associated with economic instability, 
retrenchment of state activities, limited growth and high inequality, which showed that 
“development as usual appeared to be ineffective or even counterproductive” (Carment, 
Samy and Prest, 2008: 352).  
In the beginning of the 2000s, development agencies started talking about “difficult 
partners”, “difficult environments”, or “low-income countries under stress”. There was 
a renewed focus on how to provide assistance to these countries, especially after the 
seminal paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) who argued that aid is more effective in 
countries pursuing “good policies”. The discourse around the desirability of promoting 
“good governance” in order to foster economic growth and development started to 
spread, and triggered a view that emphasised institutional failures and mismanagement 
as reasons for state collapse (Doornbos, 2002: 806). According to these ideas, the 
mitigation of governance or state failures and fragility could be achieved by following 
the right policies, or, in other words, “setting up the right processes” (Hameiri, 2007: 
128). 
This link between fragility and development was also reflected in the policy discourse. 
According to the World Bank (2005): 
“The impact of this vicious circle is clearly seen in development outcomes in fragile 
states. LICUS have twice the income poverty and child mortality rates of other low 
income countries; they also pose a risk of negative spillovers for their neighbors 
and the wider global community, through spread of conflict and organized crime, 
refugee flows, epidemic diseases, and barriers to trade and investment. Improving 
the international response in these countries is a critical development challenge.” 
(World Bank, 2005: v)  
The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) concurs to this 
view: “[w]e need to work better in fragile states because poverty is so widespread, 
because they can destabilize regional and global security, and because the costs of late 
response to crisis are high” (DFID, 2005: 9). Two years later, the European Commission 
(2007: 4) highlights that “[f]ragile situations constitute a particular challenge as an 
obstacle to sustainable development, equitable growth and peace, and creating regional 
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instability, security risks at global level, uncontrolled migration flows, etc.” Later, the 
European Report on Development (2009) is entirely dedicated to discussing fragility in 
Africa.  
Thus, providing assistance to, and sometimes intervening in, fragile states was 
increasingly justified on the basis of: i) the economic and human costs borne by these 
and neighbouring countries (Chauvet and Collier, 2004); ii) the threats these countries 
imposed to regional and global security and stability (European Report on Development, 
2009); and iii) the fact that they were also plagued by high levels of poverty, and had a 
slower progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when compared to 
other developing countries (OECD, 2012; 2014; 2016). Still, plagued by a lack of will or 
capacity of the state to perform its core functions, and frequently also by political 
violence, fragile states impose great challenges for the effectiveness of development 
assistance. This thesis is interested in exploring this quandary by uncovering some of 
the links between state fragility, development assistance, and development. 
 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH 
 
1.2.1. Research questions 
The aforementioned dilemma is the starting point of this thesis, which aims to contribute 
to the understanding of the impact of foreign aid on economic development in fragile 
states. In order to achieve this, when making theoretical considerations (especially when 
conceptualising state fragility) this thesis follows the discipline of political economy. In 
the empirical analyses, this thesis employs econometric methods which are standard 
within the economics tradition and allow one to assess the predictions from theory4.  
In the process of finding an answer, and before testing the proposition that aid is less 
effective in fragile states, this thesis takes on two other challenges. The first is related to 
the concept of state fragility and is the subject of Part I of the thesis, which is guided by 
a concern with defining state fragility and finding an appropriate measurement 
instrument for this phenomenon. 
Once the definition of state fragility is clear, and before considering aid effectiveness, 
this thesis engages with the link between state fragility and economic development, 
                                                             
4 In so doing, this approach follows an epistemological approach of critical realism. 
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looking more specifically at economic growth as the development outcome. This is done 
in the beginning of Part II. In the final empirical chapter, the hypothesis that aid is less 
effective in fragile states is put under scrutiny. A more detailed description of each of the 
chapters included is provided below. 
  
1.2.2. The state as the primary unit of analysis 
Given that throughout this thesis there is an overall focus on the role of the state in 
society, I briefly justify the choice of using the state as my primary unit of analysis. It has 
been argued in the literature that the notion of fragile states is based on a narrow state-
centric perspective and consequently suffers from analytical reductionism (Boege et al., 
2009; Nay, 2013: 333; Lambach, Johais and Bayer, 2015). The basic argument is that 
there is a propensity to focus on formal state institutions, and that stifles efforts to a 
better understanding of the institutions and arenas external to the state sphere, 
particularly networks and informal economies. As described in Boege et al. (2009: 24), 
cases of state fragility are usually characterised by the existence of diverse and 
competing claims to power, as well as coexisting, overlapping and intertwining logics of 
order. This undercuts the privileged position of provider of security, welfare and 
representation that is usually attributed to the state, as “it has to share authority, 
legitimacy and capacity with other structures” (Boege et al., 2009: 24). Hameiri (2007: 
123) contributes to this argument by claiming that the current view neglects the fact that 
power and conflict are intrinsic elements of the phenomenon of the state. The author 
highlights some consequences of defining state failure in relation to state capacity, 
namely, its confliction of politics with governance that originates a technocratic view of 
the state. 
While conceding that these are pertinent points, I argue that a focus on the state as a 
central unit helps identify the sources of its fragility and does not deviate the attention 
from other actors in society. Additionally, I concur with the reasons expressed by 
Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012: 1) for maintaining this perspective. More 
specifically, these authors argue that: i) most actors in development policy (e.g. donor 
countries and multilateral institutions) have country-based operation models and 
allocation systems; and also that ii) notwithstanding the increasing prominence of non-
state actors, states retain their role as important players and objects of activities in the 
international system. Furthermore, as pointed out by Carment, Prest and Samy’s (2009: 
76), the state is “a constrained but primary actor in international politics”.  
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Finally, and following closely the arguments used by Lambach, Johais and Bayer (2015) 
to justify their focus on the state when conceptualising state collapse, there is a 
pragmatic reason from a methodological point of view. One of the main aims of this 
thesis is to improve the empirical analysis of state fragility, which requires a concept of 
the state that is susceptible to comparative research. The view of the state used in this 
thesis (and described in detail in Chapter 3) follows the ideal-type definition, which 
underlies most of the conceptualisations of fragile states used in existing literature. 
 
1.3. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS AND MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
 
The main contribution of this thesis is to propose an alternative measure of state fragility 
that has some advantages when compared to previous approaches. First, it is based on a 
sound theoretical grounding, and thus avoids the confusion between causes and 
consequences of state fragility. The overview in Chapter 2 reviews the existing 
approaches to operationalise this concept, focusing, in particular, on their theoretical 
underpinnings and highlights that, with a few exceptions, current proposals do not 
provide a clear discussion of the theoretical roots underlying their approaches, and lack 
clarity in terms of the distinction between causes and consequences of state fragility.5 
The proposal in this thesis draws from Besley and Persson’s (2011a) model, which 
provides a clear distinction between causes, symptoms and outcomes, and suggests state 
ineffectiveness and political violence as the symptoms of state fragility. 
Second, by proposing this multidimensional approach, it contributes to unpacking the 
complexity of the phenomenon. As described in detail in Chapter 3, the measurement 
proposal in this thesis considers the aforementioned two symptoms as the core 
dimensions of state fragility and uses principal component analysis to derive an index 
for each of them. This distinction follows a recent call for the use of multidimensional 
approaches to unpack the complexity of the term, and it found support in the exploratory 
cluster analysis in the same chapter, which reveals the existence of patterns of countries 
according to the two dimensions. 
Third, the obtained indices offer an alternative way of making the concept of state 
fragility operational for further analysis. The summary of the main limitations of the 
                                                             
5 An abridged version of this chapter has been published as an article in the journal Third World 
Quarterly. See full reference for Ferreira (2017) in the list of references. 
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most widely used fragility indices in in Chapter 2 suggests that there is room for 
improvement in terms of measurement instruments. Bearing this in mind, this approach 
provides a continuous measure for state ineffectiveness and political violence, and thus 
it departs from a dichotomous distinction between fragile and non-fragile states based 
on the establishment of ad hoc cut-off points. Additionally, when compared to the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index – the most widely used 
measure of state fragility – the approach in this thesis proves advantageous because: i) 
it is derived from publicly available sources and can be easily replicated; ii) covers a 
larger number of countries; and iii) it is more comprehensive as a measure of state 
fragility as it also considers political violence. 
The construction of the two indices and some descriptive analysis of the main scores are 
provided in Chapter 3, and this thesis then provides two empirical applications of the 
proposed measure of state fragility. First, the obtained indices are employed to explore 
the impact of state ineffectiveness and political violence on economic growth. The 
review of the empirical literature on the fragility-growth link highlights that, despite the 
multitude of studies exploring similar relationships, only a handful of studies explicitly 
engaged with the cross-country evidence on the effects of state fragility on growth. In 
particular, most of these accounts were based on the CPIA as a proxy measure of state 
fragility and none of them considered the effects of distinct dimensions of fragility. 
Chapter 4 uses standard econometric methods and data for the period 1993-2012 to 
estimate growth regressions. It replaces the CPIA with the two obtained indices as 
proxies for fragility and considers the effects of each symptom separately.  
The results concur with the argument that one should examine the impact of state 
ineffectiveness and political violence separately. They show distinct effects for each 
dimension, but fail to find any evidence of an impact of state fragility on growth when a 
unidimensional index is employed. More specifically, the coefficients obtained from 
considering cross-country and panel datasets, as well as different time periods, time 
horizons, country samples, and estimation techniques suggest that, as expected, state 
ineffectiveness has a significant negative effect on economic growth. The coefficients 
estimated for political violence are more at odds with the theoretical predictions as there 
is some evidence of a positive effect of this variable on growth. However, this result is 
not robust to variations in the specifications used. Additionally, the analysis in this 
chapter considers a possible interactive effect between the two symptoms, but it finds 
no evidence that the effect of state ineffectiveness (or political violence) on economic 
growth in a country depends on the level of political violence (or state ineffectiveness). 
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The second empirical application is motivated by the aforementioned dilemma faced by 
donor organisations. With this in mind, Chapter 5 tests the proposition that aid is less 
effective in promoting growth in countries with a higher degree of state fragility. The 
chapter follows the well-established aid effectiveness literature and explores the sign 
and significance level of an interactive effect between aid and each of the symptoms, 
employing as measures the indices derived before. The results obtained with standard 
econometric methods for the period 1993-2012 show no statistically significant impact 
of either state ineffectiveness or political violence on the effectiveness of aid in 
promoting growth. Furthermore, the coefficient obtained after adding a triple 
interaction term between the three variables does not suggest that aid is even less 
effective when the country scores high in both of these dimensions. 
Finally, Chapter 6 brings together the insights from the previous chapters and 
summarises the main lessons learnt.  
  
 
 
 
PART I. DEFINING AND MEASURING 
STATE FRAGILITY
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CHAPTER 2. MEASURING STATE FRAGILITY: A REVIEW OF 
EXISTING APPROACHES6 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over a decade has passed since the term “fragile states” was adopted in the development 
vocabulary. The literature is now extensive and reflects the concerns of policymakers 
and the donor community over security and development as well as the urgency from 
academics to provide answers to their questions. 
A growing number of review studies have engaged with different aspects of the fragile 
states discourse. In the early 2000s, there was a lack of consensus on how to define the 
term, and a tendency to use it interchangeably with other expressions, such as “weak 
performers”, “failing states” or “failed states”. In the face of these disparate views, some 
authors have attempted to organise the lexicon by describing the evolution of the term, 
and by attempting to categorise existing definitions (e.g. Cammack et al., 2006; Engberg-
Pederson, Anderson and Stepputat, 2008; Bertoli and Ticci, 2012). 
This increasing popularity, but also confusion, in the use of the term has led to the 
emergence of several critical voices, motivated by the political aspects inherent to 
labelling a country as a “fragile state”. While some have focused on the concept itself 
(Boege et al., 2009; Nay, 2013), others have looked more broadly at the discourse on 
state fragility. Among the latter studies, a few authors have discussed the (lack of sound) 
theoretical groundings of related concepts, such as state failure (Hameiri, 2007; Di John, 
20107). More recently, a growing number of studies have looked into the underlying 
agendas of donors and recipient countries, and, specifically, into the political aspects 
inherent to the concept of fragile states (Cammack et al., 2006; Hout, 2010; Barakat and 
Larson, 2014). Grimm, Lemay-Hebert and Nay (2014) distinguish between “problem 
solvers”, who focus on performance issues and provide policy recommendations, and 
                                                             
6 An abridged version of this chapter has been published as an article in the journal Third World 
Quarterly. See full reference for Ferreira (2017) in the list of references. 
7 See also Milliken and Krause (2002), Boas and Jennings (2005), Di John (2008), and, more 
recently, Ayers (2012) and Hampel (2015) for critical analyses of the concept of state failure 
and the ideology behind it. 
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“critical scholars”, who question the values and assumptions underlying the concept.8 
Notwithstanding the existing scepticism, according to Brinkerhoff (2014), the “wicked 
problems” of state fragility and failure remain in good currency despite their 
weaknesses. 
In parallel to the concerns with how to deal with fragile states, there was an obvious 
need to identify the countries that fell under that category. This was met by a profusion 
of quantification efforts, which either adopted existing indices, such as the CPIA (Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment), to obtain lists of fragile states, or developed 
alternative measures, expressly aimed at measuring state fragility (e.g. Fragile States 
Index, State Fragility Index). Yet, similarly to the attempts to define the concept, 
agreement is yet to be reached on how to measure state fragility. Different frameworks 
and methodologies have resulted in diverse lists and rankings of fragile states. These 
measures, and especially the popular use of indices, have been the object of scrutiny by 
different authors. Touching upon issues of conceptualisation, methodological 
approaches, and related technical aspects (e.g. coding and aggregation procedures), 
studies by Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009), Ziaja and Fabra Mata (2010), Wennmann (2010) 
and Gutierrez Sanin (2011) have pointed out several limitations to the existing 
measures. The latter provides a comprehensive assessment of measurement 
instruments, identifying some problems emerging in different stages of index building, 
and highlighting the importance of a sound theoretical grounding for maintaining 
coherence in the construction of the measure. 
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to existing reviews by focusing on the attempts 
to operationalise the concept of state fragility, departing from existing studies that 
concentrate exclusively on the definitions of fragile states. The aim is to build upon the 
aforementioned work focusing on the implications of a lack of definitional clarity, and to 
scrutinise the theoretical roots of existing conceptualisations, in line with previous 
studies looking at the theory underlying the concept of state failure. It is argued that, 
with rare exceptions, there is a failure to discuss clearly the theoretical underpinnings 
upon which they are based. Additionally, none of the reviewed approaches provides a 
clear distinction between symptoms and causes of state fragility.9  
                                                             
8 This is the introduction to a special issue on fragile states. See the full issue for more detailed 
accounts of how the concept is used by different development actors, from donor agencies to 
governments. 
9 Similar arguments have been advanced before, for instance, in Besley and Persson (2011a) 
and Lambach, Johais and Bayer (2015). 
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The reports on fragility indices referred to above already offer a comprehensive and 
thorough scrutiny of the methodology employed in their construction. Thus, I here 
provide, as a secondary contribution, a summary of the drawbacks identified in these 
measures, according to the definition of the term, the choice and aggregation of 
indicators, and the interpretation and use of the obtained results. This overview 
indicates that, notwithstanding the challenges inherent to operationalising political 
science concepts, there is room for improvement in terms of quantifying state fragility. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section offers an outline of existing 
approaches for measuring state fragility. The third section is concerned with scrutinising 
their theoretical groundings. This is followed by a synopsis of the main limitations of 
existing fragility indices, whereas the final section summarises the key conclusions and 
offers some suggestions for future analysis. 
 
2.2. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING APPROACHES 
 
As the term became more and more ingrained in the development discourse, there was 
a growing concern with identifying the countries deemed as “fragile states”, which in 
turn required some form of quantitative assessment of fragility. In response to this need, 
a number of analytical tools emerged aimed at operationalising the concept and 
measuring different dimensions of state fragility. The baseline is the identification of a 
set of indicators that capture these perceived dimensions. Frequently, though not 
exclusively, these indicators are then aggregated to obtain an index of fragile states. In 
some cases, this measure serves as a basis to establish a threshold level below which 
countries will be classified as fragile states, and/or to form rankings of countries. In 
other cases, the analytical exercises result in the identification of different categories of 
fragile states.  
The following paragraphs provide more detail about the existing tools to measure state 
fragility, differentiating between approaches that provide: i) no rankings of countries or 
only partial rankings of countries within those groups; and ii) overall rankings of 
countries according to their degree of fragility. 
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2.2.1. No ranking or partial rankings of fragile states 
I start by considering the first group of proposals, which focus on identifying different 
groups of fragile states, based on specific criteria. Table 1 includes a summary of their 
main characteristics.  
Stewart and Brown (2009) provide lists of countries according to the number of 
classifications of “failure” or “risk” in each of the dimensions identified (authority, 
service delivery and legitimacy), but no ordering of the countries is attempted. More 
specifically, different indicators are used for each dimension, considering distinct 
thresholds for situations of failure and risk of failure10. The same applies to Goldstone et 
al. (2003), who, apart from a distinction between failing and failed states, only discuss 
examples of countries that fit into each of the ten (five for each category), non-
comparable, stylized scenarios they identify. These stylized scenarios are derived using 
a methodology that comprises five sequential steps, and serve as a basis to identify 
adequate strategies for intervention.  
In the case of the approaches providing partial rankings of countries, these refer only to 
the groups identified in the analysis. Call’s (2010) conceptualisation of fragility 
distinguishes between three “gaps” – in authority, legitimacy and capacity. The author 
provides a ranking of the top 20 of countries with the worst performance in each of these 
dimensions, based on their score in the indicator considered for each of the gaps. This 
division is used to provide some guidance for response in countries corresponding to 
each category, and some examples of countries experiencing one, two and all of the gaps 
are also included. Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012) obtain clusters of countries 
according to similar criteria and provide country rankings for each group using their 
degree of “typicality”. These authors consider a set of indicators for each of the 
dimensions of fragility they identify (authority, capacity and legitimacy). A mixture 
model11 is used to obtain different clusters of countries according to different  
                                                             
10 In the case of the service delivery, both absolute and progressive measures are considered. 
The progressive measure aims to take into account the structural differences between 
countries. For instance, the level of services considered to be causing failure varies according to 
the wealth of the country. This is achieved by considering the extent to which countries fall 
below what would be the expected level of service delivery according to their level of per capita 
income (Stewart and Brown, 2010: 13). 
11 This is a modelling approach to clustering which assumes that the observations come from a 
mixture distribution, and that each component in the mixture represents one of the clusters 
(Cox, 2005: 97). The algorithm attempts to fit two or more (multivariate) normal distributions 
within the “observed” distributions of the input variable, the idea being to find groups of 
countries by considering the sample’s shape (Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2012: 12). 
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Table 1. Proposals providing no ranking or partial rankings of fragile states 
Reference Concept Definition and Dimensions Theoretical roots Indicators and methodology Categories 
Call (2010) Failed states 
Fragile states 
 
The definition of fragility is based on 
gaps in three dimensions: capacity, 
security, and legitimacy. 
The rationale for each of the dimensions 
is explained, but there is no discussion of 
its theoretical foundations. 
Capacity is proxied by the immunisation rates, 
security by Rice and Patrick’s (2008) index of 
security, and the indicator of legitimacy is a 
combination of the ratings of political rights in 
the Polity IV dataset with civil liberties 
rankings of Freedom House in 2006. The 
indicators are not aggregated. 
Proposes a categorisation according to 
the particular gaps they confront. 
Countries are designated as follows: 
“weak states”, when experiencing a 
capacity gap; “war-torn states” when 
experiencing a security gap; “repressive 
autocracies”, when experiencing a 
legitimacy gap. 
Goldstone et 
al. (2003) 
Failing states 
Failed states 
“States that are “failing,” “in failure,” 
or “recovering from failure,” may be 
considered as all – in varying 
degrees – fragile states.” (p.3) The 
capacity of the state can be assessed 
according to four dimensions of 
state-society relations: political, 
economic, social, and security. The 
combination of loss of effectiveness 
and legitimacy in each of these four 
dimensions results in state failure. 
State fragility and failure are seen in 
relation to stability. The analysis is built 
upon an institutionalist perspective, 
according to which “[w]hen states are 
failing, failed, or recovering, lasting 
stabilization depends on rebuilding 
institutions in ways that provide lasting 
incentives to cooperative behaviour” 
(p.6). Based on this assumption, the 
authors build an institutional model. 
Definition of warning signs based on 
thresholds for effectiveness and legitimacy in 
each of the four dimensions. Proposes five 
sequential steps to identify stylized scenarios 
and propose treatment strategies. 
The two overall categories distinguish 
between failing and failed states, and 
within each of these groups five stylised 
scenarios are identified. 
Gravingholt, 
Ziaja and 
Kreibaum 
(2012; 
2015) 
State fragility Fragility is conceptualised as the 
inverse of statehood, which in turn 
comprises three dimensions: 
authority, capacity and legitimacy. 
It is argued that each of the three 
dimensions has been the focus of a 
certain strand of political theory and 
represents a particular type of state-
society relation. (p.7) The concept of 
authority is based on a corporatist 
strand of political theory, state capacity 
draws from the idea of the existence of a 
contractual relationship between state 
and society, and legitimacy is derived 
from the constructivist perspective on 
the state.  
The indicators of authority are monopoly of 
violence, homicides and battle deaths. Capacity 
is proxied by under-5 mortality, primary 
enrolment, access to water, and basic 
administration. The indicators of legitimacy 
are physical integrity rights violations, press 
freedom violations, and granted asylums by 
country of origin.  Indicators are aggregated by 
using the minimum value that any of the 
indicators takes in a given country year. A 
mixture model is employed to identify clusters 
of countries, based on the sample’s shape. 
Based on the three dimensions, six 
groups of countries are identified, with a 
seventh group formed by the group of 
countries not included in the groupings 
because of their high level of uncertainty. 
Typical countries are identified for each 
group. 
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Table 1. Proposals providing no ranking or partial rankings of fragile states 
Reference Concept Definition and Dimensions Theoretical roots Indicators and methodology Categories 
Stewart and 
Brown 
(2009) 
Fragile states Consider that fragile states are those 
that are failing, or at risk of failing, 
with respect to authority, 
comprehensive service entitlements 
or legitimacy. 
No reference is made to the theory of the 
state underlying the identification of 
these dimensions. 
State failure is proxied by ethnic or civil war. 
The absolute service entitlement index 
combines child mortality, provision of clean 
water and primary school enrolment. 
Legitimacy failure is proxied by the level of 
democratic governance. In the last two 
dimensions, both absolute and progressive 
measures are considered. The analysis is based 
on the definition of thresholds for each 
indicator, which are then combined. 
Provide lists of countries for each of the 
three dimensions, differentiating 
between failed states and countries at 
risk of failure.  
Notes: Ordered alphabetically according to the reference.  
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combinations of these three dimensions, and “typical” countries are also identified. Still, 
in both cases it is not assumed that the obtained classification of fragile states is ordinal. 
Some common features may be identified in terms of the contribution of the proposals 
in this group to the literature on fragile states. The first is their emphasis on providing 
some guidelines for assistance and intervention in these countries, especially in the case 
of Goldstone et al. (2003) and Call (2010). Secondly, there is an overall concern with the 
identification of the causal factors influencing and leading to state fragility (or failure in 
some of the cases). This is explicit in the case of Goldstone et al. (2003), but is also clear 
in both Call (2010) and Stewart and Brown (2009; 2010). Finally, and a virtue of these 
proposals, is a multidimensional approach to state fragility, and a recognition that it 
should not be considered as a binary phenomenon.  
 
2.2.2. Proposals providing overall rankings of fragile states 
I turn now to the proposals of overall rankings of countries derived from fragility indices, 
whose main characteristics are summarised in Table 2. I focus here on the most 
frequently used indices for the measurement of fragility and on those whose description 
specifically refers to this concept, namely: the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 
(CIFP) Fragility Index, the aforementioned CPIA, the Fragile States Index, the Index of 
State Weakness in the Developing World, and the State Fragility Index. All the scores 
resulting from these proposals are continuous (except for the State Fragility Index), thus 
enabling a full ranking of countries. In most of them, rankings for each of the dimensions 
of fragility identified are also provided alongside the ranking of countries according to 
the overall score. 
Due to their emphasis on elements of state performance as well as conflict indicators, 
other indices have also been considered as providing a measure of state fragility. These 
include the State Weakness Index, part of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index12, the 
Global Peace Index, the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, the Political Instability 
Index, the indicators of Political Stability and Absence of Violence, part of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (Fabra Mata and Ziaja, 2009), and the Index for Risk Management 
(INFORM, 2017). I refer to Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009), Ziaja and Fabra Mata (2010), 
Gutierrez et al. (2011) and Gutierrez Sanin (2011) for more extensive reviews. 
                                                             
12 The State Weakness Index was not considered given that it is no longer provided as part of 
the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which now only offers scores for the state of political 
and economic transformation as well as transformation management. 
36 
 
Table 2. Selected list of fragility indices 
Institution 
(References) 
Index Aim and Dimensions Theoretical roots Indicators and Methodology Rankings 
Carleton 
University 
(Carment et 
al., 2006; 
Carment, Prest 
and Samy, 
2009; Carment 
and Samy, 
2012; CIFP, 
2015) 
CIFP Fragility 
Index 
It assesses state performance 
along three dimensions of 
statehood – authority, legitimacy, 
and capacity (ALC). 
The concept of authority draws on the 
Weberian definition of the state and is 
similar in some respects to Mann’s 
(1984) [cited in Carment, Prest and 
Samy (2009, p.86)] definition of 
despotic power. The concept of 
legitimacy is based on Weber’s 
definition of the state and on a number 
of assumptions about the 
characteristics of a legitimate state. 
The definition of capacity is similar to 
Migdal’s (2001) [cited in Carment, 
Prest and Samy (2009, p.84)] in its 
focus on the state-society relation, 
though the authors follow the UNDP’s 
broader understanding. 
More than 70 indicators, measuring 
performance in governance, economics, 
security and crime, human 
development, demography, and 
environment. First, structural indicators 
are grouped and a composite index for 
country performance along those six 
categories is constructed. The results for 
each country are then averaged in each 
subject cluster (ALC). 
The scale is 1-9 (low fragility to high 
fragility). Countries have scores for 
the different components of the ALC 
approach and an overall score. 
Overall fragility scores above 6.5 are 
considered serious. 
World Bank 
(World Bank, 
2011a; 2017b) 
 
 
Country Policy 
and 
Institutional 
Assessment 
(CPIA) 
It represents the quality of a 
country’s present policy and 
institutional framework, in terms 
of how conducive it is to fostering 
poverty reduction, sustainable 
growth, and the effective use of 
development assistance. It is based 
on four dimensions: economic 
management, structural policies, 
policies for social inclusion/equity, 
and public sector management and 
institutions. 
No detailed reference to the 
underlying framework is mentioned in 
the main documents. 
16 criteria related to the four 
dimensions. For each dimension, 
countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) 
to 6 (high). The rating process includes: 
i) a benchmarking phase, during which 
there is the rating of a small but 
representative sample of countries 
selected from all regions; and ii) a 
second phase, during which the 
remaining countries are rated using the 
scores from the benchmark countries as 
guideposts. Each of the four clusters 
weighs 25% of the overall score. 
The scale is 1-6 (low to high). Fragile 
states are countries with a CPIA 
score of 3.2 or less. “Fragile 
Situations” either: a) have a 
harmonized average CPIA country 
rating of 3.2 or less, or b) had the 
presence of a UN and/or regional 
peace-keeping or peace-building 
mission during the past three years. 
Fund for 
Peace; 
Foreign Policy 
journal (Fund 
for Peace and 
Fragile states 
index (FSI) 
Based on the collection of data on 
the existing social and economic, 
political and military pressures 
faced by each country, it allows the 
identification of the normal 
The most common attributes of state 
fragility include “the loss of physical 
control of its territory or a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force; the 
erosion of legitimate authority to 
6 social and economic indicators and 6 
political and military indicators, and 
more than 100 sub-indicators. The 
Conflict Assessment Software Tool 
attributes a score to each indicator 
The scale is 1-120 (low fragility to 
high fragility). In the report 
countries are categorized by score 
quartiles: alert (90-120), warning 
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Table 2. Selected list of fragility indices 
Institution 
(References) 
Index Aim and Dimensions Theoretical roots Indicators and Methodology Rankings 
Foreign Policy, 
2014; 2015) 
pressures that all states experience 
those pressures are pushing the 
state towards the edge of failure.  
make collective decisions; an inability 
to provide reasonable public services; 
the inability to interact with other 
states as a full member of the 
international community”, but no 
information is included to the 
underlying theory of state. 
measuring the significance of the 
various pressures to the country. The 
overall assessment results from a 
triangulation of these results, 
quantitative analysis and a qualitative 
examination of the major events in the 
countries.  
(60-90), stable (30-60), and 
sustainable (0-30). 
Brookings 
Institution 
(Rice and 
Patrick, 2008) 
Index of state 
weakness in 
the developing 
world (ISW)  
It enables the identification of 
potential patterns of state 
weakness, either within 
geographical regions or across 
functional areas by capturing state 
performance across its four 
baskets of responsibility: 
economic, political, security and 
welfare. 
It is argued that the definition of weak 
states considers what are commonly 
considered as the core functions of 
statehood. 
20 indicators, with 5 indicators for each 
basket. Within each basket, the indicator 
scores are standardized and aggregated, 
creating individual indicator and basket 
scores ranging from 0.0 (worst) to 10.0 
(best). The four basket scores are 
averaged to obtain an overall score for 
state weakness. 
The scale is 0-10 (worse to best). 
Countries are classified as: “Failed 
states” (three weakest countries); 
“Critically weak states” (bottom 
rank quintile); “Weak states” 
(second rank quintile); and “States 
to watch” (those with a significantly 
low score in at least one dimension). 
George Mason 
University 
(Marshall and 
Goldstone, 
2007; 
Marshall and 
Cole, 2014a) 
State fragility 
index (SFI) 
It is a measure of state 
effectiveness and legitimacy in the 
key dimensions of security, 
governance, economics and social 
development, based on the idea 
that the state's ability to win the 
loyalty of its people depended on 
its performance in these spheres.  
This rationale of this measure is 
related to the idea that, in order to 
achieve maximum stability, the state 
must exhibit both dimensions. The 
analysis of fragility is part of a global 
report that makes use of systems 
analysis to understand the links 
between governance, conflict and 
development, but no further detail is 
provided in relation to the fragility 
index. 
8 indicators on effectiveness and 
legitimacy across the four dimensions. 
Each indicator is rated on a 4-point 
fragility scale, with the exception of the 
Economic Effectiveness indicator, which 
is rated on a 5-point fragility scale. 
These scores are then combined into a 
score for effectiveness and another for 
legitimacy. The overall index results 
from the sum of these two scores. 
The scale is 0-25 (no fragility to 
extreme fragility). The overall index 
is the basis for a ranking of countries 
according to their score. 
Notes: Ordered alphabetically by the index name. 
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The CPIA is indisputably the most widely used as an indicator of fragility. Initiated in the 
mid-1970s, the CPIA ratings were developed and used for allocation purposes, namely 
of the resources from the International Development Association (IDA). It evolved since 
its inception, undergoing a number of changes and adjustments over time. Currently the 
CPIA aims to assess how favourable the policy and institutional framework of a country 
is to the promotion of poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of 
development assistance. For that purpose, it considers sixteen criteria grouped into four 
clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and 
equity, and public sector management and institutions. Given its emphasis on policies 
and institutions, it provides an indication of state performance. 
According to many academics and development organisations, this makes the index 
suitable as a measure of state fragility. It has been used by several organisations to define 
the group of fragile states. The World Bank considered the score 3.2 as a threshold below 
which countries would be classified, first, as “LICUS” (Low Income Countries Under 
Stress), and from 2009 onward as “fragile states”. In 2011 the same institution adopted 
the designation of "fragile situations" for countries with either a harmonized average 
CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping 
or peace-building mission during the past three years (International Development 
Association, 2007; World Bank, 2017b)13.  
This index has also been used in some academic work on fragile and failing states. 
McGillivray (2006) and Feeny and McGillivray (2009) consider as fragile states those 
countries belonging to the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA or those not rated in the 
current CPIA rating exercise. Chauvet and Collier (2008) and Chauvet, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2010) adopt a cut-off level of 2.5 for the CPIA, defining failing states as those 
with a score below this threshold for at least four consecutive years. Bertocchi and 
Guerzoni (2010, 2012) consider two alternative definitions of fragility, both based on 
the CPIA. However, the rationale for using these particular thresholds is not explicitly 
explained by any of these institutions and authors.  
More recently, several indices have been built with the specific aim of measuring state 
fragility. The institute Fund for Peace has proposed a Fragile States Index (FSI)14, which 
is also published by the journal Foreign Policy. It is used to provide a ranking of 
countries, which are then categorised by score quartiles: alert (90-120), warning (60-
                                                             
13 The term “harmonized” refers to the averaging of the World Bank CPIA scores with those of 
the African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank. 
14 Previous to 2014, this index was designated Failed States Index. 
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90), stable (30-60), and sustainable (0-30). The Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) uses it to 
build its list of fragile states, which results from the compilation of the list of countries 
based on the aforementioned harmonized average of the CPIA scores (from the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank), and the 
countries of the FSI which are in the “alert” and “warning” categories (see, for instance, 
OECD, 2012). Alongside the CPIA, this is also one of the indices considered for the list of 
fragile states used by DFID15.  
The Brookings Institution built the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 
(ISW). It served as a basis to classify countries according to four categories: “failed 
states” (three weakest countries), “critically weak states” (those in the bottom rank 
quintile), “weak states” (those in the second rank quintile), and “states to watch” (states 
with a significantly low score in at least one of the four dimensions). However, the 
country rankings have only been published for the year 2008. 
In line with their work on fragile states, the research centres at Carleton University and 
George Mason University also offer their own indices of fragility. Based on the 
conceptualisation of fragility developed by Carment, Prest and Samy (2009), the CIFP 
Fragility Index provides an overall score of fragility, as well as disaggregated scores for 
authority, legitimacy and capacity. This is the measure adopted by the Canadian agency 
for international development, CIDA. Researchers at George Mason University have built 
the State Fragility Index (SFI), rooted in Marshal and Goldstone’s (2007) matrix of 
fragility, which serves as a basis for a ranking of countries. 
Although less prominent in the debate of fragility, a few other indices are worth 
mentioning. First, I briefly introduce two additional indices that were not included in the 
previous paragraphs due to lack of information. Even if not publicly available, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has its own “Alert List” for Conflict 
and Instability, which ranks 160 countries in order of fragility, based on their internally 
built index (Bhuta, 2012b: 7). It is known that the underlying framework for this 
approach is provided by Goldstone et al. (2003), detailed above, and that the 
operationalisation of the concept is based upon the proposals in ARD (2005)16, but no 
further details are provided. The second fragility index is the one underlying the 
                                                             
15 DFID uses as a working definition of fragile states the following: “countries where the 
government cannot or will not deliver core state functions to the majority of its people, 
including the poor”, and its list of fragile states draws on the CPIA, the Failed States Index of the 
Fund for Peace, and the Uppsala Conflict Database  (ICAI, 2015: 2). 
16 See Bhuta (2012a, b) for a detailed critical analysis. 
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proposal of the Crisis State Research Centre. In Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States 
(Putzel and Di John, 2012: 18) reference is made to an aggregated index resulting from 
the variables included in their Monopoly of Violence, Administration and Territorial 
Reach (MAT) database. This database and the tools used in their quantitative analyses 
are described in detail elsewhere (Gutierrez et al., 2011), but with no specific description 
of this fragility index or its application.  
Despite not frequently referred to in discussions of fragility indices, the State Failure 
Problem Set, disclosed annually by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF, previously 
State Failure Task Force), offers a dataset of internal wars and failures of governance 
which includes data since 1955 on four distinct types of state failure: revolutionary wars, 
ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides (Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff, 2015). This measure differs from the ones described in the previous paragraphs 
in its narrower focus on state collapse and conceptually different approach to state 
failure. Two of the included variables, namely “failure of state authority” and “collapse 
of democratic institutions”, are more directly linked to the described concepts. The first 
refers to situations in which central state institutions are weakened to the point that 
authority or political order can no longer be maintained in significant parts of the 
territory (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2015a: 12). The latter applies to situations in which 
autocratic political institutions, through the use or threat of force, weaken or replace 
democratic or quasi-democratic institutions (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2015a: 13). 
Finally, it is important to highlight the recent advances proposed in OECD’s (2015) 
report States of Fragility: Meeting post-2015 ambitions. The recognition of the need to 
consider multidimensional approaches to state fragility along with a concern with 
designing a strategy for post-2015 led to the suggestion of a new framework for 
identifying fragile states. This is based on the disaggregation of fragility into five 
dimensions. Each dimension is proxied by an index that results from the average of three 
normalised indicators and is designed to measure goals drawn from Goal 16, which aims 
at promoting “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development” (OECD, 
2015: 19). They include the following fragility “lenses”: peaceful and inclusive societies, 
access to justice, effective and accountable institutions, economic foundations, and 
resilience (OECD, 2015: 104). 
The focus on different dimensions of state fragility is common among existing proposals, 
though from varied perspectives. Whereas some focus on the outcomes of state fragility 
in different aspects, such as social, economic or political dimensions, others focus on the 
performance of countries across state functions, such as capacity or legitimacy. I argue 
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that the latter should inform the operationalisation of the concept in order to avoid 
confusing causes and consequences of state fragility. In the next section I examine their 
theoretical roots in more detail. 
  
2.3. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF EXISTING APPROACHES 
 
As pointed out by Bhuta (2012b: 7), a key challenge of measuring state fragility is 
definitional. In fact, the fuzziness of the term and the broadness and vagueness of current 
definitions are frequently highlighted in critical appraisals.17 Given the complexity and 
multidimensionality of state fragility, the discourse is frequently disconnected from the 
theoretical roots of the concept, which has also led to the use of inappropriate tools to 
understand it.18  
The construction of an index should be based on a sound working definition of the 
concept. According to Goertz (2006), this implies the identification of the concept as 
employed in theoretical propositions, as well as its constitutive dimensions, which will 
finally be measured by appropriate indicators. A clear and grounded theoretical 
framework is essential to inform the operationalisation of the concept. Not only does it 
identify the dimensions of state fragility, which will in turn determine the indicators to 
be used, but it also establishes the relationships between these dimensions, which will 
indicate the suitable aggregation procedure to obtain the measurement tool. 
Bearing in mind the complexity of the concept of state fragility, completing these steps 
can be particularly challenging. Existing proposals have been criticised by the lack of 
clarity in the explanation of their theoretical basis (Lambach, Johais and Bayer, 2015), 
namely, the underlying theory of the state, and by the fact that they overlook the 
distinction between symptoms, correlates and causes of fragility (Besley and Persson, 
2011a; Gutierrez Sanin, 2011: 21).19 To help assess the approaches described in the 
                                                             
17 See Table A1.1 in Appendix A for a selected list of the definitions of fragile states within the 
donor community. For detailed reviews of existing definitions see Cammack et al. (2006), 
Bertoli and Ticci (2012) and Nay (2013). 
18 See Faust, Gravingholt and Ziaja (2015) for a discussion of the cognitive challenge associated 
with identifying the causes of state fragility and with finding suitable instruments to understand 
it. 
19 Besley and Persson (2011a) also highlight that a conceptualisation based on a sound theory 
will enable the distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors. 
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previous sections, and in light of the aforementioned framework, this section focuses on 
these two elements.  
Apart from the CPIA, which was not specifically built as a measure of state fragility20, 
existing proposals are based on a working definition of the concept. Common to these 
definitions is a focus on the performance of the state in what are perceived to be its core 
functions. However, there is some divergence in the identification of the key state 
functions, as well as the capabilities that the state needs to have in order to perform 
them. Current proposals can be divided broadly according to the latter element. I start 
by describing a group of definitions focusing on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
state as determinants of state strength (in opposition to fragility). The second group of 
definitions adopts a three-dimensional approach, which, with some variation, draws 
upon the concepts of authority, legitimacy and capacity.21 
The first group of definitions establishes the different functions associated with 
statehood, and views the performance of the state in terms of its legitimacy and 
effectiveness. These two dimensions are used in the approach proposed by Goldstone et 
al. (2003), which is also used by USAID. According to these authors, the notion of fragile 
states encompasses, in different degrees, states that are “failing”, “in failure”, or 
“recovering from failure”. States can fail in either of two senses: i) “in the functional sense 
of losing the dominant role in enforcing law and order in their territories”; and ii) “in the 
normative sense of failing at those tasks that we think states should do: enforce justice 
and protect minorities, provide the conditions for economic growth, cope with natural 
and humanitarian disasters” (Goldstone et al., 2003: 3). The authors develop a matrix 
intended to summarise the complexity of state capacity. This matrix is based on the 
assessment of four dimensions of state-society relations – political, economic, social, and 
security – in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. According to Goldstone et al. (2003), 
the provision of minimal public services is considered as the bottom-line of 
effectiveness. Although the conceptualisation of these two dimensions is explored in 
detail, the underlying theoretical basis is not always explicit. 
                                                             
20 For this reason, the analysis of this index is not included in this section. 
21 This list of proposals does not make claims of completeness. The selection was made on the 
basis of the aforementioned dimensions of state fragility, which appear to be the most common 
among existing frameworks. For other, more extensive, lists of dimensions, I refer to Ghani, 
Lockhart and Carnahan’s (2005) framework based on ten functions for the modern sovereign 
state. Additionally, Kaplan (2014; 2015) has proposed to categorise fragile states (or “political 
orders”, in the terminology of the author) around four types, based on their level of political 
fragmentation and government capacity. 
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Building upon this approach, Goldstone (2008) argues that, in order to remain stable, 
the state must possess the same two general qualities: i) effectiveness, which “reflects 
how well the state carries out state functions such as providing security, promoting 
economic growth, making law and policy, and delivering social services”; and ii) 
legitimacy, which “reflects whether state actions are perceived by elites and the 
population as ‘just’ or ‘reasonable’ in terms of prevailing social norms” (Goldstone, 2008: 
285). According to the author, a state is prone to failure under changing circumstances 
if it exhibits only one of these qualities, whereas a failed state is neither effective nor 
legitimate. Through the adoption of an institutional approach, the author maps out 
different pathways of state failure, described in terms of various combinations of loss of 
the two aforementioned qualities. The recognition of the importance of institutions and 
incentives for the maintenance of stability is the only reference to the theoretical 
framework underlying this definition. 
The approach described above is also followed by the Center for Systemic Peace. The 
matrix of fragility that forms the basis for their State Fragility Index assesses the 
country’s performance in terms of effectiveness – “carry out the tasks expected of a 
competent government” – and legitimacy – “by being perceived as just and fair in the 
manner it carries out those tasks” – across the four dimensions mentioned above: 
security, political, economic and social (Marshall and Goldstone, 2007: 13-14). 
According to their definition, fragility is closely linked with the capacity of the state to 
“manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services” and 
also with “its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality 
of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive 
development" (Marshall and Cole, 2014a: 51). The rationale provided for this approach 
is related with the recognition that “assessing a state’s ability to win the loyalty of its 
people depended on its performance in multiple spheres, spanning governance, 
economic performance and opportunity, security, and delivery of social services” 
(Marshall and Goldstone, 2007: 13). However, there is some lack of clarity in terms of 
the theory used to justify this view of the stable state.  
Despite less explicitly, Rice and Patrick (2008) draw upon related concepts. These 
authors use the designation of weak states, but describe similar characteristics. More 
specifically, state weakness is measured according to the effectiveness in: 
“(…) fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic 
growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable 
political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling 
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their territory; and meeting the basic human needs for their population” (Rice and 
Patrick, 2008: 3).  
These four elements are proxied by economic, political, security and social welfare 
indicators. According to Rice and Patrick (2008: 8), this definition is intended to capture 
the government responsibilities that are commonly considered as core state functions. 
However, the only allusion to a theoretical appraisal of these functions is a footnote 
referring to two previous volumes on the topic of state failure.22  
The definitions in the second group provide a clearer description of the theoretical roots 
of the concepts used. With some variation, they focus on three dimensions associated 
with well-functioning states – authority, legitimacy and capacity –, and the essential 
functions are derived from them. 
Carment et al. (2006) propose a definition of state fragility based on the assumption that 
“it is the presence or absence of a functional government that distinguishes functional 
from fragile and failed states” (Carment et al., 2006: 5). Fragility measures the extent to 
which the actual practices and capacities of the state for providing its basic functions 
differ from their ideal image, which is the one reified in both state theory and 
international law (Carment, Prest and Samy, 2009: 84). The authors argue that there are 
three fundamental properties which reflect the functions of a state and its component 
parts: i) authority, which refers to the “ability to enact binding legislation over its 
population” and “to provide a stable and secure environment”; ii) legitimacy, which 
reflects “the ability of a state to command public loyalty to the governing regime, and to 
generate domestic support for that government’s legislation and policy”; and, finally, iii) 
capacity, which refers to “the power of a state to mobilize public resources towards 
productive ends” (Carment et al., 2006: 6-7). The identification of these elements is 
based on the determinants of state strength listed by Gurr (1986; 1980) [cited in 
Carment, Prest and Samy (2009: 83-84)], namely, capacity, legitimacy, and the 
integrative role of the state. The theoretical grounding for each of these three properties 
is described in more detail, namely with reference to the Weberian definition of the state.  
Call (2010) proposes a disaggregated approach to the problems posed by failed and 
fragile states based on the analysis of gaps in three similar dimensions. The author 
argues that there is: i) a “legitimacy gap” where the rules regulating the exercise of 
                                                             
22 Patrick (2007: 651) considers the same definition of state weakness and proposes a typology 
of seven categories of countries, from “endemically weak states” to “reform-minded 
governments”, based not only on their current situation, but also on their trajectory. 
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power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth are rejected by a significant 
group of the state’s political elites and society; ii) a “capacity gap” where the institutions 
of a state lack the capability to deliver minimal public goods and services to the 
population; and, finally, iii) a “security gap” where states do not provide minimal levels 
of security when confronted with organised armed groups (Call, 2010: 306-308). 
By the same token, Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum’s (2012; 2015) notion of state 
fragility is based on a vision of statehood as comprising three distinct, but interrelated, 
dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy. Although recognising the similarity with 
Carment et al.’s (2006) definition, their conceptualisation of these dimensions is closer 
to that of Call (2010). Each of them is based on a particular type of state-society relation, 
namely: i) authority refers to the control of violence by the state; ii) capacity concerns 
the provision of basic services to the citizens; and iii) legitimacy is linked with the 
acceptance, or refusal to accept, by the society, of the state’s claim as the legitimate actor 
to set and enforce generally binding rules (Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015: 1290-
1292). Even if referring to Call’s (2010) work and describing the three dimensions, some 
have found their justification for the choice of these dimensions as lacking in detail 
(Lambach, Johais and Bayer, 2015: 1301). 
Drawing upon a similar distinction between the dimensions of state fragility, Stewart 
and Brown (2009: 3) define fragile states “as states that are failing, or at risk of failing 
with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy”. Although 
the core list of state functions remains similar to the previous approaches, there is a 
distinction in terms of the attributes of the state necessary to perform them. The authors 
consider comprehensive basic service provision instead of state capacity, as they argue 
that service failures may result from either lack of capacity or lack of will. In addition to 
that, Stewart and Brown (2009) introduce an additional element of distinction between 
actual failure and risk of failure. The criteria used to determine whether there is a failure 
in each of these dimensions is explained in more detail. The “authority” of the state is 
related to the protection from violence, whereas “legitimacy” is linked with elements 
such as the democratic character of the regime and the civil and political liberties. A 
comprehensive service provision includes health services, basic education, water and 
sanitation, basic transport and energy infrastructure, and reduction in income poverty. 
Still, unlike the aforementioned definitions, there is no explicit reference to the 
theoretical underpinnings of the proposed definition and the three dimensions it 
encompasses. 
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This overview indicates that, although there is a concern with clarifying the terms used 
in the definitions and with identifying relevant proxies, in most cases, there is no 
reference to the underlying theory of the state. Exceptions to this lack of clarity are 
Carment, Prest and Samy (2009), Call (2010) and Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum 
(2012; 2015), who dedicate more extensive sections to explaining the theoretical roots 
of the focus on authority, legitimacy and capacity. However, neither of these works 
allows for the distinction between symptoms and causes of state fragility, which, it is 
argued here, is essential for a better understanding of the complexity of this 
phenomenon.23 
 
2.4. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING APPROACHES 
 
Having highlighted the caveats in the theoretical roots of most of the existing 
approaches, I focus now on the next level in the operationalisation of the concept, which 
involves the choice of indicators and the methodology to build the measurement tool. 
Regarding the first group of proposals described in section 2.2, which, I recall here, 
offered no ranking or only partial rankings of countries, the main caveats relate to the 
thresholds employed to determine whether the country is fragile in a certain dimension. 
In the case of Goldstone et al. (2003), no justification is provided for the thresholds 
considered and for the indicators used to specify the warning signs identified for both 
failing and failed states. As pointed out in Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012: 6), 
Call’s (2010) categorisation of states assumes that there is a gap in a certain dimension 
if a country scores below the predefined threshold. However, this means that the 
definition of different thresholds could lead to different conclusions, and the implicit 
binary logic also fails to provide more details about the “midfield” of fragility 
(Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015: 1285). Stewart and Brown (2009) carefully 
describe the use of the indicators and the methodology behind the construction of the 
                                                             
23 This discussion leaves out the definitions which, despite sharing the focus on state capacity 
and describing similar core functions of the state, turn the attention to resilience as the 
counterpart of fragility. More specifically, I refer to Ikpe’s (2007) work, which is built upon 
capacity and resilience as the two dimensions of state fragility. According to the author, this 
model is based on Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty trilogy, used to describe the dynamics 
between the citizens and the state. Additionally, I mention Putzel and Di John (2012), who use 
four attributes of the state as the basis for a fragility to resilience spectrum. The authors state 
that this framework is rooted in “a coherent and well established theoretical tradition” (Putzel 
and Di John, 2012: 7), but no reference to earlier accounts could be found. 
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composite indices. Still, further discussion of the rationale for the applied thresholds is 
lacking, as well as more detail about the usefulness of this analytical framework for 
future analysis. 
The second group of approaches was reliant on the use of indices to provide rankings of 
fragile states. Recent critical voices focusing on fragility indices have revealed several 
caveats of existing proposals (Fabra Mata and Ziaja, 2009; Gutierrez Sanin, 2011; 
Gutierrez et al., 2011; Ziaja, 2012).24 On the basis of the extensive and competent work 
done in these studies and in other critical appraisals, in this section I provide a summary 
of the main limitations divided loosely according to three elements: i) the definition of 
the term; ii) the choice of indicators and the aggregation procedure; and, finally, iii) the 
interpretation and presentation of the obtained results. The main strengths and 
limitations of the five indices discussed in section 2.2.2 are summarised in Table 3, built 
by assembling the observations found in the relevant literature. Based on this overview, 
the argument is made that, even if some of the problems of existing measures of state 
fragility are intrinsic to the quantification of social science concepts, other limitations 
can be more easily addressed. Thus, despite the plethora of existing approaches, there is 
still room for new proposals attempting to overcome those caveats. 
 
2.4.1. Definitional confusion 
A problem frequently associated with social science concepts, which particularly applies 
to state fragility, is their “intrinsic ambiguity” (Gutierrez et al., 2011). It results from the 
fact that when defining these concepts, several proposals include “hedges”, that is 
modifiers that express intensity or modality, as well as broad terms, which are equally 
complex (Gutierrez et al., 2011: 29). The use of these terms blurs the meaning of fragility 
rather than clarifying it. For instance, according to Gutierrez et al. (2011: 29), the 
definition of legitimacy presented in Carment et al. (2006: 7), mentioned in section 2.3, 
introduces a new source of ambiguity for the concept of fragility underlying the CIFP 
Fragility Index. Carment et al. (2006: 7) argue that “[s]tates in which the ruling regime  
                                                             
24 Fabra Mata and Ziaja’s (2009) User’s Guide on Measuring Fragility includes a detailed 
catalogue and an assessment of eleven fragility and conflict indices. Gutierrez Sanin (2011) and 
Gutierrez et al. (2011) provide comprehensive appraisals of poor state performance indices, 
with a particular emphasis on state fragility indices. The former focuses on problems related to 
the definition, intrinsic ambiguity, and the issue of order, whereas the latter looks at technical 
aspects underlying the construction of existing indices. On a different account, Ziaja (2012) 
assesses the content validity of nine fragility indices. 
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Table 3. Strengths and limitations of existing state fragility indices 
Index Strengths 
Limitations 
Sources Definitional confusion Choice of indicators and 
aggregation procedure 
Use and interpretation of the 
results 
CIFP 
Fragility 
Index 
- Rooted in a comprehensive 
theoretical framework.  
- Based on a multidimensional 
approach. Aggregated results 
are presented along with the 
scores for each dimension. 
- There is some ambiguity in the 
applied definition of legitimacy 
(namely resulting from the conflation 
of internal and external types of 
legitimacy). 
- When operationalising the concept, 
the distinction between the three 
dimensions is not as clear-cut as in 
their theoretical definition. 
- The comprehensive list of indicators 
does not facilitate the identification of 
priority sectors for policy making. 
- The disaggregate data below the level 
of the six categories are not provided, 
rendering it difficult to replicate the 
index. 
- The list of country scores obtained 
with the index is not structured in any 
meaningful way. 
Fabra Mata and Ziaja 
(2009: 48-49) 
Gravingholt, Ziaja and 
Kreibaum (2012: 3) 
Gutierrez et al. (2011: 29) 
Rice and Patrick (2008: 
6) 
CPIA - It supposedly adequately 
captures the will and capacity 
of states.  
- If one considers that weak 
states’ policies and institutions 
are the underlying roots of the 
features of fragility, then this 
proves to be an appropriate 
measure, as it is focused on the 
institutional and structural 
features of countries. This also 
means that this measure is 
conceptually independent of 
income levels and conflict. 
- There is some mismatch between the 
World Bank’s definition of fragility and 
its transformation into variables.  
- There is a heavy focus on economic 
dimensions of governance, but less 
emphasis on security, political and 
social aspects.  
- It largely relies on expert judgement, 
which makes it more subjective. There 
is some room for ambiguity when one 
considers the questions used to collect 
information on the clusters, and its 
reliance on the respondent’s 
perception of what he/she considers 
as a true picture. 
- It is not clear whether the weights 
attributed to each dimension are 
appropriate to define fragility. 
- There is no clear justification for the 
threshold used to identify fragile 
states. This is particularly problematic 
when one considers countries close to 
the cut-off point. 
- Given that it results from an 
aggregate average of 16 different 
dimensions, a score below 3.2 may be 
obtained in several ways, thus 
disguising important differences 
between the countries. 
- It became clearer over time that there 
has been an increasing mismatch 
between the CPIA and specific 
instances of fragility. 
Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont Jeanneney 
(2009: 6) 
Harttgen and Klasen 
(2013: 136) 
Fabra Mata and Ziaja 
(2009: 51) 
Baliamoune-Lutz and 
McGillivray (2008: 2, 8-9) 
Bhuta (2012a: 248) 
Patrick (2007: 649) 
Gutierrez et al. (2011: 26, 
32-33) 
Rice and Patrick (2008: 
6) 
Woolcock (2014: 1, 4) 
Fragile 
States Index 
(FSI) 
- The Conflict Assessment 
System Tool (CAST) processes 
information from over 12,000 
international, regional and 
national media sources, thus 
- It focuses almost exclusively on early 
warning and assessment of internal 
conflicts, thus disregarding other 
aspects of state weakness. 
- The meaning of fragility is excessively 
broad, leading to confusion between 
- The method by which scores are 
attributed to the indicator is complex, 
not transparent and not replicable. In 
the application of CAST, there is some 
lack clarity underlying the Boolean 
search process. There is no 
- The establishment of ad hoc cut-off 
points may be problematic. For 
instance, introducing the cut-off points 
at the quartiles of data rather than on 
the ranking based on the final score 
leads to different groups of countries 
Baker (2007: 90-91) 
Fabra Mata and Ziaja 
(2009: 55) 
Gutierrez et al. (2011: 26-
28, 30) 
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Table 3. Strengths and limitations of existing state fragility indices 
Index Strengths 
Limitations 
Sources Definitional confusion Choice of indicators and 
aggregation procedure 
Use and interpretation of the 
results 
providing an innovative and 
serious approach.  
- Some praise its focus on 
conflict and insecurity as 
crucial aspects of state 
weakness. 
causes and consequences. This is also 
reflected in a rather cumbersome set of 
chosen variables. 
 
information about the steps 
underlying the process of review and 
reconciliation and some doubts have 
been raised about the suitability of the 
analysts to perform this task. 
- It should be taken into account that 
countries may be under- or over-
represented in the media. 
in the four categories of failed states 
considered. 
Rice and Patrick (2008: 
7) 
Goldstone (2008: 287) 
Call (2010: 316-317) 
Bhuta (2012b: 9-11) 
Index of 
State 
Weakness in 
the 
Developing 
World (ISW) 
- The use of a simple 
methodology enables an easy 
access to this index. 
- It is fairly transparent, 
especially comparing with 
other indices. 
 - After normalisation, it is not clear 
what the unit of analysis is, or how it 
can be interpreted, for instance in the 
context of a regression. An analysis of 
this index concludes that the 
normalisation changes the relative 
weights of each basket, and the basket 
procedure violates the condition of 
independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. 
 Fabra Mata and Ziaja 
(2009: 64) 
Gutierrez et al. (2011: 31) 
State 
Fragility 
Index (SFI) 
- It is technically robust. 
- It attempts to distinguish 
between two dimensions of 
fragility, effectiveness and 
legitimacy. 
- There is some ambiguity in the 
conceptualisation of legitimacy, 
specifically for the case of political 
legitimacy. It is not clear how the items 
covered in this dimension are 
assessed, and how the scales are built 
and marked. 
- In practice it is not clear-cut how to 
distinguish between indicators of 
effectiveness and legitimacy. 
- The assigned scores are based on a 
narrow range of integers (0, 1, 2 or 3).  
Fabra Mata and Ziaja 
(2009: 74) 
Call (2010: 316-317) 
Gutierrez et al. (2011: 30-
31) 
Rice and Patrick (2008: 
6) 
Notes: Ordered alphabetically by the index name.
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lacks either broad and voluntary domestic support or general recognition suffer a lack 
of legitimacy”, which, in Gutierrez et al.’s (2011: 29) perspective mixes internal and 
external legitimacy, thus undermining the interpretation of the marks for this 
dimension. 
Additionally, existing indices have also been accused of “conceptual stretching”, which 
comprises lack of definition and the unwieldy choice of too many variables, leading to 
subjective and “noisy” results (Putzel and Di John, 2012: 17), and undermines the 
validity of the obtained instruments (Lambach, Johais and Bayer, 2015: 1300). To give 
an example, the ISW includes as a critical government responsibility “fostering an 
environment conducive to sustainable and equitable growth” (Rice and Patrick, 2008: 
3); but, as highlighted by Gutierrez et al. (2011: 26), the terms “equitable” and 
“sustainable growth” are very open, and hard to fit in the theory of the state. As indicated 
above, this can lead to confusion between causes, correlates and consequences of 
fragility. 
Finally, another criticism stems from the fact that some measurement efforts place the 
focus on only one or two of the core functions of statehood, disregarding other areas of 
state responsibility (Patrick, 2007: 649; Rice and Patrick, 2008: 7). This has been pointed 
out about the CPIA, which has been accused of a heavy reliance on economic 
components, giving less weight to security, political and social dimensions (Patrick, 
2007: 649; Harttgen and Klasen, 2013: 136). 
 
2.4.2. Choice of indicators and aggregation procedure 
After identifying the dimensions of fragility, finding suitable indicators can also prove to 
be a particularly daunting mission. First, some of the concepts used in existing 
definitions are hard to observe (recall the example referring to the ISW highlighted 
above), which implies that the analysis will be limited to the use of available proxies.  
Second, even if different in theory, some dimensions can be harder to distinguish in 
practice. This is the case of, for example, the three dimensions of the state – authority, 
legitimacy and capacity – considered in the CIFP Fragility Index, and of legitimacy and 
capacity in the SFI (Rice and Patrick, 2008: 6). In some cases, there is even a mismatch 
between the definition of fragility proposed and the variables included in the measure 
used. Gutierrez et al. (2011) illustrate this using the case of the World Bank’s definition 
of fragile states and the CPIA (applied to identify them). The definition encompasses 
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violent conflict as a dimension of state fragility, but no variable is included to account for 
it in the CPIA, whereas, although no reference is made to structural policies in the 
definition, they appear as a variable in the operationalisation of the concept (Gutierrez 
et al., 2011: 26). 
The theoretical roots of the concept of fragility should also help to clarify the links 
between the different dimensions. A failure to take into consideration that these 
dimensions are interrelated can lead to the introduction of “hidden weights” during the 
aggregation procedure (Gutierrez Sanin, 2011: 24-25). This is also a point of weakness 
in existing approaches. Most of them fail to discuss the logical operators that link the 
different dimensions of the concept, leading to logical and operational misspecifications 
(Gutierrez Sanin, 2011: 24-25).  
Additionally, the fact that there is no numeraire, given that each country lies in a space 
of many dimensions, implies that one is unable to compare and establish the order 
between the dimensions, i.e. they are incomparable unless one makes explicit which one 
is more important (Gutierrez Sanin, 2011: 31). Bearing this in mind, doubts have been 
raised about the suitability of the weights attributed to the different variables and 
dimensional clusters, especially when they are considered as contributing equally to the 
overall score. For instance, there is no discussion of the reasons behind the attribution 
of weights of the different dimensions included in the USAID index of fragility (Bhuta, 
2012a: 270; 2012b: 16). Even the use of a weighted average as the aggregation function 
can be questioned as it presumes that there is a substitution rate between the variables. 
Harttgen and Klasen (2013: 136) raise doubts about whether the weights used in the 
construction of the CPIA are reasonable for defining fragility. According to Gutierrez et 
al. (2011), a change in the aggregation procedure of the CPIA leads to substantially 
different rankings. Ultimately, some highlight the loss, and even distortion, of 
information that results from assuming that fragility can be aggregated into a 
unidimensional measure (Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2012). This is the case of the 
CPIA, the Fund for Peace FSI, and the ISW. 
Finally, I describe two additional problems of existing approaches associated with the 
construction of the index, namely: i) the lack of transparency in the applied 
methodology; and ii) the quality of data and their availability. 
The first aspect relates to an overall concern with the information disclosed about the 
methodology employed in the construction of the index. This is an important element 
for users to judge the suitability of the index (and how impartial it is) for a certain 
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application, and to enable the understanding of the disaggregate components of the 
index and its replicability (Fabra Mata and Ziaja, 2009). Some authors state that, overall, 
there is lack of transparency in the metrics used to rank countries (Rice and Patrick, 
2008: 7) as well as in the data sources (Patrick, 2007: 649). More specifically, doubts 
have been raised about the attribution of scores to each of the FSI indicators, with claims 
that the underlying method is complex, not transparent and not replicable (Rice and 
Patrick, 2008: 7; Bhuta, 2012b: 9). 
The construction of fragility indices faces an inherent obstacle related to information 
availability, as the existing data are frequently of low quality, incomplete and ambiguous 
(Putzel and Di John, 2012: 17). In terms of the nature of the collected data, it has been 
argued that the main shortcomings of fragility indices include: i) the quality of the data 
based on expert assessments, which is frequently undermined by lack of information 
about the way opinions are gathered and aggregated, and about how experts are chosen; 
and the ii) ambiguity of the applied questionnaires (Gutierrez et al., 2011: 29). In 
reference to the USAID index of fragility, Bhuta (2012b: 13) highlights that it is difficult 
to know what underlying quality is being measured by subjective perception surveys 
used to build existing datasets. Some have raised doubts about the questions included in 
the questionnaire applied by the World Bank to obtain data for the construction of the 
CPIA clusters, as well as about the validity of relying on the respondent’s perception of 
what he/she regards as the true picture (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2008: 8-9). 
Additionally, even if variables based on expert opinion avoid the problem of missing 
values, the same does not apply to a great portion of the variables used in these indices. 
Although some available imputation techniques have been employed, there is room for 
improvement (Gutierrez et al., 2011: 29). 
 
2.4.3. Use and interpretation of obtained results 
The final group of shortcomings is related to the outcomes obtained and the conclusions 
derived from the use of existing fragility indices. Firstly, the establishment of an ad hoc 
cut-off point to distinguish fragile from non-fragile countries has been extensively 
criticised. For instance, the use of the 3.2 threshold for the CPIA to derive the group of 
fragile states has been frequently questioned (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2008: 
2; Woolcock, 2014: 1). Furthermore, it has two problematic implications. First, given the 
adopted aggregation methodology, there are many ways in which an average score 
below 3.2 can be obtained (Harttgen and Klasen, 2013: 136). Second, and related, this 
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overlooks the differences between countries with scores approximate to the threshold 
level. Similar concerns apply when one considers the proposed rankings and 
categorisation of countries (Putzel and Di John, 2012: 17). Gutierrez et al. (2011: 30) 
demonstrate that, if one places cut-off points at the quartiles of the data obtained for the 
FSI instead of considering the overall score, the four categories of countries identified in 
this approach correspond to different groups of countries. By applying fuzzy 
transformations25 to the 2005 CPIA scores, Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2008) 
obtain significantly different scores. This divergence leads them to conclude that some 
countries, and particularly those close to the border of a quintile or to a cut-off point, 
may be incorrectly classified. 
A further limitation of some of the existing approaches is their tendency to provide 
recommendations that are generic in nature, thus failing to provide information about 
the changes or processes that should be set in place to respond to the existing challenges 
(Goldstone, 2008: 287; Call, 2010: 316-317). For instance, despite offering the scores 
obtained for the different indicators used to derive the final score, the analysis of the SFI 
does not provide much detail beyond the description of overall trends. A similar 
constraint is identified in the PITF approach (mentioned briefly in section 2.2.2), which, 
though drawing its conclusions from a large dataset, focuses on a limited number of 
predefined “types” of failure, thus undermining its applicability to policy (Carment, Prest 
and Samy, 2009: 83). 
In a nutshell, existing proposals for the measurement of state fragility suffer from a 
significant number of limitations. Even if some are inherent to the difficulties associated 
with operationalising social science concepts, others stem from conceptual stretching 
and ambiguity, or from lack of clarity in their methodology and data usage, which can 
lead to conclusions that overlook the complexities of the concept.  
 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this chapter has been to review the main limitations of current proposals to 
measure state fragility, focusing first on the theoretical underpinnings of existing 
definitions, and then on the problems undermining the operationalisation of the 
                                                             
25 See Afful-Dadzie et al. (2014) for an application of a similar method in order to suggest a 
procedure for selecting fragile states based on the African Development Bank selection criteria. 
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concept, the construction of the measurement instruments and the interpretation of 
results. In so doing, some important caveats have been identified that can be overcome 
in future work. More specifically, most of the existing approaches are undermined by a 
lack of solid theoretical foundations, which leads to confusion between causes, 
symptoms and outcomes of state fragility.  
One prominent aspect of some of the current approaches is their focus on different 
dimensions of state fragility. However, considering the rankings of countries based on 
fragility indices, they do not take into account this multidimensional character of the 
concept when operationalising it (particularly when it comes to the choice of the 
aggregation procedure). Recent views in the academic world warn of the fact that, by 
ranking countries according to a single aggregate measure of state fragility, these 
proposals overlook the heterogeneity among fragile states (Zulueta-Fulscher, 2014). 
The donor community moves in a similar direction, drawing attention to “the need for 
new approaches to assessing and monitoring fragility using metrics that do not reduce 
fragility measures to a single index but rather allow for tracking multiple (and 
potentially uncorrelated) dimensions” (OECD, 2015: 45). However, with the exception 
of the recent suggestions by Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012; 2015) and OECD 
(2015), the call for departing from overall scores has yet to inform existing indices. This 
proves even more relevant when one considers that different types of fragility will 
require distinct forms of assistance. A better understanding of this differentiation is of 
crucial importance for policy decision-making. 
Finally, a last remark is in order on the need to pursue better approaches to the 
measurement of state fragility. Despite the criticism it has been subject to, this chapter 
concurs to the view that the term still holds sway over the development lexicon. Given 
its complexity and underlying political aspects, there is a need to “tame the wickedness 
of the state fragility/failure problem set” (Brinkerhoff, 2014: 337) by adopting a term in 
common use while simultaneously examining the diversity of the phenomenon that it 
assembles (Gisselquist, 2015: 1272). 
Bearing this in mind, the following chapter proposes an alternative measure of state 
fragility, which aims to overcome some of the problems identified in current approaches, 
namely the fact that, although some of the existing approaches are based on more 
thorough theoretical considerations, the foundations of others are weaker and deserve 
more clarity. A few recent efforts have been made to provide theoretical models of state 
fragility. For instance, focusing on late-century Africa, and referring to state failure, Bates 
(2008a, b) provides a model to determine the conditions for the prevalence of political 
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order. It is argued that there is a state when there is an equilibrium resulting from the 
choices that characterise that political order, and the model derives the determinants of 
this equilibrium. Also, Besley and Persson (2011a) put forward a framework for 
analysing fragile states by exploring the origins of state fragility, and, more specifically, 
how different factors contribute to different types of fragile states. Both proposals offer 
useful starting points to derive hypotheses regarding the main causes of state fragility, 
and to distinguish them from what are its dimensions, or pathologies, using Besley and 
Persson’s (2011a) terminology. The measurement instrument advanced in this thesis 
makes use of the latter. The reason for this choice and all the details of the construction 
of this alternative measure of state fragility are delineated in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF STATE FRAGILITY: 
MEASURING STATE INEFFECTIVENESS AND POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As suggested in Chapter 2, despite the prominent position of the term in the 
international discourse, the definition of fragile states remains disconcertingly far from 
precise. Furthermore, the existing lists of fragile states, alongside the indices of failure 
and fragility, fail to provide a concerted view on the issue. The review in the previous 
chapter showed how fragility indices have been used by a distinct number of institutions, 
from development organisations (e.g. World Bank), to independent institutes (e.g. Fund 
for Peace), or universities (e.g. George Mason University). The methodologies diverge, 
as do the obtained lists and rankings of fragile states, leading to different, and sometimes 
conflicting, views and claims about state fragility. Additionally, it highlighted that the 
criticisms of the existing measures, especially those based on indices, are often related 
to the way the concept is operationalised, the steps involved in the construction of the 
measurement instrument, and to the interpretation and application of the obtained 
results.  
Bearing this in mind, the present analysis seeks to contribute to an improved 
operationalisation of the concept of state fragility by: i) using a working definition of 
state fragility which is built on a clear conceptual framework that establishes the role of 
the state and how its performance is measured; and ii) applying statistical methods to 
investigate the existence of patterns among countries and to build an alternative 
measure.  
As recently expressed by both the donor community (OECD, 2015) and academics 
(Zulueta-Fulscher, 2014; Gisselquist, 2015), a better understanding of state fragility 
requires unpacking the concept and examining its different dimensions. This is the 
starting point of this chapter. The proposal made here is in line with previous work 
taking multidimensionality into account when conceptualising and measuring state 
fragility (Gravingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum, 2012, 2015; Lambach, Johais & Bayer, 2015). 
However, it departs from these approaches in that it considers state ineffectiveness and 
political violence as two dimensions of state fragility, and proposes a methodological 
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approach to measure them separately. These dimensions are the two symptoms of state 
fragility identified by Besley and Persson (2011a), who provide a clear distinction 
between causes, symptoms and consequences. A preliminary analysis with cluster 
methods unravels the existence of patterns of countries according to these two 
dimensions, and further contributes to the argument that they should be considered 
separately. Principal component analysis is then used to obtain an index for each 
dimension, thus avoiding an arbitrary aggregation procedure.  
The roadmap of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.2 the theoretical framework 
underlying the conceptualisation of state fragility is described, while section 3.3 gives 
more detail about the data and the methodology used. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the 
results obtained with cluster analysis and principal component analysis, respectively. 
Afterwards, in section 3.6 the results derived from the two methods are compared, and 
the scores obtained for the two indices are contrasted with existing approaches. Finally, 
section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2. CONCEPTUALISING STATE FRAGILITY 
 
Defining state fragility requires first considering the role of the state in society. The 
proposal in this article draws upon a view of the state similar to that in the approaches 
reviewed in Chapter 2. The normative standpoint and positive judgements described 
below serve as the basis to the conceptual framework that explains the importance of 
the state in society.  Afterwards, I describe in more detail the working definition of state 
fragility used in this chapter.  
 
3.2.1. The role of the state in society 
Definitions of state abound and diverge according to different theoretical foundations. 
Weber’s widely used concept of state explains it “as a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory” (cited in Di John, 2010: 12). Developing a theoretical framework which 
explains the importance of the state in society implies both a normative standpoint and 
positive judgements. I start by establishing my approach for the standard role of the 
state based on political economy theory, and later I use the theoretical model developed 
by Besley and Persson (2011a) to describe what the actual role of the state is. 
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a) Normative standpoint 
The role of the state has been approached from different perspectives and in different 
disciplines26. Given the aims of this research, I adopt a political economy view of the 
state. I consider that promoting economic development entails stimulating economic 
growth, but also involves a concern with improving welfare. This approach is aligned 
with the “post-Washington Consensus” view of economic development (Stiglitz, 1998; 
2002). According to this line of thought, it is assumed that the economic role of the state 
is to address market failures, by supporting and complementing the market. In the 
presence of imperfect information or markets, it is argued that state interventions (even 
when the government shares the same imperfections of information) will promote 
markets’ efficiency (Stiglitz, 2002: 219). Additionally, the existence of externalities 
creates situations of overproduction or underproduction of certain goods, leading to 
outcomes which are not efficient. This is the case of goods that are essentially public in 
nature, like defence, and of areas where markets simply fail to exist, such as the provision 
of funding for investment in human capital (Stiglitz, 2002: 222). Finally, markets are 
often not self-regulating, which creates a need for the state to assume the role of 
promoting economic stability.   
In order to achieve this goal, the state must provide a set of public goods. Wolfensohn 
(1999) and Sen (1999) provide similar detailed lists. Stiglitz (2002: 218) highlights: i) 
the importance of providing high-quality education to all; ii) the provision of 
infrastructure, including the institutional infrastructure, and namely the legal system; 
iii) the regulation of the financial sector; and iv) the promotion of technology. Here I 
follow the framework proposed in the World Development Report (World Bank, 1997) 
which classifies the functions of the state as “minimal”, “intermediate” and “activist” 
functions (World Bank, 1997: 27 – Table 1.1), according to the degree to which the 
activities require state intervention. For the present analysis, I consider the minimal 
functions of the state and, more specifically: i) the provision of pure public goods: 
defence, law and order, property rights, macroeconomic management, and public health; 
and ii) the protection of the poor (World Bank, 1997: 27). Furthermore, I concur with 
the view that complementing the market also implies ensuring social justice, in order to 
mitigate the situations in which the market leaves people with insufficient resources to 
survive (Stiglitz, 2002: 218). In this case, by ensuring that markets work in the way they 
                                                             
26 See Milliken and Krause (2002) for a discussion of the evolution of statehood and a critical 
view of the state as the solution for the problem of political order, and Rotberg (2004) for a 
conceptualisation of nation-states. 
59 
 
are supposed to, the state provides a safety net for the poor. The overall framework is 
represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The normative standpoint on the role of the state in society 
 
By adopting this view of the state, I align my proposal with what Hameiri (2007) has 
labelled as the “neo-Weberian institutionalist approaches”, which “evaluate states in 
terms of institutional capacity and compare their performance to a Weberian ideal-type” 
(Hameiri, 2007: 133). This view, underlying many of the existing definitions of state 
fragility, has been accused of being intrinsically relational and normative, i.e. based on a 
comparison with an ideal performance of an effective, capable, legitimate, and stable 
state (Bertoli and Ticci, 2012: 216; Bhuta, 2012a: 236-237). Deviations from this 
epitome – usually the Weberian/Westphalian state – are associated with state weakness, 
fragility and failure.27 However, some contend, this ideal state does not exist in reality 
beyond the most advanced industrialised countries (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 755; 
Boege et al., 2009; Nay, 2013: 332-333). Boas and Jennings (2005) provide a clear critical 
perspective: 
“To say that something ‘fails’ or ‘is failing’ is a normative judgement that is only 
meaningful in comparison to something else; in this case, that something else is the 
existence of a Westernised, ‘healthy’ state that, unfortunately, has little relevance to 
most of the states in question because it has simply never existed there. Comparing a 
‘failing’ state to mature states thus entails a neglect of history, demography, culture 
and economics, and their relationship to regional dynamics and patterns.” (Boas and 
Jennings, 2005: 338)    
More recent studies have attempted to overcome these limitations by proposing new 
analytical frameworks for the definition of state fragility and failure28. For instance, 
                                                             
27 Nay (2013) argues that the three functions of the state identified in several of the described 
definitions – namely, authority, legitimacy and capacity – endorse an essentialist definition of 
political order, which is rooted in Western conceptions. More specifically, the concept of 
“authority” is based on Western political theory, the interest in “legitimacy” draws on Weberian 
conception of domination as well as liberal democratic theory, and “capacity” echoes Western 
donors’ concern for managerial performance (Nay, 2013: 335). 
28 Bertoli and Ticci (2012) provide a review of these approaches. 
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Boege et al. (2009) argue that thinking in terms of hybrid political orders can bring new 
insights into how to prevent conflict and promote development. Frodin (2012) proposes 
the abandonment of the objectivist understanding of the state as a coherent and coercive 
entity, and promotes instead the idea of a “collective ability or inability to achieve 
governance to generate public goods and opportunities or to address common 
problems” (Frodin, 2012: 284). According to this view, one considers degrees and kinds 
of governance failures, depending on the different kinds of existing informal institutional 
orders. These accounts provide useful elements to improve the understanding of fragile 
states, especially because they underline the importance of considering the complexity 
of the relation between the state and society in light of the recent cases of state fragility 
and failure. Still, in the case of Boege et al. (2009) any theoretical exercise remains to be 
done. Also, Frodin (2012) does not provide an application of his proposed 
conceptualisation.  
Despite recognizing the limitations of following the aforementioned approach, I find its 
theoretical premises useful as a starting point. Still, an approach based solely on a 
normative view of the state would fail to capture the dynamics between the state and 
society. Thus, I follow Besley and Persson’s (2011a) theoretical model to complement 
this with positive considerations about the actual role of the state. It is my belief that the 
adoption of Besley and Persson’s (2011a) theoretical model enables the examination of 
whether and why the actual role of the state deviates from the standard identified above 
(in which case there is an indication of state fragility). The performance of the functions 
identified will be dependent on state capacity as well as on state effectiveness. The latter 
differs from the first in that it corresponds not only to the ability of the state to perform 
the described functions, but is also dependent on the willingness of those in power to 
use that capacity to meet the demands of the society.29 Besley and Persson’s (2011a) 
two-period model of investments in state capacity and violence is thus applied in order 
to understand the state’s decision-making process. I elaborate on this idea in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
b) Positive judgments 
Besley and Persson (2011a) explore the origins of state fragility by attempting to explain 
two pathologies of the state, namely state ineffectiveness and political violence. 
According to the authors, a peaceful state with high levels of state capacity will emerge 
                                                             
29 This follows closely the approach in the World Development Report (World Bank, 1997: 3). 
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if institutions are sufficiently cohesive and there is a common interest in providing 
public goods. However, if this is not the case, then two pathologies of the state can 
emerge. There is: i) “state ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, 
providing public goods and raising revenues”; or ii) “political violence either in the form 
of repression or civil conflict”; or even iii) both pathologies are present at the same time 
(Besley and Persson, 2011a: 373).  
I start by providing some formal discussion of the model, introducing the basic 
assumptions and equations used, in order to ground the hypotheses generated. Besley 
and Persson (2011a) consider two periods (𝑠 = 1,2) and divide the society into two 
groups: i) the Incumbent – the elements of society who hold the power (the state 
hereafter); and ii) the Opposition – those who have incentives to fight for power. In the 
first period, endowed with an initial level of state capacity (𝜋1 representing the initial 
level of fiscal capacity, and 𝜏1representing the initial level of legal capacity), the state 
chooses: i) its policies (transfers 𝑟𝑠
𝐼 and 𝑟𝑠
𝑂, and public goods provision 𝑔𝑠); ii) the 
investments in state capacity (legal and fiscal capacity, {𝜋2 − 𝜋1, 𝜏2 − 𝜏1}) for the second 
period; and iii) the investment in violence (the means to hold on to power).  
Between the two periods, there is a possibility of a transition in power, which will be 
dependent on the investments in violence by both the state and the opposition. In the 
first period, the opposition can mount an insurgency, with an army 𝐿𝑂 ≤ ?̅?𝑂, with 
marginal cost ν, and paid within the group. The state can form an army 𝐿𝐼 ≤ ?̅?𝐼, at 
marginal cost 𝜆1, but which is financed out of the government budget. The probability of 
a transition in power 𝛾(𝐿𝑂, 𝐿𝐼 , 𝜉) depends on the size of the armies, 𝐿𝑂 and 𝐿𝐼, and on the 
advantage of the state over the opposition when considering the conflict technology ξ 
(i.e. the marginal gain from fighting). 
The aforementioned choices are constrained by the budget available to the state, which 
comprises the revenues obtained through taxation 𝜏𝑠𝜔, where ω represents individual 
income obtained through wages, as well as an additional source of revenue from natural 
resource ownership and foreign aid R. Thus, the government budget constraint is given 
by 
𝑅 + 𝜏𝑠𝜔 = 𝑔𝑠 + 𝑚𝑠 +
𝑟𝑠
𝐼+𝑟𝑠
𝑂
2
, 
where 𝑚𝑠 represents the cost of investing in fiscal capacity, legal capacity and violence 
in period s, and can be described as 
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𝑚𝑠 = {
ℱ(𝜏2 − 𝜏1) + ℒ(𝜋2 − 𝜋1) + 𝜔(𝜋1)𝐿
𝐼       if 𝑠 = 1,
0                                                                         if 𝑠 = 2.
 
Finally, it is assumed that political institutions play a crucial role in constraining the 
state, and impose that, for every unit of transfers that it gives to its own group, the state 
must give a share σ (≤1) to the opposition. The parameter 𝜃 =
𝜎
1+𝜎
 𝜖 [0,
1
2
] is used for 
convenience, with a higher level representing more cohesive institutions. 
The authors analyse a sub-game perfect equilibrium in policy, violence and state 
capacity investments separately. Starting with the state’s decisions in terms of policy, 
optimal public spending choices are made in order to maximise its within-period payoff, 
given by 
𝛼𝑠𝑔𝑠 + (1 − 𝜏𝑠)𝜔(𝜋𝑠) + 𝑟𝑠
𝐼 , 
subject to 𝑟𝑠
𝑂 ≥ 𝜎𝑟𝑠
𝐼  and the government budget constraint. 𝛼𝑠 ∈ {𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐻} represents the 
stochastic value of public goods, where 𝛼𝐻 > 2 > 𝛼𝐿 > 1 and Prob[𝛼𝑠 = 𝛼𝐻] = 𝜙. The 
latter is used to derive the optimal level of transfers 
𝑟𝑠
𝐽 = 𝛽𝐽[𝑅 + 𝜏𝑠𝜔(𝜋𝑠) − 𝑔𝑠 − 𝑚𝑠],  where 𝛽
𝐼 = 2(1 − 𝜃) and 𝛽𝑂 = 2𝜃. 
In terms of public goods provision, the following expression represents its optimal level. 
𝐺(𝛼𝑠, 𝜏𝑠) = {
𝑅 + 𝜏𝑠𝜔(𝜋𝑠) − 𝑚𝑠      if 𝛼𝑠 ≥ 2(1 − 𝜃),
0                            otherwise .
 
The decisions of investing in violence for the state and the opposition are based on the 
analysis of the chances of, respectively, remaining in, or obtaining power, against the 
cost of the investment.30 The authors determine the Nash equilibrium in violence levels 
{?̂?𝑂 , ?̂?𝐼} by maximizing the expected period-2 utility for each group. The first order 
conditions obtained represent the fact that the marginal benefit of investing in violence 
results from the increased probability of being in power in period 2, whereas the costs 
are the resources needed to finance this violence. These are used to characterise the 
obtained equilibrium and its dependence on certain parameters, but, first, the following 
observation is derived 
[𝑈𝐼(𝜏2, 𝜋2) − 𝑈
𝑂(𝜏2, 𝜋2)] = 𝜔(𝜋1)2(1 − 2𝜃)𝑍, 
                                                             
30 Besley and Persson impose some restrictions on the conflict technology and assume that ξ 
increases the state’s marginal return to fighting (in terms of the probability of holding power) at 
the same time as reducing the opposition’s marginal return.  
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where Z is given by the following expression, and represents the benefit from holding 
office in terms of residual tax revenues relative to the opportunity cost of fighting 
determined by the wages in period 1: 
𝑍 = (1 − 𝜙) [
𝑅+𝜏2(𝜋2)−𝐺(𝛼𝐿,𝜏2)
𝜔(𝜋1)
]. 
Two propositions are derived from the first order conditions. First, if institutions are 
sufficiently cohesive, or the demand for public goods is high enough, then neither group 
has an incentive to invest in political violence. However, if either of these conditions does 
not hold, there will be two threshold levels that will determine whether each group 
invests in violence or not. Formally, these two threshold levels are 
𝑍𝐼(𝜃, 𝜙, 𝜉) = −
𝜆1
𝛾𝐼(0,0,𝜉)(1−𝜙)2(1−2𝜃)
      and     𝑍𝑂(𝜃, 𝜙, 𝜉) = −
𝜈
𝛾𝑂(0,0,𝜉)(1−𝜙)2(1−2𝜃)
, 
where  𝑍𝐼(𝜃, 𝜙, 𝜉) < 𝑍𝑂(𝜃, 𝜙, 𝜉), and the conditions are as follows31 
1. if 𝑍 < 𝑍𝐼 , there is peace with ?̂?𝑂 = ?̂?𝐼 = 0 
 2. if 𝑍 ∈ [𝑍𝐼 , 𝑍𝑂], there is repression with ?̂?𝐼 > ?̂?𝑂 = 0, 
 3. if 𝑍 > 𝑍𝑂, there is civil conflict with ?̂?𝐼 , ?̂?𝑂 > 0. 
According to the first proposition, both the state and the opposition accept the peaceful 
allocation of power (i.e. the probability of a transition in power is 𝛾(𝐿𝑂, 𝐿𝐼 , 𝜉)). In the 
second case, the government invests in violence but the opposition does not do the same, 
a situation labelled as repression. Finally, if the value of benefit from holding office is 
above the two thresholds, both groups will invest in violence, i.e. the opposition will 
mount an insurgency and the state will respond also with political violence, resulting in 
a civil war. In terms of the main parameters affecting this decision, the authors derive 
that: i) higher wages, 𝜔(𝜋1), will increase the opportunity cost of fighting and, thus, 
reduce the likelihood of repression or civil war; ii) higher additional revenues from 
natural resources or foreign aid, R, increase the value of holding power and hence the 
investments in political violence, therefore increasing the likelihood of repression or 
civil war; iii) higher expected spending on common interest goods, due to higher ϕ, 
decreases the likelihood of repression or civil war; and, finally, iv) more cohesive 
institutions (higher θ) reduce the likelihood of repression or civil war. 
                                                             
31 These conditions were amended in order to make the text description in the chapter 
consistent with the formulas included in Proposition 2 (Besley and Persson, 2011a: 381). 
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Since these three situations determine the investments in violence of both groups, they 
will also influence the equilibrium rate of political turnover. Formally, these are 
represented by the following expression, which allows the authors to derive some 
insights into how violence has an impact on investments in state capacity  
Γ(𝑍, 𝜈, 𝜉) = {
𝛾(?̂?𝑂, ?̂?𝐼 , 𝜉)     if 𝑍 > 𝑍𝑂(𝜃, 𝜙, 𝜉)                           
𝛾(0, ?̂?𝐼 , 𝜉)       if 𝑍𝑂(𝜃, 𝜙, 𝜉) ≥ 𝑍 > 𝑍𝐼(𝜃, 𝜆1, 𝜉)
𝛾(0, 0, 𝜉)        if 𝑍𝐼(𝜃, 𝜆1, 𝜉) ≥ 𝑍                          
. 
These investments are determined simultaneously with the violence decisions, and are 
chosen in order to maximise the expected utility for the state in period 2. These decisions 
are greatly influenced by the expected value of public funds in the second period, given 
by the expression 
𝐸(𝜆2; 𝑍, 𝜈, 𝜉, 𝜃) = 𝜙𝛼𝐻 + (1 − 𝜙)𝐸(𝜆2|𝛼𝐿; 𝑍, 𝜈, 𝜉, 𝜃), 
where       
𝐸(𝜆2|𝛼𝐿; 𝑍, 𝜈, 𝜉, 𝜃) = {
𝛼𝐿                                                                          if 𝛼𝐿 ≥ 2(1 − 𝜃),
2[(1 − 𝜃)(1 − Γ(𝑍, 𝜈, 𝜉)) + 𝜃Γ(𝑍, 𝜈, 𝜉)]   otherwise.            
 
Two conditions are imposed in order to determine them: i) cohesiveness, which requires 
that θ is close to ½; and ii) stability, which states that the expected value of public 
spending is above 1 when the previous condition fails and, as a consequence, spending 
falls on transfers when 𝛼2 = 𝛼𝐿 . The model demonstrates the existence of three types of 
states, depending on these conditions: i) if cohesiveness holds or ϕ is close to 1, there is 
a common-interest state and there are investments in both legal and fiscal capacity; ii) if 
cohesiveness fails but stability holds, the state is redistributive with public revenues 
used to finance transfers when 𝛼𝑠 = 𝛼𝐿, and there are investments in both kinds of state 
capacity; and, finally, iii) if both conditions fail, the state is weak, there is no incentive to 
invest in state capacity, and the level of investment in legal capacity is lower than in cases 
i) and ii). I provide more details about the intuition behind each of these cases. 
In common-interest states, the existence of either of those conditions guarantees that all 
future marginal public revenues are allocated to public goods, and also the expected 
value of public funds in period 2 is high enough to make a positive marginal return to 
investment in fiscal capacity. The fact that institutions are cohesive means that it is hard 
to use public funds to serve private interests (or there is no interest in doing so), and 
thus this is a peaceful state as neither of the groups invests in violence. 
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In redistributive states, the state is relatively unconstrained by political institutions, 
which means that it can use public funds for its private use. It will still choose to invest 
in state capacity given that it is likely to stay in power, rather than because it is 
concerned with promoting the common good. 
In weak states, given that there is no stability, there is no incentive for the state to invest 
in fiscal capacity. Additionally, as the cohesiveness condition fails and the probability of 
political turnover is high, it is likely that the investments in fiscal capacity will be 
redistributed for the private use of the other group when it gains power. Therefore, weak 
states are also associated with political violence. 
Putting together the results obtained from the analysis of state decisions in the two 
periods, the authors demonstrate that the two pathologies of the state have common 
roots. I summarise the main dynamics of the model in Table 4, representing the four 
state decisions and the underlying criteria and exogenous determinants. As pointed out 
by Besley and Persson (2011a), this allows one to identify the exogenous and 
endogenous variables, a distinction which is also made clear in this table, with the state 
decisions represented in the first column being endogenous variables in the model. 
Table 4. State decisions and underlying determinants  
Decision Criteria Exogenous determinants 
Public goods Amount of revenue left after 
investment decisions, depending on 
the interest in common goods 
Additional revenue 
Initial level of fiscal capacity 
Institutional cohesiveness 
Interest in common goods 
Transfers Amount of revenue left after 
investment decisions and expenditure 
in public goods, depending on the 
respective group  
Additional revenue 
Initial level of fiscal capacity 
Institutional cohesiveness 
Interest in common goods 
Investment in 
violence 
Cost-benefit ratio considering the 
stakes of holding power 
Interest in common goods 
Additional revenue 
Initial level of fiscal capacity 
Marginal costs of violence 
Violence technology 
Institutional cohesiveness 
Investment in 
state capacity 
Expected value of public funds in 
period 2, which is largely determined 
by the rate of political turnover 
Interest in common goods 
Institutional cohesiveness 
(Additional revenue 
Initial level of fiscal capacity 
Marginal costs of violence 
Violence technology) 
 
As highlighted in the table, according to the hypotheses established, Besley and Persson 
(2011a) conclude that parameters ϕ and θ are of particular importance. High levels of ϕ 
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and θ, reflecting, respectively, the presence of cohesive institutions and strong common 
interests, lead to high investments in fiscal and legal capacity, and to low levels of 
political violence. However, if the value of one or both of these parameters is low, then 
the outcome will be dependent on the remaining parameters, namely, the existence of 
additional revenues (R), the violence technology (ξ), and the marginal cost of investing 
in violence for the opposition (ν). Thus, according to the hypotheses in the model, the 
determinants of state fragility are: i) the strength of common interests; ii) the extent of 
cohesive institutions; iii) the amount of resource rents (or foreign aid); and iv) the 
technologies for organising and conducting violence (Besley and Persson, 2011a: 386). 
The main outcome of the model is a matrix of the state space that distinguishes between 
different categories of state fragility, according to different combinations of the two 
symptoms and their underlying determinants. Table 5 represents an adapted version of 
Besley and Persson’s (2011a) matrix.  
Table 5. Different categories of state fragility 
Source: Besley and Persson (2011a: 386, Table A1; 2011c: 233, Table 5.1) - adapted.  
Weak states are characterised by weak common interests and non-cohesive institutions. 
In redistributive states, institutions are non-cohesive, though the extent of common 
interests varies.  The costs of investing in violence for both the state and the opposition 
will determine whether there is peace, repression or civil war.  A high degree of resource 
dependence (or, similarly, of foreign aid dependence) will increase the likelihood of a 
civil war rather than repression. Having described the general lines of Besley and 
Persson’s (2011a) model32, in the next subsections I further justify the approach taken 
here and introduce my working definition of state fragility. 
                                                             
32 This same framework has been used by the authors to build a Pillars of Prosperity Index 
(Besley and Persson, 2011c: 310), which is used to order 150 countries. It results from 
averaging three outcome variables: i) state capacity, which includes fiscal and legal capacity; ii) 
political violence, either in the form of repression or civil war; and, finally, iii) income. Although 
the authors warn that the goal is simply to provide an empirical illustration of development 
clusters identified by their model (Besley and Persson, 2011c: 310), the analysis is limited in 
some aspects. Namely, the fact that the three outcomes are equally weighted, and also the use of 
  State (in)effectiveness 
  Weak Redistributive Common interest 
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Peace 
Low  ϕ, θ, R 
Low θ, R 
High ϕ 
High θ, ϕ 
Repression Low θ, ϕ, ξ, R 
High ν 
Low  θ, ϕ, R 
High ν, ξ 
N/A 
Civil war Low  θ, ϕ, ξ, ν 
High R 
Low  θ, ϕ, ν 
High ξ, R 
N/A 
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c) Besley and Persson (2011a) as the preferred approach 
Besley and Persson’s (2011a) framework is not unique in its focus on the role of 
institutions and political violence in explaining differences in economic performance 
across countries. Given their prominence in the theoretical literature, the following 
paragraphs offer a brief overview of the framework of analysis developed by North et al. 
(2013), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, 2012), and, more recently, by Centeno et al. 
(2017). I then justify my choice of using Besley and Persson (2011a) as the approach for 
this thesis. 
North, Wallis and Weingast’s (2009) framework is developed around the concept of 
social orders, which are patterns of social organization that can be characterized by: i) 
the way in which the institutions that support the existence of these forms of 
organization originate in the society; ii) the way the access to these organizations is open 
or limited; and iii) the incentives created by these forms of organization. These elements 
are closely linked with the control of violence by the society.  
According to the authors, limited access orders (LAO) discourage the use of violence by 
organizations (North et al., 2013). In functioning LAO, the privileged position of the 
members of the dominant coalition – i.e. economic, political, religious an educational 
leaders – create rents that ensure the cooperation between them and create 
organizations that enable the mobilization and redistribution of the goods and services 
produced by the population (North et al., 2013: 5). The dominant coalition is crucial in 
providing third-party enforcement for each of the member organizations and limits the 
possibility of others to start rival organizations – a key feature of LAO. 
The concept of rents is central to their framework, as they make individual behaviour 
predictable (North et al., 2013: 6). If leaders do not cooperate, their rents will be reduced. 
Also, continual armed conflict is only avoided as long as the rents received under peace 
conditions are higher than those received by using violence. Thus, rents can limit 
violence only if they are reduced when violence breaks out; they provide the mechanism 
that keeps the possibility of violence in check. 
                                                             
income, identified as an outcome of the model, alongside the two pathologies of state fragility. 
The approach proposed here departs from this analysis by focusing only on the two symptoms 
of state fragility, as it is considered that income is not a symptom but rather a consequence of 
state fragility. Additionally, both the data used and the methodology applied also differ from the 
ones used by the authors. Besley and Persson have also tested several of the hypotheses 
obtained from the model – in the form presented here and in more extended versions – in some 
of their work (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2011b, c). 
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Considering a continuous spectrum of societies, North et al. (2013: 11-14) distinguish 
between three types of LAO: i) fragile LAO, where the dominant coalition can hardly 
sustain itself if facing internal and external violence and where all surviving 
organizations have violence capacity (e.g. Afghanistan, Congo, Dem. Rep.); ii) basic LAO, 
which have a well-established government, with whom elite privileges and 
organizations are often closely identified (e.g. Myanmar, North Korea); finally, iii) in 
mature LAO the dominant coalition supports organizations outside and within the 
government, but limits access to private organizations that the government allows and 
supports in order to limit competition and creates rents to sustain itself and prevent 
violence (e.g. China, India). 
The authors distinguish LAO from open access orders (OAO), which characterize 
developed countries. They “are sustained by institutions that support open access and 
competition” and the government has a monopoly over the use of violence, which is 
consolidated only in military and police forces (North et al., 2013: 16). The transition 
from LAO to OAO is possible for a mature LAO and “begins when members of the 
dominant coalition find it in their interest to expand impersonal exchange and, 
therefore, incrementally increase access” (North et al., 2013: 17). This requires three 
doorstep conditions (North et al., 2013: 17): i) rule of law for elites; ii) support for 
perpetually lived elite organizations (including the state), both public and private; and 
iii) consolidated political control of the organizations with violence capacity. This 
framework enables the authors to explain economic and political development across 
developing countries, highlighting that limited access societies have historically moved 
back and forth along the continuum between the three types. However, they claim that 
that the transitions from LAO and OAO have happened relatively quickly and that none 
of them has been reversed (North et al., 2013: 19). 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, 2012) argue that institutions – defined as “the rules of 
the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (North, 1990) – are the fundamental cause of economic growth. 
Their framework is centred on three main institutional characteristics – economic 
institutions, political power and political institutions. Economic institutions are 
determined by the collective choices of the society. If there is a conflict of interest over 
institutions, then the winner will be determined by the distribution of political power. 
The authors distinguish between de jure political power – the power that stems from the 
political institutions in the society – and de facto political power – which depends the 
ability of the group in question to solve its collective action problem as well as on the 
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distribution of resources (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008: 6-7). The political and 
economic system, the authors argue, is maintained by a combination of de jure and de 
facto political power, and, thus, changes in the political equilibrium can only be triggered 
by reforming both forms of political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008: 14).  
A central idea in their argument is that of persistence: political institutions and the 
distribution of resources are relatively slow-changing and persistent. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008: 7) identify two central mechanisms of persistence: i) those who hold 
political power will determine the evolution of political institutions and will, thus, 
choose to maintain institutions that guarantee their political power; ii) if there is an 
imbalance in the distribution of resources, this means that the richer group has more de 
facto political power relative to others, which will allow it to advocate for economic and 
political institutions that favour this position and, consequently, perpetuate the initial 
disparity. However, their framework also allows for the potential of change through 
“shocks” to the balance of de facto political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008: 7). 
Another important distinction made by these authors is between inclusive and 
extractive institutions. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 74-75), sustained 
economic growth can only be achieved with inclusive economic institutions, which 
secure private property, an unbiased system of law and the provision of public services, 
as well as permit the entry of new businesses and enable individuals to choose their 
careers. The state will play a central role as the enforcer of law and order, of private 
property and contracts, and as a key provider of public services (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012: 75-76). Given the link between the two, in order to promote inclusive 
economic institutions, political institutions should also be inclusive, i.e. sufficiently 
centralised and pluralistic (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 81).  
The emergence of inclusive institutions will occur during critical junctures, when a 
combination of factors deteriorates the power position held by the elites, strengthens 
their opponents’ position, and generates the incentives for building a pluralistic society 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 332). An important corollary of this is that nations with 
extractive economic institutions supported by extractive political institutions that create 
obstacles to economic growth will fail (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 83). 
More recently, Centeno et al. (2017: 2) developed a framework to examine the state and 
its ability to fulfil a set of important goals, namely, the provision of legitimate order, the 
advancement of effective economic development and the promotion of social inclusion. 
Central to their argument is the distinction between the capacity and the performance 
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of the state. The first refers to its organizational and bureaucratic ability to implement 
governing projects, whereas the second represents what it is actually able to achieve 
(Centeno et al., 2017: 3). The relationship between the two is mediated by politics, and, 
consequently, an understanding of the performance of the state requires examining both 
state capacity and political dynamics. 
In order to avoid conflicting causes and outcomes, Centeno et al. (2017: 7-8) propose to 
distinguish between the origins of the state from its organizational capacity, which, in 
relation to the politics of deployment, will then affect the state’s overall performance. 
The authors depart from the previous view of the origins of the state as a way to capture 
the gains from cooperation, but, in line with Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, 2012) and 
others, argue that institutions exhibit path dependence and originate at critical 
junctures.  
The organizational capacity of the state is identified through four indicators: i) the 
resources required to fulfil its obligations; ii) its presence in the society; iii) the presence 
and training of the civil service; and iv) the institutional coherence (Centeno et al., 2017: 
10). The deployment of this organizational capacity will then be dependent on two 
crucial inputs (Centeno et al., 2017: 11-12): i) the political coalitions, which encompass 
the political leadership of the state, the quality of the political institutions (namely, the 
political parties) and the coalitions established to support the state’s projects; and ii) the 
balance of social forces, which considers how the broader society responds to the state. 
Finally, the authors consider state performance according to: i) the maintenance of 
political order and the territorial reach of the state; ii) the level of economic 
development, which depends on the policies pursued; and iii) the ability of the state to 
be inclusive, promoting the wellbeing of the whole population (Centeno et al., 2017: 14). 
Besley and Persson’s (2011a) model can be linked with the three frameworks. In 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) approach, growth failures are explained by bad 
institutions, which will then lead to poor policy choices. In other words, the state has the 
relevant knowledge to choose good policies, but lacks the will to pursue them (Besley 
and Persson, 2014: 930). In Besley and Persson’s (2011a) model, governments may have 
the knowledge about, and the willingness to, implement good policies, but they lack the 
capacity to pursue them (Besley and Persson, 2014: 930). Both frameworks are similar 
in the importance they attribute to political institutions, which in Besley and Persson’s 
(2011a) model are an important determinant of the investments in state capacity. 
Additionally, according to these authors, the effects of changes in exogenous conditions 
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– such as changes in geopolitical conditions (Besley and Persson, 2014: 943) – can 
trigger reforms towards cohesive institutions, an idea that is very much in line with what 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) refer to as “critical junctures”. 
By placing the focus on state capacity, Besley and Persson (2011a) align their approach 
with the work by Centeno et al. (2017), who, as explained above, make a very clear 
distinction between the organizational capacity of the state and its performance. 
Although both approaches draw attention to the multidimensionality of state capacity, 
the framework proposed by Besley and Persson (2011a) has the advantage of showing 
not only the complementarities between these dimensions, but also the link between 
state capacity and both income and political violence (Besley and Persson, 2014: 931). 
Finally, Besley and Persson’s (2011a) analysis of political violence has parallels to the 
approach offered by North et al. (2013). Both frameworks look at the dynamics that 
deter the use of violence, but, as pointed out by the authors, Besley and Persson’s 
(2011a) analysis of political violence is embedded in a wider setting, which considers: i) 
government repression and civil war as alternative outcomes with common underlying 
causes; ii) the link between income and political violence as a two-way relationship; iii) 
the effects of economic, political and social forces on investments in state capacity and 
political violence; and iv) the effect that political instability caused by political violence 
can have on the investments on state capacity (Besley and Persson’s, 2014: 931). 
Overall, Besley and Persson’s (2011a) approach has the virtue of combining the analyses 
of state capacity and political violence in a single framework, which is directly applied to 
understanding state fragility. Furthermore, it contributes to unpacking its complexity by 
enabling a clear distinction between causes, symptoms and consequences. 
 
3.2.2. Defining state fragility 
Despite the criticism received by the term, I concur with the view that defends its 
usefulness for the discourse (Bhuta, 2012b: 238; Brinkerhoff, 2014: 337). In the present 
analysis, when possible I will avoid using the term “fragile states” interchangeably with 
“state fragility” as I recognise that the first implies a defined group of countries, 
distinguishable from non-fragile states, whereas the second suggests a continuum in 
which countries may exhibit different degrees of state fragility. As argued by Carment, 
Prest and Samy (2008: 3), fragility is a matter of degree not kind, and “[w]hile some 
countries are in fact failing or failed, in general aspects of fragility can be identified in 
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virtually all states”. Thus, I depart from the “erroneous” understanding of fragility as an 
“either-or phenomenon” (Engberg-Pedersen, Andersen and Stepputat, 2008: 7). 
In order to obtain a working definition of state fragility, I follow loosely the “three-level” 
framework proposed by Goertz (2006)33. According to the author, the “basic level” is “the 
concept as used in theoretical propositions” (Goertz, 2006: 6), and thus “state fragility” 
itself. Next is the “secondary level”, which includes the constitutive dimensions of the 
basic level concept. Here, I follow Besley and Persson’s (2011a) approach and use their 
two pathologies as representing the symptoms of state fragility: state ineffectiveness 
and political violence. If, in order to diagnose a disease, one considers the list of 
symptoms of the patient, I argue that the definition of state fragility should be based on 
these symptoms. 
Of the two prototypical ways to build multidimensional concepts proposed by Goertz 
(2006), namely the necessary and sufficient condition structure and the family 
resemblance one, I opt for the latter. I consider that there is state fragility when the 
country exhibits one or both of the aforementioned symptoms; and the higher the level 
of these symptoms, the greater will be the degree of state fragility. The third level is the 
“indicator/data level”, which comprises indicators of secondary level factors, and forms 
the basis for quantitative measures (Goertz, 2006: 7). More detail about the choice of 
indicators is provided in the next section.  
When compared to the existing definitions described in Chapter 2, the one adopted here 
is built upon a similar view of the state. Even if placing the focus on state effectiveness 
and political violence, some parallels can be drawn with the proposals based on 
authority, legitimacy and capacity. Given the strength of the approach proposed by 
Carment, Prest and Samy (2009), I focus on their fragile states framework as the 
benchmark for comparison.  
According to their conceptualisation, “authority captures the extent to which a state 
possesses the ability to enact binding legislation over a population, to exercise coercive 
force over its sovereign territory, to provide core public goods, and to provide a stable 
and secure environment to its citizens and communities” (Carment, Prest and Samy, 
2009: 86). Thus, this dimension of the state, basically, captures security and government 
competence and effectiveness, or, more specifically, it encompasses the legal capacity 
                                                             
33 In line with the approach in Lambach, Johais and Bayer (2015) for conceptualising state 
collapse. 
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and coercive force of the state, public goods provision, and the guarantee of stability and 
security.  
Regarding state capacity, Carment, Prest and Samy (2009: 87) refer to it as “the potential 
for a state to mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends”. Based on an 
analysis of the state-society relations, this dimension of the state corresponds to an ideal 
and not to the actual ability. These definitions have some similarities with the 
dimensions encapsulated in Besley and Persson’s (2011a) “state effectiveness” – namely 
enforcing contracts, protecting property, and providing public goods –, which is highly 
dependent upon the investments in state capacity (divided into legal and fiscal capacity).  
Finally, legitimacy is defined by Carment, Prest and Samy (2009: 88) as “an expression 
of the ideational, rather than simply instrumental, loyalty that the governing regime 
commands with the population”. The authors assume that this dimension can be proxied 
by considering the level of democracy, the protection of human rights, the extent of 
political rights and civil liberties, the treatment of disempowered populations, and 
environmentally sustainable policies (Carment, Prest and Samy, 2009: 88-89). This is 
harder to reconcile with Besley and Persson’s (2011a) framework. Still, a link can be 
established with the importance that the cohesiveness of political institutions and the 
common interest in public goods assume in their model. The cohesiveness of political 
institutions captures checks and balances on the executive or the representation of 
electoral losers in election systems, whereas common interest in public goods refers to 
the use of public revenue in the common interest of both groups. They are important 
determinants of the decisions to invest in political violence, which, for the case of the 
opposition, partly reflect the legitimacy held by the state. 
The departure from existing approaches and the adoption of Besley and Persson’s 
(2011a) framework proves advantageous for a number of reasons. Firstly, it allows one 
to overcome the lack of theoretical rigour that undermines some of the existing 
contributions. Furthermore, Besley and Persson’s (2011a) approach enables the 
differentiation between determinants, symptoms and outcomes of state fragility (as 
represented schematically in Figure 2), thus avoiding the conflation of causes and 
consequences made in previous approaches.  
The empirical analysis included in this chapter is based on this theoretical framework, 
and aims at building an alternative measure of state fragility. The following section gives 
more detail about the data and methodology applied to pursue this goal. 
 
74 
 
Figure 2. State fragility: determinants, symptoms and outcomes 
 
 
3.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, I provide more details about the data and methodology used for the 
empirical analysis carried out in the remainder of this chapter. The first subsection 
introduces the main variables used and provides some descriptive statistics, whereas 
the second explains the methods employed in sections 3.4 and 3.5, providing a rationale 
for their application.  
 
3.3.1. Data 
In order to operationalise the concept, and focusing now on Goertz’s (2006) third level, 
I follow closely the elements provided in Besley and Persson’s (2011a) description of the 
two symptoms of state fragility. The indicators listed in Table 6 were thus chosen to 
represent cues that reveal their presence, subject to data availability. The baseline 
dataset included raw data from different data sources for a total of 215 countries34 for 
the period 1993-2012. These were selected as proxies for the different elements 
encompassed by the two symptoms of state fragility identified in the previous section35, 
and based on data availability.36 
                                                             
34 Table B1.1 in Appendix B1 includes the list of countries. Some territories and small islands 
were left out of the dataset due to limited information available for specific variables: 
Monserrat, Faeroe Islands, French Polynesia, Curacao, Isle of Man, St. Martin, Northern Mariana 
Islands and Sint Maarten. 
35 These elements can also be linked with the different categories of state fragility identified in 
the matrix in Table 5. This is obvious for the two types of political violence – repression and 
civil conflict. In terms of state ineffectiveness, weak and redistributive states may be empirically 
distinguished by analysing the balance between state revenues and the provision of public 
goods. 
36 Other variables have been considered for the analysis (e.g. indicator of infrastructure as a 
proxy for public goods provision), but the presented list was the preferred option, given that 
increasing the number of variables represents a trade-off in terms of the sample size. More 
specifically, the indicators ‘executive constraints’ (Polity IV) and ‘checks and balances’ (Keefer 
Determinants 
 Common interests 
 Cohesive institutions 
 Resource rents/ aid 
 Violence technology 
State decisions 
 Policies 
 Inv. in state capacity 
 Inv. in violence 
Symptoms 
 State effectiveness/ 
ineffectiveness 
 Peace/ violence 
Outcomes 
 Economic 
development 
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Table 6. Variables used in the analysis 
Symptom Elements Proxies 
State 
(in)effectiveness 
Contract enforcement Rule of law 
Regulatory quality 
Enforcing contracts 
Independence of judiciary 
Control of corruption 
Protection of property Property rights enforcement 
Public goods provision Government effectiveness 
Public spending on education 
Public health expenditure 
Access to improved water 
Raising revenue Tax revenue 
Authority Failure of state authority 
Political 
violence 
Repression Physical integrity 
Empowerment rights 
Political terror scale 
Civil conflict Major episodes of civil violence 
Armed conflict 
Coups d’état 
Revolutionary wars 
Ethnic wars 
 
The importance of distinguishing between de facto and de jure has been addressed in the 
institutional economics literature, especially in relation to the role of institutions in 
explaining cross-country differences in socio-economic outcomes (Foldvari, 2017: 759). 
According to this literature, institutions comprising official, formal rules are defined as 
de jure, whereas the ones that are enforced (usually reflected by practices and outcomes) 
are defined as de facto institutions (Foldvari, 2017: 759).  The variables listed on Table 
6 are all de facto measures, as they capture perceptions of how regulations work (e.g. 
rule of law and regulatory quality), measure how rules are enforced (e.g. property rights 
enforcement), or represent actual outcomes (e.g. public spending on education and 
health). There are some limitations of considering only de facto measures, namely the 
fact that by not considering de jure measures one fails to acknowledge that they are not 
all similar to each other everywhere (Voigt, 2013: 10).  
                                                             
and Stasavage, 2003; Keefer, 2013) were initially included as measures of the quality of political 
institutions. However, and in line with Besley and Persson (2011c), they were removed as they 
are considered to be proxies of the causes of state fragility, namely of institutional cohesion and 
common interests, respectively. Although a similar argument could be made about the variable 
‘rule of law’, a narrower definition of the concept is adopted here. The list of variables 
considered follows closely the elements of state effectiveness and political violence comprised 
by their respective definitions. 
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However, in addition to the constraints on data availability mentioned above, this choice 
of indicators can be justified by the fact that Besley and Persson’s (2011a) framework 
and definition of the two symptoms suggest the use of de facto measures. Furthermore, 
previous work has found an effect of the de facto measures on economic growth, but no 
effect when using de jure measures (e.g. Feld and Voigt, 2003, on judicial independence). 
Aditionally, some claim that there may be contadictions between de jure rules and de 
facto practices (e.g. Robinson, 2013, on land redistribution in the Trobriand-islands), 
especially in the last decades of the nineteenth century as globalization meant that the 
Western powers imposed expectations and directives on other countries directly, via 
colonization, and indirectly, via conditional aid on political or economic reforms 
(Foldvari, 2017: 762). Using only de jure measures could fail to capture these effects. 
Table B1.2 in Appendix B1 includes more information about the variables used, namely 
their definitions, scales and ranges, and data sources. In general terms, with the 
exception of the variables for enforcing contracts and failure of state authority, higher 
levels of the variables in the first group will be associated with higher levels of state 
effectiveness, and thus, it is expected that they will be negatively related with state 
fragility. In terms of the variables used as proxies for political violence, with the 
exception of physical integrity and empowerment rights, it is expected that they will be 
positively related with state fragility. 
Table 7 represents the summary statistics for the 20 variables. The number of 
observations indicates that some variables have a significant number of missing values, 
the most obvious example being enforcing contracts. It is also straightforward to 
observe the widely differing scales and magnitudes of the variables. 
The correlation matrix (represented in Table B1.3 in Appendix B) provides some 
insights into the relationships among the different variables. Looking at one variable at 
a time, it is shown that there is a very high positive correlation between: i) rule of law 
and regulatory quality, control of corruption, property rights, and government 
effectiveness; ii) regulatory quality and control of corruption, property rights, and 
government effectiveness; iii) control of corruption and property rights, and 
government effectiveness; iv) property rights and government effectiveness; and v) 
empowerment rights an political terror scale. It can also be concluded that, among the 
variables with the lowest levels of correlation with other variables, enforcing contracts, 
failure of state authority, and coups d’état can be highlighted. 
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Table 7. Summary statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Rule of law 2904 -0.011 0.998 -2.669 2.003 
Regulatory quality 2841 -0.007 1.001 -2.675 2.247 
Enforcing contracts 1566 620.607 305.068 120 1800 
Independence judiciary 3591 1.085 0.803 0 2 
Control of corruption 2847 -0.006 1.003 -2.057 2.586 
Property rights 2832 48.716 24.025 0 95 
Government effectiveness 2841 -0.007 1.003 -2.454 2.431 
Education 2003 4.616 2.115 0 44.334 
Health 3355 3.697 2.330 0.009 21.569 
Access to water 3837 84.347 18.327 4.9 100 
Tax revenue 2040 16.914 7.775 0.02 65.903 
Failure of state authority  3340 0.100 0.572 0 4 
Physical integrity 3300 4.938 2.294 0 8 
Empowerment rights 3304 8.521 4.100 0 14 
Political terror scale 3549 2.475 1.118 1 5 
Episodes of civil violence 3360 0.529 1.431 0 10 
Armed conflict 3480 0.206 0.589 0 7 
Coups d’état 3340 0.030 0.190 0 2 
Revolutionary wars 3340 -0.350 0.678 -0.5 4 
Ethnic wars 3338 -0.208 0.876 -0.5 4 
 
 
3.3.2. Methodology 
The following sections provide the results obtained with two different methods used for 
multivariate statistical analysis: cluster analysis and principal component analysis 
(PCA). By applying cluster analysis, I hope to gain insight into how countries are grouped 
by similarities.  Cluster analysis is used to partition data, grouping individuals that are 
“close” according to some appropriate criterion in order to form homogenous groups, 
which differ among each other as much as possible (Hardle and Simar, 2007: 271). This 
renders it a suitable method to compare different countries according to their degree of 
state fragility (following the line of work in Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2012, 
2015). Additionally, it does not require the pre-establishment of critical values for group 
parameters (Neack, 1993), which allows one to avoid using potentially arbitrary 
thresholds to classify fragile states. 
Given the nature of the analysis, a hierarchical method of clustering will be applied, 
which starts with each object in an individual cluster and then continuously joins 
clusters together, until all objects belong to only one cluster (Cox, 2005: 87). From the 
different hierarchical methods, the Ward method was chosen, as it optimises the 
minimal variance within the clusters it produces, i.e. its objective is to join two clusters 
at each step in a way that minimises the variance for the joined clusters (Neack, 1993; 
Kronthaler, 2005). 
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The second method used is PCA. This is a procedure to reduce a set of highly correlated 
variables into a smaller number of components (groups of variables), minimising their 
correlation. Each of the obtained principal components is a linear combination of the 
original variables, and its variance indicates the amount of information conveyed (Afifi, 
Clark and May, 2004). Thus, the goal of reducing the number of variables describing state 
fragility without losing much of the information can be achieved by choosing to analyse 
only the first few principal components. An additional advantage of this method is that 
the obtained principal components are uncorrelated. Hence, this technique is applied in 
order to: i) investigate which elements of state fragility are more closely related with 
each other; and ii) reduce the number of dimensions of state fragility in a non-arbitrary 
procedure, and build an index for each dimension.  
Factor analysis is usually presented as an alternative to PCA. However, the latter seems 
more appropriate given the aims of the analysis. Whereas factor analysis originates 
factors that are selected mainly to explain the interrelationships among the original 
variables, PCA provides a selection of a number of components that explain as much of 
the total variance as possible (Afifi, Clark and May, 2004: 391-392)37. 
 
3.4. CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
 
This section describes the results obtained with the Ward cluster method. In order to 
fulfil the requirement of a balanced dataset, some changes were made to the original 
dataset38. The resulting sample includes data for 148 countries for 17 variables 
(enforcing contracts, education, and tax revenue were dropped). Following Neack 
(1993), I divide the full period 1993-2012, and apply cluster analysis over two 10-year 
periods. 
 
 
                                                             
37 In fact, one of the methods for factor analysis is based on the rotation of the principal 
components obtained with PCA, a strategy that is pursued later (more detail below). 
38 First, the averages were taken in each period for each variable and country. Afterwards, 
countries with a number of missing values higher or equal to ten were dropped (as this meant 
that they had missing values for at least five variables for at least one of the periods). Then, the 
variables with 30 or more missing values were dropped: enforcing contracts, education, and tax 
revenue. Finally, countries with missing values were dropped. All variables were standardised. 
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3.4.1. Period 1993-2002 
a) Determining the optimum number of clusters 
In implementing cluster analysis, one first needs to choose the “true” number of clusters. 
One way to address this issue is to consider the Duda and Hart Je(2)/Je(1) index or the 
Calinski and Harabasz pseudo-F index. In both cases, larger values (and smaller pseudo 
T-squared values) indicate more distinct clustering (StataCorp., 2013). Table 8 
represents the results for the stopping rules using each of the indices. The highest value 
for the Duda-Hart index corresponds to an optimal number of nine clusters, followed by 
two or four clusters, whereas the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F indicates an optimal 
number of two clusters. 
Table 8. Results for the Duda-Hart and Calinski-Harabasz indices, 1993-2002 
Nr of clusters 
Duda-Hart index Calinski-Harabasz 
pseudo-F Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo T-squared 
1 0.6789 69.05  
2 0.7827 30.26 69.05 
3 0.7570 8.34 60.96 
4 0.7785 2304 52.14 
5 0.5119 4.77 47.52 
6 0.7346 6.87 43.84 
7 0.6925 7.99 41.79 
8 0.5614 27.34 40.29 
9 0.8040 13.16 39.06 
10 0.6792 12.75 38.44 
11 0.7498 8.34 37.05 
12 0.5383 2.57 36.13 
13 0.7084 4.12 35.52 
14 0.0000 . 34.82 
15 0.4786 6.54 34.32 
Notes: Highest values for each index highlighted in bold. 
I use an additional heuristic procedure to choose the number of clusters. This consists of 
observing the dendrogram in order to detect any apparent clusters, and to compare it 
with the expectations based on what is known about the structure of the data (Neack, 
1993: 350). The dendrogram is a visual illustration of the clusters, which continually 
branches from the top, with the final branches at the bottom leading to the objects that 
are being clustered (Cox, 2005: 87). It indicates the sequence of, and distance between, 
entities as they are clustered. The height of the vertical lines represents the strength of 
the clustering, with long vertical lines indicating that the groups represented by those 
lines are highly distinct from one another. Figure 3 depicts the dendrogram obtained by 
considering a cut number of 10 clusters. 
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Figure 3. Dendrogram for the cluster analysis, 1993-2002 
 
Notes: Cluster analysis applying the agglomerative hierarchical 
Ward method. Cut number: 10. The numbers underneath each 
group indicate the number of countries. 
If an analysis from the top to the bottom of the dendrogram is considered, there are two 
distinct opposing clusters, which correspond to the cluster including G9 and G10, and 
the cluster including groups G1 to G8. The groups in the latter are more similar to each 
other than to the joint group G9 and G10. However, it seems reasonable to consider at 
least three distinct groups within the first cluster: i) groups G1 to G3; ii) groups G4 to 
G6; iii) and groups G7 and G8. Considering the analysis from the bottom to the top of the 
dendrogram, groups G1-G2 and G9-G10 are the most similar and join together first in 
the branching diagram. These are followed by groups G4-G5, which are then joined with 
group G6. On the next level, group G7 joins G8, followed by the grouping of the cluster 
including G1-G2 with G3. Considering one level up, the group including G4, G5 and G6 
joins with group G7-G8, forming three distinct clusters; and so on, until one unique 
cluster is obtained.  The observation of the dendrogram seems to suggest the analysis 
with four clusters, an option that also corresponds to high values of the indices 
mentioned previously. 
  
b) Final results 
These four clusters correspond to the division of countries listed in Table 9, while Table 
10 represents the means for each variable, considering the four different clusters. 
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Table 9. Resulting clusters of countries, 1993-2002 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Albania 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Iran 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Qatar 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Slovak Rep. 
South Africa 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Algeria 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Egypt 
Guatemala 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Tajikistan 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Angola 
Azerbaijan 
Burundi 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Guinea-Bissau 
Sierra Leone 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Botswana 
Canada 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Mauritius 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Notes: Typical countries highlighted in bold. Following Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012: 13), the indicator of 
typicality is used to identify the countries that are more representative of each group. It is obtained by computing the sum 
of the squared differences of a country’s scores in each variable from the respective medians of its group, standardised to 
a 0 to 1 scale. The more representative a country is of its cluster, the lower will be its score. 
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Table 10. Means by categories of the cluster analysis, 1993-2002 
 1 2 3 4 
State 
effectiveness 
Rule of law -0.5 -0.6 -1.5 1.2 
Regulatory quality -0.4 -0.3 -1.3 1.2 
Independence judiciary 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.9 
Control of corruption -0.5 -0.5 -1.1 1.4 
Property rights 43.4 45.9 28.3 79.2 
Gov. effectiveness -0.4 -0.4 -1.3 1.3 
Health 2.8 2.1 1.6 5.1 
Access to water 75.9 78.8 57.3 98.2 
Failure state authority 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 
Political 
violence 
Physical integrity 4.9 2.1 2.5 6.9 
Empowerment rights 7.9 7.1 5.8 12.4 
Political terror scale 2.5 3.9 3.8 1.4 
Eps. civil violence 0.1 2.6 2.9 0.0 
Armed conflict 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.0 
Coups d’état 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Revolutionary wars -0.5 0.3 0.8 -0.5 
Ethnic wars -0.4 0.8 1.2 -0.5 
There is a clear opposition between cluster 4 and clusters 2 and 3. Cluster 4 has: i) the 
highest mean values for the variables representing state effectiveness; ii) the lowest 
mean values for the variables representing repression; and iii) the values for variables 
representing civil conflict indicate that, on average, there were no conflict events in these 
countries. In contrast, cluster 3 has: i) the lowest mean values for the variables 
representing state effectiveness; and ii) high mean values for the variables representing 
civil conflict. In its turn, cluster 2 has most of the highest values for the variables 
representing repression, and also for armed conflict. Cluster 1 seems to be a more 
intermediate group. Comparing with the clusters 2 and 3, its mean values for the 
variables representing state effectiveness are higher than those of cluster 3, and roughly 
similar to the values for cluster 2. Its mean values for the variables representing 
repression and civil conflict are lower than those of these two clusters. 
Following the proposal made by Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012: 13), I use an 
indicator of typicality to identify the countries that are more representative of each 
group. This indicator is obtained by computing the sum of the squared differences of a 
country’s scores in each variable from the respective medians of its group, standardised 
to a 0 to 1 scale. The more representative a country is of its cluster, the lower will be its 
score in the indicator. The most typical countries for cluster 3, with the lowest levels of 
state effectiveness and highest levels of civil conflict, are Azerbaijan, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Guinea-Bissau. On the opposite extreme of the spectrum, Belgium, Australia and the 
United States feature as the most representative among the countries with highest levels 
of state effectiveness and with no conflict. Gabon, Ghana, and Bolivia are typical 
83 
 
countries in cluster 1, which has low mean values in the indicators of state effectiveness. 
Typical countries for 2, characterised by higher mean values of the variables 
representing repression, include Uganda, Indonesia, and Russia. 
 
3.4.2. Period 2003-2012 
a) Determining the optimum number of clusters 
A similar strategy was carried out for period 2003-2012. Table 11 represents the results 
for the stopping rules using the Duda and Hart Je(2)/Je(1) and the Calinski and Harabasz 
pseudo-F indices. The highest values for the Duda-Hart index correspond to three and 
four clusters, while two would be the optimal number of clusters considering the 
Calinski-Harabasz index. Again, I use the dendrogram as well to provide some indication 
of the ideal number of clusters to consider. 
Table 11. Results for the Duda-Hart and Calinski-Harabasz indices, 2003-2012 
Nr of clusters 
Duda-Hart index Calinski-Harabasz 
pseudo-F Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo T-squared 
1 0.6557 76.65  
2 0.7905 27.29 76.65 
3 0.8235 19.94 62.80 
4 0.8015 11.39 54.37 
5 0.7772 12.61 49.57 
6 0.5403 34.88 47.17 
7 0.7415 13.59 46.13 
8 0.5820 5.75 45.94 
9 0.7756 10.99 46.35 
10 0.5454 5.83 45.85 
11 0.5425 18.56 45.55 
12 0.7763 12.97 45.09 
13 0.7228 6.52 44.56 
14 0.4535 3.62 44.04 
15 0.7150 7.57 43.42 
Notes: Highest values for each index highlighted in bold. 
The dendrogram represented in Figure 4 seems to suggest that there are three very 
distinct groups, although there is some heterogeneity within the groups, which could 
also be captured in smaller different subgroups. I opt for the first option. 
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Figure 4. Dendrogram for the cluster analysis, 2003-2012 
 
Notes: Cluster analysis applying the agglomerative hierarchical 
Ward method. Cut number: 10. The numbers underneath each 
group indicate the number of countries. 
 
b) Final results 
The suggested three clusters correspond to the division of countries listed in Table 12, 
while Table 13 represents the mean values for each variable, considering the three 
different clusters. 
Table 12. Resulting clusters of countries, 2003-2012 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central Afr. Rep. 
Chad 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Eq. Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique  
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
India 
Israel 
Myanmar 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Russia 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Turkey 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahrain 
Belgium 
Botswana 
Canada 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Oman 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
U. Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Notes: Typical countries highlighted in bold. See Table 9 for details on the construction of the indicator of typicality. 
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Table 13. Means by categories of the cluster analysis, 2003-2012 
 1 2 3 
State 
effectiveness 
Rule of law -0.7 -0.4 1.2 
Regulatory quality -0.5 -0.4 1.2 
Independence judiciary 0.6 0.7 1.7 
Control of corruption -0.6 -0.6 1.2 
Property rights 32.2 37.5 73.7 
Gov. effectiveness -0.6 -0.3 1.2 
Health 3.0 2.3 5.4 
Access to water 79.4 87.1 99.1 
Failure state authority 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Political 
violence 
Physical integrity 4.1 1.3 6.7 
Empowerment rights 7.1 5.0 10.6 
Political terror scale 2.8 4.1 1.5 
Eps. civil violence 0.2 3.4 0.0 
Armed conflict 0.1 1.5 0.0 
Coups d’état 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Revolutionary wars -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 
Ethnic wars -0.4 1.7 -0.5 
Similarly to the results for period 1993-2002, there is a clear opposition between 
clusters; in this case, between cluster 3 and clusters 1 and 2. Cluster 3 has: i) the highest 
mean values for the variables representing state effectiveness; ii) the lowest mean 
values for the variables representing repression; and iii) and the values for variables 
representing civil conflict indicate that, on average, there were no conflict events in these 
countries. Overall, cluster 1 seems to represent the group of countries with lowest mean 
values for the variables representing state effectiveness. The distinction in terms of 
political violence is also clear, with cluster 2 including the countries with the highest 
values for the means of the variables representing repression and civil conflict. 
For purposes of comparability with the results obtained for the period 1993-2002, the 
analysis was also carried out considering four clusters. The only difference was that the 
first cluster was divided into two clusters. Cluster 3 matched with cluster 2 in the 
analysis with three clusters, representing the countries with the highest mean values for 
the variables proxying for political violence, while cluster 4 was equal to cluster 3, and 
retained the same characteristics. 
Equally to the analysis in the previous period, I use the same indicator of typicality to 
assess the degree to which each country is representative of its group. Typical examples 
in cluster 1, and thus representative of the countries with low mean values for state 
ineffectiveness, especially government effectiveness and political authority, are Gambia, 
Dominican Republic and Honduras. The typical countries in the group with the highest 
levels of civil conflict (cluster 2) include Sri Lanka and Russia alongside the Philippines. 
Finally, among the best performers are Portugal, Japan and Hungary. 
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By considering the main features of the different clusters regarding their levels in the 
two symptoms of state fragility, some insights can be gained in terms of the comparison 
between the two periods. Starting from one extreme, one observes no movements from 
clusters 2 or 3 in period 1993-2002 to cluster 3 in period 2003-2012, which would 
constitute the biggest improvement in terms of both state effectiveness and political 
violence. Still, several countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait and Malaysia, moved from 
cluster 1 in period 1993-2002, which was characterised by low levels of state 
effectiveness, to cluster 3 in period 2003-2012, thus demonstrating an improvement in 
this dimension. With one exception, all countries in cluster 3 in 1993-2002, 
characterised by the highest levels of state ineffectiveness and civil conflict, are part of 
cluster 1 in 2003-2012, which represents countries with a comparatively lower level of 
repression and political violence. Thus, this seems to represent some progress in terms 
of this dimension. The exception is the Democratic Republic of Congo which moved to 
cluster 2 in 2003-2012, thus improving its situation in terms of state effectiveness. 
In the opposite direction, a movement to cluster 2 in period 2003-2012, which is 
characterised by the highest values of the variables representing civil conflict, can be 
interpreted as a deterioration in the situation of the country in terms of political 
violence. Thailand moved from cluster 4 in period 1993-2002, when it belonged to the 
group of countries with the highest levels of state effectiveness and lowest levels of 
political violence, to cluster 2 in period 2003-2012. The change of Trinidad and Tobago 
from the same cluster 4 in period 1993-2012 to cluster 1 in 2003-2012, which is 
characterised by low levels of state ineffectiveness, represents a worsening of the 
position of the country in terms of this dimension.    
The analysis carried out in this section was exploratory and the inferences that can be 
derived are limited. Firstly, the number of clusters chosen in the beginning of the section 
partly determined the conclusions taken from the analysis. According to the results of 
the Duda-Hart index, the analysis provided here could have been based on the division 
of the countries into smaller groupings. In Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012), the 
authors identify seven clusters of countries, offering a more disaggregated approach. 
However, given that the goal here was mainly to understand whether or not there was a 
rough clustering of countries according to the two symptoms of fragility, it is my belief 
that considering a smaller number of clusters proves to be a reasonable approach. 
Secondly, the conclusions derived from the characterisation of the obtained clusters 
should be taken with care given that they are based solely on the mean values of the 
variables included, with the limitations associated with that type of analysis.  
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Finally, it could be argued that the results would change if a different set of variables was 
used. In order to address this point, the present analysis was repeated considering 
different alternative variables, namely other proxies for the quality of political 
institutions (e.g. executive constraints) and for the level of repression in the country 
(civil liberties).39 Overall, the results indicated that there was some variation in terms of 
the optimum number of clusters indicated by the tests, but the application of three or 
four clusters seemed reasonable in most cases. The distinction of a cluster of ‘more 
fragile’ countries was not clear in all of the hypotheses tested, neither was the 
differentiation between a cluster of ‘more fragile’ states in terms of state effectiveness 
and a cluster of ‘more fragile’ states in terms of political violence. However, the cluster 
of ‘less fragile’ states was clearly observed in all of the hypotheses tested, and overall the 
lists of countries belonging to the ‘most fragile’ and ‘least fragile’ clusters were roughly 
the same across the alternatives tested. 
In spite of this, some conclusions can be drawn based on the analysis presented here. 
The clusters obtained for both periods seem to suggest that there is a group of countries 
that can be distinguished from the others by its higher levels of state effectiveness and 
lower levels of political violence. However, the mean values represented in Tables 10 
and 13 show some heterogeneity among the remaining countries, which precludes their 
characterisation as a single group of ‘fragile states’.  Additionally, when comparing the 
clusters obtained for the two periods, it seems that in the period 1993-2002 a group of 
‘more fragile’ states can be more clearly identified. The countries in cluster 3 are 
characterised by some of the lowest levels in state effectiveness and the highest levels in 
terms of political violence. However, in the second period this distinction is not as clear-
cut. Cluster 1 seems to represent countries with the lowest levels of state effectiveness, 
whereas cluster 2 gathers the countries with the highest mean values for political 
violence. Thus, I argue that examining fragile states from a unidimensional perspective 
has some limitations. Instead, it proves more useful to consider the two symptoms of 
state fragility separately.  
This concurs to the argument that state fragility should not be regarded as a dichotomy: 
there is no clear division between fragile and non-fragile states. Additionally, it 
corroborates the inference made by Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012: 13) that a 
multidimensional concept such as fragility would not be appropriately measured by a 
one-dimensional index score. As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, the resulting 
                                                             
39 Appendix B2 describes and summarises the main conclusions from the alternatives tested. 
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clusters show diverse performances across the indicators for the two dimensions. 
However, and considering broadly the two symptoms, it is not possible to determine 
how much one dimension could compensate for the other (Gravingholt, Ziaja and 
Kreibaum, 2012: 14). Cluster analysis allows one to take some steps further in the 
identification of non-comparable groups. Still, the results also seem to indicate that 
further empirical analysis considering a disaggregated approach to the two symptoms 
of state fragility may shed light into the understanding of state fragility. The following 
subsection further contributes to this argument. 
 
3.5. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
 
3.5.1. Preliminary analysis: exploratory analysis of sample adequacy 
The initial baseline dataset for the period 1993-2012 was considered, and an 
exploratory analysis was made to assess sample adequacy. Firstly, an exploratory 
analysis was held to determine the adequacy of the sample, using three criteria: i) a scale 
for the sample size proposed in Comrey and Lee (1992: 127); ii) the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sample adequacy; and, finally, iii) the value of Rho, indicating the 
percentage of the total variance that is explained by the retained principal components. 
Comrey and Lee (1992: 217) propose the following scale for determining the adequacy 
of the sample size: 50 – very poor; 100 – poor; 200 – fair; 300 – good; 500 – very good; 
and 1000 or more – excellent. Others have proposed that, considering the variable:factor 
ratio, a minimum of 1:5 should be required, the ideal being a ratio of 1:20. So, in the 
present analysis, the aim is to obtain at least 100 observations, the ideal being around 
400 observations. The second criterion used to determine whether the sample is 
appropriate is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. This 
measure ranges from 0 to 1, with small values indicating that overall there is too little in 
common between the variables to permit a PCA analysis. A scale is proposed to assess 
the results: between 0.00 and 0.49, “unacceptable”; between 0.50 and 0.59, “miserable”; 
between 0.60 and 0.69, “mediocre”; between 0.70 and 0.79, “middling”; between 0.80 
and 0.89, “meritorious”; and between 0.90 and 1.00, “marvellous” (StataCorp., 2013). 
Thus, the aim is to obtain a minimum value of 0.5. Finally, the value of Rho, indicating 
the percentage of the total variance that is explained by the retained principal 
components, will also be used as an indicator of the appropriateness of the analysis. 
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Table 14 represents the results for different sets of analyses, considering the insights 
into the data obtained previously. A command was used to apply the Kaiser-Guttman 
criterion and only the principal components with eigenvalues greater than 1 were 
retained. The idea behind this rule is that any principal component with variance less 
than 1 contains less information than one of the original variables, and thus should not 
be retained (Jolliffe, 2002: 114). 
Table 14. Exploratory analysis of sample adequacy 
Description of different analyses Obs. Nr comps. Rho KMO 
A. All variables 595 5 0.767 0.887 
Low KMO     
B. Drop revolutionary wars 595 4 0.735 0.906 
Low correlations     
C1. Drop enforcing contracts 876 4 0.728 0.894 
C2. Drop failure state authority 595 4 0.746 0.890 
C3. Drop coups d’état 595 4 0.748 0.888 
Low number of observations     
D1. Drop education 827 4 0.710 0.897 
D2. Drop tax revenue 749 4 0.719 0.889 
D3. Drop enf. contracts, education and tax revenue 1857 3 0.683 0.888 
Initially, all the variables were considered. The values are represented in the first line of 
the table. Both the number of observations and the value for Rho indicate that this 
sample size is appropriate, and the value of the KMO measure means that the sample is 
“meritorious”. A few more options were tested. Given that revolutionary wars had the 
lowest score in the KMO measure in the previous analysis, this variable was dropped 
from the dataset. Even though, according to the KMO scale, the sample is now 
“marvellous”, the number of observations remained the same. The percentage of the 
total variance explained is lower, but this results solely from the fact that the number of 
retained components is four instead of five. Thus, no significant improvements were 
obtained from this change. 
One of the assumptions of PCA is factorability, i.e. there should be at least some 
correlation amongst the variables. Given that the analysis of the correlation matrix held 
in section 3.3.1 indicated that, alongside enforcing contracts, failure of state authority 
and coups d’état had the lowest levels of correlation with other variables, the following 
set of alternative analyses consists of dropping each of these variables at a time. 
Compared to option A, dropping enforcing contracts leads to an increase in the number 
of observations and in the KMO value. The obtained results for options C2 and C3 
showed no significant improvements when compared to option C1, and thus I retain this 
as a hypothesis. 
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Additionally, I consider the variables with the lowest number of observations, namely 
enforcing contracts, education and tax revenue. The option of dropping the first of these 
variables has already been analysed, so I focus on the latter two (options D1 and D2). 
There was an increase in the number of observations and also in the KMO measure when 
compared to the initial analysis with all variables, especially in the case of option D1. 
Still, when compared to the dataset without enforcing contracts, the sample is still 
smaller in this option, and the KMO value is not significantly higher. In light of these 
conclusions, alternative C1 remains the preferred option.  
Bearing in mind the analysis in section 3.4 of this chapter, I perform the analysis with 
the dataset obtained after dropping the three variables with the lowest number of 
observations. The results are presented in line D3. The increase in the number of 
observations is noticeable, even though the value for the KMO measure remains similar 
to those obtained with other alternatives. Despite the reduction in the Rho value, as 
highlighted before, this is simply related to the fact that the number of retained 
components is now three instead of four compared to previous alternatives, or five, in 
the case of the dataset with all variables. It is important to highlight that the main goal 
of this preliminary analysis is to guarantee that the sample size is adequate for further 
empirical exercises, and thus one should not be limited by small changes in the 
indicators chosen. Therefore, and in order to maximise the number of observations and 
to keep consistency with the samples considered in the previous section, I opt to 
consider alternative D3 as the preferred option from this preliminary analysis. 
 
3.5.2 Results from non-rotated analysis 
a) Determining the number of retained components 
The analysis was carried out using the standard method of PCA. Given that PCA is not 
scale invariant and that the variables included in the dataset differ greatly in their ranges 
and scales, the correlation matrix is preferred to the covariance matrix in order to treat 
all variables on an equal basis40.  
                                                             
40 Applying PCA to ordinal variables may be problematic because they violate the assumption 
underlying the “classic” formulation of this method that at least normality is a reasonable 
distributional approximation for input variables (Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009: 134). Despite 
acknowledging this limitation, PCA has been extensively used with this type of variables, 
namely by Filmer and Pritchett (1980) when building an asset index based on household 
surveys. 
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One of the decisions embedded in the application of the PCA is the number of 
components to interpret. This was determined by two exploratory procedures. The first 
was based on the Kaiser-Guttman criterion, according to which one should retain the 
components with eigenvalues (estimated variances of the principal components) over 1. 
The results indicated that three principal components, with eigenvalues greater than 1, 
would be retained. Table 15 shows the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix, ordered 
from smallest to largest, and the proportion of the overall variance explained by each 
component (only the information about the retained three principal components is 
represented). 
Table 15. Eigenvalues obtained with PCA, non-rotated analysis 
  Nr observations 1857 
  Nr components 3 
  Trace 17 
   Rho 0.6827 
  
Component Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 7.80089 0.4589 0.4589 
Comp2 2.69012 0.1582 0.6171 
Comp3 1.11479 0.0656 0.6827 
The second procedure consists in the observation of the scree plot to check the choice 
regarding the number of principal components retained.  The scree plot represents the 
number of principal components on the horizontal axis versus the individual 
eigenvalues. The idea is to consider the number of principal components that 
corresponds to a cutoff point where, at the left, lines are relatively steep and, at the right, 
lines are relatively flat. In line with the Kaiser-Guttman criterion, the scree plot in Figure 
5 seems to suggest the cutoff point in number three.  
Figure 5. Scree plot, non-rotated analysis 
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b) Final results  
The principal components (eigenvectors) are represented in Table 16. Given that the 
analysis considers the correlation matrix, the variables are standardised to have unit 
variance. Each loading represents the correlation between a component and a variable. 
The first component can be said to represent state effectiveness, with a focus on the legal 
system. The variables with the highest correlation with component two are major 
episodes of civil violence, armed conflict and ethnic wars. Thus, it can be interpreted as 
an indicator of political violence. The third components is mostly correlated with the 
variables representing the failure of state authority and coups d’état. 
Table 16. Principal components (eigenvectors), non-rotated analysis  
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 
Rule of law 0.3326 0.1549 -0.0420 
Regulatory quality 0.3234 0.1446 0.0073 
Independence judiciary 0.2751 0.1311 0.1390 
Control of corruption 0.3271 0.1382 -0.0018 
Property rights 0.3053 0.1797 0.0421 
Gov. effectiveness 0.3262 0.1711 -0.0480 
Health 0.2675 0.0335 0.0171 
Access to water 0.2228 0.1283 -0.1881 
Failure state authority -0.0489 0.0093 0.5137 
Physical integrity 0.2783 -0.2145 0.0914 
Empowerment rights 0.2379 0.0103 0.2618 
Political terror scale -0.2846 0.2036 -0.0209 
Eps. civil violence -0.1474 0.5022 0.0611 
Armed conflict -0.1311 0.4613 -0.0207 
Coups d’état -0.0507 -0.0428 0.7068 
Revolutionary wars -0.0859 0.2872 0.2894 
Ethnic wars -0.1225 0.4502 -0.1022 
Notes: Values higher than 0.3 highlighted in bold.  
The loadings obtained for the first principal component are of similar size, which made 
their interpretation relatively easy. However, interpreting the remaining principal 
components is not as straightforward. Some methods have been proposed to aid 
interpretation, one of them being the rotation of the principal components. After 
deciding that the first m components account for the most variation in the dataset, it may 
be argued that simply interpreting the m-dimensional space defined by these 
components is more relevant than it is to interpret each individual component (Jolliffe, 
2002: 270). So, the axes are rotated within this m-dimensional space in such a way that 
the interpretation of the axes is simplified as much as possible, and hopefully more 
conceptually appealing.41 I now consider this strategy and discuss the results obtained 
for the PCA when rotation is considered. 
                                                             
41 This analysis also corresponds to one of the methods for factor analysis, which, first, finds q 
principal components, and then these are rotated so that they line up more with some of the 
original values (Cox, 2005: 182).   
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3.5.3. Results obtained with rotation procedure 
There are several procedures for rotation; but, following similar previous analyses (e.g. 
Larru, 200942), the orthogonal varimax method of rotation is used. Orthogonal 
procedures lead to new coordinated axes which are perpendicular to one another. The 
varimax method consists in the rotation of the coordinate axes in order to maximise the 
varimax criteria, which maximises the sum of the variances of the square loadings within 
each column of the loading matrix (Dunteman, 1989: 49). This method is applied first in 
its “raw” form and then with Kaiser normalisation, which means that in the computation 
of the optimal rotation, all rows have the same weight (StataCorp., 2013).  
Table 17 contains the rotated components ordered by decreasing order of variance, 
without and with Kaiser normalisation. The cumulative proportion of the variance 
explained by the retained rotated components is identical to the total variance explained 
by the leading principal components.  
Table 17. Variance of the rotated principal components 
  Nr observations 1857 
  Nr components 3 
  Trace 17 
   Rho 0.6827 
  
Component Variance Proportion Cumulative 
Without Kaiser normalisation    
Comp1 7.1716 0.4219 0.4219 
Comp2 3.2901 0.1935 0.6154 
Comp3 1.1441 0.0673 0.6827 
With Kaiser normalisation    
Comp1 6.9291 0.4076 0.4076 
Comp2 3.5543 0.2091 0.6167 
Comp3 1.1224 0.0660 0.6827 
Tables 18 and 19 report the loadings of the rotated principal components, respectively, 
without and with the Kaiser normalisation. The results obtained with Kaiser 
normalisation do not entail many differences when compared with those obtained 
without Kaiser normalisation. The most striking difference is that in the case of the 
former, the variables physical integrity and political terror scale are now also highly 
correlated with the second principal component. 
 
 
 
                                                             
42 Larru (2009) follows this approach in order to identify the principal components of state 
fragility in a study comparing Sub-Saharan African countries and Mediterranean countries. 
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Table 18. Rotated principal components (eigenvectors), without Kaiser normalisation 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 
Rule of law 0.3618 0.0315 -0.0673 
Regulatory quality 0.3530 0.0251 -0.0173 
Independence judiciary 0.3123 0.0290 0.1175 
Control of corruption 0.3537 0.0178 -0.0264 
Property rights 0.3505 0.0642 0.0178 
Gov. effectiveness 0.3608 0.0489 -0.0733 
Health 0.2633 -0.0601 -0.0012 
Access to water 0.2396 0.0441 -0.2053 
Failure state authority -0.0069 0.0258 0.5154 
Physical integrity 0.1939 -0.2968 0.0783 
Empowerment rights 0.2447 -0.0717 0.2455 
Political terror scale -0.1986 0.2888 -0.0072 
Eps. civil violence 0.0378 0.5223 0.0584 
Armed conflict 0.0334 0.4783 -0.0233 
Coups d’état -0.0130 -0.0225 0.7094 
Revolutionary wars 0.0378 0.2994 0.2873 
Ethnic wars 0.0320 0.4648 -0.1049 
Notes: Values higher than 0.3 highlighted in bold. 
 
Table 19. Rotated principal components (eigenvectors), with Kaiser normalisation 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 
Rule of law 0.3665 0.0059 -0.0455 
Regulatory quality 0.3543 -0.0020 0.0035 
Independence judiciary 0.3061 -0.0004 0.1359 
Control of corruption 0.3549 -0.0089 -0.0059 
Property rights 0.3527 0.0358 0.0402 
Gov. effectiveness 0.3672 0.0235 -0.0508 
Health 0.2576 -0.0805 0.0107 
Access to water 0.2539 0.0336 -0.1894 
Failure state authority -0.0353 0.0050 0.5148 
Physical integrity 0.1659 -0.3141 0.0754 
Empowerment rights 0.2236 -0.1007 0.2552 
Political terror scale -0.1753 0.3035 -0.0051 
Eps. civil violence 0.0737 0.5149 0.0841 
Armed conflict 0.0709 0.4748 0.0004 
Coups d’état -0.0565 -0.0505 0.7058 
Revolutionary wars 0.0434 0.2834 0.3023 
Ethnic wars 0.0733 0.4648 -0.0817 
Notes: Values higher than 0.3 highlighted in bold. 
Comparing the rotated principal components with the principal components obtained 
without rotation, in terms of the first rotated principal component, there are only slight 
changes in the values of the loadings corresponding to the variables with highest 
correlation, and in the fact that the variable independence of judiciary is now also highly 
correlated with this component. The second principal component is very similar in the 
case of non-rotated results and the rotated without Kaiser normalisation. Thus, it can 
still be interpreted as an indicator of political violence. The third principal component is 
very similar in the three cases. 
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3.5.4. Final considerations 
There are some differences in the interpretation of the rotated and non-rotated principal 
components, which led me to prefer the former. For instance, when considering the first 
component in the results obtained with PCA without rotation (Table 16), the variables 
representing state effectiveness have high positive correlations, whereas the variables 
representing repression and civil violence are negatively correlated with this 
component (with the exception of physical integrity and empowerment rights, which are 
negatively correlated with the level of repression in a country). This is in line with the 
expected from the theory, and means that a country with high levels of state 
effectiveness will have a higher score in this component. This score will be reduced in 
the case of a high level of political violence, or increased in the case of low levels of 
political violence. 
However, when looking at the loadings of the variables representing state effectiveness 
in the second column, one notices that they are all positively correlated with these 
components, and most of the coefficients are higher than 0.1. This means that a country 
with high values for these variables will have a high score in this component, misleading 
its interpretation as an indicator of the level of political violence. 
Considering the results obtained after rotation of the components (Tables 18 and 19), 
one observes that the correlation coefficients between the variables representing civil 
violence and the first principal component are low, and the same applies to the 
correlation between the variables proxying for state effectiveness and the second 
principal component. Although the proxies for repression have a significant influence in 
the rotated first principal component, this effect is slightly attenuated when the Kaiser 
normalisation is applied.  
The use of the rotation procedure destroys some of the properties of the principal 
components, namely the first rotated component no longer has maximal variance, the 
second rotated component no longer has maximal variance among those linear 
combinations to the first component, and so on (StataCorp., 2013). However, given the 
benefits for the coherence in the interpretation of the two first principal components, it 
remains the preferred option.  
In a nutshell, the results from PCA corroborated the argument advanced in the previous 
section that the two symptoms of state fragility must be analysed separately in order to 
obtain a better grasp of the multidimensionality of state fragility. The results obtained 
with PCA also indicated that the scores from the first two principal components can be 
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used to determine the scores for the indices measuring these two symptoms. The next 
section builds upon this idea. 
 
3.6. ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF STATE FRAGILITY 
 
3.6.1. Implications for an alternative measure of state fragility 
In light of the results obtained in the previous section, it seems that the first two principal 
components can be further used to represent the two symptoms of state fragility – state 
ineffectiveness (interpreted as the inverse of the first principal component) and political 
violence. The corresponding indices are obtained from the scores for each country for 
the first two principal components, which result from the application of the elements of 
the corresponding eigenvector to the standardised values of the original observations 
for each country (Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt, 2004: 261).  
This proposal is in line with the view expressed recently in the OECD’s report on states 
of fragility, which highly commends the analysis of multiple dimensions of fragility: 
“[t]his highlights the need for new approaches to assessing and monitoring fragility 
using metrics that do not reduce fragility measures to a single index but rather allow for 
tracking multiple (and potentially uncorrelated) dimensions” (OECD, 2015: 45). The 
obtained indices can then be used to identify the overall position of countries according 
to their performance in the two dimensions of fragility, avoiding the establishment of 
thresholds, which are frequently neither theoretically nor empirically justified. In 
addition, it can serve as a useful tool for further empirical analysis. 
Despite the pitfalls of applying indices of state fragility, this type of measurement 
instrument is still valuable. As highlighted in Ziaja and Fabra Mata (2010: 1), this can be 
a useful tool for development policy for: “determining which countries need a different 
approach; monitoring larger trends of global political stability; evaluating the overall 
impact of development aid; and for investigating the dynamics of state fragility”. 
Furthermore, in comparison with the first group of approaches described in section 2.2, 
they allow one to consider state fragility as a continuum rather than a discrete variable.  
When compared with existing fragility indices, adopting this approach brings additional 
advantages in terms of the aggregation procedure. First, by considering indicators of 
state effectiveness and indicators of political violence separately, one avoids the 
assumption that different components of fragility can compensate each other. As 
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reminded in Ziaja and Fabra Mata (2010: 3), one of the arguments in the literature 
discussing state formation is that “the security dimension is a necessary condition for 
stabilizing states – it should thus be modelled as such and the index should not allow 
other dimensions like economic growth to compensate for security”. By keeping the two 
indicators separate, instead of aggregated into one index of fragility, the proposed 
approach overcomes this limitation. Second, by using PCA to obtain the aggregated 
scores for state effectiveness and political violence, one avoids the establishment of ad 
hoc weights to the different indicators. This is common in existing indices of fragility, 
and the underlying assumption overlooks the dynamics that exist between the different 
components of fragility.  
Bearing these advantages in mind, in the next subsection I build upon the results from 
the PCA to obtain an index of state effectiveness and an index of political violence. The 
analysis carried out in subsection 3.5.4 indicated that the use of a rotation procedure 
was helpful in terms of the interpretation of the obtained results. Thus, I use the loadings 
obtained with the latter procedure to build the disaggregated indices of fragility. Tables 
B3.1 and B3.2 in Appendix B3 provide the annual scores for each of these indices.43 The 
following two subsections compare the obtained results with those from cluster 
analysis, and with existing indices of state fragility.44 
 
3.6.2. Comparison with the obtained clusters 
a) Period 1993-2002 
In order to enable comparison, the scores obtained with PCA were averaged to obtain an 
overall value for each of the subperiods considered. Additionally, countries within each 
of the obtained clusters were first ranked by their degree of typicality45, and then 
                                                             
43 On a similar manner, PCA was applied separately to the variables proxying for state 
effectiveness and the proxies for political violence. In terms of the first, the scores obtained 
were similar to the ones presented here. Given that more data are available for the variables 
representing civil violence, the originating scores also correspond to a larger number of years 
and countries. The resulting ranking, though positively correlated to the one presented here, 
entails some differences. Table B3.3 in Appendix B3 provides a full list of rankings. It is my 
belief that the analysis presented in this chapter remains more useful. Firstly, it is more suited 
for comparability reasons. In addition, it allows one to retain the concept of state fragility as a 
whole, in opposition to the aforementioned approach, which distinguishes a priori between the 
two symptoms and their proxies.  
44 Although the remaining of the chapter makes use of country rankings for purposes of 
comparison, the focus remains on the proposed measurement approach for the dimensions of 
fragility, rather than on countries’ performance. 
45 With the exception of the cluster of ‘least fragile’ states, the higher the degree of typicality the 
higher the level of fragility. 
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matched with the respective rankings and scores according to the first two principal 
components obtained with PCA – state effectiveness (SE) and political violence (PV). 
Countries are ranked from the lowest to highest levels of state effectiveness and from 
the highest to the lowest level of political violence.  
Figures 6 and 7 compare the scores and rankings of countries obtained with PCA with 
the ordering of countries resulting from cluster analysis for period 1993-2002. 
Considering the first group of countries, which corresponds to cluster 3, characterised 
by the lowest levels of state effectiveness and the highest levels of political violence, one 
observes that the scores for the countries with data available for the indices obtained 
with PCA also correspond to high positions in the rankings (with the exception of 
Guinea-Bissau, which shows a lower position in the ranking for political violence). 
Similarly, when comparing the country scores for the political violence index, one may 
observe that the countries included in cluster 2 have high scores, and thus high positions 
in this ranking. Finally, the cluster with the “best performing” countries (cluster 4) is also 
matched by high scores in the state effectiveness index (low positions in the same 
ranking) and comparatively low scores in the political violence index. Thus, overall the 
results of PCA seem to contribute to the conclusions derived from cluster analysis. 
Figure 8 plots the rankings for state effectiveness against those for political violence, 
using different colours to represent the corresponding cluster of each country. It is clear 
that countries in cluster 4 are ranked lower in both rankings, which means they are less 
fragile in terms of state effectiveness and political violence. In contrast, countries in 
cluster 3 occupy some of the highest positions in both rankings. Countries in cluster 2 
also show high positions in the ranking for political violence (corresponding to higher 
levels of fragility in terms of this symptom), but their position in the ranking of state 
ineffectiveness is varied. Finally, countries in clusters 1 are roughly concentrated in the 
first three quarters of both rankings, assuming more intermediate positions. 
In order to obtain a more direct comparison of the results obtained with the two 
methods, the analysis was restricted to the countries with values obtained from both 
methods. New rankings were then calculated using this restricted sample. Even if the 
construction of the rankings for SE and PV is straightforward, the same does not apply 
to the results from cluster analysis. For the purposes of the exercise described in the next 
paragraph, it was assumed that the cluster with the lowest mean values for political 
violence represented “more fragile” states when compared with the cluster with the  
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Figure 6. Comparison of the results obtained with cluster analysis and the state 
ineffectiveness ranking, 1993-2002 
 
Notes: Total number of countries: 145. For consistency in the presentation of the results, countries are 
ranked from 1-145 from the lowest to the highest levels of state effectiveness (i.e. from the highest to the 
lowest level of state ineffectiveness). However, 3 countries ranked by PCA indices not included in the 
graph, as they were not part of the sample obtained with cluster analysis. The SE ranking for these 
countries is as follows (scores in parenthesis): Iraq – 1 (-4.923); Libya – 2 (-3.980); and Sudan – 6 (-3.551). 
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Figure 7. Comparison of the results obtained with cluster analysis and the political 
violence ranking, 1993-2002 
 
Notes: Total number of countries: 145. For consistency in the presentation of the results, countries are 
ranked from 1-145 from the highest to the lowest level of political violence. However, 3 countries ranked 
by PCA indices not included in the graph, as they were not part of the sample obtained with cluster analysis. 
The PV ranking for these countries is as follows (scores in parenthesis): Iraq – 12 (3.460); Libya – 40 
(0.114); and Sudan –3 (6.922). 
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Figure 8. Ranking positions for the SE and PV indices against cluster groups, 1993-2002 
 
lowest mean values for the variables representing state effectiveness. Additionally, the 
ranking of countries within each cluster is based solely on the country’s score in the 
indicator of typicality. Thus, the relationships described do not intend to be more than 
illustrations of the relationship between the results obtained with the two methods. 
These rankings are listed in Table B3.4 in Appendix B3, and Table 20 represents the 
respective Spearman correlation rank coefficients. The last line of the table 
demonstrates that there is a positive and significant correlation between the rankings 
from cluster analysis and both the SE and the PV indices, even though the correlation 
coefficients are not very high. The correlation coefficient between the SE and the PV 
rankings is also positive and statistically significant, indicating that countries with high 
positions in one of the rankings also have high positions in the other.46 However, this 
result should be regarded with care. When looking at specific cases, and especially when 
considering the clusters including the ‘most fragile’ countries, one observes that high 
scores in one of the symptoms does not necessarily correspond to high scores in the 
other. For instance, Guinea-Bissau represents an extreme example, occupying position 
15 in the SE ranking, but being ranked 106 in the PV ranking. Conversely, Israel and India 
                                                             
46 I recall here that countries have been ranked from the worst to the best performance in terms 
of state effectiveness and political violence. 
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have a low rank of 114 and 91, respectively, in terms of state effectiveness, but occupy 
the 9th and 1st positions in the PV ranking. 
Table 20. Spearman correlation rank coefficients: cluster analysis, SE and PV scores, 
1993-2002 
 SE rank PV rank Cluster rank 
SE rank 1.0000   
PV rank 0.6914*** 1.0000  
Cluster rank 0.5735*** 0.6792*** 1.0000 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
b) Period 2003-2012 
A similar analysis was held for the second subperiod. Figures 9 and 10 compare the 
scores and rankings of countries obtained with PCA with the ordering of countries 
resulting from cluster analysis (when available). 
Cluster 2 – characterised by the highest levels of political violence – has also most of the 
highest values for political violence. Most of the countries with the highest positions in 
the state effectiveness ranking seem to be part of cluster 1 – which represented the 
group with the lowest values in this dimension. Finally, the scores in cluster 3, the group 
of “best performers”, show high levels for state effectiveness (and corresponding low 
positions in the ranking) and overall, also low levels for political violence. 
I use a scatterplot again to plot the rankings for the two indices against one another, 
using different colours to represent the three groups of clusters. This is represented in 
Figure 11. It is clear that countries with the lowest positions (less fragile) in both 
dimensions are included in cluster 3. The majority of the most fragile states in terms of 
state ineffectiveness are located in cluster 1, whereas cluster 2 includes the most fragile 
states in terms of political violence. 
The Spearman correlation rank coefficients were again calculated in order to gain more 
insight into the relationship between the obtained results.47 These are included in Table 
21, whereas the complete rankings are listed in Table B3.5 in Appendix B3. The rho 
values indicate that there is a statistically significant, positive correlation between the 
ranking obtained with cluster analysis and both the SE and the PV rankings. Additionally,  
 
                                                             
47 The assumptions made were the same as described for period 1993-2002, and thus the same 
caveats apply. 
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Figure 9. Comparison of the results obtained with cluster analysis and the state 
ineffectiveness ranking, 2003-2012 
 
Notes: Total number of countries: 148. For consistency in the presentation of the results, countries are 
ranked from 1-148 from the lowest to the highest levels of state effectiveness (i.e. from the highest to the 
lowest levels of state ineffectiveness). However, there are 7 countries ranked by PCA indices not included 
in the graph, as they were not part of the sample obtained with cluster analysis. The SE ranking is as follows 
(scores in parenthesis): Liberia – 37 (-2.131); Comoros – 42 (-1.995); Timor-Leste – 46 (-1.892); Bhutan –
108 (0.651); Montenegro – 103 (0.361); Serbia – 97 (0.170); and Solomon Islands – 92 (-0.120). 
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Figure 10. Comparison of the results obtained with cluster analysis and the political 
violence ranking, 2003-2012 
 
Notes: Total number of countries: 148. For consistency in the presentation of the results, countries are 
ranked from 1-148 from the highest to the lowest levels of political violence. However, there are 7 
countries ranked by PCA indices not included in the graph, as they were not part of the sample obtained 
with cluster analysis. The PV ranking is as follows (scores in parenthesis): Liberia –98 (-0.725); Comoros 
–146 (-1.340); Timor-Leste –131 (-1.197); Bhutan – 71 (-0.448); Montenegro –125 (-1.143); Serbia – 120 
(-1.053); and Solomon Islands –155 (-1.736). 
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Figure 11. Ranking positions for the SE and PV indices against cluster groups, 2003-2012 
 
Table 21. Spearman correlation rank coefficients: cluster analysis, SE and PV scores, 
2003-2012 
 SE rank PV rank Cluster rank 
SE rank 1.0000   
PV rank 0.7196*** 1.0000  
Cluster rank 0.5430*** 0.5668*** 1.0000 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
and similarly to the previous period, there seems to be a strong and significant positive 
correlation between the rankings obtained for the PV and the SE index. However, some 
caution is again in order over the conclusions drawn from the analysis of correlation 
coefficients. The observation of clusters 2 and 1 suggests that several of the countries 
occupying high positions in the PV ranking do not have high positions for the SE ranking 
(e.g. Russia, Philippines, or India). The most extreme example is again Israel, which is 
one of the ‘most fragile’ states in terms of political violence, but is ordered in position 
120 when one considers the SE ranking. The opposite pattern is also found, with some 
of the highest positions in terms of fragility in state effectiveness corresponding to 
countries with comparatively lower positions in the PV ranking (e.g. Equatorial Guinea, 
Turkmenistan, or Angola). 
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The analysis in this subsection demonstrated that the results for state effectiveness and 
political violence obtained with PCA seem to corroborate the insights gained with cluster 
analysis in terms of the differences in country performance for these two symptoms. 
Thus, it further contributes to the argument of considering the two indices separately 
when trying to measure state fragility. 
Finally, the approach taken in this chapter was data-driven in that there was no 
distinction a priori between the lists of variables that proxy for each of the two 
symptoms, even though the theory suggested this distinction. However, it is important 
to clarify that the conclusions reached are similar to those suggested by theory, i.e. the 
performance of the countries may be different in terms of state ineffectiveness and 
political violence.48 
 
3.6.3. Comparison with existing indices 
Having argued that the empirical strategy described in the previous sections allows one 
to overcome some of the limitations of existing measures of state fragility, I now 
compare the obtained scores with a selection of the most frequently used fragility 
indices, highlighting some of the main similarities and differences. 
 
a) Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index 
I start with the most widely used indicator of state fragility, the CPIA index. Table 22 
includes the rankings obtained for each of the two symptoms and the rankings provided 
for the CPIA. In order to facilitate comparison, the sample of countries was restricted to 
those with scores for the three indices and the rankings for this subsample were 
calculated for the period 2005-201249. The comparison is limited by the fact that the 
aggregate CPIA scores are only provided for IDA eligible countries. Still, it is possible to 
make some overall comments. 
 
 
                                                             
48 As illustrated by the aforementioned comparison of rankings included in Table B3.3 in 
Appendix B3, which lists the rankings obtained using the approach in this chapter with those 
obtained when PCA was applied separately to the variables proxying for state effectiveness and 
the proxies for political violence. 
49 A table with a full listing of the countries can be found in Appendix B4, Table B4.1. 
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Table 22. Comparison of the results obtained with PCA and the CPIA, 2005-2012 
Country 
SE index PV index CPIA 
Rank Rank Rank 
Angola 
Armenia 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Sri Lanka 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
3 
46 
15 
39 
60 
41 
53 
45 
19 
18 
17 
61 
7 
2 
30 
1 
16 
6 
44 
23 
42 
52 
57 
5 
12 
54 
4 
38 
58 
22 
35 
11 
59 
27 
31 
56 
43 
21 
50 
49 
25 
29 
40 
28 
13 
26 
32 
48 
47 
20 
55 
51 
14 
34 
36 
10 
16 
25 
13 
47 
37 
54 
56 
48 
15 
22 
19 
58 
6 
7 
60 
4 
42 
12 
53 
5 
34 
26 
43 
23 
55 
52 
27 
30 
1 
14 
24 
35 
57 
51 
38 
44 
41 
28 
40 
46 
36 
11 
49 
32 
8 
2 
45 
18 
33 
50 
61 
3 
20 
39 
59 
29 
5 
60 
35 
40 
57 
48 
44 
52 
15 
25 
19 
59 
3 
2 
1 
8 
10 
6 
16 
34 
24 
61 
58 
13 
4 
31 
12 
45 
53 
46 
41 
20 
38 
14 
37 
29 
42 
22 
50 
33 
43 
28 
50 
30 
32 
27 
23 
49 
47 
18 
9 
39 
26 
55 
11 
7 
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Country 
SE index PV index CPIA 
Rank Rank Rank 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
33 
9 
24 
8 
37 
10 
17 
21 
9 
31 
56 
21 
54 
17 
36 
Notes: The results represented correspond to the countries for each scores 
for the three indices were available – a total of 61 countries. The rankings 
were calculated after the sample was restricted to that group, and are, thus, 
directly comparable. The CPIA rankings were obtained after calculating the 
average of the scores for the period considered. Data for CPIA from the 
World Databank (World Bank, 2016). 
 
Considering the countries with the highest positions – in other words, those with the 
highest level of state fragility – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Central 
African Republic show prominent positions in the three rankings, with low levels of state 
effectiveness, high levels of political violence, and a low CPIA score. However, some 
countries show different performances in the SE and PV rankings when compared to the 
CPIA. For instance, India comes first in the ranking of political violence, but has a lower 
position in both the ranking for state effectiveness and for the CPIA, whereas Angola has 
the 3rd and 5th highest positions in the SE and CPIA rankings, respectively, but occupies 
a lower position in the PV ranking. In an inverse position, other countries located at the 
bottom of the CPIA ranking, such as Pakistan or Sri Lanka, also have low positions in the 
ranking according to the SE index, but comparatively higher positions in the PV index, 
indicating a higher degree of fragility in terms of this symptom. This reiterates the idea 
that countries show different performances in state effectiveness and political violence, 
and that, consequently, state fragility should not be considered as a unidimensional 
phenomenon. 
Country rankings are more similar between the CPIA and SE indices than when 
compared to the PV index, which can be explained by the dimensions included in the 
calculation of the CPIA. The observation of the plots of the two pairs of rankings in these 
two indices (represented in Figures 12 and 13) also demonstrates a positive relationship 
between the CPIA and the SE rankings, and no relationship between the rankings for the 
CPIA and the PV index. This is corroborated by an analysis of the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients represented in Table 23. The coefficient for the relationship 
between the SE rank and the CPIA rank indicates a significant, positive correlation. 
However, the relationship indicated by the coefficient between the CPIA rank and the PV 
rank is very weak, and not statistically significant. 
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Figure 12. Comparison of the ranking positions: CPIA and SE, 2005-2012  
 
Figure 13. Comparison of the ranking positions: CPIA and PV, 2005-2012  
 
Table 23. Spearman correlation rank coefficients: SE, PV and CPIA scores 
 SE rank PV rank CPIA rank 
SE rank 1.0000   
PV rank 0.4876*** 1.0000  
CPIA rank 0.6759*** 0.0602 1.0000 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The similarities observed between the country rankings in the index of state 
effectiveness and the CPIA indicate that the proposed index is also capturing the 
countries’ performance in terms of policy and institutional quality dimensions. Still, the 
results demonstrate that the CPIA fails to capture the performance of countries in terms 
of political violence. Thus, the measurement strategy proposed in this chapter not only 
overcomes the limitation of the CPIA of focusing exclusively on IDA eligible countries, 
but also provides a more comprehensive approach to the concept of state fragility. 
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b) Fragile States Index (FSI), State Fragility Index (SFI) and CIFP Fragility Index (CIFP) 
A similar exercise was held for each of the other main indices of fragility discussed in 
section 2.4 of Chapter 250. Table 24 compares the rankings obtained for a restricted list 
of countries for which scores were available for all of the represented indices. Given that 
they refer to roughly similar time periods, the rankings are directly comparable.51 
Overall, the rankings obtained with the SE and PV indices seem to be in line with the 
existing fragility rankings.  
 
Table 24. Comparison of the results obtained with PCA and the SFI, FSI, and CIFP 
indices 
Country 
SE index PV index SFI FSI CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
78 
50 
7 
83 
71 
145 
147 
26 
113 
17 
29 
141 
58 
108 
61 
80 
125 
90 
102 
68 
23 
21 
20 
148 
117 
9 
5 
137 
33 
84 
42 
1 
22 
121 
8 
108 
22 
33 
105 
57 
135 
130 
34 
88 
26 
54 
144 
100 
71 
101 
118 
114 
36 
103 
96 
30 
45 
39 
141 
128 
14 
15 
111 
23 
4 
146 
7 
73 
139 
18 
109 
28 
12 
120 
88 
126 
145 
36 
104 
41 
108 
129 
52 
66 
49 
95 
113 
98 
115 
16 
8 
42 
15 
145 
104 
6 
2 
122 
76 
52 
38 
1 
22 
131 
18 
100 
71 
44 
127 
95 
148 
146 
55 
115 
14 
60 
143 
87 
42 
48 
50 
103 
105 
112 
28 
12 
41 
23 
147 
75 
4 
1 
134 
58 
34 
54 
2 
24 
120 
3 
105 
48 
20 
118 
89 
143 
150 
71 
87 
36 
97 
136 
40 
60 
73 
72 
107 
114 
117 
30 
2 
52 
26 
145 
93 
5 
3 
126 
76 
74 
35 
1 
19 
120 
6 
                                                             
50 The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World was not considered given that it is 
available only for 2008, which would limit the comparison with the approach proposed here. 
51 Tables B4.2-E4.4 in Appendix B4 provide a comparison between the scores obtained with 
PCA and each of the FSI, SFI and CIFP for the corresponding period. 
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Table 24. Comparison of the results obtained with PCA and the SFI, FSI, and CIFP 
indices 
Country 
SE index PV index SFI FSI CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
115 
51 
133 
129 
155 
65 
53 
41 
62 
86 
4 
134 
28 
76 
153 
139 
59 
69 
74 
144 
94 
118 
63 
10 
16 
91 
6 
57 
130 
99 
36 
14 
142 
127 
122 
96 
138 
101 
39 
30 
126 
107 
40 
11 
119 
70 
104 
37 
123 
149 
95 
49 
89 
106 
136 
63 
112 
138 
151 
99 
48 
68 
27 
79 
40 
134 
10 
106 
147 
127 
80 
74 
44 
145 
82 
97 
77 
55 
117 
90 
38 
62 
122 
1 
24 
21 
140 
6 
123 
60 
143 
52 
51 
28 
102 
85 
61 
59 
119 
50 
121 
98 
137 
152 
107 
78 
81 
56 
115 
95 
115 
136 
145 
30 
99 
59 
45 
89 
48 
136 
4 
90 
145 
131 
62 
35 
81 
145 
46 
135 
57 
9 
14 
58 
29 
78 
145 
44 
68 
36 
145 
80 
139 
115 
144 
90 
75 
42 
143 
114 
56 
33 
139 
72 
54 
7 
129 
139 
112 
46 
27 
99 
114 
73 
99 
130 
149 
57 
71 
63 
33 
84 
40 
121 
11 
69 
154 
137 
88 
74 
42 
136 
107 
126 
61 
7 
20 
92 
5 
77 
122 
85 
47 
36 
151 
53 
129 
104 
142 
79 
97 
15 
133 
109 
31 
39 
117 
29 
62 
21 
125 
145 
90 
64 
25 
102 
121 
109 
124 
135 
155 
31 
79 
84 
59 
98 
27 
127 
4 
75 
151 
138 
66 
29 
82 
146 
61 
122 
53 
12 
11 
62 
13 
57 
128 
45 
64 
39 
144 
116 
133 
82 
147 
69 
92 
17 
131 
102 
49 
33 
123 
56 
58 
8 
134 
142 
100 
28 
34 
113 
112 
 
Table 24. Comparison of the results obtained with PCA and the SFI, FSI, and CIFP 
indices 
Country 
SE index PV index SFI FSI CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
67 
31 
124 
87 
77 
79 
103 
56 
35 
2 
112 
45 
152 
154 
60 
38 
19 
151 
109 
34 
105 
43 
48 
85 
72 
135 
116 
88 
52 
66 
73 
75 
97 
25 
136 
120 
131 
92 
111 
132 
82 
98 
64 
150 
146 
27 
18 
44 
93 
46 
15 
114 
81 
100 
92 
66 
109 
19 
76 
89 
125 
46 
72 
2 
110 
17 
153 
150 
94 
70 
11 
154 
116 
3 
132 
84 
87 
53 
5 
126 
115 
86 
9 
37 
29 
67 
120 
93 
104 
133 
149 
155 
49 
83 
8 
113 
75 
148 
129 
25 
47 
69 
13 
131 
58 
95 
41 
12 
21 
20 
128 
107 
69 
83 
109 
92 
25 
5 
92 
26 
145 
127 
67 
13 
10 
125 
106 
22 
95 
54 
69 
73 
49 
145 
103 
102 
81 
10 
69 
59 
94 
3 
124 
131 
145 
65 
76 
138 
40 
85 
79 
145 
131 
59 
39 
49 
86 
32 
31 
111 
87 
73 
76 
37 
128 
89 
51 
113 
111 
80 
67 
8 
93 
18 
144 
150 
58 
17 
10 
155 
124 
6 
116 
45 
96 
82 
46 
141 
118 
110 
65 
27 
82 
91 
70 
22 
140 
123 
135 
32 
108 
131 
19 
94 
56 
153 
152 
30 
35 
66 
78 
16 
38 
106 
101 
86 
23 
10 
119 
108 
99 
86 
77 
81 
32 
22 
91 
24 
148 
149 
55 
15 
14 
153 
95 
9 
110 
51 
94 
104 
64 
137 
111 
115 
63 
21 
80 
43 
88 
16 
128 
130 
140 
50 
96 
139 
67 
101 
41 
154 
152 
42 
38 
37 
90 
44 
25 
106 
103 
84 
113 
 
Table 24. Comparison of the results obtained with PCA and the SFI, FSI, and CIFP 
indices 
Country 
SE index PV index SFI FSI CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
3 
47 
55 
110 
143 
140 
128 
13 
24 
32 
12 
54 
42 
16 
65 
91 
124 
32 
142 
31 
35 
43 
20 
64 
62 
17 
99 
119 
139 
122 
121 
33 
62 
83 
19 
22 
49 
13 
98 
119 
139 
138 
132 
26 
68 
81 
9 
52 
47 
18 
78 
112 
141 
125 
132 
46 
70 
68 
7 
54 
Notes: The results represented correspond to the countries for which there were scores available for the 
SE and PV indices – a total of 155 countries. The rankings were calculated after the sample was restricted 
to that group, and are, thus, directly comparable. The SE and PV rankings correspond to the period 2003-
2012. The SFI, FSI and CIFP rankings were obtained after calculating the average of the scores, 
respectively, for the periods 2003-2012, 2006-2012, and 2006-2012. Data for FSI from Fund for Peace 
and Foreign Policy (2015), for the SFI from Marshal and Cole (2014b), and for CIFP from Carment, 
Langlois-Bertrand and Samy (2015). 
 
When comparing the top 10 lists of the most fragile states suggested by each of these 
indices (represented in Table 25), there are some striking similarities, namely the fact 
that the Democratic Republic of Congo appears in all of the lists, whereas Myanmar, Chad 
and Central African Republic feature in four out of the five lists. Ethiopia, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea and Pakistan are also recurrent features in the top positions. However, there are 
also some countries that appear uniquely in the top 10 of the SE (e.g. Angola) and PV 
indices (e.g. India). 
Table 25. Top 10 of most fragile states according to the PCA, SFI, FSI and CIFP scores 
SE index PV index SFI FSI CIFP 
Congo, DR 
Myanmar 
Turkmenistan 
Eq. Guinea 
Chad 
Haiti 
Angola 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Central Af. Rep. 
Guinea 
India 
Myanmar 
Pakistan 
Colombia 
Philippines 
Israel 
Congo, DR 
Sri Lanka 
Russia 
Ethiopia 
Congo, DR 
Chad 
Sierra Leone 
Ethiopia 
Myanmar 
Central Af. Rep. 
Liberia 
Burundi 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
Chad 
Congo, DR 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Central Af. Rep. 
Haiti 
Pakistan 
Guinea 
Myanmar 
Yemen 
Nigeria 
Congo, DR 
Burundi 
Chad 
Ethiopia 
Central Af. Rep. 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Yemen 
Liberia 
Pakistan 
Mauritania 
Notes: Rankings calculated after the sample was restricted to the 155 countries with scores available for 
the SE and PV indices. Coefficients obtained by direct comparison of the rankings for each of the SFI, FSI, 
and CIFP indices and the SE and PV rankings for the same period, namely 2003-2012 in the case of the 
first, and 2006-2012 for the FSI and CIFP. Sources: Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy (2015); Marshal 
and Cole (2014b); Carment, Langlois-Bertrand and Samy (2015). 
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This conclusion also becomes clear from the observation of the Spearman correlation 
coefficients represented in Table 26. There are strong, positive, and statistically 
significant correlations across the five indices. More specifically, all the correlation 
coefficients between the SE index and the three existing indices are above 0.85. With 
regards to the PV index, the coefficients are smaller, indicating that this index may be 
capturing some dimensions that do not necessarily correspond to the existing indices. 
Table 26. Spearman correlation rank coefficients: SE, PV, SFI, FSI and CIFP scores 
 SE rank PV rank SFI rank FSI rank CIFP rank 
SE rank 1.0000                
PV rank 0.6898*** 1.0000    
SFI rank 0.8577*** 0.6548*** 1.0000   
FSI rank 0.8682*** 0.6839*** 0.9078*** 1.0000  
CIFP rank 0.8784*** 0.6287*** 0.9518*** 0.9134*** 1.0000 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Spearman correlation rank coefficients were obtained by direct 
comparison of the rankings for each of the SFI, FSI, and CIFP rankings and the SE and PV rankings for the 
same period, namely 2003-2012 in the case of the first, and 2006-2012 for the FSI and CIFP. 
 
Still, as highlighted previously when discussing Table 25, some of the countries scoring 
high (low) in the SE and PV indices occupy lower (higher) positions in the three existing 
indices of fragility. For instance, Ethiopia occupies high positions in the SFI, FSI and CIFP 
rankings, but ranks comparatively lower in the SE index. This suggests that fragility in 
this country is related more to aspects of political violence than to state effectiveness 
indicators. Conversely, the comparatively lower position of Chad and Central African 
Republic in the PV index against higher positions in the remaining indices indicates that 
the degree of fragility in these countries is driven more by lack of state effectiveness. 
Thus, a closer look at these country cases seems to contribute to the idea that 
considering the two symptoms of fragility separately provides important insights. 
To sum up, in this section I provided a justification for the use of the PCA held in section 
3.5 to build an alternative measure of state fragility, arguing that this approach responds 
to the call expressed recently to preserve the multidimensionality of the concept and 
overcomes some of the limitations related to the aggregation procedure employed in 
existing approaches. The resulting indices of state effectiveness and political violence 
were then compared not only with the clusters of countries obtained in section 3.4, but 
also with a selection of existing indices of state fragility. Overall, the index of state 
effectiveness had a significant and strong positive correlation with the CPIA, State 
Fragility Index, Fragile States Index, and CIFP Fragility Index, and especially with the last 
mentioned. This seems to demonstrate that the results obtained are in line with what 
are perceived to be the main elements captured by an index of state fragility. 
115 
 
With the exception of the CPIA, the political violence index was also significantly and 
positively correlated with the considered fragility indices, though to a lower degree. A 
more detailed analysis of the country rankings showed some marked differences in the 
comparison of the rankings of existing indices with the one obtained with the political 
violence index, which seems to indicate that some caution is in order over how 
representative they are of this symptom of state fragility. This contributes to the 
argument of this chapter to consider state effectiveness and political violence separately 
in order to overcome the problems of using unidimensional measures of a 
multidimensional phenomenon. 
 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter proposes an alternative approach to measuring state fragility that takes 
into consideration its multidimensional character by providing an index for each of its 
two symptoms – state ineffectiveness and political violence. The advantages of this 
proposal are twofold. First, the conceptualisation of state fragility is based on a sound 
theoretical grounding. The two symptoms are derived from Besley and Persson’s 
(2011a) model, which clearly distinguishes between causes, symptoms and outcomes of 
state fragility. Second, by using PCA to obtain the indices, it overcomes some of the 
methodological problems of existing indices, namely related to their aggregation 
procedures. 
Some interesting findings from adopting this approach can be highlighted. The results 
from cluster analysis helped to uncover some nuances in the groupings of countries 
according to the two symptoms, concurring to the view that they should be analysed 
separately. PCA further contributed to this view. From the three principal components 
retained from the analysis, the first two seem to represent the two symptoms of state 
fragility used in the working definition. The inverse of the first principal component is 
an indicator of state ineffectiveness, whereas the second seems to be representative of 
political violence.  
Additionally, the Spearman rank coefficients between the SE and PV indices obtained 
with different subsamples are always positive as expected, given the ranking of 
countries from the least to the most effective and from the most to the least violent. Still, 
the values for the Spearman rank coefficients are no higher than 0.72, suggesting that 
countries’ overall position varies according to the dimension considered, as illustrated 
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by the examples of Israel or India. Having the highest position in the PV ranking, the 
latter is an interesting case. This value can be tentatively explained by the levels of civil 
conflict and repression in the country during the period considered. A final interesting 
result is the fact that the CPIA seems to capture only one of the dimensions. This has 
implications for the numerous analyses using this index as a measure of fragility. 
These results open up possibilities for further analysis. In particular, the two indices can 
be used to throw some light on how different degrees of fragility in each symptom 
influence economic development. Additionally, they may be used to explore how 
development assistance has an effect on fragile states, depending on the combination of 
the levels of state effectiveness and political violence in the country. I take these two 
avenues as the object of study in the next chapters of this thesis. 
  
 
 
 
PART II. EXAMINING THE LINKS 
BETWEEN STATE FRAGILITY, AID AND 
DEVELOPMENT
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CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF STATE FRAGILITY ON GROWTH 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I began this thesis by explaining the context in which the term fragile states emerged in 
the policy and academic discourses. The main argument was that it appeared as a result 
of a concern over security and development, triggered by events occurring during the 
last decades of the twentieth century. At the core of the discourse on fragile states is the 
postulate that state fragility has a negative impact on economic development. This 
hypothesis is put under scrutiny in this chapter. 
The country-specific evidence on the economic performance of fragile states is not 
scarce. However, cross-country analyses of the links between state fragility and growth 
are still rare. This chapter aims to fill this gap by following the tradition of the growth 
literature to determine if, when taking the two dimensions into account, one finds any 
impact of state fragility on growth. To be clear, the main contribution is to test whether, 
on average, state ineffectiveness and/or political violence have a detrimental effect on 
the growth performance of a country. 
The theoretical underpinning for this hypothesis is provided by Besley and Persson’s 
(2011a) model. In the spirit of the literature examining the effect of specific conditions 
on growth, I use a standard growth equation and add a term for state ineffectiveness and 
another for political violence, together with their interaction at a later stage. The two 
indices obtained in Chapter 3 are used as indicators for these dimensions. Standard 
econometric techniques, namely Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental 
Variables (IV) methods, are applied to test this postulate. I consider both cross-country 
and panel datasets, as well as different time periods, time horizons, and country samples, 
and a range of different estimation techniques. 
The results are easy to summarise. The weight of the evidence suggests that, as expected, 
state ineffectiveness has a significant negative effect on economic growth. This result is 
robust to variations in the data used and the method employed. The conclusion for the 
effect of political violence is less clear-cut. In contrast to the expectation, there is some 
evidence suggesting a positive effect, but this result is not robust to variations in the 
specifications used.  
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Even though the two state symptoms are often expected to be correlated, as suggested 
by Besley and Persson’s (2011a) matrix of fragile states, different combinations of these 
two symptoms may lead to different outcomes52. Thus, in addition to exploring their 
separate effect, the analysis in this chapter also considers their possible interaction. The 
obtained results show no evidence that the effect of state ineffectiveness (or political 
violence) on economic growth in a country depends on the level of political violence (or 
state ineffectiveness). 
These conclusions have implications for the understanding of how to assist fragile states. 
The fact that state ineffectiveness has a detrimental impact on the growth performance 
of a country is already well established in the literature. However, the results in this 
chapter demonstrate that the effect of political violence may not be as easily discernible. 
Moreover, if the two dimensions entail such distinct results, one can reaffirm the need 
to consider them separately when examining state fragility. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I establish the links between this 
analysis and the existing literature. Section 4.3 recovers the proposition established by 
Besley and Persson (2011a) in terms of the link between state fragility and development, 
in order to derive the testable hypotheses. Additionally, it presents the empirical model 
and describes the data used. The results of a diagnostic analysis of the data are presented 
in section 4.4, whereas the main results from the estimations are discussed in section 
4.5, which also includes some robustness checks. Finally, section 4.6 draws the overall 
conclusions and compares them to the existing literature, and section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The tradition of using cross-country regressions to examine economic growth and its 
determinants has been established since the early studies towards the end of the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s. The canonical cross-country growth regression is the 
result from the transition from neoclassical theory to econometrics.53 As outlined in 
                                                             
52 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of Besley and Persson’s (2011a) model and of 
the reasoning justifying the analysis of the separate effects of these symptoms, as well as their 
possible interaction. 
53 I refer to Maier (2010) for a review of growth models and economic explanations for 
underdevelopment in the context of fragile states. 
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detail in Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005)54, the baseline theoretical framework 
starts with a generic one-sector growth model and derives an equation that decomposes 
the growth rate into two sources: i) the rate of technological progress, and ii) the 
“catching up” factor, i.e. the difference between the initial output per worker and the 
steady-state value. This is the baseline for the standard cross-country growth regression 
used in the empirical growth literature. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)55 model 
aggregate output with a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function and derive a 
growth regression model that is linear in observable variables. The standard cross-
country regression is a version of this, which can be generically represented as: 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝛽 log 𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝜓𝑋𝑖 + 𝜋𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , 
where 𝑖 indexes countries, 𝑔𝑖 represents the rate of growth and log 𝑦𝑖,0 is the logarithm 
of the initial level of output per labour unit. 𝑋𝑖  encompasses a constant, the logarithm of 
the sum of the rates of population growth, technological progress and depreciation 
(which determines the rate at which effective capital-labour ratio needs to be 
replenished), as well as the logarithms of the savings rates of physical capital and human 
capital. Together with log 𝑦𝑖,0, the variables included in 𝑋𝑖  represent the growth 
determinants suggested by the Solow growth model. The variables included in 𝑍𝑖  
represent growth determinants that are outside of the original version of this theory, 
and vary considerably among the existing analyses, whereas 𝜀𝑖  is a stochastic term 
capturing all omitted influences. The overall idea of this type of equation is that growth 
can be expressed as a function of initial income and the determinants of the steady-state. 
This regression specification has been the basis for the empirical growth research. Due 
to Robert J. Barro’s seminal work using it in the study of growth determinants (Barro, 
1991; 1997), this type of growth regression has been labelled as Barro-style growth 
regression. Barro (1997: xi) argues that the growth rate depends on the initial level of 
output and its steady-state level, which will in turn be dependent on government policies 
and on household behaviour in terms of saving, work effort, and fertility. He suggests 
that there is a conditional convergence effect; in other words, for given determinants of 
the steady-state level, the growth rate is negatively related with the initial level of output. 
Additionally, the growth rate increases with higher levels of the steady-state output 
                                                             
54 The following description of the theoretical foundations of the growth regressions used in 
empirical analysis follows closely the explanation provided by these authors. I refer to their 
work for more detail. 
55 These authors provided an important contribution to the empirical research on economic 
growth, and their formulation, which is close to that in Barro (1991; 1997), has been widely 
applied. 
121 
 
level. The empirical results lend support to these hypotheses. Using panel data for a 
sample of approximately 100 countries for the period 1960-1990, Barro (1997) finds 
that, for a given initial level of real per capita GDP, higher initial levels of schooling and 
life expectancy, lower fertility rates and government consumption, better protection of 
the rule of law, lower inflation, and improvements in the terms of trade contribute to 
higher growth rates.  
The use of growth regressions in development economics stems from the interest in 
understanding the underlying factors that explain the differences in the economic 
performance of countries. This has led to a plethora of studies examining different 
growth determinants. As mentioned before, given that growth theory does not provide 
a definite list for the determinants of growth, these variables vary greatly from paper to 
paper. Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) provide a survey of 145 different regressors 
that have been used in the literature, but group them into 43 conceptually distinct 
categories of growth determinants. In an attempt to throw light on the “true” correlates 
of growth, Sala-i-Martin (1997) ran two million regressions using 62 variables employed 
in the literature, and found that 22 appeared to be significant according to the criteria 
established by the author.56 In the face of this challenge, recent studies include their 
variable of interest and use the results from previous empirical studies as a guideline for 
the choice of control variables. 
  
4.2.1. The link between state fragility and growth 
Despite being at the core of the discourse on fragile states, the link between state fragility 
and economic development has only been examined in the context of cross-country 
regressions in a few studies.57 Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) distinguish between 
empirical studies focusing on the direct impact of fragility on economic development, 
from those exploring an indirect effect through aid. This chapter contributes to the first 
of these groups.  
                                                             
56 Sachs and Warner (1997), Bosworth and Collins (2003) and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and 
Miller (2004) also contribute to the quest for the determinants of long-run growth using growth 
regressions. 
57 The field of political science is not short of accounts of the challenges imposed by failing and 
failed states, especially before the fragile states term become in use. The majority of these 
studies focus on state-building and peace-building, and make use of case studies and 
comparative analysis. The reports from development organisations are also filled with 
qualitative evidence of the perceived effects of state fragility on development, based on country-
specific evidence as well as on comparative analysis. However, given the focus of this chapter, 
these are not reviewed here. 
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In an early account, Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) explore the costs of failing 
states, conceptualising “failure” around three aspects: i) hurt citizens in neighbouring 
countries; ii) lack in the provision of basic security for their own citizens; and iii) failure 
to secure an environment in which poverty reduction is achievable. Considering the 
period 1998-2001, their empirical strategy consists of adding dummy variables for 
failing states58, for states in civil war, and for neighbourhood spillovers to a growth 
regression, and then using OLS and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methods to 
estimate the percentage of reduction in the growth rate. They conclude that being a 
failing state at peace corresponds to a decrease in the growth rate by 2.6 per cent when 
compared to countries at peace with adequate policies and governance. Furthermore, a 
switch from peace to war leads to a further reduction in growth of 1.6 per cent. Their 
calculation of the total costs of failing states amounts to around US$276 billion per year, 
which leads the authors to suggest that there is a strong case for “over-riding 
sovereignty” and “inducing reform in failing states” (Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler, 2007: 
12). 
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) focus on Sub-Saharan Africa to examine the effect of state 
fragility on development. Making use of a dataset including 28 countries for the period 
1999-2004, the authors apply both pooled OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
estimators to a standard Barro (1991) growth regression. Using the OECD-DAC 
definition of fragile states59, they conclude that there is no significant impact of fragility 
on economic growth. However, when applying a more extreme definition, which 
restricts the list of fragile states to those countries belonging to the bottom quintile of 
the CPIA rating or unrated, the results show a clear, negative impact.60 
Despite the profusion of studies examining the effect of related factors – such as 
corruption, institutional quality, or state capacity, among others – on growth, to the best 
of the author’s knowledge, these are the only studies that focus explicitly on the 
                                                             
58 Defined as the LICUS countries that have been in this position for a continuous period of at 
least four years. 
59 Countries belonging to the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA ratings, or unrated. 
60 I also refer to the analysis in Besley and Persson (2011c), which brings together their work on 
state capacity and political violence. It includes the development of the model that serves as a 
basis for their paper (Besley and Persson, 2011a), and which has been extensively used for the 
conceptualisation of state fragility in this thesis. This work includes an empirical application of 
their framework in which the authors build an index of prosperity. However, this index is not 
used in further empirical regression analysis of the type used in this chapter. Additionally, 
despite being based on the same theoretical framework, the approach to state fragility used 
here departs from their proposal by using an index for each of the two dimensions, and by not 
including a measure of income in its construction. In Besley and Persson (2014) these authors 
offer a more recent account of the links between state capacity, political violence, and income, 
despite not providing any empirical analysis. 
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examination of the link between state fragility per se and economic growth in the context 
of cross-country regressions.61 The main contribution of this paper is to fill this gap in 
the literature. The following paragraphs briefly outline the findings derived in related 
work. I refer to Maier (2010) for a more comprehensive review.  
 
4.2.2. Related studies within the empirical growth literature 
By focusing on the impact of state ineffectiveness and political violence on economic 
growth, this chapter also contributes to different strands of studies within the growth 
literature. The first contribution is towards the group of studies rooted in the idea that 
different rates of economic growth can be explained by differences in state effectiveness 
or in other forms of state capacity. The second is the line of argument that examines the 
impact of different dimensions of political violence on growth rates. The paragraphs 
below provide a brief overview. 
  
a) Effect of state capacity, governance and institutions on growth 
Whereas initial work examined the effect of related concepts, such as “social advance” 
(Abramovitz, 1986), “social development” (Adelman and Morris, 1967) and “social 
infrastructure” (Hall and Jones, 1999)62, over the last two decades, there has been an 
increasing focus on governance. One observes a tendency towards assessing its level by 
using the lenses of the state, and underlining the importance of state capacity as an 
essential feature for effective governance (Savoia and Sen, 2015). Due to its 
multidimensionality, state capacity has been conceptualised and measured in a variety 
of ways63. The assumptions about the mechanisms through which the state affects 
development outcomes will dictate the type of state capacity that promotes 
development, and different authors have focused on different channels (Savoia and Sen, 
2015: 442).64  
                                                             
61 Despite the link with state fragility, the object of analysis of Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2007) is failing states and not fragile states.  
62 I refer to Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) for a review of these studies. 
63 See Hendrix (2010) and Savoia and Sen (2015) for reviews of definitions and 
operationalisation of the concept, as well as recent empirical research on the measurement of 
state capacity. 
64 A detailed review of these studies is out of the scope of this section, but I refer to Cingolani 
(2013) for a comprehensive overview, and focus here on some of most prominent papers. 
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Evans and Rauch (1999) find a strong association between “Weberianness” and 
economic growth in 35 emerging economies for the period 1970-1990. Their 
“Weberianness Scale” is a measure of the degree to which meritocratic recruitment and 
the offer of predictable, rewarding long-term careers characterises core state agencies 
(Evans and Rauch, 1999: 749). The results in Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) 
show a positive association between state antiquity65 and economic growth for 94 
countries over the period 1960-1995. 
A different line of work uses measures of institutional quality in the empirical analysis. 
Focusing on the period 1974-1989, and using data from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) and the Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI), Knack and 
Keefer (1995) found that institutions that protect property rights are crucial for 
investment and growth.66 Extending the period until 2000 and using three alternative 
measures for the level of corruption (including the ICRG index), Mendez and Sepulveda 
(2006) concluded that there is a non-linear relationship between corruption and growth, 
with corruption being favourable at low levels of incidence and harmful to economic 
growth at high levels of incidence.67 Combining growth regressions with growth 
accounting, Bosworth and Collins (2003) argue that a part of the cross-country variation 
in economic growth over the forty-year period between 1960 and 2000 can be explained 
by the quality of the governing institutions (e.g. law and order, absence of corruption, 
and protection of property rights).68  
Within this literature, some authors have started to unpack the concept of state capacity 
by distinguishing between different components (see Bardhan, 2016, for an overview). 
Dincecco and Katz (2014) find a significant link between fiscal centralization and 
economic growth for a sample of 11 European countries for a long-term period between 
1650 and 1913. Using different indicators of governance from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators database, but focusing on the impact of regulatory 
quality, Jalilian, Kirkpatrick and Parker (2007) suggest that there is a strong causal link 
between this dimension and economic growth. 
                                                             
65 State antiquity is measured by an index taking a value between 0 and 1, which results from 
the scores on the following three questions: i) is there a government above the tribal level? ii) is 
this government foreign or locally based? iii) how much of the territory of the modern country 
was ruled by this government? (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002: 352) 
66 The same authors used data since 1960 until 1989 on different indicators of institutional 
quality to test the link between institutions and convergence (Keefer and Knack, 1997). 
67 See Serritzlew, Sonderskov and Svendsen (2014) for a more detail review of the work 
examining the link between corruption and growth. 
68 The connection with the literature on “good governance” is also apparent, but will not be 
explored in detail here. 
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More tangentially, this chapter also relates to two other groups of studies. The first 
comprises the work testing the link between historical institutional factors and 
economic growth. Among these studies, I highlight Engerman and Sokoloff (1997; 2002), 
La Porta et al. (1998), and the seminal work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), 
and refer to Nunn (2009) for a review of their findings and an overview of this research. 
The second group of studies is positioned within the empirical literature examining aid 
allocation and aid effectiveness, which makes use of cross-country growth regressions. 
Within this large body of studies, measures of institutional quality are frequently used 
as controls (and also in interaction terms with aid). Additionally, the CPIA index (which, 
as previously mentioned, is used as an indicator of state fragility) is employed as an 
overall indicator of the level of governance in a country (e.g. Collier and Dollar, 2002).  
 
b) Effect of political violence on growth 
In parallel to this literature, a large number of papers have examined the significance of 
political variables in growth regressions. It is out of the scope of this section to review 
this literature to a great extent, but I refer to Carmignani (2003) for an overview. Here I 
focus on recent work addressing this dimension, and describe the main results from 
studies that include in their analysis the variables used in the construction of the political 
violence index.69 I recall that it encompasses physical integrity, empowerment rights, 
and an indicator of political terror as proxies for the level of repression in a country; as 
well as episodes of civil violence, of armed conflict, and the number of coups d’état, 
revolutionary wars, and ethnic wars as proxies for civil conflict.  
Some authors have tested the relationship between repression or its opposite, political 
freedom, on economic growth. An early study by Chen and Feng (1996) reports that the 
analysis of cross-sectional data for 88 countries for the period 1974-1990 confirms the 
expected negative effect of government repression on economic growth. Considering the 
period 1975-2004, and using data for about 100 countries, Chauffour (2011) found a 
positive effect of civic and political rights on economic growth. 
Focusing on the growth effect of civil wars70, Collier’s (1999) influential work found that 
when considering all civil wars during the period 1960-92, the results indicate a decline 
                                                             
69 It is important to highlight that these studies explore the variation across countries, but in 
most cases they use panel data and employ panel data methods in the empirical estimations. 
70 I refer to Polachek and Sevastianova (2012) and to Bove, Elia and Smith (2017) for more 
detailed reviews of the literature. 
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of GDP per capita at an annual rate of 2.2% during civil wars in comparison to its 
counterfactual. The results for Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1960-
1996 obtained in Gyimah-Brempong and Corley (2005) concur with the prediction that 
civil war incidence and severity have a negative and significant effect on economic 
growth. This is in line with previous work that has found the link between civil war 
incidence and economic growth to be negative (e.g. Barro, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1997).  
More recently, the results obtained by Murdoch and Sandler (2004) show that in the 
short-run (5-year period), per capita real GDP growth is predicted to be 0.05 percentage 
points less if there is a civil war in the country during that period. Bodea and Elbadawi 
(2008) concur with the view that political violence, and particularly civil war, has a 
significant negative effect on growth. This is corroborated by Polachek and Sevastianova 
(2012) who estimate a reduction of between 0.01 and 0.13 percentage points in annual 
growth due to civil war. Biswas et al. (2016) fail to find a significant effect of ethnic civil 
war on income growth over the period 1975-2005, although the negative 
contemporaneous impact of non-ethnic war is significant. 
However, two early accounts point to the opposite effect. Organski and Kugler (1977) 
find that 15-20 years after the war its effects have dissipated and countries recover the 
level of pre-war performance, a phenomenon that authors label as the “phoenix factor”. 
The evidence in Collier (1999: 176) also suggested that the post-war growth rate 
actually improved 5.9% per annum after a 15-year war.71 More recently, also using cross-
sectional data, but extending the period until 2001, Cerra and Saxena (2008: 442) show 
evidence of a partial rebound of output following a civil war. This is also corroborated 
by Murdoch and Sandler (2004), whose results show that in the long run, there is the 
possibility of recovery, and even catch-up, after civil war.  
Although these results seem counterintuitive at first, the literature has advanced 
theoretical arguments on the positive effects of civil war on economic growth. For 
instance, the participation in civil wars may lead to improvements stemming from 
institutional changes and technological innovations, and can also enable socio-economic 
changes that were otherwise blocked by the existing social order or special interests 
(Bove, Elia, and Smith, 2017).72 Still, some authors also fail to find any significant effect. 
Among other dimensions, Jong-A-Pin (2009) uses an indicator of politically motivated 
violence and another of mass civil protest, and finds a positive but not significant effect 
                                                             
71 This effect loses significance when the sample of countries is restricted, and when fixed-
effects and random-effects methods are used.  
72 I refer to Bove, Elia and Smith (2017) for a more comprehensive review of these and related 
arguments. 
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for both of these variables. Aisen and Veiga (2013) use data for 169 countries over the 
period 1960-2004 and, among different indicators of political instability, employ an 
indicator of violence that includes revolutionary and civil wars. The results show a 
negative but non-significant effect for this variable.  
The literature focusing specifically on coups d’état is scarcer. For instance, using data for 
121 countries over the period 1950-1982, Londregan and Poole (1990) failed to find 
evidence of a significant effect of either the recent history of coups or the current 
propensity for a coup d’état. In contrast, Fosu (2002) found an adverse effect of coup 
events in Sub-Saharan African countries over the 1960-1986 period. The 
aforementioned study by Aisen and Veiga (2013) employs two composite indicators of 
regime instability that include coups d’état in their construction. The obtained 
coefficients show a negative and significant effect.  
Overall, existing studies seem to indicate that there is a positive (negative) effect of state 
effectiveness (ineffectiveness) on growth. In the case of political violence, the literature 
suggests that different dimensions have different effects on economic growth. Thus, the 
overall effect may be less clear. 
 
4.3. HYPOTHESES, EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
 
4.3.1. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Using the indices obtained from Chapter 3 that reflect the two dimensions of state 
fragility, I examine its effect on economic growth. I recover the terminology used in 
Besley and Persson (2011a), and for simplicity purposes, as well as to help the 
interpretation of the obtained results, I now consider state ineffectiveness, instead of 
state effectiveness, as one of the symptoms of state fragility, alongside political violence.  
Before formulating the hypotheses being tested here, I briefly summarise their 
theoretical underpinnings, discussed at length in Chapter 3. According to Besley and 
Persson’s (2011a) model of state fragility, the distinction between determinants, 
symptoms and outcomes can be portrayed as in Figure 14 (reproduced from Figure 2 in 
Chapter 3). 
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Figure 14. State fragility: determinants, symptoms and outcomes 
 
This chapter tests the arrow that links the last two boxes in the figure; in other words, 
the effect of each symptom of state fragility on economic growth, which is used as a 
measure of economic development. The first two hypotheses stem from the postulate 
that higher levels of fragility have a detrimental effect on growth73, and, according to the 
predictions from Chapter 3, can be formulated as: 
 H1.1: Higher levels of state ineffectiveness have a negative effect on 
economic growth.  
H1.2: Higher levels of political violence have a negative effect on economic 
growth.  
The main argument from Part I of this thesis is that these two symptoms of state fragility 
should be examined separately, and the underlying theoretical model highlights the 
importance of heterogeneity. Additionally, the results in Chapter 3 suggested that the 
two dimensions, although clearly correlated, are far from perfectly correlated. The 
matrix of the state resulting from this model (see Chapter 3) identifies different types of 
states, resulting from the combination of the two symptoms. For instance, it suggests 
that civil war is usually associated with weak or redistributive regimes (Besley and 
Persson, 2011a: 386).74 Also, the economic performance of a weak state at peace is likely 
to be different from that of a repressive, but effective state. This inspired the introduction 
of an additional hypothesis to test whether there is an interactive effect of the two 
symptoms: 
H2: The effect of state ineffectiveness (or political violence) on economic 
growth will depend on the level of political violence (or state 
ineffectiveness). 
 
                                                             
73 I recall here that higher levels of state ineffectiveness and of political violence are interpreted 
as higher levels of state fragility. 
74 See also Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) for an overview of the literature relating state capacity 
and armed conflict and civil war. 
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4.3.2. Empirical model 
The empirical basis described in this and the following sections is largely in line with the 
growth literature reviewed previously: 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log 𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     (1) 
where 𝑖 indexes countries, 𝑔𝑖 is per capita real GDP growth, α is a constant, log 𝑦𝑖,0 is the 
logarithm of the initial level of per capital real GDP, 𝑋𝑖  includes covariates that I motivate 
and discuss below when describing the data used, and 𝜀𝑖  represents the error term.  
In order to test the hypotheses described above, I include in this formulation a term to 
capture state ineffectiveness and another to capture political violence. This is 
represented in equation (2), where 𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the obtained index for state ineffectiveness and 
𝑝𝑣𝑖  is the political violence index. The coefficients on state ineffectiveness and political 
violence, 𝛾1 and 𝛾2, measure how growth is affected by each of these dimensions. 
         𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log 𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                   (2) 
Subsequently, I introduce the interaction term between these two variables to capture 
the effects described in hypothesis H2. This is represented in equation (3), where 𝛾3 
allows one to examine whether the effect of state ineffectiveness, or political violence, 
on growth is different for different values of political violence, or state ineffectiveness.  
              𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log 𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑠𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                   (3) 
 
When compared to the studies testing the effect of state fragility on growth reviewed in 
the previous section, this approach differs by using two distinct indices to proxy for the 
dimensions of state fragility separately, and by employing a continuous measure of state 
fragility rather than a dummy for whether a country is fragile. 
The links described and the expected signs for the coefficients of interest are 
represented in Table 27. The data used to test these relationships are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
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Table 27. Summary of specifications 
Hypothesis Link(s) tested Coefficient  
(Expected sign) 
H1.1: Higher levels of state 
ineffectiveness have a negative 
effect on economic growth. 
H1.2: Higher levels of political 
violence have a negative effect on 
economic growth. 
State ineffectiveness 
 
Economic growth 
 
Political violence 
𝛾1 (–) 
𝛾2 (–) 
H2: The effect of state 
ineffectiveness (or political 
violence) on economic growth will 
depend on the level of political 
violence (or state ineffectiveness). 
State ineffectiveness 
 
Economic growth 
 
Political violence 
𝛾3 (–) 
 
 
4.3.3. Endogeneity 
While the interest in this chapter is to test whether state fragility affects economic 
growth, as pointed out by Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010), it is plausible to assume that 
the causality runs in the opposite direction, i.e. from growth to state fragility. Given the 
nature of the two variables used to proxy for state fragility, there is a risk that the use of 
OLS methods leads to biased regressors, for two main reasons. The first is the potential 
for omitted variables. For instance, it is possible that state ineffectiveness and growth 
respond simultaneously to an omitted factor, such as the legal framework, or the 
historical evolution of the nation in question (Mendez and Sepulveda, 2006). 
The second reason is that, as mentioned above, there is a possibility that economic 
growth has an effect on state ineffectiveness. For instance, it could be the case that 
countries with higher rates of economic growth have more resources to fight against and 
control corruption (Mendez and Sepulveda, 2006: 91). It is also more likely that richer 
economies choose strong fiscal systems, or they have, at least, the ability to do so 
(Dincecco and Prado, 2012: 172). Also, income levels and income growth have been 
explored at length in the literature examining the causes of conflict, with some authors 
finding a significant relationship between the two (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a; 
Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004).75  
In section 4.5.3, I attempt to take into account the potential for endogeneity of both state 
ineffectiveness and political violence by using different strategies for cross-country and 
                                                             
75 See Humphreys (2003) for an overview of the links between economic factors and conflict, 
and Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review of the cross-country studies examining the causes 
of conflict. 
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panel data. In the case of state ineffectiveness, I explore as possible instruments the 
logarithm of settler mortality, in line with the influential work by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001), and the four variables used as instruments for social infrastructure in 
Hall and Jones (1999). Both strategies are applied to cross-country and panel data.  
In order to overcome the potential endogeneity of political violence, I run a set of 
specifications considering the initial value of this variable, and alternatively I use a food 
price index as an instrument for this variable. Recent studies have found an empirical 
link between increases in food prices and incidence of political violence, such as anti-
government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict (Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; 
Bellemare, 2014; Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis and Thies, 2017). Again, these strategies 
are applied to cross-country and panel data.  
When using panel data, the strategy followed in recent work pursuing similar aims is to 
employ dynamic panel methods, such as GMM, in both its difference and system versions 
(see, for instance, Aisen and Veiga, 2013). Still, the use of these methods in this chapter 
is precluded by data availability. Even in the case of the dataset with 5-year averaged 
data, only four periods are available. Bearing this in mind, I use as controls the lagged 
values of the time-variant explanatory variables included before, alongside the initial 
level of per capita GDP, the measure of geography and the three regional dummies in 
order to mitigate the potential endogeneity of both variables simultaneously. Finally, I 
follow the suggestion in Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) and employ as instruments the 
lagged values of the regressors. 
 
4.3.4. Data 
Given that the data for the index of state ineffectiveness are available only from 1996, 
and in order to maximise the use of the data available, the estimations in this chapter 
were carried out considering the period 1993-2012. The first set of results was obtained 
with cross-country data for 20- and 10-year horizons; panel data considering 5-year 
averages and 10-year averages were used later in the analysis. Table 28 summarises the 
different time periods used, as well as the number of countries included in each sub-
sample.76 
 
                                                             
76 Table C1.2 in Appendix C1 includes the lists of countries for each sub-sample. 
132 
 
Table 28. Different time periods and number of countries 
 Reproduced dataset 
 Cross-country Panel 
Time horizon 20-year 10-year 5-year 10-year 
Sub-period(s) 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 1993-1997 
1998-2002 
2003-2007 
2008-2012 
1993-2002 
2003-2012 
Nr countries 92 87 80 85 92 
Following the standard practice in the literature, the average of the annual growth rate 
of real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is used as dependent variable. The explanatory 
variables of interest are state ineffectiveness and political violence. They are measured 
using two indices derived on the basis of the analysis described in Chapter 3. For the 
purposes of this chapter, PCA was applied to each set of variables separately.77 This 
means that the state ineffectiveness index was obtained by applying PCA to the set of 
variables representing state effectiveness (described in Table 6 in Chapter 3), and then 
multiplying the resulting scores by -1, in order to transform this variable into a measure 
of state ineffectiveness. Similarly, the political violence index results from the application 
of PCA to the set of variables describing political violence.78 Figures C3.1-C3.5 in 
Appendix C3 show the histograms obtained for these variables for each of the periods 
considered. Overall, one observes a bimodal distribution for state ineffectiveness, with a 
greater concentration of countries in the intervals of values [-6,-4] and [0,2]. The 
histograms for political violence show a right-skewed distribution, with the majority of 
countries assuming values between -2 and 0. 
Figures 15-17 include the scatters for GDP per capita growth versus state ineffectiveness 
and political violence for the three periods considered. They suggest a negative 
relationship between growth rates and state ineffectiveness in the periods 1993-2012 
and 1993-2002, although it is more clearly visible for the latter period. When the period 
2003-2012 is considered it is hard to identify any clear relationship between the two 
variables. In all three periods, there is a concentration of the countries with lower levels 
of state ineffectiveness in similar rates of growth. The relationship between growth rates  
                                                             
77 In the previous chapter, applying PCA to all the selected indicators allowed me to avoid 
making an ad hoc distinction between the two symptoms. However, given that the results 
concurred to the view that the two symptoms of fragility should be considered separately, the 
application of PCA to the variables used to proxy for each of them separately seems natural and 
appropriate for the analysis in this chapter.  
78 In the application of PCA, and unlike the analysis in Chapter 3, no rotation procedure was 
employed, and each of the fragility indices results from the scores obtained when considering 
the first principal component. The eigenvectors resulting from applying this approach are 
included in Table C3.1 in Appendix C3.  
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Figure 15. GDP per capita growth rates versus the indices of state ineffectiveness and 
political violence, 1993-2012 
 
Figure 16. GDP per capita growth rates versus the indices of state ineffectiveness and 
political violence, 1993-2002 
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Figure 17. GDP per capita growth rates versus the indices of state ineffectiveness and 
political violence, 2003-2012 
 
and political violence is harder to describe. Countries with low levels of political violence 
are dispersed in terms of their position in terms of growth when one observes the 20-
year period. The data representation for the first decade gives some indication of a 
negative relationship, but, in contrast, for period 2003-2012, the point represented 
suggest a counter-intuitive positive correlation.  
As highlighted in the previous section, there is no definite list of growth determinants. 
Still, inspired by the growth literature referred to above, namely by Bosworth and 
Collins’ (2003) and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller’s (2004) work, the following 
were chosen as control variables: 
 Initial level of per capita GDP: logarithm of per capita GDP in the beginning of 
the relevant period in both the cross-country and the panel datasets. This is used 
to capture convergence, which corresponds to a negative coefficient; 
 Education: percentage of the population aged 15 and over for whom the 
secondary level is the highest level of education completed, averaged across the 
relevant period. Higher levels of education are expected to be positively related 
to higher levels of growth;  
 Terms of trade: change in the net barter terms of trade index. Cross-country 
estimations also include the variability (measured by the standard deviation) of 
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the net barter terms of trade index. The coefficient of the change in terms of 
trade is expected to be positive, whereas one expects a negative coefficient for 
the variability; 
 Measure of geography: time-invariant measure from Bosworth and Collins 
(2003) that averages the number of frost days and tropical land area. Standard 
deviations of the two measures are used and then assigned equal weights. Given 
that the first is positively correlated with growth, whereas the second has a 
negative correlation, the weights assigned are -0.5 and +0.5, respectively. Higher 
values of this measure, represent better geography; thus, a positive coefficient 
is expected; 
 Inflation: logarithm of (1+inflation/100) in the beginning of the relevant period 
in the case of cross-country analysis, and averaged across the 5-year or 10-year 
periods in the panel datasets. The coefficient is expected to be negative, given 
that high inflation has a detrimental effect on economic growth;  
 Budget balance: cash surplus or deficit (% of GDP) in the beginning of the 
relevant period in the case of cross-country analysis, and averaged across the 5-
year or 10-year periods in the panel datasets. In general, it is more challenging 
to raise funds to finance expenditure if the country has a high budget deficit, so 
a negative coefficient is expected; 
 Trade policy: Sachs and Warner’s (1995) openness index in the beginning of the 
relevant period in the case of cross-country analysis, and averaged across the 5-
year or 10-year periods in the panel datasets. Based on the hypothesis that trade 
openness promotes economic growth, the coefficient is expected to be positive. 
In addition to these, regional dummies were included for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, 
and Latin America, as well as time dummies in the case of panel regressions. Two 
additional variables were considered for the analysis, namely the ICRG as a measure of 
institutional quality and life expectancy. The full details of the sources and construction 
of the variables are included in Table C1.1 in Appendix C1, and Tables C1.3 and C1.4 
include the descriptive statistics for the datasets used. The growth rates vary 
significantly among the sample of countries and depending on the periods considered. 
For instance, when considering the 10-year period 1993-2002 the growth rates range 
from -3.61% to 7.21%, whereas for the period 2003-2012 they range from -1.07% to 
10.12%. There is also a noticeable variation in the levels of state ineffectiveness and 
political violence. In the case of the first, the average values across the sample range 
between around -0.4 and -0.7, with minimum values being as low as -5.5 and maximum 
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values reaching 4.3. Considering the political violence index, one observes average 
values across the samples between -0.03 and 0.08, and similar amplitudes between the 
minimum and maximum values, which are around -2 and 7.6, respectively. The following 
sections provide more detail about the choice of variables. 
 
4.4. DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS 
 
4.4.1. Multicollinearity 
In line with previous work, life expectancy and the ICRG indicator of quality of 
government were initially considered in the analysis. However, the potentially high 
correlation between these variables and some of the other explanatory variables 
included, namely state ineffectiveness, raised some concerns over multicollinearity. I 
have followed two procedures to investigate this possibility. First, I considered the 
pairwise correlations between the variables. Second, and following the suggestion of 
Kennedy (2008: 199), I used the inverse of the correlation matrix to detect 
multicollinearity, and compute the variance inflation factors, VIFi (i.e. its diagonal 
elements). Two rules of thumb are usually applied to detect harmful collinearity: i) VIFi 
> 10; and ii) the mean of all the VIFs is considerably larger than 1 (Kennedy, 2008: 199; 
StataCorp., 2013). 
The results obtained using the cross-country datasets confirmed the possibility for 
multicollinearity. The correlation between the ICRG index and the state ineffectiveness 
index was high in all the periods considered (-0.936 when the dataset for period 1993-
2012 was used, -0.925 for period 1993-2002, and -0.927 for period 2003-2012), which 
motivated the exclusion of this variable from the main analysis.79 In terms of life 
expectancy, the pairwise correlations highlight a negative correlation with the state 
ineffectiveness index, but lower than -0.7 in all the periods considered. 
The second of the aforementioned methods was used to further explore whether 
including this variable would be problematic. The diagnostic tests for multicollinearity 
indicated a VIF of 7.02 for life expectancy for the 20-year period, and a mean VIF of 3.19. 
The values were slightly lower for period 1993-2002, with the VIF value for life 
expectancy being 6.39, and a mean VIF of 3.03. When considering the second 10-year 
                                                             
79 In section 4.5.2 I discuss the results obtained when this variable is included. 
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period 2003-2012, the values were higher than before. The VIF for life expectancy was 
12.73, and the mean VIF in this case was 4.13. The VIF for the state ineffectiveness index 
was also quite high, and, with the exception of the last of the periods considered, similar 
to that of life expectancy. In light of these results, I have decided not to consider life 
expectancy in the main analysis.80  
Focusing on the remaining controls and the variables of interest, the observation of the 
correlation matrices (Tables C2.1-C2.3 in Appendix C2) does not suggest much reason 
for concern. As a rule of thumb, absolute values below 0.8 are not usually considered as 
indicators of potential collinearity. Given that most values are below this threshold in 
the three time horizons, I did not consider it to pose any problems. The only exceptions 
are the correlation coefficients for the pair of variables state ineffectiveness and GDP per 
capita, which are above 0.8 in the three periods. However, these are both crucial for the 
analysis, so they were included. 
Still, I use the second procedure to confirm this conclusion. The obtained values 
(represented in Table C2.6 in Appendix C2) show that no VIF is greater than 10, but the 
mean VIF is 2.69 for period 1993-2012, 2.60 for period 1993-2002, and 2.83 for period 
2003-2012, which is slightly above the unit. Despite these results, there seems to be no 
further reason for concern.  
The same analysis was also carried out to the panel data covering the full time period 
1993-2012. In line with previous studies employing similar lists of variables (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2005), the standard deviation of the terms of trade was not included with 
this data structure. Again, the ICRG was highly correlated with the state ineffectiveness 
index (with a coefficient of -0.907 when 5-year periods were considered and -0.920 for 
the dataset with 10-year periods), and it was thus excluded from the analysis.81 The 
obtained correlation coefficients between life expectancy and state ineffectiveness were 
0.770 and 0.750 for the 5-year period dataset and the 10-year period data, respectively. 
When looking at the levels obtained for the VIF, in the case of the data with 5-year 
averages, the value for life expectancy was 7.72, and the mean VIF was 3.07. The mean 
VIF for the panel dataset obtained with 10-year averages is 3.23, with a value of 8.07 for 
                                                             
80 Basic OLS regressions were run including life expectancy, and the coefficient obtained for this 
variable was significant at 10% level in only one of the three specifications. Additionally, the 
results obtained when life expectancy is used instead of education are briefly discussed in 
section 4.5.2. 
81 In section 4.5.2 I discuss the results obtained when this variable is included. 
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life expectancy. Similarly to the decision made for cross-country data, life expectancy 
was left out of the main analysis.82 
After considering these changes, the correlation matrices for the two datasets did not 
suggest further reason for concern, with the exception being again the correlation 
coefficients between state ineffectiveness and the logarithm of per capita GDP.83 
Furthermore, similarly to the cross-country datasets, the analysis of the VIFs (also 
represented in Appendix C2, Table C2.7) did not show any individual value above 10 and 
the mean VIFs were 2.40 and 2.57 for the datasets with 5-year averages and 10-year 
averages, respectively.  
 
4.4.2. Outliers 
A second aspect that warrants further investigation in this type of analysis is the 
potential for the existence of outliers. I adopt the Hadi (1992) procedure for identifying 
multiple outliers as implemented by Roodman (2007a) to the partial estimation of 
growth and a regressor of interest.84 This method starts by measuring the distance 
between data points and the main body of the data, and then applies an interactive 
process that decreases the sample to eliminate distant data points (Lessmann and 
Markwardt, 2012: 1734). 
Table 29 represents the results obtained after applying this procedure to the two main 
regressors of interest – state ineffectiveness and political violence – to the cross-country 
and panel data, respectively. The results vary with the dataset considered, with India 
being identified as an outlier in the three cross-country datasets.85 In the case of panel 
data, observations for Myanmar and Burundi are identified as potential outliers in the 5-
year and 10-year averaged datasets, respectively.  
                                                             
82 Once again I considered a regression specification including all control variables and life 
expectancy for the three periods, and none of the coefficients obtained for this variable were 
significant. However, the results obtained when life expectancy is used instead of education are 
briefly discussed in section 4.5.2. 
83 The correlation matrices for the panel data can be found in Appendix C2, Tables C2.4 and 
C2.5. 
84 This consists on the partial estimations of growth and a regressor of interest on the remaining 
regressors, and the application of the Hadi (1992) procedure to the residuals obtained from 
these estimations. In addition to this procedure, I make use of Stata’s command bacon (Weber, 
2010), a recently presented alternative to the hadimvo command (which applies the Hadi’s 
procedure) to identify outliers in multivariate data. 
85 The observation of the scatter plots comparing the residuals of the obtained estimations 
concurs to the conclusions presented in Table 29. 
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Table 29. Outliers identified with the Hadi procedure  
 Cross-country Panel 
 20-year 10-year 
5-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
SII 0 0 0 Myanmar (2003-2007) 0 
PVI 
Colombia 
India 
Israel 
India 
Colombia 
India 
0 Burundi (1993-2002) 
Notes: 0.05 was used as the cut-off significance level for both when applying the Hadi procedure and using 
the bacon command. The latter did not identify any outliers across the different datasets. Periods 
represented in parenthesis for the results with panel data. 
Additionally, I consider the potential outliers in terms of growth rates by using a 
graphical procedure that consists in the observation of a leverage-versus-squared-
residual plot. This is a graph of leverage against the (normalized) residuals squared and 
includes two lines showing the average values for these two dimensions. Any points 
lying above the horizontal line have a leverage value which is higher than average, and 
any points lying to the right of the vertical line have residuals which are higher than 
average (StataCorp., 2013). The first of these groups of points causes the most concern. 
Although there is no consensus on what threshold level to consider for leverage values, 
some consider as a rule of thumb that values higher than 0.5 constitute a reason for 
concern. Others use as a selection criterion values of the leverage higher than 2xK/N, 
where K is the number of parameters (including the intercept) and N is the sample size. 
Given that the value of the latter is close to 0.4 in the samples considered here, and it is 
also lower than 0.5, I consider this as the threshold level. The plots are not included here, 
but Table 30 lists the countries highlighted with this procedure.  
Table 30. Outliers identified for economic growth 
 Cross-country Panel 
 20-year 10-year 
5-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
Economic 
growth 
Congo, D. Rep. Brazil 
Algeria 
India 
Russia 
Venezuela 
Brazil (1993-1997) Brazil (1993-2002) 
Notes: These countries were selected based on the observation of the leverage-versus-squared-residual 
plot and by considering levels of the leverage higher than 0.4. 
For the following analysis, I opt to consider the whole sample with available data. 
However, bearing in mind the results of this preliminary analysis, I discuss the changes 
when the potential outliers are excluded from the sample in section 4.5.2. 
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4.5. RESULTS ANALYSIS 
 
This section presents the results obtained after estimating the empirical models 
discussed in subsection 4.4.1, beginning with the regressions estimated with OLS, using 
both cross-country and panel data, in subsection 4.5.1. These results are then submitted 
to a battery of robustness checks in subsection 4.5.2, and subsection 4.5.3 presents 
different alternatives to overcoming the potential endogeneity of state ineffectiveness 
and political violence. The final subsection further explores the data by looking at the 
results from spline regressions. Table 31 summarises the information contained in the 
main tables, clarifying the hypotheses tested, and respective coefficients of interest, as 
well as the variables included, and the time periods and horizons considered.86 
Table 31. Summary of the tables with the main results 
 
Baseline 
 Robustness checks  
Endogeneity   Outliers 
Alt 
controls  
Estimation method OLS  OLS  IV OLS 
Table 34 35  39 40 
41 
43 
42 
44 
 48 49 51 50 
52 
53 
Hypothesis, equation, coeff.                  
 H1, (2), β3 and β4 X  X   X  X  X X  X X X X X 
H2, (3), β5  X  X   X  X         
Variables                  
State ineffectiveness (SII) X X X X  X X X X X X  X X X X X 
Political violence (PVI) X X X X  X X X X X X  X X X X X 
SII x PVI  X  X   X  X         
Cross-country                  
20-year: 1993-12 X X    X X   X   X  X X  
10-year: 1993-02; 2003-12 X X    X X   X   X  X X  
Panel                  
5-year   X X    X X  X   X X X X 
10-year   X X    X X  X   X X X X 
In the baseline regressions, the first set of results includes a basic growth equation to 
which I added the index of state ineffectiveness and the index of political violence, and 
subsequently their interaction. The cross-country datasets consider two time horizons: 
a 20-year period is used first (1993-2012); and two 10-year periods are then considered 
in turn (1993-2002 and 2003-2012). The panel datasets were obtained using 5-year 
averages and 10-year averages, respectively. 
 
 
                                                             
86 I refer back to Table 27 for a summary of the hypotheses and coefficients of interest. 
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4.5.1. Baseline results 
a) Cross-country estimates 
I begin the analysis by using the cross-country data and considering the two time 
horizons described before. The results are represented in Table 32.  
 Table 32. Cross-country OLS estimations, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.410*** -1.437*** -1.221*** -1.228*** -1.484*** -1.532*** 
 (0.258) (0.244) (0.285) (0.277) (0.226) (0.210) 
Education 0.0314* 0.0300 0.0185 0.0176 0.0451** 0.0437** 
 (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0182) (0.0179) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00530 0.00531 -0.112* -0.109* 0.00331 0.00371 
 (0.00536) (0.00530) (0.0660) (0.0648) (0.00585) (0.00573) 
St. dev. terms of trade 0.00387 0.00479 0.0399 0.0447 0.0171 0.0143 
 (0.00990) (0.00986) (0.0399) (0.0369) (0.0145) (0.0140) 
Geography 0.231 0.234 -0.0326 -0.0113 -0.236 -0.193 
 (0.260) (0.257) (0.288) (0.290) (0.236) (0.228) 
Initial inflation -0.557 -0.473 -0.287 -0.326 19.93*** 21.31*** 
 (0.467) (0.479) (0.448) (0.470) (4.108) (4.215) 
Initial budget balance 0.0674 0.0638 0.0551 0.0470 0.0967** 0.107*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0419) (0.0464) (0.0473) (0.0368) (0.0351) 
Initial trade policy 0.236 0.153 1.080** 0.971** 0.155 -0.110 
 (0.514) (0.538) (0.465) (0.475) (0.563) (0.518) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.279*** -1.316*** -2.558*** -2.551*** -1.187** -1.198** 
 (0.477) (0.462) (0.685) (0.687) (0.542) (0.494) 
East Asia 1.127 1.204* 0.404 0.478 1.063** 1.218*** 
 (0.724) (0.685) (0.806) (0.831) (0.426) (0.405) 
Latin America 0.272 0.241 -1.227** -1.223** -0.125 -0.164 
 (0.440) (0.441) (0.558) (0.558) (0.534) (0.530) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.303*** -0.344** -0.382*** -0.416*** -0.375*** -0.446*** 
 (0.110) (0.146) (0.144) (0.145) (0.118) (0.106) 
Political violence 0.183* 0.186* -0.0999 -0.102 0.280*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0980) (0.0968) (0.113) (0.113) (0.0907) (0.0789) 
SI x PV   -0.0275  -0.0282  -0.0579 
  (0.0782)  (0.0844)  (0.0406) 
Constant 13.88*** 14.24*** 11.83*** 12.01*** 13.08*** 13.86*** 
 (2.387) (2.272) (2.598) (2.452) (2.050) (1.941) 
Observations 92 92 87 87 80 80 
R2 0.456 0.459 0.456 0.458 0.663 0.675 
Adj. R2 0.365 0.361 0.359 0.352 0.597 0.606 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Columns with odd numbers were obtained with the baseline specification, with the goal 
of testing H1, whereas even numbered columns result from adding the interaction 
between state ineffectiveness and political violence, in order to test H2.87 I ignore the 
endogeneity concerns for the moment, and describe the results obtained with OLS. 
                                                             
87 A complete description of these variables and data sources is in Table C1.1, in Appendix C1. 
142 
 
Beginning with the controls used, the hypothesis of convergence is confirmed by the 
negative and significant coefficient for the initial level of real per capita GDP.88 The 
coefficient for education shows a positive effect, which is significant in three of the 
specifications considered. Among the remaining variables, when period 1993-2002 is 
considered, the coefficients for the change in terms of trade and the initial level of trade 
policy show, respectively, a significant negative and positive effect on growth. The 
coefficients for inflation and the initial level of the budget balance show a positive and 
significant effect of these variables on economic growth, when the 2003-2012 period is 
considered.  With the exception of inflation, the signs obtained for these variables are in 
line with the expected.  
The regional dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries indicates a negative and 
significant effect in all the specifications considered, whereas the East Asia dummy 
shows a positive effect, which is significant in three specifications, and, in particular, 
when period 2003-2012 is used. The dummy for Latin America captures a negative and 
significant regional effect only when the 10-year horizon from 1993 to 2002 is 
considered. 
Turning now to the variables of interest, state ineffectiveness has a negative and 
significant effect on economic growth in all specifications. This is in line with the 
theoretical predictions and with previous related work (as discussed in section 4.2). For 
instance, for period 1993-2012, column (1), the estimated coefficient suggests that, if the 
position of a country in terms of state ineffectiveness moves from the 25th percentile to 
the 75th percentile, the state ineffectiveness index would rise by approximately 3.19, 
from -1.28 to 1.91. If the state ineffectiveness index did rise by this amount, then growth 
would fall by almost 1 percentage point. 
In contrast with the intuition from theory, the coefficient for political violence reveals a 
positive and significant effect when the 20-year time horizon is considered and when 
                                                             
88 According to the growth empirics literature, there is β-convergence when the coefficient for 
initial per capita income is below 0 and many cross-section studies find estimated convergence 
rates of about 2% per year (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005: 586). Applying the formula 
included in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: 517), the results in this chapter concur with this 
hypothesis, even though the rates of convergence are slightly below this value. Considering the 
coefficients on Table 32, one obtains rates of: 1.66% and 1.69% for the period 1993-2012; 1.3% 
and 1.31% for period 1993-2002; and 1.61% and 1.66% for period 2003-2012. As discussed in 
Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005: 586), the literature on convergence has focused on 
samples of countries that are more homogeneous than the ones presented in the paper (e.g. 
OECD countries, US states, Swedish counties, Japanese prefectures, or regions of Europe). In 
addition, the controls used in the early studies differ from the ones used in this chapter. Finally, 
the estimated coefficients are in line with those obtained with more recent studies following 
similar approaches, namely Rajan and Subramanian (2008).   
143 
 
data for the 10-year period 2003-2012 are used, but it is negative and non-significant 
with data for the period 1993-2002. These conclusions are maintained when the 
interaction term between these two indices is included. There are minor changes in the 
magnitude of the coefficients, but, in general, the significance levels remain the same.  
Finally, I discuss the results obtained when testing the hypothesis that there is an 
interactive effect between state ineffectiveness and political violence. The results in 
columns (2), (4), and (6) do not suggest that there is a significant interactive effect. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is similar across specifications and they all exhibit a 
negative sign, but none is significant. Additionally, the inclusion of this term does not 
cause any major changes in the sign, significance levels, and magnitudes of the 
coefficients of either the variables of interest or the control variables. 
 
b) Panel estimates 
I turn now to the evidence on the impact of state fragility on growth obtained using panel 
data, considering the 5-year and 10-year averages, represented in Table 33. Columns (1) 
and (3) examine the effect of the two symptoms of state fragility on growth, thus testing 
hypothesis H1, using equation (2). Columns (2) and (4) add the interaction between 
these two variables to test H2, using equation (3). 
Starting with the 5-year averaged data, the expected negative and significant coefficient 
for the initial level of GDP is confirmed. The results suggest a positive and significant 
effect of education, although of small magnitude. Against the prediction from theory, one 
finds a positive and significant effect of inflation. Similarly, the results indicate that there 
is a positive and significant link between budget balance and economic growth. In terms 
of the regional variables, the only significant coefficients demonstrate a negative effect 
for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Turning now to the variables of interest, the expected negative effect of state 
ineffectiveness persists when panel data are considered. However, it loses significance 
after the inclusion of the interaction term with political violence. Regarding the latter 
variable, the obtained coefficient is positive, but small in magnitude and not significant. 
Finally, the result for the interaction term does not lend support to the existence of an 
interactive effect of these two variables on growth. 
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Table 33. Panel OLS estimations, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.226*** -1.187***  -1.572*** -1.577*** 
 (0.327) (0.322)  (0.235) (0.221) 
Education 0.0407** 0.0428**  0.0375*** 0.0372*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0174)  (0.0143) (0.0141) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00317 0.00281  -0.00233 -0.00224 
 (0.0162) (0.0163)  (0.00828) (0.00821) 
Geography 0.127 0.107  -0.146 -0.141 
 (0.240) (0.249)  (0.219) (0.222) 
Inflation 1.138** 1.078**  0.189 0.183 
 (0.522) (0.441)  (0.528) (0.547) 
Budget balance 0.130*** 0.125***  0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0475)  (0.0366) (0.0364) 
Trade policy -0.407 -0.253  0.0648 0.0260 
 (0.734) (0.690)  (0.538) (0.468) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.929*** -1.887***  -2.158*** -2.157*** 
 (0.538) (0.548)  (0.569) (0.569) 
East Asia 0.912 0.826  0.686 0.703 
 (0.651) (0.583)  (0.575) (0.520) 
Latin America -0.457 -0.429  -0.501 -0.502 
 (0.406) (0.418)  (0.402) (0.403) 
State ineffectiveness -0.238* -0.190  -0.322*** -0.331*** 
 (0.126) (0.145)  (0.0990) (0.105) 
Political violence 0.0754 0.0689  0.0545 0.0560 
 (0.106) (0.106)  (0.0977) (0.0933) 
SI x PV  0.0407   -0.00741 
  (0.0700)   (0.0697) 
Constant 13.05*** 12.05***  16.04*** 16.14*** 
 (3.102) (3.046)  (2.384) (2.099) 
Observations 198 198  167 167 
R2 0.325 0.328  0.322 0.322 
Adj. R2 0.273 0.273  0.264 0.260 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Time dummies also included in the 
regressions. 
Considering the 10-year averaged data, with the exception of inflation, the obtained 
results show similar results for the coefficients of the control variables that are 
significant. The adverse effect of state ineffectiveness found previously holds when 10-
year averages are considered, and also when the interaction term is added. The 
coefficient for political violence remains roughly the same, with a small reduction in 
magnitude, but still non-significant. The inclusion of the state ineffectiveness x political 
violence term does not cause major variations to the coefficients of the two variables, 
and despite the change in sign, it remains small in magnitude and non-significant. 
The discussed coefficients were simply estimated by OLS, and thus not recognizing the 
panel structure of the data. Given that using a panel structure allows one to account for 
individual heterogeneity, I explore this possibility further. Two tests provide some 
support for this decision. First, the results of the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) applied to the 5-year averages dataset indicated that one 
can reject the null hypothesis that the variances across entities are zero, thus suggesting 
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that random effects is more appropriate when compared to simple OLS. Still, one could 
not reject the null hypothesis for the case of 10-year averages. In other words, there is 
no evidence of significant differences across countries in this case, and therefore one can 
run a simple OLS regression. Second, the F-test that the observed and unobserved fixed 
effects are equal to zero indicated that one rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting the use 
of the fixed effects estimator.  
One of the central issues when estimating panel data is whether the unobserved unit 
effects and time effects must be treated as random or fixed. The result of the Hausman 
test, frequently used to compare fixed effects and random effects, led to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient with random effects is efficient, thus, 
deeming fixed effects as the preferred model.89 In light of these results (summarised in 
Table 34), in what follows, I explore the coefficients obtained when panel structure is 
considered and the fixed-effects (FE) estimator is employed. These are presented in 
Table 35. 
Table 34. Diagnostic tests for panel data estimators 
 p-values 
 5-year averages 10-year averages 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 0.0001 0.1658 
F-test of 𝑢𝑖 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test 0.0026 0.0000 
  
In general there is a noticeable loss in the significance level of the explanatory variables, 
with only the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP and inflation holding a significant 
effect on growth in both datasets. When 5-year averaged data are considered, one 
notices a loss of significance of the negative coefficient for state ineffectiveness, whereas 
the term for political violence is now negative, but still non-significant. In the case of 10-
year averages, the sign of the coefficient for state ineffectiveness changed and it also lost 
significance. Similarly to the 5-year dataset, political violence exhibits a negative 
coefficient, which is, however, non-significant. The interaction term between these two 
variables is positive, but not significant in both datasets. 
 
                                                             
89 The Mundlak (1978) approach was also considered as an alternative to the Hausman test. 
This method estimates random effect regressions adding group-means of independent variables 
to the model. The results of the test for both the 5-year and 10-year averaged datasets rejected 
the null hypothesis that the panel-level means are jointly zero, lending support to the use of 
fixed effects. 
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Table 35. Panel FE estimations, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Initial pc GDP, log -8.273*** -8.517***  -6.408*** -6.546*** 
 (2.560) (2.555)  (1.112) (1.141) 
Education 0.0100 0.00357  -0.0287 -0.0310 
 (0.0391) (0.0392)  (0.0278) (0.0268) 
Terms of trade growth -0.00484 -0.00674  -0.000116 -0.000498 
 (0.0102) (0.00969)  (0.00590) (0.00600) 
Inflation 0.916*** 0.912***  -1.224* -1.120* 
 (0.283) (0.277)  (0.694) (0.674) 
Budget balance 0.0927 0.0923  0.0358 0.0374 
 (0.0789) (0.0727)  (0.0554) (0.0555) 
Trade policy -0.589 -0.689  -1.179 -1.257 
 (1.165) (1.110)  (0.931) (0.887) 
State ineffectiveness -0.403 -0.585  0.767 0.698 
 (0.623) (0.654)  (0.514) (0.533) 
Political violence -0.0771 -0.156  -0.206 -0.276 
 (0.291) (0.286)  (0.319) (0.365) 
SI x PV  0.182   0.0808 
  (0.144)   (0.149) 
Constant 75.96*** 77.81***  61.35*** 62.37*** 
 (22.50) (22.44)  (10.04) (10.24) 
Observations 228 228  197 197 
R2 0.395 0.404  0.518 0.521 
Nr of countries 101 101  108 108 
Adj. R2 0.367 0.374  0.495 0.495 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Time dummies also included in the 
regressions. 
Despite the changes observed when the panel structure of the data was considered, these 
results should be regarded with caution. Fixed-effects estimators are useful when one 
wants to analyze the impact of variables that vary over time, but a recognized problem 
in the literature is that they will not be appropriate for variables that change slowly over 
time. This means that the limited time variation of state ineffectiveness and political 
violence may be the reason for the lack of a significant effect for these two indices. 90 
 
c) Summary of results 
Before moving to the discussion of the robustness of the estimated coefficients, I 
summarise the main conclusions from this section, briefly described in Table 36. Given 
the aforementioned reservations about the use of a panel structure, I focus on the results 
obtained with OLS. 
 
                                                             
90 An analysis of the variation of these variables over time (see Table C3.3. in Appendix C) 
indicated that most variation is explained by differences between rather than within countries. 
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Table 36. Summary of baseline results 
 Cross-country Panel* 
SI The coefficient is negative and significant in 
all specifications. 
Negative and significant in all 
specifications, but one of them. 
PV Positive and significant coefficient for 
periods 1993-2012 and 2003-2012, but 
negative and non-significant for period 
1993-2002. 
The coefficient is positive, but small in 
magnitude and never significant. 
SI x PV Negative coefficient, but it is not significant 
in any specification. 
The sign of the coefficient changes 
depending on the specification considered, 
but it is not significant in any of them. 
Notes: *Refers to the results obtained with pooled OLS. 
The evidence from the cross-country data suggests a negative effect of state 
ineffectiveness on economic growth, in line with previous studies examining the link 
between related concepts (such as state capacity and institutions) and economic growth. 
It is interesting to note the significant positive coefficient for political violence in some 
of the cross-country regressions, which, against the prediction, suggests that higher 
levels of political violence will contribute to higher economic growth. However, it is 
important to highlight that the sign of the coefficient and its significance level change 
dramatically with different data specifications. Finally, the lack of statistical significance 
of the coefficient for the interaction term seems to discard H2, showing no evidence that 
there is an interactive effect of these two variables on economic growth. 
 
4.5.2. Robustness checks 
a) Excluding outliers 
The results of the preliminary analysis of potential outliers presented in section 4.4.2, 
and summarised in Tables 29 and 30, called for closer scrutiny of the influence of some 
observations on the obtained results. Table 37 corresponds to the analysis represented 
in Table 32, excluding all of the potential outliers identified. More specifically, it includes 
the results for the main variables of interest obtained by applying OLS to the cross-
country datasets i) for period 1993-2012, for the original sample of countries, but 
excluding Israel, Colombia, India and Dem. Rep. Congo; ii) for period 1993-2002, 
excluding India and Brazil; iii) and for period 2003-2012, for the original sample 
excluding Colombia and India, as well as Algeria, Russia and Venezuela. 
The main differences in the obtained results lie in the coefficients for political violence, 
which remain positive but lose significance when using the 20-year period, and retain 
significance only in the specification after the interaction term is added for the decade  
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Table 37. Cross-country OLS estimations after excluding outliers, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-20121 1993-20022 2003-20123 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.391*** -0.347** -0.240 -0.269* -0.344** -0.404*** 
 (0.123) (0.166) (0.160) (0.145) (0.130) (0.112) 
Political violence 0.270 0.247 -0.176 -0.174 0.182 0.207** 
 (0.175) (0.165) (0.127) (0.123) (0.123) (0.0988) 
SI x PV   0.0287  -0.0220  -0.0428 
  (0.0952)  (0.0809)  (0.0359) 
Observations 88 88 85 85 75 75 
R2 0.464 0.466 0.471 0.473 0.652 0.659 
Adj. R2 0.370 0.364 0.374 0.367 0.578 0.579 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, the growth and variability 
of terms of trade, a measure of geography, initial level of inflation, initial budget balance, initial policy, and regional 
dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. . 1Considers the original sample of countries and excludes Israel, Colombia, India and Dem. Rep. Congo. 
2Considers the original sample of countries and excludes India and Brazil. 3Considers the original sample of countries 
and excludes Algeria, Colombia, India, Russia and Venezuela. 
2003-2012. The changes are smaller for period 1993-2002, with the term remaining 
negative and non-significant. 
Turning now to the results for state ineffectiveness, the obtained coefficients are similar, 
although slightly smaller in magnitude, in most cases, when compared to those obtained 
with the full sample of countries. There is an overall decrease in the significance level, 
but, with the exception of one specification, all of the coefficients remain significant. 
Finally, the results for the interaction term between the two variables remain roughly 
the same, although there is a change in the sign for the coefficient in period 1993-2012. 
The same principles were applied to panel data. According to the conclusions from the 
preliminary analysis included in Tables 29 and 30, the observations for Myanmar in 
2003-2007 and Brazil in 1993-1997 were identified as potential outliers when 5-year 
averaged data are considered. Also, the observations for Burundi and Brazil in period 
1993-2002 were signalled as potential outliers in the dataset using 10-year averages. 
Table 38 represents the coefficients obtained after dropping these observations from the 
datasets and applying OLS methods. 
When comparing the obtained results with those resulting from the full sample, in the 
case of the dataset with 5-year averages, one notices that the negative effect of state 
ineffectiveness is now significant even when the interaction term is included. The results 
for the alternative dataset remain virtually the same for this variable. In the case of the 
coefficient for political violence, there are only some changes in magnitude, but it 
remains not significant in any specification. The same applies for the interactive effect  
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Table 38. Panel OLS estimations after excluding outliers, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages1  10-year averages2 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
State ineffectiveness -0.254* -0.274**  -0.337*** -0.302*** 
 (0.133) (0.132)  (0.100) (0.108) 
Political violence 0.0628 0.0646  0.112 0.110 
 (0.107) (0.106)  (0.0809) (0.0814) 
SI x PV  -0.0157   0.0310 
  (0.0534)   (0.0585) 
Observations 196 196  165 165 
R2 0.306 0.307  0.346 0.350 
Adj. R2 0.253 0.249  0.290 0.289 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, growth of terms of trade, 
a measure of geography, inflation, budget balance, policy, and regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and 
Latin America. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1Considers the original 
sample of countries and excludes the observation for Myanmar in 2003-2007 and Brazil in 1993-1997. 2Considers the 
original sample of countries and excludes the observation for Burundi in 1993-2002 and Brazil in 1993-2002. 
between these two variables. Despite the changes in sign, there is no indication of a 
significant effect on growth. 
 
b) Alternative controls 
As mentioned in the literature review in section 4.2, there is no definite list of controls, 
and different authors use different sets of explanatory variables. The following 
paragraphs describe the results obtained after I allowed for some changes in the set of 
controls used.  
Firstly, I added the following three additional covariates, which can be frequently found, 
for instance, in the literature examining the link between aid and growth (e.g. Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008): 
 M2 as a ratio of GDP: averages over the relevant time periods of money and quasi 
money (M2) expressed as a percentage of GDP. This is a proxy for the level of 
depth of the financial system, and, thus, a positive sign is expected;  
 Revolutions: average number of revolutions, defined as “any illegal or forced 
change in the top government elite, any attempt at such change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the 
central government” (Banks and Wilson, 2016). It is expected to have a negative 
coefficient in the model; 
 Ethnic fractionalization: average of Alesina et al.’s (2003) measure of ethnic 
fractionalization over the period. This indicator reflects the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not share the same ethnicity, 
and it is expected to have a negative correlation with growth. 
150 
 
The results for cross-country data are shown in Table 39.91 The structure is similar to 
the previous tables with odd columns corresponding to the baseline specification and 
even columns presenting the results after adding the interaction term. 
Table 39. Cross-country OLS estimations with alternative controls, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.397*** -1.415*** -1.229*** -1.231*** -1.385*** -1.449*** 
 (0.283) (0.277) (0.305) (0.302) (0.276) (0.259) 
Education 0.0438** 0.0430* 0.0333* 0.0329* 0.0405 0.0401 
 (0.0216) (0.0218) (0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0252) (0.0249) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00273 0.00284 -0.0915 -0.0907 0.00381 0.00431 
 (0.00651) (0.00645) (0.0748) (0.0754) (0.00644) (0.00628) 
St. dev. terms of trade 0.00449 0.00480 0.0339 0.0351 0.0176 0.0153 
 (0.00980) (0.00972) (0.0392) (0.0355) (0.0167) (0.0158) 
Geography 0.156 0.164 0.0387 0.0456 -0.270 -0.209 
 (0.293) (0.296) (0.329) (0.338) (0.253) (0.247) 
Initial inflation -0.599 -0.538 -0.348 -0.356 19.29*** 20.72*** 
 (0.460) (0.483) (0.446) (0.465) (4.912) (4.934) 
Initial budget balance 0.0579 0.0555 0.0725 0.0703 0.0777 0.0880* 
 (0.0480) (0.0472) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0491) (0.0467) 
Initial policy 0.249 0.175 0.992** 0.957* 0.165 -0.104 
 (0.538) (0.604) (0.462) (0.549) (0.638) (0.591) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.264** -1.293** -2.198*** -2.200*** -1.225* -1.247** 
 (0.586) (0.582) (0.725) (0.730) (0.644) (0.618) 
East Asia 1.403* 1.481** 0.952 0.979 1.022* 1.246** 
 (0.723) (0.664) (0.820) (0.861) (0.562) (0.529) 
Latin America 0.345 0.322 -0.703 -0.708 -0.256 -0.258 
 (0.548) (0.549) (0.638) (0.648) (0.552) (0.538) 
Initial M2/GDP -0.00801 -0.00827 -0.0106 -0.0107 -0.00174 -0.00206 
 (0.00510) (0.00498) (0.00792) (0.00819) (0.00593) (0.00564) 
Revolutions -1.284** -1.222* -1.585* -1.540* -0.109 -0.0861 
 (0.571) (0.672) (0.864) (0.871) (0.532) (0.499) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.172 0.196 0.217 0.219 -0.109 0.00364 
 (0.673) (0.681) (0.879) (0.887) (0.697) (0.706) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.335** -0.363** -0.429*** -0.438*** -0.369*** -0.438*** 
 (0.130) (0.162) (0.137) (0.159) (0.135) (0.120) 
Political violence 0.380** 0.373** 0.194 0.186 0.284* 0.304** 
 (0.144) (0.160) (0.136) (0.149) (0.153) (0.133) 
SI x PV   -0.0211  -0.00790  -0.0605 
  (0.0827)  (0.0876)  (0.0442) 
Constant 13.99*** 14.23*** 12.15*** 12.20*** 12.58*** 13.42*** 
 (2.506) (2.471) (2.525) (2.477) (2.411) (2.299) 
Observations 80 80 74 74 69 69 
R2 0.490 0.491 0.522 0.522 0.589 0.604 
Adj. R2 0.360 0.352 0.387 0.377 0.462 0.472 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
                                                             
91 The multicollinearity analysis was repeated for the new set of variables and no concerns were 
raised. More specifically, the correlation between political violence and revolutions was below 
0.75 in all datasets. 
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Starting with the coefficients for the new explanatory variables, the obtained terms 
suggest a negative and significant effect of revolutions for the first two periods under 
consideration, but no significant effect for the decade 2003-2012. The initial level of 
financial depth exhibits a negative, small, coefficient across specifications, but it is not 
significant in any of them. Finally, the term for ethnic fractionalization indicates a 
positive effect of this variable on growth, but the coefficient is non-significant in all the 
regressions. 
Focusing now on the coefficients for two indices of fragility, one observes that, similarly 
to the results in section 4.5.1, state ineffectiveness exhibits a negative and significant 
effect on economic growth in all specifications, even when controlling for the possibility 
of an interactive effect with political violence. Regarding the latter, its positive effect now 
holds in all periods considered, but remains significant only in periods 1993-2012 and 
2003-2012. The lack of significance of the coefficients for the state ineffectiveness x 
political violence term again leads one to discard the hypothesis that there is an 
interactive effect of these variables on growth. 
The same analysis was repeated using the panel data, and the coefficients obtained can 
be observed in Table 40. When this data structure is used, the level of financial depth 
shows a negative and significant effect for the dataset with 10-year averages, but it is 
very small in magnitude. Similarly to the cross-country results, the same effect is found 
for revolutions, which is significant in most specifications. Finally, again the results do 
not indicate a significant effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth. 
In terms of the variables of interest, the main differences lie in the coefficient for political 
violence. In contrast with the results obtained before, this variable has a positive effect 
on growth, which is now significant and holds with different data structures and after 
the inclusion of the interaction term in the case of the 5-year averaged data. The results 
for state ineffectiveness and for its interaction with political violence remain roughly the 
same. 
The second possibility I address in this sub-section is related to the fact that the 
dimensions captured by the state ineffectiveness index are similar to those usually 
included in measures of institutional quality. As discussed in the preliminary analysis to 
ascertain the potential for multicollinearity, the state ineffectiveness index is highly 
correlated with the ICRG indicator of quality of government, which is frequently used as 
an indicator of the quality of institutions in a country.  
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Table 40. Panel OLS estimations with alternative controls, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.236*** -1.202***  -1.505*** -1.522*** 
 (0.342) (0.339)  (0.233) (0.224) 
Education 0.0474** 0.0490**  0.0442** 0.0431** 
 (0.0198) (0.0198)  (0.0182) (0.0183) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00426 0.00390  -0.000873 -0.000433 
 (0.0162) (0.0163)  (0.00840) (0.00817) 
Geography 0.167 0.150  -0.104 -0.0758 
 (0.259) (0.270)  (0.236) (0.241) 
Inflation 0.901* 0.861**  0.0326 0.000128 
 (0.467) (0.425)  (0.546) (0.578) 
Budget balance 0.120** 0.117**  0.100** 0.0985** 
 (0.0481) (0.0490)  (0.0399) (0.0384) 
Trade policy -0.314 -0.170  -0.0461 -0.213 
 (0.706) (0.689)  (0.501) (0.503) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.975*** -1.914***  -2.122*** -2.130*** 
 (0.708) (0.711)  (0.607) (0.600) 
East Asia 1.331* 1.218*  1.339* 1.455** 
 (0.721) (0.625)  (0.673) (0.621) 
Latin America -0.212 -0.176  -0.320 -0.324 
 (0.479) (0.493)  (0.418) (0.410) 
M2/GDP -0.00925 -0.00802  -0.0129** -0.0136** 
 (0.00796) (0.00736)  (0.00576) (0.00557) 
Revolutions -0.984** -1.022**  -0.891* -0.841 
 (0.438) (0.464)  (0.495) (0.538) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.569 0.538  0.589 0.627 
 (0.910) (0.913)  (0.709) (0.712) 
State ineffectiveness -0.302* -0.260  -0.414*** -0.448*** 
 (0.154) (0.163)  (0.115) (0.120) 
Political violence 0.255* 0.258*  0.208* 0.205 
 (0.129) (0.129)  (0.123) (0.126) 
SI x PV  0.0341   -0.0305 
  (0.0678)   (0.0677) 
Constant 14.60*** 14.00***  16.11*** 16.52*** 
 (3.347) (3.216)  (2.277) (2.121) 
Observations 176 176  143 143 
R2 0.386 0.388  0.400 0.404 
Adj. R2 0.320 0.318  0.324 0.323 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Tables 41 and 42 include, first, the coefficients estimated for the main variables of 
interest when both the ICRG and the state ineffectiveness index are included in the 
analysis, and then the results obtained when the ICRG replaces the state ineffectiveness 
index. 
When considering cross-country data (Table 41), with the exception of period 2003-
2012, the coefficient for state ineffectiveness remains negative and significant, which 
suggests that the obtained results are robust even when controlling for the quality of 
institutions in the country. However, despite not being significant in any of the baseline 
regressions, the coefficient for the ICRG index shows a positive and significant effect 
when the state ineffectiveness index is dropped from the analysis. 
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Table 41. Cross-country OLS estimations with ICRG, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ICRG -0.0361 3.377** 2.068 4.010*** -0.964 2.160* 
 (1.829) (1.436) (2.150) (1.510) (2.852) (1.106) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.363**  -0.377**  -0.392  
 (0.138)  (0.184)  (0.292)  
Political violence 0.198** 0.164* -0.0201 -0.0618 0.281*** 0.233** 
 (0.0937) (0.0924) (0.0896) (0.0977) (0.0957) (0.101) 
Observations 85 87 80 83 75 76 
R2 0.516 0.505 0.529 0.604 0.682 0.661 
Adj. R2 0.420 0.417 0.427 0.529 0.608 0.590 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, the growth and variability of 
terms of trade, a measure of geography, initial level of inflation, initial budget balance, initial policy, and regional dummies 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 42. Panel OLS estimations with ICRG, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ICRG -0.224 1.935  0.610 2.276** 
 (1.600) (1.289)  (1.632) (1.140) 
State ineffectiveness -0.313*   -0.307**  
 (0.161)   (0.142)  
Political violence 0.119 0.0322  0.124 0.113 
 (0.109) (0.115)  (0.0818) (0.0866) 
Observations 186 193  155 159 
R2 0.368 0.343  0.379 0.427 
Adj. R2 0.312 0.292  0.317 0.376 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, growth of terms of trade, a 
measure of geography, inflation, budget balance, policy, and regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin 
America. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Looking now at the coefficients obtained for the two datasets with panel data (Table 42), 
again state ineffectiveness remains negative and significant, after the inclusion of ICRG. 
Similarly to the results with cross-country data, when state ineffectiveness is not 
included, the coefficient for the ICRG index is positive, though significant only with the 
dataset with 10-year averages. 
A final robustness check was considered by replacing education with life expectancy as 
an indicator of human capital. The results are not reported here, but they showed a 
positive but non-significant effect of this variable in the three cross-sectional datasets as 
well as in the two datasets with panel data.  
 
c) Single index of state fragility 
A final test to the obtained results and to the overall claim in this thesis that it is 
important to consider the two indices separately is to compare the results with those 
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obtained with a single index of state fragility. This is explored by using two different 
single indices of state fragility, derived from the data used in the construction of the state 
ineffectiveness and political violence indices: i) the first is the first principal component 
obtained from applying PCA to the two indices; ii) the second is the first principal 
component obtained from applying PCA to all of the dimensions used in the two indices. 
I will refer to the first as version 1 and to the second as version 2.92  
These two variations of a single index of state fragility are then used to replace state 
ineffectiveness and political violence in the baseline growth regression. The results for 
cross-section data are reported in Table 43, whereas those obtained with the panel 
datasets are shown in Table 44. For brevity, I include only the coefficients obtained for 
the two indices.  
Table 43. Cross-country OLS estimations with a single index of state fragility, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State fragility (version 1) -0.00254  -0.567***  0.0731  
 (0.193)  (0.205)  (0.215)  
State fragility (version 2)  -0.106  -0.353***  -0.0971 
  (0.0857)  (0.0980)  (0.0983) 
Observations 92 92 87 87 80 80 
R2 0.401 0.409 0.443 0.460 0.599 0.603 
Adj. R2 0.311 0.320 0.353 0.372 0.527 0.532 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control variables included are: logarithm 
of the initial level of income per capita, the growth and variability of terms of trade, a measure of geography, initial level 
of inflation, initial budget balance, initial policy, and regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin 
America. 
 
Table 44. Panel OLS estimations with a single index of state fragility, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
State fragility (version 1) -0.0335   -0.253  
 (0.219)   (0.183)  
State fragility (version 2)  -0.102   -0.203** 
  (0.107)   (0.0835) 
Observations 198 198  167 167 
R2 0.312 0.315  0.296 0.308 
Adj. R2 0.263 0.267  0.241 0.254 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control variables included are: 
logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, growth of terms of trade, a measure of geography, inflation, budget 
balance, policy, regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin America, and time dummies. 
The results concur with the argument that, by considering a single index of state fragility, 
one may be overlooking the effect of different aspects of this phenomenon. With the 
                                                             
92 The eigenvectors obtained with these two procedures are included in Table C3.2 in Appendix 
C3. 
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exception of the 10-year period between 1993 and 2002, the coefficients for neither of 
the state fragility indices show a significant effect on economic growth. When 
considering panel data, only one of the obtained coefficients for each version of the index 
shows a significant impact of state fragility. 
Before concluding this section, I add that the opposite reasoning was also considered. 
That is, the argument for the disintegration of state fragility proposed in this and in the 
previous chapters was taken to the extreme and all of the variables used in the 
construction of each of the indicators were used as regressors, instead of aggregated into 
indices. The obtained coefficients are not presented here but can be found in Appendix 
C4, Table C4.1. These preliminary results should be regarded with care, and one should 
not forget that the interpretation of some of them is now different. For example, most 
variables used to build the variable state ineffectiveness are negatively correlated with 
this index, and are thus expected to have a positive effect on growth. Bearing this in mind, 
I confine my comments on the obtained results to highlighting public expenditure in 
health, failure of state authority, and coups d’état as the only variables showing a 
significant effect in more than one specification.  
 
d) Summary of results 
The main insights from this section are synthesized in Table 45. In line with the results 
presented before, the negative and significant link between state ineffectiveness and 
growth is robust to excluding potentially influential observations, and to including 
additional covariates. 
The results for the index of political violence are more surprising. When dropping 
outliers, in general the positive effect indicated by the obtained coefficient is not 
significant. However, the inclusion of the indicators of financial quality, revolutions, and 
ethnic fractionalization resulted in a positive and significant effect also in the panel 
regressions. Finally, there is again no evidence that supports the hypothesis of an 
interactive effect between the two variables. 
In addition to these results, this section also demonstrated that by considering a single 
index of state fragility, one might not capture the effects of different dimensions of state 
fragility on growth. The coefficients obtained when considering two versions for a single 
index of state fragility (obtained from the same data used to build the state 
ineffectiveness and political violence indices) were significant in only a few of the  
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Table 45. Summary of results from the robustness checks 
 Outliers 
 Cross-country Panel 
SI Negative and significant effect in almost all 
specifications. 
Negative and significant effect in all 
specifications. 
PV The sign of the coefficient varies depending on 
the period considered and it is significant in 
only one specification. 
Positive effect, but it is not significant in any of 
the specifications. 
SI x PV The sign of the coefficient varies depending on 
the dataset used and it is never significant. 
The sign of the coefficient varies depending on 
the dataset used and it is never significant. 
 Alternative controls 
 Cross-country Panel 
SI Negative and significant in all specifications. Negative and significant in three of the four 
specifications. 
PV Positive coefficient in all specifications, but 
significant only when periods 1993-2012 and 
2003-2012 are considered. 
Positive and significant in three of the four 
specifications. 
SI x PV Negative coefficient, but small in magnitude 
and non-significant in all specifications. 
The sign of the coefficient varies depending on 
the dataset used and it is never significant. 
specifications considered. The next section takes into account the considerations about 
potential endogeneity made before, and explores a few possibilities to overcoming this 
challenge. 
 
4.5.3. Addressing endogeneity 
In light of the issues discussed in section 4.3.3, the following paragraphs present the 
results from exploring a series of strategies for overcoming the potential endogeneity of 
state ineffectiveness and political violence.  
The first group of estimations follows one of the most common approaches and was 
obtained by applying instrumental variable procedures. More specifically, I explore 
three alternatives as instruments for state ineffectiveness: i) Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson’s (2001) logarithm of settler mortality; ii) Hall and Jones’ (1999) list of 
instruments which represent the extent of Western European influence, namely distance 
to equator, fraction of the population speaking a European language, fraction of the 
population speaking English, and Frankel and Romer’s log of predicted trade share; and 
iii) reduce the previous list to the distance to equator and the fraction of population 
speaking a European language. To clarify: 
 Log of settler mortality: time-invariant variable representing the logarithm of 
the settler mortality estimates provided by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001). According to these authors, the diseases that potential European settlers 
faced in the colonies (mostly malaria and yellow fever) influenced the patterns 
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of settlement and the type of institutions that were put in place, but did not have 
a major effect on the health and economy of indigenous people;  
 Distance to equator: time-invariant variable obtained by taking the absolute 
value of latitude in degrees and dividing it by 90 to obtain a 0-1 scale. Hall and 
Jones (1999) argue that at the start of the fifteenth century Western Europeans 
were more likely to move and settle in regions that were sparsely populated and 
with a similar climate to Western Europe, and these criteria suggest regions far 
from the equator; 
 Population speaking a European language: time-invariant variable that 
represents the fraction of a country’s population speaking one of the five 
primary Western European languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, 
and Spanish) as a mother tongue in the present (considering 1999 as the present 
year). According to the same authors, this will be correlated with the extent of 
Western European influence; 
 Population speaking English: similarly to the previous variable, this is a time-
invariant variable that captures the percentage of the population speaking 
English as a mother tongue, and was selected for similar reasons, but in order to 
allow for the potential of a separate impact; 
 Frankel and Romer’s log of predicted trade share: this variable was constructed 
by Frankel and Romer (1996) and is based on a gravity model of international 
trade that considers only the population of a country and its geographical 
characteristics. 
In the case of political violence, two possibilities are examined with both cross-country 
and panel data: i) consider the initial value of political violence; and ii) use the level of 
domestic food price index (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2016) averaged across 
the relevant period as an instrument for this variable. The latter is inspired by the work 
that finds a positive causal link between rising food prices and social unrest (e.g. Arezki 
and Bruckner, 2011; Bellemare, 2014).  
The subsequent paragraphs present and discuss the obtained results. The interaction 
term between state ineffectiveness and political violence poses additional challenges in 
terms of finding an appropriate instrument. In order to simplify the analysis, this term 
is not included in the discussion that follows. 
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a) State ineffectiveness 
Table 46 contains the coefficients obtained by estimating the data with IV methods. 
Columns (1), (4), and (7) correspond to the results using the logarithm of settler 
mortality as an instrument for state ineffectiveness. Focusing on the main variables of 
interest, the coefficient for state ineffectiveness maintains its negative sign, but it is not 
significant in any of the datasets considered. Political violence shows a positive 
coefficient, which is significant only when the 20-year period is used. 
The last rows of Table 46 contain the results for some of the tests for instrument 
strength. The p-value of the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) statistic is obtained from an 
underidentification test using the rank-based statistic developed by Kleibergen and Paap 
(2006), which, if lower than 0.05, leads one to reject the hypothesis that the equation is 
underidentified. As pointed out by Bazzi and Clemens (2013: 158), even if the rejection 
of the null hypothesis is an indication that the smallest canonical correlation between 
endogenous variables and instruments is different from zero, this is not significant for 
strong correlation. Thus, I also include as an indicator of weak identification, the first-
stage F-statistics, which, as a rule of thumb, should be at least 10 for weak identification 
not to be considered a problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The logarithm of settler 
mortality fails to pass both tests, thus indicating that it is not a strong instrument for the 
purposes of this analysis. 
There are some reasons that may explain the weakness of the variable settler mortality 
rate as an instrument. First, the dependent variable used in this chapter is the GDP 
growth rate rather than the level of per capita income as in Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) and subsequent studies. Second, the state ineffectiveness index is a 
more comprehensive measure when compared to the risk of expropriation, which is the 
measure of institutions used by the aforementioned authors. Furthermore, the results 
for the tests on instrument strength are very similar when the state ineffectiveness index 
is replaced by the ICRG index, another widely used measure of institutions.  
Third, this instrument has been criticised by different authors (Albouy, 2012; Glaeser at 
al., 2004; Olsson, 2004). Albouy (2012) raises doubts about the reliability and 
comparability of the European setter mortality data. The author offers two main reasons 
for these concerns. First, Albouy (2012: 3060) claims that more than half of the mortality 
rates for the countries in the sample do not originate from within their own borders, but 
rather they are “unfounded and potentially contradictory” assignments based on 
countries with similar disease environments. Second, the author highlights that data on 
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Table 46. Cross-country IV estimations with instruments for state ineffectiveness, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 1993-2012  1993-2002  2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.238 -1.620*** -1.669***  -1.671** -1.778*** -1.748***  -2.210** -1.056** -1.240*** 
 (1.281) (0.431) (0.426)  (0.764) (0.599) (0.570)  (0.983) (0.426) (0.383) 
Education 0.0464 0.0282 0.0272  0.0269 0.0107 0.0112  0.0295 0.0548*** 0.0533*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0181) (0.0184)  (0.0208) (0.0177) (0.0174)  (0.0432) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00467 0.00362 0.00357  -0.207* -0.141** -0.140**  -0.00927** 0.000390 -0.000180 
 (0.0227) (0.00531) (0.00544)  (0.122) (0.0710) (0.0700)  (0.00382) (0.00690) (0.00642) 
St. dev. terms of trade -0.000650 0.00737 0.00819  0.0614* 0.0301 0.0305  0.00567 0.00544 0.00808 
 (0.0268) (0.0103) (0.0104)  (0.0347) (0.0376) (0.0377)  (0.0221) (0.0144) (0.0141) 
Geography 0.238 0.153 0.140  -0.187 -0.130 -0.124  -0.626 -0.122 -0.194 
 (0.536) (0.280) (0.280)  (0.455) (0.310) (0.304)  (0.629) (0.280) (0.258) 
Initial inflation 0.238 -0.522 -0.507  0.0204 0.337 0.312  19.25*** 16.38*** 17.41*** 
 (0.229) (0.448) (0.452)  (0.413) (0.479) (0.464)  (6.712) (5.194) (4.844) 
Initial budget balance 0.0893 0.0648 0.0642  0.0213 0.0567 0.0568  0.166* 0.0841** 0.0888*** 
 (0.0861) (0.0404) (0.0406)  (0.0934) (0.0496) (0.0491)  (0.0884) (0.0337) (0.0323) 
Initial policy 0.393 0.177 0.155  1.025 0.572 0.595  -0.433 0.559 0.497 
 (0.780) (0.488) (0.484)  (0.673) (0.584) (0.566)  (0.512) (0.643) (0.591) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.285* -1.411*** -1.437***  -2.664*** -2.565*** -2.562***  -2.124** -0.952* -1.087** 
 (0.704) (0.491) (0.491)  (0.730) (0.697) (0.694)  (0.827) (0.577) (0.535) 
East Asia 1.319 1.110 1.107  0.766 0.511 0.505  0.502 1.220*** 1.161*** 
 (0.922) (0.676) (0.680)  (0.806) (0.739) (0.739)  (0.692) (0.377) (0.363) 
Latin America -0.0229 0.348 0.373  -0.958 -0.953* -0.967*  -0.426 -0.220 -0.227 
 (0.988) (0.445) (0.447)  (0.777) (0.576) (0.564)  (0.555) (0.565) (0.532) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.195 -0.451* -0.488*  -0.810 -0.796** -0.774**  -0.907 -0.000448 -0.135 
 (0.931) (0.272) (0.268)  (0.574) (0.395) (0.371)  (0.903) (0.264) (0.242) 
Political violence 0.297*** 0.194* 0.199**  0.0245 -0.0358 -0.0385  0.365 0.178 0.204* 
 (0.113) (0.0998) (0.100)  (0.135) (0.103) (0.101)  (0.239) (0.119) (0.109) 
Constant 12.12 15.73*** 16.16***  15.06** 16.96*** 16.68***  20.73** 9.176** 10.76*** 
 (10.96) (3.835) (3.783)  (6.705) (5.495) (5.233)  (8.740) (3.802) (3.385) 
Exogenous instruments Settler 
mortality, log 
Dist. equator; 
Euro. lg.; Eng. lg.; 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator; 
European lang. 
 Settler 
mortality, log 
Dist. equator; 
Euro. lg.; Eng. lg.; 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator; 
European lang. 
 Settler 
mortality, log 
Dist. equator; 
Euro. lg.; Eng. lg.; 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator; 
European lang. 
Observations 58 91 91  55 86 86  48 79 79 
R2 0.531 0.450 0.445  0.553 0.393 0.398  0.576 0.614 0.644 
p-valuea --- 0.754 0.807  --- 0.946 0.785  --- 0.254 0.501 
p-value of LM statisticb 0.0906 0.000141 1.75e-05  0.0157 0.000506 0.000123  0.171 0.00341 0.000503 
F-stat for weak ident. 2.401 8.632 15.22  5.340 8.296 11.88  1.669 7.235 11.50 
Notes: Settler mortality, log is the logarithm of settler mortality rates provided by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). Dist. equator is obtained by taking the absolute value of latitude in degrees and dividing it 
by 90 to obtain a 0-1 scale. Euro. lg. and Eng. lg. correspond, respectively, to the fraction of a country’s population speaking one of the five primary Western European languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, 
and Spanish) and English as a mother tongue. FR trade share is Frankel and Romer’s log of predicted trade share. ap-value of Hansen J statistic. bThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural 
equation is underidentified. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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mortality rates does not come from actual European settlers, but instead from European 
and American soldiers in the nineteenth century. After controlling for the source of the 
mortality rate, Albouy (2012: 3060) finds a substantially weaker correlation between 
expropriation risk and mortality rates. In a previous study, Glaeser et al. (2004) had 
already described some concerns about the validity of this variable as an instrument for 
institutions. The authors argued that the data is not informative about what European 
settlers brought, stating that it could have been human capital, political institutions, or 
something else. Therefore, the effects of colonial settlement could have worked through 
many channels, which undermines their validity as instruments for institutions (Glaeser 
et al., 2004: 296). Finally, Olsson (2004) had also demonstrated that disaggregating 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s (2001) sample into different groups for Latin 
American, African, Asian and Neo-European countries showed a weak or even non-
existent link between disease environment and institutions. 
Turning now to columns (2), (5), and (8), they correspond to the coefficients obtained 
when the four instruments proposed in Hall and Jones (1999) were employed. They 
indicate that the negative effect of state ineffectiveness on growth holds again in the 
three periods, and it is now significant in two of them (1993-2012 and 1993-2002). The 
term for political violence is positive and significant with period 1993-2012, but the sign 
changes and it is non-significant for the remaining periods, which suggests that the result 
is not robust across specifications. This instrumentation strategy is stronger than the 
one previously described. It passes the overidentification test, although the value for the 
F-test is still below the threshold level considered to rule out instrumentation weakness. 
Based on the significance levels of the four variables used as instruments in the first-
stage regressions (not presented here for space reasons), I dropped the fraction of the 
population speaking English and the measure of trade share, and kept only the distance 
to the equator and the fraction of the population speaking a European language as 
exogenous instruments.93 The results are presented in columns (3), (6), and (9). They 
are similar to the ones obtained with the four instruments. State ineffectiveness holds a 
negative and significant coefficient for the 20-year period and for the decade 1993-2002, 
though there is a loss of significance for the period 2003-2012. The sign and significance 
level of the coefficient for political violence once again vary with the period considered, 
although it is positive and significant in two out of the three specifications. In terms of 
the strength of the instrument, considering only the distance to equator and the fraction 
                                                             
93 This is partly in line with the instruments for institutions used in Alcala and Ciccone (2004). 
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of people speaking a European language has led to an improvement. This 
instrumentation strategy passes both tests of instrument weakness in all specifications, 
as shown in the last two rows of Table 46. 
The same three sets of instruments were then applied to the panel data. The results are 
represented in Table 47, in columns (1)-(3) for 5-year averaged data, and (4)-(6) for 10-
year averages.  
Table 47. Panel IV estimations with instruments for state ineffectiveness, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Initial pc GDP, log -2.688** -1.884*** -1.768***  -2.268** -1.885*** -1.979*** 
 (1.241) (0.640) (0.608)  (0.927) (0.522) (0.491) 
Education 0.0173 0.0343* 0.0358*  0.0343 0.0378*** 0.0368** 
 (0.0364) (0.0196) (0.0194)  (0.0298) (0.0145) (0.0147) 
Terms of trade growth -0.0398 -0.0176 -0.0158  -0.0154*** -0.00925 -0.00955 
 (0.0300) (0.0177) (0.0181)  (0.00577) (0.00783) (0.00774) 
Geography -0.110 -0.0525 -0.0295  -0.344 -0.278 -0.306 
 (0.413) (0.287) (0.274)  (0.422) (0.265) (0.261) 
Inflation 1.145 1.402* 1.329*  0.901 0.878 1.004 
 (0.756) (0.790) (0.749)  (0.802) (0.782) (0.767) 
Budget balance 0.165** 0.117*** 0.117***  0.159** 0.125*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0454) (0.0445)  (0.0667) (0.0361) (0.0365) 
Trade policy -0.207 -0.504 -0.437  0.0290 0.0255 -0.0451 
 (1.030) (0.859) (0.830)  (0.916) (0.725) (0.704) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.475*** -2.210*** -2.169***  -2.502*** -2.344*** -2.391*** 
 (0.751) (0.581) (0.557)  (0.683) (0.611) (0.612) 
East Asia 1.403* 0.974 0.975  0.897 0.656 0.637 
 (0.810) (0.665) (0.656)  (0.647) (0.537) (0.540) 
Latin America 0.148 -0.328 -0.365  -0.238 -0.507 -0.482 
 (0.665) (0.471) (0.448)  (0.640) (0.400) (0.394) 
State ineffectiveness -1.124 -0.631* -0.557  -0.840 -0.525 -0.591** 
 (0.804) (0.380) (0.364)  (0.687) (0.323) (0.301) 
Political violence 0.249 0.0777 0.0713  0.212 0.0707 0.0810 
 (0.155) (0.102) (0.102)  (0.203) (0.106) (0.103) 
Constant 27.29** 20.04*** 18.96***  22.31** 18.66*** 19.55*** 
 (11.91) (6.219) (5.885)  (8.991) (5.106) (4.791) 
Exogenous instruments Settler 
mortality, log 
Dist. equator; 
Euro. lg.; Eng. lg.; 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator 
European lang.  
Settler  
mortality, log 
Dist. equator; 
Euro. lg.; Eng. lg.; 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
Observations 136 196 196  103 165 165 
R2 0.361 0.295 0.304  0.428 0.320 0.311 
Adj. R2 0.287 0.240 0.250  0.344 0.262 0.252 
p-valuea --- 0.753 0.606  --- 0.774 0.927 
p-value of LM statisticb 0.0339 0.000447 7.72e-05  0.0185 0.000335 6.61e-05 
F-stat for weak ident. 4.465 9.348 12.97  5.412 10.38 13.77 
Notes: Settler mortality, log is the logarithm of settler mortality rates provided by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001). Dist. equator is obtained by taking the absolute value of latitude in degrees and dividing it by 90 to obtain a 0-1 
scale. Euro. lg. and Eng. lg. correspond, respectively, to the fraction of a country’s population speaking one of the five 
primary Western European languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish) and English as a mother 
tongue. FR trade share is Frankel and Romer’s log of predicted trade share. All estimations include time dummies. Cluster 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ap-value of Hansen J statistic. bThe null hypothesis 
of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified.  
In all three cases, these instrumentation strategies seem stronger when applied to this 
data structure. In terms of the obtained results, they are roughly in line with those 
obtained before. The sign of the coefficient for state ineffectiveness is negative in all 
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estimations, but significant in only some of the specifications considered. The political 
violence term is now positive in all specifications, but not significant in any one of them.94 
 
b) Political violence 
Finding an appropriate instrument for political violence is even harder than the quest 
for instruments for state ineffectiveness. A great number of studies exploring the links 
between variables related to political violence use GMM methods (e.g. Bodea and 
Elbadawi, 2008; Biswas et al., 2016). However, given the limitations of these methods95, 
I opt for exploring two different approaches here. 
The first strategy used to isolate the possible effect of economic growth on the level of 
political violence was to consider its initial value in the regressions. The results obtained 
for cross-country and for panel data are presented in Table 48. Overall, they do not show 
significant differences in terms of the signs and significance levels for the two variables 
of interest. In fact, one still observes a positive coefficient for political violence in most 
cases, which, however, is only significant in two out of the five specifications. The 
negative and significant effect of state ineffectiveness remains robust in all regressions. 
The second attempt considered a food price index as an instrument for political violence. 
As discussed in section 4.4.3, a few recent studies have determined a link between rising 
food prices and increases in the levels of political violence (Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; 
Bellemare, 2014). The results obtained for cross-country and panel data, portrayed in 
Table 49, cast serious doubts on the strength of this variable as an instrument. There 
was a dramatic loss in the explanatory power of the model and the tests for instrument 
weakness are failed across specifications.96 
                                                             
94 In an additional attempt to overcome the problem that weak instruments may lead to 
estimated coefficients that are biased towards OLS, I use Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimation. Following Ricciuti, Savoia and Sen (2016: 25), I use the Fuller’s 
version of LIML (Fuller, 1977; Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007), which is more robust than 
the IV methods in the presence of weak instruments and seems to have lower small-sample 
variability when compare to LIML. In line with the strategy by the same authors, I employ the 
Fuller 4 version, which minimises the mean squared error of the estimator (Fuller, 1977). In the 
just identified case, the IV and the LIML estimators are the same. Thus, this strategy was only 
employed when Hall and Jones’ (1999) instruments were used, and when these were restricted. 
The results are in line with the IV estimations and can be found in Table C4.2, in Appendix C4. 
95 See, for instance, Roodman (2009), Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010), and Frot and Perrotta 
(2012). 
96 Terrain ruggedness was also considered as a potential instrument for political violence. 
Despite passing the tests for instrumental weakness, the argument for the exogeneity of this 
variable was hard to defend. For instance, the impact of terrain ruggedness on income through 
its effects on institutions has been defended in the literature (e.g. Nunn and Puga, 2012).  
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Table 48. Cross-country and panel OLS estimations with initial level of political violence, 
1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 Cross-country  Panel 
 20-year 10-year  5-year 
averages 
10-year 
averages  1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.410*** -1.221*** -1.484***  -1.226*** -1.572*** 
 (0.258) (0.285) (0.226)  (0.327) (0.235) 
Education 0.0314* 0.0185 0.0451**  0.0407** 0.0375*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0151) (0.0182)  (0.0176) (0.0143) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00530 -0.112* 0.00331  0.00317 -0.00233 
 (0.00536) (0.0660) (0.00585)  (0.0162) (0.00828) 
St. dev. terms of trade 0.00387 0.0399 0.0171    
 (0.00990) (0.0399) (0.0145)    
Geography 0.231 -0.0326 -0.236  0.127 -0.146 
 (0.260) (0.288) (0.236)  (0.240) (0.219) 
Inflationa -0.557 -0.287 19.93***  1.138** 0.189 
 (0.467) (0.448) (4.108)  (0.522) (0.528) 
Budget balancea 0.0674 0.0551 0.0967**  0.130*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0464) (0.0368)  (0.0462) (0.0366) 
Policya 0.236 1.080** 0.155  -0.407 0.0648 
 (0.514) (0.465) (0.563)  (0.734) (0.538) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.279*** -2.558*** -1.187**  -1.929*** -2.158*** 
 (0.477) (0.685) (0.542)  (0.538) (0.569) 
East Asia 1.127 0.404 1.063**  0.912 0.686 
 (0.724) (0.806) (0.426)  (0.651) (0.575) 
Latin America 0.272 -1.227** -0.125  -0.457 -0.501 
 (0.440) (0.558) (0.534)  (0.406) (0.402) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.303*** -0.382*** -0.375***  -0.238* -0.322*** 
 (0.110) (0.144) (0.118)  (0.126) (0.0990) 
Initial political violence 0.183* -0.0999 0.280***  0.0754 0.0545 
 (0.0980) (0.113) (0.0907)  (0.106) (0.0977) 
Constant 13.88*** 11.83*** 13.08***  13.05*** 16.04*** 
 (2.387) (2.598) (2.050)  (3.102) (2.384) 
Observations 92 87 80  198 167 
R2 0.456 0.456 0.663  0.325 0.322 
Adj. R2 0.365 0.359 0.597  0.273 0.264 
Notes: Robust and cluster robust standard errors in parentheses for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel estimations include time dummies. aThe initial level of these three variables is considered 
in the cross-country regressions. 
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Table 49. Cross-country and panel IV estimations with instrument for political violence, 
1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 Cross-country  Panel 
 20-year 10-year  5-year 
averages 
10-year 
averages  1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Initial pc GDP, log -0.924* -0.578 -1.313***  -0.574 -1.121** 
 (0.552) (0.748) (0.342)  (0.731) (0.513) 
Education 0.0267 0.0202 0.0421**  0.0354 0.0339** 
 (0.0205) (0.0238) (0.0183)  (0.0222) (0.0164) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00328 -0.0636 -0.00148  2.46e-05 -0.0126 
 (0.00715) (0.0923) (0.00419)  (0.0182) (0.0105) 
St. dev. TOT growth -0.0128 -0.00740 0.00588    
 (0.0190) (0.0567) (0.0120)    
Geography 0.634 0.858 -0.00667  0.526 0.460 
 (0.521) (0.772) (0.317)  (0.492) (0.524) 
Inflationa 0.205 -0.935 18.50***  1.455 -0.674 
 (0.603) (0.870) (3.983)  (4.571) (1.054) 
Budget balancea 0.153** 0.199 0.112***  0.165** 0.187*** 
 (0.0631) (0.121) (0.0418)  (0.0799) (0.0678) 
Policya 0.648 2.543** -0.0560  0.228 1.742 
 (0.705) (1.108) (0.746)  (1.384) (1.368) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.143 0.518 -0.270  -0.0366 -0.0837 
 (2.003) (2.405) (1.415)  (1.923) (1.929) 
East Asia 1.092 0.556 1.184***  0.361 0.966 
 (0.687) (1.015) (0.377)  (0.769) (0.600) 
Latin America 1.976 1.693 0.552  1.223 1.315 
 (1.714) (2.214) (1.112)  (1.759) (1.661) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.617** -0.754** -0.428**  -0.418 -0.549* 
 (0.297) (0.377) (0.196)  (0.326) (0.281) 
Political violence 1.325 1.490 0.618  1.047 1.071 
 (0.863) (1.079) (0.568)  (0.870) (0.863) 
Constant 8.707 4.106 11.72***  7.082 9.792 
 (5.432) (7.689) (3.768)  (8.185) (6.192) 
Exogenous instrument Food prices  Food prices 
Observations 88 83 78  147 161 
R2 -0.311 -0.728 0.660  -0.076 -0.100 
Adj. R2 -0.541 -1.054 0.591  -0.181 -0.198 
p-value of LM statisticb 0.106 0.101 0.186  0.113 0.152 
F-stat for weak ident. 2.635 2.374 1.568  2.539 1.944 
Notes: Results obtained considering the domestic food price index as an instrument for political violence. Robust and 
cluster robust standard errors in parentheses for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel estimations include time dummies. aThe initial level of these three variables is considered in 
the cross-country regressions. bThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange Multiplier test is that the 
structural equation is underidentified. 
Finally, I consider two alternative approaches. Firstly, I use as controls the lagged values 
of the time-variant explanatory variables included before, alongside the initial level of 
per capita GDP, the measure of geography and the three regional dummies. Despite the 
problems of this approach, it has the advantage of addressing the potential of 
endogeneity of both variables simultaneously. The results are presented in Table 50. The 
estimates for the two variables of interest show a loss in the significance level for the 
coefficient of state ineffectiveness when 10-year averaged data are used, whereas the  
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Table 50. Panel OLS estimations with lagged values of the explanatory variables, 1993-
2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) 
Log of initial pc GDP -1.110*** -1.296*** 
 (0.356) (0.330) 
Education, lagged 0.0449** 0.0429** 
 (0.0183) (0.0207) 
Terms of trade, lagged 0.00891 -0.0268 
 (0.0174) (0.0744) 
Geography 0.174 0.319 
 (0.228) (0.302) 
Inflation, lagged 0.854 1.697* 
 (0.802) (0.993) 
Budget balance, lagged 0.0784* 0.103* 
 (0.0410) (0.0605) 
Trade policy, lagged -0.504 -0.0848 
 (0.713) (0.912) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.707 0.0861 
 (0.626) (0.707) 
East Asia 1.557** 1.772** 
 (0.664) (0.755) 
Latin America 0.444 1.440** 
 (0.451) (0.667) 
State ineffectiveness, lagged -0.0443 -0.276* 
 (0.126) (0.149) 
Political violence, lagged 0.239** 0.488*** 
 (0.115) (0.143) 
Constant 10.18*** 12.60*** 
 (3.381) (3.466) 
Observations 198 87 
R2 0.392 0.521 
Adj. R2 0.346 0.444 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimations include time dummies. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
term for political violence remains positive and it is now significant in both 
specifications. 
The second is inspired by Bertocchi and Guerzoni’s (2010) approach. These authors 
suggest that by employing as instruments the lagged values of the regressors, they are 
able to guarantee that their values are determined before those of the dependent 
variable (Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2010: 12-13). In their work, they apply this 
instrumentation strategy to all of the regressors given that they are all potentially 
endogenous. Here I assume that only the two indices of fragility are endogenous, but 
consider as exogenous instruments the lagged values of the time-variant explanatory 
variables, namely, education, terms of trade growth, inflation, budget balance, trade 
policy, state ineffectiveness and political violence. The results are presented in Table 51 
and suggest that there are no major changes when the 10-year averaged dataset is used. 
The results in Column (1) show that none of the coefficients for the variables of interest 
is significant. Still, it is important to notice the significant loss of countries in the sample,  
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Table 51. Panel IV estimations with lagged values as instruments, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) 
Log of initial pc GDP -1.192*** -1.336*** 
 (0.418) (0.264) 
Education 0.0440** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0174) 
Terms of trade 0.0144 0.0111** 
 (0.0111) (0.00483) 
Geography 0.0753 -0.219 
 (0.270) (0.225) 
Inflation 4.162 14.90*** 
 (3.846) (5.096) 
Budget balance 0.0752* 0.100*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0247) 
Trade policy -1.770** -0.802 
 (0.857) (0.521) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.834** -0.655 
 (0.776) (0.517) 
East Asia 0.685 1.298*** 
 (0.586) (0.408) 
Latin America -0.416 0.541 
 (0.487) (0.519) 
State ineffectiveness -0.0524 -0.325** 
 (0.172) (0.136) 
Political violence 0.0355 0.373*** 
 (0.133) (0.109) 
Constant 15.04*** 13.02*** 
 (4.191) (2.581) 
Exogenous instruments Lagged values of education, terms of trade growth, inflation, 
budget balance, trade policy, state ineffectiveness and political 
violence 
Observations 112 75 
R2 0.479 0.651 
Adj. R2 0.409 0.584 
p-value of LM statisticb 0.0192 0.0296 
F-stat for weak ident. 19.44 12.35 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimations include time dummies. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
and to bear in mind the limitations in terms of the number of periods for which data are 
available. 
 
c) Summary of results 
An overview of the conclusions from this section is provided in Table 52. Overall, the 
results concur with those obtained before. 
Although it loses its significance in some specifications when different periods are 
considered, the coefficient for state ineffectiveness maintains its negative sign and 
concurs to the conclusions drawn before of an effect of this variable on growth. The 
positive sign of political violence is more pervasive when the endogeneity of this variable  
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 Table 52. Summary of results after taking endogeneity into account 
 Endogeneity of state ineffectiveness 
 Cross-country Panel 
SI Negative effect in all specifications, but significant 
in only some of them. 
Negative coefficient in all specifications, but 
significant in only some of them. 
PV The sign of the coefficient and its significance level 
vary depending on the period considered. 
Positive sign in all coefficients, but they are never 
significant. 
 Endogeneity of political violence 
 Cross-country Panel 
SI Negative and significant in all specifications. Negative coefficient for both data structures and 
significant in most of them. 
PV Positive coefficient in all specifications but one, 
and generally non-significant. 
Positive sign, but the term is only significant in 
some specifications. 
 
is taken into account. However, the lack of significance of this term in most specifications 
suggests no link between this variable and growth. 
 
4.5.4. Spline regressions 
Before discussing the results obtained throughout this chapter, the final part of this 
section explores an additional possibility for modelling state ineffectiveness and political 
violence. More specifically, I investigate whether each of these variables has a non-linear 
relationship with growth, and allow for the effect of each of the state fragility indices to 
have a different effect depending on the level of these variables. In order to do this, I 
make use of linear splines. 
The idea behind linear splines is that the relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variables can be estimated as a piecewise linear function, which is 
composed of linear segments (StataCorp., 2013). Each segment represents the function 
for an interval of the values of the independent variable, and they are arranged so that 
they join at specific points called knots. The choice of the location and the number of 
knots is, however, difficult and, unless obvious from the data structure, needs to be 
determined by the user. 
In order to avoid making an ad hoc choice, I present the results obtained considering one 
single knot in different values of the variable of interest. The results are summarised in 
Tables 53 and 54 considering a spline function for state ineffectiveness and political 
violence, respectively.  
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Table 53. Spline regressions for state ineffectiveness considering different knots, 1993-2012  
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 Knots 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 Cross-country 
 1993-2012 (92 observations) 
State ineffectiveness 1  0.601 0.236 0.135 0.0146 -0.0936 -0.190 -0.273** -0.306** -0.277** 
  (0.561) (0.283) (0.190) (0.153) (0.132) (0.124) (0.121) (0.122) (0.119) 
State ineffectiveness 2  -1.005 -0.708** -0.735*** -0.731*** -0.721*** -0.731*** -0.744* -0.573 16.92** 
  (0.610) (0.337) (0.253) (0.232) (0.226) (0.270) (0.408) (0.896) (7.842) 
R2  0.474 0.485 0.509 0.518 0.519 0.503 0.478 0.459 0.487 
 1993-2002 (87 observations) 
State ineffectiveness 1 7.457 0.557 -0.00511 -0.0678 -0.208 -0.261 -0.306* -0.361** -0.383**  
 (16.17) (0.771) (0.375) (0.267) (0.219) (0.192) (0.169) (0.161) (0.160)  
State ineffectiveness 2 -7.847 -1.025 -0.477 -0.483 -0.353 -0.348 -0.460 -0.491 0.0470  
 (16.19) (0.824) (0.429) (0.331) (0.306) (0.310) (0.370) (0.577) (1.493)  
R2 0.457 0.467 0.465 0.471 0.465 0.465 0.467 0.461 0.456  
 2003-2012 (80 observations) 
State ineffectiveness 1 2.180 0.697 0.206 0.0250 -0.109 -0.197 -0.274** -0.368*** -0.375*** -0.356*** 
 (2.455) (0.536) (0.279) (0.191) (0.156) (0.140) (0.133) (0.126) (0.125) (0.124) 
State ineffectiveness 2 -2.582 -1.211** -0.778** -0.682*** -0.616** -0.578** -0.548* -0.146 -0.0980 5.749 
 (2.478) (0.590) (0.338) (0.257) (0.237) (0.237) (0.292) (0.444) (0.902) (4.838) 
R2 0.669 0.684 0.689 0.696 0.695 0.692 0.681 0.664 0.663 0.670 
 Panel 
 5-year averages (198 observations) 
State ineffectiveness 1 4.002 1.392** 0.644* 0.334 0.0982 -0.0574 -0.114 -0.170 -0.167 -0.180 
 (4.451) (0.671) (0.331) (0.226) (0.182) (0.161) (0.145) (0.136) (0.134) (0.129) 
State ineffectiveness 2 -4.183 -1.704** -1.024*** -0.773*** -0.541** -0.311 -0.286 0.108 1.780 26.28*** 
 (4.466) (0.720) (0.384) (0.283) (0.256) (0.258) (0.311) (0.485) (1.111) (6.363) 
R2 0.250 0.269 0.275 0.276 0.265 0.253 0.250 0.247 0.257 0.311 
 10-year averages (167 observations) 
State ineffectiveness 1 4.412 0.820 0.243 0.0993 -0.0560 -0.146 -0.210* -0.275** -0.277** -0.276** 
 (3.145) (0.539) (0.275) (0.193) (0.158) (0.138) (0.125) (0.116) (0.114) (0.110) 
State ineffectiveness 2 -4.718 -1.215** -0.673** -0.605** -0.476** -0.403* -0.391 -0.114 1.199 19.41*** 
 (3.160) (0.582) (0.323) (0.250) (0.233) (0.235) (0.281) (0.429) (0.896) (5.251) 
R2 0.315 0.324 0.324 0.330 0.323 0.318 0.314 0.305 0.313 0.362 
Notes: Assuming k as the value of the knot, State ineffectiveness 1 assumes the values of state ineffectiveness for the values of this variable lower than k, and the value 
of the knot for values of this variable higher than or equal to k. State ineffectiveness 2 assumes the value of 0 for the values of state ineffectiveness lower than k, and the 
value of state ineffectiveness minus k for values of this variable higher than or equal to k. The analysis includes the same covariates as before. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.     
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Table 54. Spline regressions for political violence considering different knots, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 Knots 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Cross-country 
 1993-2012 (91 observations) 
Political violence 1 12.10 0.669 0.134 0.0724 0.122 0.111 0.129 0.155 0.155 0.155 
 (16.68) (0.698) (0.370) (0.251) (0.183) (0.141) (0.129) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
Political violence 2 -11.92 -0.511 0.0609 0.179 0.145 0.292 0.359 0.276 0.455 1.282 
 (16.69) (0.724) (0.433) (0.365) (0.348) (0.361) (0.445) (0.617) (1.015) (2.860) 
R2 0.459 0.459 0.456 0.457 0.457 0.460 0.460 0.457 0.457 0.457 
 1993-2002 (87 observations) 
Political violence 1 4.677 -0.445 -0.337 -0.135 -0.157 -0.197 -0.181 -0.180 -0.180 -0.180 
 (9.688) (0.762) (0.438) (0.277) (0.202) (0.157) (0.140) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) 
Political violence 2 -4.781 0.366 0.296 0.0586 0.141 0.420 0.608 0.878 1.407 3.544 
 (9.694) (0.797) (0.525) (0.414) (0.395) (0.419) (0.503) (0.680) (1.089) (2.744) 
R2 0.457 0.457 0.458 0.456 0.457 0.463 0.466 0.468 0.468 0.468 
 2003-2012 (80 observations) 
Political violence 1 45.56 1.197 0.622 0.252 0.220 0.244 0.226* 0.242* 0.242* 0.242* 
 (42.18) (0.786) (0.394) (0.287) (0.198) (0.157) (0.130) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Political violence 2 -45.28 -0.942 -0.403 0.0421 0.133 0.135 0.390 0.443 0.753 2.505 
 (42.18) (0.800) (0.446) (0.398) (0.368) (0.415) (0.504) (0.661) (1.123) (3.734) 
R2 0.669 0.670 0.668 0.663 0.664 0.664 0.666 0.666 0.666 0.666 
 Panel 
 5-year averages (198 observations) 
Political violence 1 7.774 -0.0706 -0.487 -0.269 -0.0564 -0.00386 0.0264 0.0689 0.0693 0.0700 
 (10.84) (0.704) (0.380) (0.266) (0.183) (0.139) (0.120) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) 
Political violence 2 -7.673 0.182 0.714 0.588 0.373 0.423 0.546 0.360 0.570 1.400 
 (10.84) (0.728) (0.443) (0.386) (0.351) (0.362) (0.423) (0.562) (0.896) (2.240) 
R2 0.249 0.247 0.257 0.256 0.251 0.252 0.254 0.249 0.248 0.248 
 10-year averages (167 observations) 
Political violence 1 -8.539 -0.121 0.0147 -0.0447 -0.0272 -0.0220 -0.00180 0.0297 0.0316 0.0410 
 (9.658) (0.632) (0.344) (0.232) (0.167) (0.131) (0.114) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) 
Political violence 2 8.607 0.196 0.0629 0.179 0.224 0.362 0.525 0.447 0.698 1.441 
 (9.660) (0.652) (0.401) (0.337) (0.318) (0.346) (0.420) (0.561) (0.923) (2.552) 
R2 0.308 0.305 0.305 0.306 0.307 0.310 0.312 0.308 0.307 0.306 
Notes: Assuming k as the value of the knot, Political violence 1 assumes the values of political violence for the values of this variable lower than k, and the value of the knot 
for values of this variable higher than or equal to k. Political violence 2 assumes the value of 0 for the values of political violence lower than k, and the value of political 
violence minus k for values of this variable higher than or equal to k. The analysis includes the same covariates as before. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The obtained coefficients measure the change in slope from the preceding group97, 
which allows for the possibility to test whether the change in slope is significant. Thus, 
the interpretation of the coefficient will be: 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑si
= {
𝑎1, 𝑠𝑖 < 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑎1 + 𝑎2, 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡
 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑pv
= {
𝑎1, 𝑝𝑣 < 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑎1 + 𝑎2, 𝑝𝑣 ≥ 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡
 
Assuming k as the value of the knot, for values of state ineffectiveness lower than k, State 
ineffectiveness 1 equals the value of state ineffectiveness, whereas State ineffectiveness 2 
is equal to 0. For values of state ineffectiveness higher than or equal to k, State 
ineffectiveness 1 is equal to k, whereas State ineffectiveness 2 equals the value of state 
ineffectiveness minus k.  
To give an example, let us look at the results for state ineffectiveness for period 1993-
2012, and to the fourth column, which corresponds to the results obtained after 
specifying the knot at the value -2 for state ineffectiveness. The coefficients indicate that 
for values of state ineffectiveness lower than -2, the effect of an additional one unit in the 
level of state ineffectiveness on growth would be 0.135, but it is non-significant; and for 
values of state ineffectiveness higher than or equal to -2, it would be -0.6 (the result from 
summing -0.735 to 0.135). This coefficient is now significant, which indicates that there 
is evidence that the effect of state ineffectiveness changes after the break point. 
Starting with the results for state ineffectiveness, the first impression from Table 53 is 
that the results obtained depend on the data structure and the period considered, as well 
as on the location of knots. Still, the results are generally supportive of the negative effect 
of state ineffectiveness. Roughly speaking, looking at the coefficients obtained when 
knots are at points -1 and 0 for cross-country data for periods 1993-2012 and 2003-
2012 (which correspond to the specifications with higher values of R2), the results 
indicate the effect of state ineffectiveness changes after the breaking point. More 
specifically, the coefficients suggest that a movement in the position of the country from 
moderately effective to very ineffective (e.g. from 0 to 3) would have a negative and 
significant impact on growth (in line with the results in section 4.5.1). In other words, 
moving from very ineffective to moderately effective would raise growth. However, an 
                                                             
97 They were derived from applying command mkspline from Stata and using the option 
marginal. 
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improvement in the position of the country from moderately effective to very effective 
(e.g. from -2 to -4) does not seem to affect growth. 
Generally speaking, this also seems to be the case when using 10-year averaged panel 
data. However, the conclusions are harder to draw for the cross-country dataset for 
period 1993-2002 and for panel data obtained with 5-year averages. 
The results for political violence (Table 54) also concur with the conclusions derived in 
the previous sections. With rare exceptions, they show no significant effect of this 
variable on growth in any of the specifications considered, which allow not only for 
different data structures and time periods (similarly to what was done before), but also 
for different effects considering diverse breaking points. 
 
4.6. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
 
This section draws together the insights from the results obtained from the empirical 
analysis, and positions them in relation to the main conclusions found in previous 
literature. I start by recapitulating the main conclusions in Table 55, organised in order 
to highlight the variation of the results obtained for each of the variables of interest. 
The summary of the estimated coefficient for state ineffectiveness seems unanimous in 
terms of the sign of the effect, which is significant in most cases. The results based on 
OLS estimates should be regarded with care as they may be biased (given the problems 
of endogeneity discussed before and the fact that I cannot correct for unobserved 
country effects). Additionally, the IV estimates were obtained with instruments that did 
not pass all the tests for instrument strength. Despite acknowledging these limitations, 
as shown in Table 55, the negative sign and the significance level of the coefficient seem 
to be robust to using different specifications and estimation methods, thus suggesting 
that there is support to the hypothesis that countries with higher levels of state 
ineffectiveness are expected to grow at lower rates.  
This is in line with the theory described in section 4.2, which suggests that in general 
there is a positive link between state capacity and economic growth, and more 
specifically that the quality of institutions is an important determinant. The indicator for 
state ineffectiveness comprises different dimensions of the capacity as well as the 
effectiveness of the state, thus lending support to the view that attributes an important 
role to the state in the promotion of development. 
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Table 55. Review of the empirical results 
 SI PV SI x PV 
 Cross-country data 
Baseline OLS 
estimates 
The coefficient is 
negative and significant 
in all specifications. 
Positive and significant 
for two of the periods, but 
the sign varies and it loses 
significance for period 
1993-2002. 
Negative coefficient, but 
it is not significant in 
any specification. 
Outliers 
excluded 
Negative and significant 
effect in almost all 
specifications. 
The sign of the coefficient 
varies depending on the 
period considered and it is 
rarely significant. 
The sign of the coefficient 
varies depending on the 
dataset used and it is 
never significant. 
Alternative 
controls 
Negative and significant 
effect in all specifications. 
Positive coefficient in all 
specifications, but it loses 
significance for period 
1993-2002. 
Negative coefficient, but 
small in magnitude and 
non-significant in all 
specifications. 
Addressing 
endogeneity 
Negative and significant 
in most specifications. 
Positive sign in most 
specifications, but the sign 
of the coefficient and its 
significance level vary 
depending on the period 
considered. 
---- 
 Panel data 
Baseline OLS 
estimates 
Negative and significant 
in all specifications, but 
one of them. 
The coefficient is positive, 
but small in magnitude and 
never significant. 
The sign of the coefficient 
changes depending on 
the specification 
considered, but it is not 
significant in neither of 
them. 
Outliers 
excluded 
Negative and significant 
effect in all specifications. 
Positive effect, but it is not 
significant in any of the 
specifications. 
The sign of the coefficient 
varies depending on the 
dataset used and it is 
never significant. 
Alternative 
controls 
Negative and significant 
in most specifications. 
Positive and significant 
in most specifications. 
The sign of the coefficient 
varies depending on the 
dataset used and it is 
never significant. 
Addressing 
endogeneity 
Negative and significant 
in some specifications. 
Positive sign in all 
specifications, but the 
coefficient is rarely 
significant. 
---- 
 
The conclusion for the effect of political violence is less clear. When cross-country data 
are used, the sign and significance level of the coefficient seem to vary depending on the 
period and method applied. With panel data, the positive sign seems more pervasive 
across specifications, but it is rarely significant. I, therefore, conclude that the model 
used in this chapter fails to find a definite conclusion about the impact of political 
violence on growth, though the estimated coefficients seem to indicate that there is no 
causal effect. 
At face value, the latter result seems to be at odds with the intuition. Also, the main 
conclusion from many of the studies examining the link between different dimensions 
of political violence and economic growth reviewed in section 4.2 suggests a negative 
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causal effect. Bearing this in mind, I advance some possible reasons that may explain the 
obtained results. However, I acknowledge that these are based on speculation. 
The first set of possibilities is related to some methodological challenges in the analysis. 
First, despite the attempts made in section 4.5.3 to take the potential for endogeneity 
into account, the challenge of isolating the causal effect of political violence on growth 
from the reverse effect remains hard to overcome. Second, the measure of political 
violence used here does not allow for a distinction between conflicts with different 
nature, thus disguising potentially distinct effects on economic performance (Serneels 
and Verpoorten, 2015: 558), as seen in Bodea and Elbadawi’s (2008) work. Finally, as 
pointed out by Serneels and Verpoorten (2015: 558), there is a selection bias that stems 
from the fact that there are more data available for middle- and high-income incomes 
when compared to poor countries. In fact, the percentage of low-income and lower-
middle-income countries in the five samples used in this chapter varies between 39% 
and 42%98. This may lead to an overestimation of the speed of recovery (Almer and 
Hodler, 2015: 2). 
However, theory also suggests that there may be a positive link between the two 
variables. As pointed out in Serneels and Verpoorten (2015), the standard neoclassical 
growth theory suggests that in the years after civil conflict, an economy could grow 
relatively fast and converge to its steady state. Within the context of modern theory of 
growth, Olson (1982) has suggested that if war destroys vested interests existent in the 
society which block the adoption of new and superior technologies, than it can lead to a 
higher growth rate (Koubi, 2005: 70). Additionally, Organski and Kugler’s (1977) 
Phoenix factor suggests that one might expect positive growth effects at the post-conflict 
stage, as a result of the reestablishment of economic activities; for example, the efforts 
of reconstruction may lead to boom in construction after the decrease in violence and 
insecurity (Vothknecht and Sumarto, 2011: 10).  
Some earlier studies have found empirical support for this theory (e.g. Organski and 
Kugler, 1977). More recently, Przeworski et al (2000: 190) concur with the hypothesis 
of rapid post-war recovery by documenting that the average rate of growth during the 
five years following a war was 5.98% and during other years it was 4.15%. Similarly, 
Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol (2008) found an average growth rate of per capita GDP 
in conflict countries significantly higher before than after the war, by about 2.4 percent 
points. Given that economic growth in this thesis is measured through the compound 
                                                             
98 According to the current World Bank classification. 
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growth rate over the different periods considered, thus disguising the short-run 
fluctuations in growth rates, the results obtained may be capturing some of these effects. 
Gutierrez-Sanin (2009: 22) discusses some “’anti-intuitive externalities’ of violent 
conflict” and mentions some examples of recent cases where periods after a war have 
seen improved welfare and advanced state building (e.g. the victory of Yoweri 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement of a guerrilla war in Uganda in 1986 that was 
followed by a period of peace and economic development). 
The analysis presented here concurs to some of these findings. One additional possibility 
for explaining the obtained results is the fact that the measure of political violence used 
encompasses indicators of repression in addition to indicators of civil war. I use two 
empirical examples to help to illustrate how one may then find a positive correlation 
between the index of political violence used here and economic growth. China and India 
are among the fastest growing countries in the recent decades. Yet, they show also high 
scores in terms of political violence.  
India has a low score in physical integrity and has been considered as an abusive state, 
based on the violations of physical or personal integrity carried out by the state.  In terms 
of ethnic conflict, the PITF (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2015) reports mass protests 
against the Indian rule erupting in violence in 1990 and continuing during the same 
decade. Additionally, several events related to the Maoist insurgency have been 
documented since 2001. Subscribing to a left-wing Maoist ideology and advocating pro-
rural poor agenda, the origins of the insurgency have been traced back to the “Naxalite” 
movement. 
China has also experienced growth under extractive institutions. The authoritarian 
regime scores low in terms of physical integrity and empowerment rights and high in 
political terror scale. The decades following the 1989 violent events in the Tiananmen 
Square have seen economic progress with rapid growth, but the political institutions 
became more extractive. For instance, reformers such as Zhao Ziyang, who provided 
support to the students in Tiananmen Square as general secretary of the Communist 
Party, were purged, and the government increased its actions to suppress civil liberties 
and press freedom (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 440). The PITF (Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff, 2015) also reports episodic violent protests by Uighers in Xinjiang province 
against Han Chinese control escalating into terror by 1996, and which later spread to 
include targets outside Xinjiang. The Freedom House (2012) reports an upsurge of 
quasi-Maoist propaganda in 2011, and tens of thousands of protests during the same 
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year against corruption, abuse of power and injustice, which were accompanied by 
increasing political repression (which had begun in 2008).  
Although not included in the table, the analysis using spline regressions was roughly in 
line with the results presented previously (obtained without splines). I found some 
support for the claim of a negative significant effect of state ineffectiveness on growth. 
The coefficients obtained when placing the knots at different values of the variable seem 
to suggest that there is a non-linear effect of state ineffectiveness on growth. 
Improvements from a very low position in terms of this dimension to a moderate 
position lead to significant impacts on growth. However, one observes very little effect 
when considering movements at higher levels of this variable, i.e. from an effective state 
to a very effective state.99 However, there was no indication of a significant effect for 
political violence. 
Finally, a similar conclusion can be derived for hypothesis H2. When using cross-country 
data, the interaction term between state ineffectiveness and political violence holds a 
negative effect across specifications, but it is not significant in any of them. In the case of 
panel data, both the sign and the significance level of this coefficient vary depending on 
the type of dataset, period, and method considered. Overall, the estimations do not 
suggest that the effect of state ineffectiveness (or political violence) on economic growth 
in a country depends on the level of political violence (or state ineffectiveness). 
 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presents new evidence on the impact of state fragility on economic growth. 
Despite the numerous accounts of the weight that state fragility bears on economic 
development provided by the reports of development agencies and previous studies, 
there is a relative scarcity of empirical work on this topic that makes use of cross-country 
regressions. 
Following the tradition of using these methods to understand the determinants of 
growth, the analysis in this chapter explores the effect of the two dimensions of state 
                                                             
99 This is in line with the concept of “good enough governance” advanced by Grindle (2007). The 
author argues that interventions by development actors should depart from the assumption 
that all governance or institutional gaps can be tackled at once, and move towards the 
identification of “minimal” conditions of governance that enable political economic 
development. 
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fragility identified in Chapter 3 – state ineffectiveness and political violence – on 
economic growth across countries. It is in line with previous literature considering the 
impact of related aspects, such as institutions, governance, or state capacity, as well as 
political violence, but aims to fill the gap that still exists in the studies focusing explicitly 
on the concept of fragile states. 
I hypothesise that both of these dimensions have a negative impact on economic growth, 
and test this postulate making use of standard ordinary least squares techniques applied 
to datasets obtained from different data structures and time periods. The overall sample 
covers data for between 80 and 90 countries for the period 1993-2012. The analysis also 
accounts for potential biases by excluding outliers, including additional covariates, and 
taking the endogeneity of each of these dimensions into account. 
I find a negative and significant impact of state ineffectiveness on growth, which is robust 
to the different data specifications used, as well as to changes in the data sample and list 
of explanatory variables. More specifically, the negative coefficient remains significant 
after including the ICRG as a measure of institutional quality, and also holds when 
different instrumentation techniques are used to address endogeneity. 
The results for the coefficient for political violence do not suggest that there is a 
significant effect of this variable on growth. Even though one finds an unexpected 
positive and significant link in some specifications, the results vary in sign and 
significance, and have proven not robust, or even reversed, by new estimations and 
when different time periods are considered. Similarly, the results do not suggest that 
there is an interactive effect of this variable and state ineffectiveness on growth. 
This analysis provides an additional important insight into the link between state 
fragility and growth. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first analysis 
showing that considering the two distinct aspects of state fragility unveils a link between 
fragility and growth, which is not necessarily visible if a unidimensional index is 
considered. When a single index of fragility obtained from the indicators identified in 
Chapter 3 was included in the growth regression to replace the separate indices for the 
two dimensions, one failed to find a consistent effect of this index on growth. This 
provides further support to the argument made in previous chapters that, in order to 
unpack the complexity of state fragility, one should consider its different dimensions 
separately. As shown in this chapter, they bear a very distinct effect on economic growth. 
However, it is also important to recognise some limitations in the analysis. Firstly, the 
sample of countries included is reduced when compared to other analyses on fragile 
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states, and the period covered is limited when compared to previous work using growth 
regressions. These two limitations are a result of the challenges in terms of data 
availability. On the one hand, this problem is more severe in empirical analyses looking 
at countries where the institutions of the state are not well functioning, as is the case of 
the countries with high levels of state ineffectiveness. On the other hand, several of the 
indicators used in the construction of the index for this dimension were obtained from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators, which have data only from 1996 onwards, thus 
limiting the time scope of the analysis. Secondly, the strategies used to minimise the bias 
resulting from the endogeneity of state ineffectiveness and political violence are far from 
perfect. Still, it is my belief that they uncovered some interesting facts. 
Finally, the results presented in this chapter also suggest important avenues for future 
research. The negative and significant link between state ineffectiveness and growth was 
already expected from the theoretical predictions as well as from previous work 
examining the link between economic growth and related variables. The generally non-
significant, but sometimes significant and positive coefficient for political violence is 
more at odds with the predictions. Still, several empirical accounts for the effect of civil 
war on economic growth have demonstrated a positive effect, as described in the 
literature review earlier in this chapter. I suggest that further investigation of this 
relationship is still needed, with a closer scrutiny of the changes verified when different 
time periods are considered. 
The support found for the use of these two distinct dimensions of state fragility when 
studying this phenomenon provides a second suggestion for future work. One of the 
main concerns of development agencies is over the effectiveness of development 
assistance, especially in the case of fragile states, as demonstrated in recent reports. The 
measurement tools derived from this and the previous chapter provide a new 
opportunity to examine how different dimensions of state fragility interact with the 
impact of aid on economic growth. I take on this challenge in the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON GROWTH IN 
FRAGILE STATES 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The results presented so far have suggested that state ineffectiveness has a significant 
negative effect on economic growth, whereas it has proven harder to find a distinctive 
significant effect of political violence. This chapter focuses on an indirect link through 
which state fragility may have an impact on growth. Namely, it scrutinises the hypothesis 
proposed in the empirical literature on aid effectiveness, which suggests that aid is only 
effective in countries pursuing good policies and with a good institutional environment. 
By definition, fragile states score lower in both of these dimensions, which suggests that 
aid will not be as effective in these countries. However, as explained before, the need to 
provide assistance to these countries has been justified in the donor community for over 
a decade now. 
Thus, solving this dilemma would entail some crucial implications for donor policy. Even 
if there is an increasing abundance of qualitative evidence at the country-level, only a 
few studies have tested the argument that aid is deemed less effective in fragile states 
using cross-country data. The aid effectiveness analysis in Carment, Samy and Prest 
(2008) is preliminary and subject to several caveats (namely the control variables 
included and the estimation procedure). Although providing stronger accounts in terms 
of their empirical strategy, the work by McGillivray and Feeny (2008) and by 
Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma and Devarajan (2011) is undermined by the fact that their 
definition of fragile states is based on thresholds of the CPIA, which, as discussed in 
previous chapters, overlooks the complexity of state fragility.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to replace the use of the CPIA with an alternative 
measurement procedure, which consists of two indices that capture the dimensions of 
state fragility proposed in Besley and Persson (2011a) – state ineffectiveness and 
political violence. It also departs from previous approaches that consider a dummy 
variable for fragile states and suggests its substitution by a continuous variable for state 
fragility. This strategy allows one to determine whether, on average, there is any impact 
of state ineffectiveness, political violence, or both, on aid effectiveness. The robustness 
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of these results is tested by considering different datasets, time periods and horizons, 
and distinct instrumentation strategies. 
I am once again inspired by Besley and Persson’s (2011a) model to provide the 
theoretical foundations for the testable hypotheses. I follow the tradition of the literature 
examining the aid-growth nexus, and add three interaction terms to the model 
formulation used in Chapter 4. Aid interacted with state ineffectiveness and the 
interaction between aid and political violence are introduced simultaneously, whereas a 
triple interaction term between aid and the two symptoms of state fragility is added 
later. 
To give a preview of the results, in line with previous work, there seems to be no 
statistically significant impact of either state ineffectiveness or political violence on the 
effectiveness of aid in promoting economic growth. Additionally, the evidence does not 
suggest that aid is even less effective when the country has high scores in both of these 
dimensions. A secondary contribution is made to the empirical aid effectiveness 
literature. The results for the coefficient of the aid variable vary widely in sign and size, 
and are rarely significant, thus lending support to those studies that fail to find a 
statistically significant effect of aid on growth.   
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. I begin by reviewing the related 
literature in the following section. Section 5.3 formulates the hypotheses and describes 
the empirical model used to estimate them. In section 5.4, I refer to the data used and to 
the results obtained from a preliminary analysis. The main results obtained with cross-
country data and with panel data are presented, in turn, in section 5.5, which ends by 
discussing their robustness after performing a few checks. Finally, section 5.6 
summarises the main conclusions and positions them in relation to the existing 
literature, before section 5.7 concludes.  
 
5.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Forty years of research on the impact of development aid have failed to reach a 
consensus on whether aid works or not. Recent results from meta-analysis of the aid-
growth relationship mirror the long-standing disagreement in the empirical literature: 
while Mekasha and Tarp (2013) find a positive and statistically significant effect of aid 
on growth, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2011, 2013, 2014) claim that aid has been 
180 
 
ineffective in promoting growth. A significant part of the existing studies argues that this 
effect is conditional on certain factors100, not only on the demand side of aid, such as the 
macroeconomic policies or the level of institutional quality in the recipient country, but 
also on the supply side, e.g. donor motives or aid volatility.  
The aid conditionality literature is the starting point for the review presented in the next 
paragraphs, giving more attention to the studies that found the effect of aid to be 
dependent on the type of policies and the quality of institutions in a country. The reason 
behind this is the conundrum of aid to fragile states described previously in this thesis, 
which I recap here. On the one hand, the need to engage with these countries has been 
recognised by the international community due to the costs and dangers they impose on 
their citizens, neighbouring countries, but also on a global scale. However, given the 
characteristics of fragile states (described in detail in chapter 2), aid is presumed to be 
less effective in these countries. More specifically, according to the insights provided by 
the aid effectiveness literature, “bad” policies and institutions have a detrimental effect 
on the impact of aid on growth. Even if not directly alluding to this group of countries, 
the studies examining this interaction are described in more detail below.  
After this, I narrow the focus to existing empirical analyses that look at aid to fragile 
states. I firstly briefly refer to the works examining aid allocation trends, which explore 
whether these countries receive more or less aid than predicted according to their policy 
and institutional level. I then move to the few empirical papers that explicitly address 
the impact of aid on growth in fragile states, some of which only include tentative 
preliminary analysis. This overview highlights the limitations of these studies and 
identifies the gap in knowledge this chapter aims to fill.  
The final two parts of this section offer a short outline of the challenges that one faces 
when analysing aid effectiveness, and refer to a group of studies proposing to look at 
different categories of aid, a possibility that is also explored later in the empirical 
analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Conditional aid effectiveness 
The interest in the effect of aid on growth dates back to the early 1970s, when the first 
studies started to emerge. Since then, the increase in data availability and the 
                                                             
100 See Doucouliagos and Paldam (2010) for a meta-study of the literature focusing on 
conditional aid effectiveness. 
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improvement in estimation methods have led to a plethora of studies examining the aid-
growth link. Given the extensiveness of the empirical literature on aid effectiveness and 
the fact that there is a reasonably large group of thorough reviews on this topic (e.g. 
Temple, 2010), I here provide a general overview of existing work, zooming in on those 
studies more relevant for the purposes of this chapter.101  
Hansen and Tarp (2000) have identified three generations of empirical research on the 
impact of aid on growth. The early studies in the first two generations (the first dating 
back to the early 1970s, and the second spanning from the 1980s until the early 1990s) 
were based on the Harrod-Domar growth model and the two-gap Chenery-Strout 
extension. Overall, the results lent support to the idea of a positive impact of aid on 
growth. In the early 1990s, a new generation of studies began, characterised by the 
application of more advanced econometric techniques and more realistic assumptions 
about this link.102 
One of the views that emerged during the late 1990s and early 2000s was that the effect 
of aid was conditional on certain factors, such as: i) the type of policies (e.g. Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000); ii) the institutional quality (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Baliamoune-
Lutz and Mavrotas, 2009); iii) the political system and its stability (e.g. Svensson, 1999; 
Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2003); but also iv) external and climatic factors, namely, 
trends in terms of trade, short-term export instability, and natural disasters, among 
others (e.g. Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Goderis, 
2009); as well as v) the geographic conditions of a country (e.g. Dalgaard, Hansen and 
Tarp, 2004); and, finally, vi) the level of social capital (e.g. Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Mavrotas, 2009). The insignificant effect of aid found in a number of studies has been 
explained by some with the fact that aid has non-linear effects, i.e. aid has diminishing 
returns due to a limited absorptive capacity of recipient countries to take up large 
inflows of foreign capital (e.g. Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001; 
Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2003).103  
                                                             
101 Previous reviews include, but are not restricted to, White (1992), Hansen and Tarp (2000), 
Hermes and Lensink (2001), Morrissey (2001), Easterly (2003), Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 
(2004b), McGillivray et al. (2006) and Radelet (2006), and, more recently, Glennie and Sumner 
(2014), Sumner and Glennie (2015) and Addison, Morrissey and Tarp (2017). 
102 I refer to Hansen and Tarp (2000) for more detail on these generations of studies. 
103 Roodman (2007a) performed robustness checks to seven prominent studies in this 
generation, including Burnside and Dollar (2000), and found their results to be fragile, 
especially to sample expansion. With a similar purpose, Jensen and Paldam (2006) test the 
robustness of the studies applying the “Good Policy Model” (i.e. including the interaction term 
aid×policy) and studies using the “Medicine Model” (i.e. including a coefficient for aid2), by 
simplifying the models and replicating the analyses with the inclusion of more data. The results 
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Another strand of literature has focused on the supply side and examined the effects of 
donor motives (e.g. Kilby and Dreher, 2010), aid proliferation (e.g. Kimura, Mori and 
Sawada, 2012), aid fragmentation (e.g. Annen and Kosempel, 2009) and aid volatility 
(e.g. Lensink and Morrissey, 2000; Hudson and Mosley, 2008; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 
2009) on its effectiveness. Others have contributed to the understanding of the aid-
growth link by analysing the effect of aid according to its composition (e.g. Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010; Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004a), 
or by tracking other outcomes, such as education or health improvements (e.g. Gomanee 
et al., 2005; Michaelowa and Weber, 2006; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2008; 
Mishra and Newhouse, 2009; Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2011, 2015a)104, but also growth 
accelerations (e.g. Dovern and Nunnenkamp, 2007). 
As highlighted in previous chapters, existing definitions of fragile states are frequently 
based on dimensions of capacity, legitimacy, authority, and sometimes effectiveness, of 
the state, and more often than not operationalise the concept by considering countries 
with a CPIA level below a certain threshold (depending on the definition used). These 
approaches can thus be linked to the literature looking at the effect of policy and 
institutions on the impact of aid in promoting growth, which are frequently proxied by 
the CPIA levels. I highlight some of the most prominent studies below. 
Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) seminal work suggested that aid had a positive effect only 
in countries pursuing “good” policies, where policy is measured by an index derived from 
the variables trade openness, inflation, and budget balance as percentage of GDP.  This 
result found support in other studies (such as Collier and Dehn, 2001, or Collier and 
Dollar, 2001, 2002105), and policy recommendations by international aid agencies, such 
as the World Bank, echoed the view that allocating aid to “good performers” would 
promote aid effectiveness in spurring growth106. Still, Burnside and Dollar’s study was 
also heavily criticised and triggered responses from different scholars who cast doubt 
on the robustness of their results (among others, Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hansen 
and Tarp, 2001; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Easterly, 2003; Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman, 2004; Antipin and Mavrotas, 2006). More recently, using policy indicators as 
threshold variables, Alia and Anago (2014) found that a good macroeconomic policy 
                                                             
from within-sample replications indicate that the first of these models is fragile whereas the 
second is robust. Still, both models fail in out-of-sample replications. 
104 See Glennie and Sumner (2014) for a more detailed review of the literature looking at the 
impact of aid on education, health and monetary poverty reduction. 
105 In all three studies, the CPIA is used as a measure of the policy level. 
106 See the report Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998). Collier and Dollar (2002) build upon this 
idea and present poverty-efficient aid allocation levels. 
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does indeed have an effect on the impact of aid on growth. They conclude that this impact 
will be higher in an economy with sound monetary policies that translate into low 
inflation rates, small budget deficit and a relatively high level of trade openness (i.e. 
under liberal trade policies in opposition to a rather closed economy).   
A related argument contends that the level of institutional quality of a country will 
mediate the impact of aid on growth. Burnside and Dollar (2004) have also later 
examined this effect and found some evidence that aid promotes growth conditional on 
institutions. In order to measure the extent to which institutions and policies in a country 
promote a good environment for entrepreneurship and growth, the authors use the 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) index of institutional quality107. However, 
using the ICRG (Knack and Keefer, 1995) as an alternative measure of quality of 
government institutions, Collier and Dollar (2002) found that this effect is small and 
negative, but only marginally significant. With a focus on political regimes, the results 
found by Svensson (1999) concurred to the argument that aid is conditional on the 
degree of political and civil liberties, and, more specifically, that the impact of aid was 
positive in more democratic countries. Using a composite index of socio-political 
instability108, Chauvet and Guillaumont (2003) add that aid effectiveness is negatively 
influenced by an unstable and uncertain political environment. Despite the use of a 
different procedure to obtain an index of political instability109, Islam (2005) finds 
support to this relationship. 
This finding is corroborated by Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas (2009), who conclude 
that good institutions have a positive impact on aid effectiveness by looking at the 
coefficient of the interaction between aid and the ICRG institutional quality index. 
However, this claim is challenged by Dovern and Nunnenkamp (2007: 378), who report 
a significant positive effect of aid on growth accelerations in “bad states”, i.e. countries 
with a level of the Polity IV index worse than the median for all sample countries in the 
particular year. 
                                                             
107 This includes the six clusters of variables which still serve as a basis for the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank. Namely, voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003). 
108 Resulting from a weighted sum of the number of coups d’état, of the demonstrations and of a 
dummy equal to one when a civil war breaks out (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2003: 10-11).  
109 This index results from a linear combination of assassinations, coups d’état, revolutions, riots 
and strikes, whose weights are determined according to the impact of these variables on 
growth. 
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Economides, Kalyvitis and Philippoppoulos (2008) lend support to the view that aid 
causes rent seeking, which in turn reduces the net growth effect of aid, but this effect is 
significant only in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors. They use a 
composite measure of rent seeking that comprises the scores of corruption in 
government, rule of law, risk of repudiation of government contracts, risk of 
expropriation, and quality of bureaucracy. Looking at the role of local elites, Angeles and 
Neanidis (2009) claim that the local elite determines how much of the aid inflows are 
diverted or reach its final goal, thus influencing the benefits that can be obtained from 
foreign aid. The results from empirical analysis demonstrate that the aid-elite 
multiplicative term is negative and significant, thus concurring to their argument. 
Additionally, according to these authors, countries having a colonial past and being the 
object of large European settlement would constitute a “risk group” in terms of aid 
effectiveness (Angeles and Neanidis, 2009: 133). Focusing on the impact of the degree of 
decentralisation on the effect of aid in promoting growth, Lessmann and Markwardt 
(2012) find a negative and significant coefficient of the interaction of aid with a 
decentralisation measure, and thus conclude that aid has a positive contribution in more 
centralised developing countries, but is less effective, or even harmful, in more 
decentralised economies.    
 
5.2.2. Aid effectiveness conditional on state fragility 
The literature on aid to fragile states has expanded in the last decade. Following from 
the concerns expressed by development agencies, there was a surge in reports focusing 
on proposals on how to “work more effectively in fragile states” (DFID, 2005), on how to 
“achieve development effectiveness in weakly performing countries” (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007), on “strengthening [a] rapid response and long term 
engagement” (World Bank, 2007), and on what principles to follow for a “good 
international engagement” (OECD, 2007) in these countries. The European Report on 
Development (2009) was crucial to the framing of the European approach. Later there 
was an agreement between key international actors110 on a new framework for working 
in fragile contexts, formulated in a New Deal for engagement in fragile states (IDPS, 2011) 
to be implemented in a trial period in 2012-2015. 
                                                             
110 These include the g7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development 
partners, and international organisations. 
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The academic studies have a more specific character, focusing on the effects of 
assistance, and in most cases intervention, in particular countries.111 This topic has 
attracted the attention of political scientists, whose discipline included an already well-
established literature focusing on service delivery, and on the promotion of state-
building and peace-building in this context.112 The qualitative literature is thus more 
extensive than the quantitative work. This chapter aims at contributing to the latter. The 
following paragraphs review the academic studies113 addressing the links between aid, 
state fragility, and economic development using quantitative methods. 
The main contribution of the initial studies on aid to fragile states was drawing attention 
to the need to improve engagement with these countries, highlighting, on the one hand, 
the costs they imposed (Chauvet and Collier, 2004; Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler, 2007), 
and, on the other, the divergence between predicted and actual aid levels to these 
countries (Levin and Dollar, 2005; Jones, Riddell and Kotoglou, 2005).114 Jones, Riddell 
and Kotoglou (2005) notice an increase in the amount of aid to “difficult partnership” 
countries in the early 2000s, though it was biased towards certain countries regarded as 
of wider global or regional importance. Levin and Dollar (2005) highlight the fact that 
there were significant differences within this group, and that while some countries, 
labelled “darlings”, received more aid than the CPIA levels would predict, others – the 
“aid orphan” group – were receiving less than the predicted aid levels (Levin and Dollar, 
2005).115 Carment, Samy and Prest (2008) argue later, that, based on the values of aid 
per capita and in comparison with the overall sample of countries, fragile states116 are 
underfunded. Still, the authors also suggest that they continue to be aid dependent, as 
the value of aid expressed as a percentage of gross national income has not changed 
significantly. Their analysis of the determinants of aid allocation suggests that authority 
and capacity are the main factors affecting the policy decision-making process.117 
                                                             
111 Recent examples include Menkhaus (2014), Zürcher (2012), or Arandel, Brinkerhoff and Bell 
(2015). See also Gisselquist (2014) for a comparative analysis of the effects of aid on institution-
building in fragile states. 
112 I refer to Mcloughlin (2012) and to the UNU-WIDER (2014) position paper for literature 
guides. See also Leader and Colenso (2005), and examples of recent work include, but are not 
restricted to, Batley and Mcloughlin (2010), Woolcock (2014), Baudienville (2010), Ishihara 
(2012), and Faust, Gravingholt and Ziaja (2015). 
113 I review both published journal articles as well as working papers, given that the latter form 
most of the existing literature. 
114 See Ellison (2016) for an overview of the debate on aid allocation to fragile states. 
115 See McGillivray (2006) for a more extensive review of these studies. 
116 Fragile states are the top 40 countries in the ranking built by these authors, based on their 
ALC approach (Carment, Prest and Samy, 2008). 
117 See also Carment, Prest and Samy (2008), who examine trends in aid for the period 1969-
2003 and conclude that, compared to the overall sample, fragile states – as measured by the 
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Following from the increasing awareness of the need to assist fragile states, and of the 
dangers of not doing so, the attention shifted to determine what type of development 
assistance was more effective in these countries. Chauvet and Collier (2004, 2006) 
provide some insights into what may be the most appropriate and effective sequence of 
aid instruments to increase the chances of a sustained turnaround in failing states, 
defined according to the CPIA criteria118. More specifically, they find that technical 
assistance has a significant positive effect on the prospects of turnaround in failing 
states, in contrast with aid as finance, which has a significant adverse effect (Chauvet and 
Collier, 2008).119 
In a different approach, Feeny and McGillivray (2009) explore the “growth efficient” 
levels of foreign aid to fragile states. Classifying as fragile those countries with a CPIA 
score that falls in the two bottom quintiles, the authors conclude that some countries 
have received more, and others less, than the amount of aid that should be provided in 
order to maximise current growth in these countries. 
Following the line of the aid effectiveness literature reviewed in the previous 
subsections, a few econometric studies have attempted to take the effect of state fragility 
into account. McGillivray and Feeny (2008) test the hypothesis that an inflow of aid to, 
or the interaction between aid and policies in, a fragile state will lead to less growth than 
in a non-fragile state. According to their specification, the aid x fragility term tested 
whether a score in the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA (or a country that has not been 
rated) had an impact on the effectiveness of aid. The authors consider a sample of 113 
countries for the period 1977 to 2001, and use a two-step system GMM estimator. They 
found this term not to be statistically significant from zero. The results remained similar 
when allowing for different thresholds of the CPIA, but the estimated coefficient became 
significant when the threshold level was set to belonging to the bottom CPIA quintile. 
Based on this, they concluded that they do not find support for two of the hypotheses, 
namely: i) that the quality of policies and institutional performance is of additional 
                                                             
aforementioned index created by the authors – are underfunded and that aid volatility has 
increased over time. 
118 Failing states are countries classified as a low-income country for at least one year by the 
World Bank, and that had a level of the CPIA under 2.5 for at least 4 consecutive years. A 
turnaround is achieved by attaining a level of at least 3.5 in the CPIA, and a turnaround is 
deemed sustained if the CPIA remains above 3 for at least 2 years after the turnaround is 
achieved. 
119 Given the characteristics of fragile states, a link can also be made with studies looking at 
post-conflict situations. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) found that growth is more 
sensitive to policy in these situations (using the CPIA as a measure of policy), and that social 
policies should be prioritised to sectoral policies and macro policies.  
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importance in countries with critically low CPIA scores; or that ii) only a level of 
performance below a certain threshold has an impact on aid effectiveness. However, 
they conclude that there are differences in aid effectiveness when one compares fragile 
states with highly-fragile states (those belonging to the bottom CPIA quintile).120 
In using the CPIA as an indicator to derive the lists of fragile states,  Chauvet and Collier 
(2004, 2006, 2008), McGillivray and Feeny (2008) and Feeny and McGillivray (2009) can 
be linked with the earlier aid effectiveness literature that employed this measure 
provided by the World Bank to assess the level of policy environment in a country. To 
give one example, Collier and Dollar (2002) test whether the effectiveness of aid is more 
effective in raising growth in countries with a better policy environment using this 
measure as the indicator for policy. In addition to considering aid and policy as 
explanatory variables in a standard growth regression, they also include an interaction 
term between policy and aid. In so doing, they come close to the analyses described so 
far.121 The main differences are that: i) this indicator is not used to derive lists of 
countries that score under a certain score, but instead employed as a continuous 
variable; ii) there is no reference to the countries that have lower scores as being 
classified as “fragile”. 
Carment, Samy and Prest (2008) propose their own measure of fragility, derived as an 
overall score based on country performance in authority, legitimacy and capacity, 
described in previous chapters. In a preliminary application of this measure, and using 
cross-sectional data, they consider the countries with a score of 4 or above in their 
measure of fragility. In their baseline regression, the term aid x fragility tests the 
hypothesis that the impact of aid is different in fragile states. The authors then restrict 
their sample to include only countries with an overall score higher than 5, and then to 
countries with a score higher than 6 in a subsequent specification. According to the 
estimates for the coefficient of aid, there is a positive and significant effect of aid and this 
effect increases with the level of fragility, which leads the authors to conclude that “aid 
has a larger impact on growth in more fragile states, ceteris paribus” (Carment, Samy 
and Prest, 2008: 366). However, even though briefly discussing the results obtained for 
the interaction term, the authors overlook its meaning for the interpretation of the 
results. To be clear, the estimated coefficient for the aid*fragility term is negative and 
                                                             
120 Focusing on small island developing states (SIDS) and using these two thresholds for 
fragility, the same authors found no evidence of a different effect of aid on growth in fragile and 
non-fragile SIDS. However, the results also indicated that this impact was lower in highly fragile 
in SIDS than in all others. 
121 Their analysis is further developed in Collier and Hoeffler (2004b). 
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significant in the three samples, being more significant in the sample of the most fragile 
countries. 
Following the World Bank’s criteria to identify fragile states122, Andrimihaja, 
Cinyabuguma and Devarajan (2011) also find a positive and significant relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth. The dataset comprised data for the period 
1980-2010 for about 120 countries, and both OLS, FE and IV estimators were applied. 
These authors also include an interaction term between aid and a dummy for fragile 
states, but add in a different specification an interaction between aid and a dummy for 
African fragile states. In the case of the first, the coefficient is positive and non-
significant, and the sign and coefficient for aid remains unchanged (positive and 
significant). The same holds when the second interaction term is considered instead. The 
small positive effect between aid and African fragile states becomes significant only 
when the authors add a dummy for African fragile states. The authors interpret this 
result as an indication that “ODA [official development assistance] continues to exert an 
independent effect on growth in African fragile countries” (Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma 
and Devarajan, 2011: 25). 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the last three empirical papers represent the only 
existing attempts to determine the link between aid and economic growth in fragile 
states following the tradition of the aid effectiveness literature. Carment, Samy and 
Prest’s (2008) appraisal is, as recognised by the authors, a preliminary analysis, which 
is subject to several caveats (namely the control variables included and the estimation 
procedure). The work in both McGillivray and Feeny (2008) and Andrimihaja, 
Cinyabuguma and Devarajan (2011) is stronger in terms of the empirical strategy, but is 
undermined by the fact that their definition of fragile states is based on thresholds of the 
CPIA, which, as discussed in previous chapters, overlooks the complexity of state 
fragility. Thus, I argue that i) given the widely recognised (and justified) interest in better 
understanding how to engage in fragile states, and ii) the possibilities offered by the use 
of econometric techniques to look at macro effects, as demonstrated in the review of the 
aid effectiveness literature in the beginning of this section, there is a potential to expand 
the existing work. This is the aim pursued in the remainder of this chapter, but, before 
that, I briefly summarise some of the difficulties faced when examining aid effectiveness. 
 
                                                             
122 Fragile states are those with an overall score of 3.2 or below on the CPIA (World Bank, 
2017b).  
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5.2.3. The challenges of establishing causality in aid effectiveness studies 
Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2009, 2010) have identified a recent generation of studies that 
cast doubt on the methodology employed in previous literature. More specifically, the 
criticism is related to their instrumentation strategies and to the unwitting way that 
GMM estimations are used (Frot and Perrotta, 2012: 2).   
Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) study, one of the most influential papers in this 
generation, shows little evidence of an effect (positive or negative) of aid on growth, even 
after submitting their specification to a series of robustness checks. These authors have 
attempted to overcome some of the limitations associated with cross-country 
regressions by proposing a comprehensive approach that includes a new 
instrumentation strategy, accounts for different time horizons and periods as well as 
different sources, types and timings of aid, and which considers different specifications 
and samples. Their conclusion is corroborated by Dreher and Langlotz (2016). Still, 
several others continue to find a positive, even if modest, effect of aid on growth (e.g. 
Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010, 2015a; Frot and Perrota, 2012; Clemens et al., 2012; Galiani 
et al., 2014; Jackson, 2014). 
The debate around the causal link between aid and growth remains unresolved. 
Roodman (2007b) attributes the lack of agreement in the literature to the challenges of 
demonstrating causation, and to the fact that, despite the increasingly sophisticated 
techniques that have been developed to overcome them, there is a danger that these can 
potentially magnify an old peril in econometrics, the “black box problem”.123 Almost a 
decade later, this account remains pertinent. Simultaneous causation, omitted variables, 
and mis-measurement still feature among the issues confounding the causality between 
aid and growth identified by Glennie and Sumner (2014: 19) in their review of cross-
country peer-reviewed, econometric studies on aid effectiveness. However, recent 
studies offer new possibilities to deal with the challenges inherent to attempting to 
establish the causality between aid and growth and new perspectives on how to measure 
the progress on development assistance (see, for instance, Qian, 2015, for a review). I 
return to the first of these issues in section 5.4.3. 
 
 
                                                             
123 Roodman (2007b) also discusses publication bias as a third cause of the existing 
controversy. I leave the discussion of this element aside, but refer to the paper as well as to 
Glennie and Sumner (2014) for more detail on this. 
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5.2.4. Disaggregation of aid 
A few authors have challenged some assumptions adopted in the aforementioned 
studies, namely that aid has a unique contemporaneous effect on growth, and that 
different kinds of aid have the same effect by looking at different types of development 
assistance. Bearing this in mind, some proposals argue that aid should be disaggregated 
into different types.  
Clemens et al.’s (2012) proposal124 was a seminal contribution in terms of disaggregating 
aid into different categories. Their idea was to identify the elements of aid whose impacts 
are more likely to be manifested in the short run, thus focusing on the timing of the effect. 
For that purpose, the authors distinguish between: i) “short-impact” aid, which includes 
the expenditures whose effects might be observed within roughly four years125; ii) “long-
impact” aid, encompassing technical cooperation and most social sector investments; 
and iii) “humanitarian” aid, which includes emergency assistance and food aid (Clemens, 
Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004a: 13). They then use “early-impact” aid, a restricted variable 
that considers the share of aid that is expected to have an impact on growth within the 
relevant time period. Based on the obtained results, the authors conclude that there is a 
positive impact of aid on growth on average across all countries, “but is limited and quite 
modest in comparison with other determinants of growth, and is negative in some 
countries” (Clemens et al., 2012: 591).  
Yet, Dreher and Langlotz (2016) draw attention to the fact that Clemens et al.’s (2012) 
estimates may be biased. In another replication exercise, Roodman (2015) casts doubt 
about the robustness of Clemens et al.’s (2012) claim, and argues that the 
contemporaneous endogeneity in their work is not completely removed by the approach 
these authors propose. Bjornskov (2013) adds to the discussion by using factor analysis 
to obtain a categorisation of aid126 and by comparing it to the results obtained with 
Clemens et al.’s (2012) proposal. The author concludes that overall aid has no effect on 
growth, though reconstruction aid shows direct positive effects. 
                                                             
124 Initially published as a working paper (Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004a, b). 
125 According to the authors, it includes “budget support or ‘program’ aid given for any purpose 
and project aid given for real sector investments for infrastructure or to directly support 
production in transportation (including roads), communications, energy, banking, agriculture 
and industry”, but excludes “any aid flow that clearly and primarily funds an activity whose 
growth effect might arrive far in the future or not at all (…)” (Clemens et al., 2012: 598-599). 
126 The author distinguishes between aid for economic purposes, social purposes, and 
reconstruction. 
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Some other proposals have disaggregated aid according to its purpose. Following the 
classification methodology of Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004a, b), Neanidis and 
Varvarigos (2009) distinguish between productive aid and pure aid, and add to the 
literature on the aid-growth link by accounting for the effect of volatility in the aid flows. 
Productive aid includes assistance given to improve the public services and the physical 
and social infrastructure of the economy, whereas pure aid encompasses food aid and 
monetary relief in critical situations, such as bad harvests or reconstructions (Neanidis 
and Varvarigos, 2009: 452-453). They conclude that the former has a positive effect on 
growth, while the later has a negative impact. In contrast with this, the volatility of 
productive aid reduces growth, but the volatility of pure aid increases growth. 
Annen and Kosempel (2009) disaggregate aid into technical assistance, provided in the 
form of a knowledge transfer with the aim of improving productive capabilities in the 
recipient country, and non-technical assistance, which consists on an income transfer 
that can be used in addition to the available resources for consumption and investment. 
Based on their theoretical analysis of the link between aid and growth, built upon a neo-
classical growth model, the authors predict that technical assistance will promote 
growth through its effect on productivity, regardless of whether it is perceived as 
permanent or temporary (Annen and Kosempel, 2009: 3). In contrast, non-technical 
assistance, if perceived as permanent, will not contribute to increased growth given that 
it will be entirely consumed (Annen and Kosempel, 2009: 3). Technical assistance is 
proxied by the variable of technical cooperation, as defined by the OECD, and non-
technical assistance is obtained by using current and actual transfers, and excluding debt 
forgiveness grants and capitalised interest, food and emergency aid, and technical 
assistance. They find that, in contrast with non-technical assistance, technical assistance 
has a positive and significant impact on growth, except in countries where it is highly 
fragmented, where the estimated effect is zero. 
Headey (2008) proposes to remove separately reported humanitarian aid from the ODA 
disbursements data in order to obtain a measure of aid that is ultimately intended to 
promote growth. Additionally, the author also considers the type of donor, and 
distinguishes between multilateral, bilateral, and repayment aid flows. The results 
indicate that multilateral aid has been, on average, more effective than bilateral aid in 
promoting growth.  
Focusing on aid modalities, Ouattara and Strobl (2008) use a distinction between project 
aid, financial programme aid, technical assistance, and food aid to test the specifications 
used in Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard, Hansen and 
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Tarp (2004). The results obtained from system GMM indicate that only project aid has a 
significant positive effect on growth, whereas financial programme aid has a negative 
effect. The authors found no significant effect for the latter two types of aid. 
Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) study covers three types of disaggregation, according 
to the timing of the effects (late-impact and early-impact), the purpose of aid (social and 
economic aid)127, and also the type of donor (multilateral and bilateral aid). Overall, the 
authors do not find a significant effect of any of the subcategories of aid on growth. 
Minoiu and Reddy (2010) contribute to this strand of the literature by focusing on donor 
motivations and distinguishing between developmental and non-developmental aid. 
Development aid is defined as “aid expended in a manner that is anticipated to promote 
development, whether achieved through economic growth or other means”, and is 
operationalised by pooling bilateral aid flows from “development-friendly” donor 
countries, selected on the basis of aid-quality donor rankings (Minoiu and Reddy, 2010: 
29). Non-developmental aid is obtained by deducting multilateral aid and development 
aid from total aid. The obtained coefficients show that developmental aid has a positive 
and robust impact on growth in the long-run. 
This chapter starts by examining the impact of total aid flows. Still, the insights from 
these studies are also taken into account at a later stage, and in section 5.5.3 I examine 
whether different categories of aid have distinct effects on economic growth in fragile 
states. 
 
5.3. HYPOTHESES, EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
 
5.3.1. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Similarly to the previous chapters, I follow Besley and Persson’s (2011a) framework, but 
now focus on the analysis of the impact of development assistance in light of their model 
of state fragility. These authors abstract from the role of strategic objectives in 
determining donor motives to provide aid, and from issues of coordination by focusing 
on a single intervention, i.e. a transfer of resources from a foreign government or 
                                                             
127 Hirano and Otsubo (2014) also propose a division according to the sectors of destination of 
aid, and assess the effect of social aid (i.e. aid directed at social infrastructure and services) and 
of economic aid (aid to economic infrastructure), in comparison to the impact of aggregate aid 
on economic growth.   
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organisation to the government of a developing country (Besley and Persson, 2011a: 
387).  The interest is in examining the effects that this transfer of resources has on the 
recipient government, and, eventually, on the welfare of the citizens of the country.  
The model suggests that aid can contribute to increased welfare. Given the aims of the 
analysis, welfare will be broadly equated with economic growth. Aid can contribute to 
promoting economic growth directly through the provision of public goods, and 
indirectly through investment in state capacity. It can also have a detrimental effect 
through an increase in the likelihood of violence. These links are schematically 
represented in Figure 18. The focus of this chapter is on the first of these links.128  
Together with the insights provided in the literature reviewed in the previous section, 
these served as inspiration to derive the hypotheses to be tested in the next sections, and 
which I describe in more detail below. 
Figure 18. Mechanisms linking foreign aid and welfare, according to Besley and Persson 
(2011a) 
 
Notes: Full lines represent direct links and dashed lines represent indirect links. 
I first consider the hypothesis suggested by early studies on aid conditionality that aid is 
deemed to be less effective in fragile states, tested in the studies reviewed at the end of 
section 5.2. In other words: 
H1: Aid is less effective in promoting economic growth in countries with a 
higher degree of state fragility. 
                                                             
128 Even though I recognise the importance of examining the other two channels through which 
aid may have an impact on growth, for reasons of space, these are not explored in this thesis, 
and I suggest this extension for future work. However, as described below, the regressions in 
this chapter control for state ineffectiveness and political violence, thus ruling out these links. 
For reviews of existing studies examining similar relationships, I refer to Clist and Morrissey 
(2011) and Morrissey (2012), who focus on the effect of aid on government spending and tax 
effort in developing countries, and to Findley et al. (2011), who offer an overview of the 
quantitative literature on the effect of foreign aid on conflict dynamics. 
FOREIGN AID 
Investment in 
public goods 
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Following the idea of considering the effects of the two symptoms separately, I subdivide 
this hypothesis into two:  
H1.1: Aid is less effective in promoting economic growth in states with 
higher levels of state ineffectiveness. 
H1.2: Aid is less effective in promoting economic growth in states with 
higher levels of political violence. 
The second hypothesis derived by Besley and Persson’s (2011a) model is that aid is more 
effective in promoting economic growth in weak or redistributive, but peaceful states, 
than in states with repression or civil war. This proposition suggests the examination of 
an interactive effect between aid and the two symptoms of state fragility. This can be 
formulated as follows:  
H2: Aid will be even less effective in promoting growth in countries with a 
combination of state ineffectiveness and political violence. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this hypothesis has not been examined in previous 
studies. The following section describes the empirical strategy employed to test these 
postulates. 
 
5.3.2. Empirical model 
This chapter follows closely the empirical formulation used in Chapter 4, which I briefly 
recall here. I used as a baseline the standard growth equation, largely used in the aid-
growth literature, to which I added the two fragility indices as well as their interaction. 
I now also include the term for aid:  
𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log 𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑠𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑎𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (4) 
where 𝑔𝑖 is the per capita real GDP growth rate, α is a constant, log 𝑦𝑖,0 is the logarithm 
of the initial level of per capital real GDP, 𝑋𝑖  includes the control variables described in 
more detail below, and 𝜀𝑖  represents the residuals. The additional terms 𝑠𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑣𝑖  are 
the indices for state ineffectiveness and political violence, respectively, and their 
interaction is represented by the term 𝑠𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑣𝑖 . Finally, 𝑎𝑖  represents development aid 
receipts.  
The interest of this chapter lays now in determining how the level of state fragility in a 
country influences the impact of aid on growth. Bearing this in mind, and following a 
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similar approach to previous studies, I introduce the interaction of each state 
ineffectiveness and political violence with aid. Thus, the new formulation is: 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log 𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑠𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑎𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑎𝑖 × 𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑎𝑖 ×
𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖            (5) 
The main interest will be in analysing the sign and significance of the coefficient for aid, 
𝛾4, but mainly of the coefficients for the interaction terms, 𝛾5 and 𝛾6. They tell us about 
aid effectiveness and to what extent it varies with the degree of state fragility. In order 
to test H2 I add an additional interaction term:  
           𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log 𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑠𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑎𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑎𝑖 × 𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑎𝑖 ×
𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑎𝑖 × 𝑠𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑣𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖       (6) 
The coefficient 𝛾7 represents whether the effect of aid on growth is dependent on the 
existence of both state ineffectiveness and political violence in combination. 
In using the two distinct indices to proxy for the dimensions of state fragility proposed 
in Chapter 3, I depart from the existing cross-country studies looking at aid effectiveness 
in fragile states in three elements. First, I use the two dimensions separately, instead of 
including an interaction term of aid with a single unidimensional measure of fragility. 
Second, these indicators are not based on CPIA scores, thus overcoming the limitations 
of using this index to identify fragile states (as discussed in section 2.4). Finally, I move 
away from a binary approach to state fragility that considers that a country is either a 
fragile or a non-fragile state. McGillivray and Feeny (2008) and Andrimihaja, 
Cinyabuguma and Devarajan (2011) (discussed in section 5.2.2) use dummy variables to 
account for fragility, whereas the two indices employed here are continuous variables.129  
Although not directly the aim of this chapter, the analysis in the following sections also 
describes the results obtained for the coefficient of aid before any interaction terms are 
included, i.e. the coefficients resulting from estimating equation (4). Not only does this 
allow for a comparison with the aid effectiveness literature, but it also enables one to 
observe any changes in the aid term after the interaction effects are taken into account. 
Before describing the data used in the empirical analysis, I summarise the hypotheses 
tested, the corresponding links, and the respective coefficients of interest in Table 56. 
 
                                                             
129 It is important to clarify that previous cross-country studies examining the conditional effect 
of aid on growth have interacted the former with other continuous measures of policy 
environment and institutional quality (e.g. CPIA, ICRG …). The above comment refers only to 
those studies explicitly using the framework of fragile states.   
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Table 56. Summary of specifications 
Hypothesis Link(s) tested 
Coefficient 
(Expected 
sign) 
H1.1. Aid is less effective in promoting 
economic growth in states with high 
levels of state ineffectiveness. 
 
H1.2: Aid is less effective in promoting 
economic growth in states with high 
levels of political violence. 
 
                      State ineffectiveness 
 
           Aid                        Growth 
 
                         Political violence 
𝛾5 (–) 
𝛾6 (–) 
H2: Aid will be even less effective in 
promoting growth in countries with a 
combination of state ineffectiveness 
and political violence. 
 
           State ineffect.         Political violence 
 
            Aid                         Growth 
 
𝛾7 (–) 
 
5.3.3. Data 
Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) contribution to the aid effectiveness empirical 
literature has been praised for the comprehensiveness of their analysis, which assesses 
the effect of aid on growth using different time horizons and periods, sources, types, and 
timing of aid, and varied specifications and samples. Following the line of previous 
studies (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010; Clemens et al., 2012), I use this benchmark study 
as a baseline. The first set of results included in this chapter is obtained using Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2008) original dataset, which is publicly available, and simply adding, in 
stages: 1) the two indices representing the symptoms of state fragility – state 
ineffectiveness and political violence, as well as their interaction; and 2) their 
interactions with aid. In the tables included in the following section “RS08 original” will 
correspond to this dataset. 
Next, I attempt to reconstruct Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) dataset, in order to 
extend the period of analysis, by obtaining data from, as far as possible, the same sources 
used by these authors. The majority of the variables in the resulting dataset are very 
close to the ones used by Rajan and Subramanian (2008).130 However, due to data 
availability, the extended dataset includes a few changes when compared to the original, 
the main differences being in the measures of institutional quality and ethnic 
                                                             
130 Table D1.5 in Appendix D1 includes the correlation coefficients between the variables 
included in the original dataset and the dataset reproduced in this study. With the exception of 
GDP growth, institutional quality, inflation, and ethnic fractionalization, all the correlation 
coefficients for the cross-country data are above 0.9. The lower correlation coefficients can be 
explained by the fact that inflation is transformed by taking the logarithm of (1+inflation/100), 
and different measures are used for institutional quality and ethnic fractionalization. 
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fractionalization.131 In the remainder of this chapter this dataset will be designated 
“RS08 reproduced”. 
Following the standard practice in the literature, the average of the annual growth rate 
of real per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) between the start and end year is used 
as a measure for economic growth.  
Despite the fact that some studies, namely Burnside and Dollar (2000), use effective 
development assistance (EDA) as a measure of development assistance, most authors 
use official development assistance (ODA). In line with the latter, I use net ODA 
disbursements expressed as a percentage of GDP to measure development aid. ODA 
includes all grants or loans that are undertaken by the official sector and are intended to 
promote economic development and welfare (OECD-DAC, 2016). In the case of loans, the 
requirement is that they have a grant element of at least 25 per cent. ODA includes not 
only financial flows, but also technical cooperation. The net value is obtained by 
deducting from the gross amount the repayments of loan principals or recoveries on 
grants received during the same period (OECD-DAC, 2016). 
The two indices of state fragility were derived on the basis of the analysis described in 
Chapter 3, but following the procedure in Chapter 4, in which PCA was applied to each 
set of variables separately. To recap, the state ineffectiveness index was derived by 
applying PCA to the set of variables representing state effectiveness and then 
multiplying the resulting scores by -1, in order to obtain a measure of state 
ineffectiveness. Similarly, the political violence index results from the application of PCA 
to the set of variables describing political violence. 
The scatters in Figure 19 represent the variables GDP per capita growth and aid for 
different quartiles of state ineffectiveness and political violence for the 20-year period. 
Overall, they do not show any clear relationship between growth and aid. Additionally, 
neither the set of scatters for different quartiles of state ineffectiveness nor the one for 
different quartiles of political violence suggest that the correlation between the two 
variables changes depending on the levels of the two dimensions of state fragility. 
Similar scatters were built for the two 10-year periods and can be found in Appendix D1, 
Figures D1.1 and D1.2. The conclusions are the same as those described for period 1993-
2012.  
                                                             
131 More details of the variables and data sources used by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) are 
included in Table D1.1 in Appendix D1, which also describes the variables included in the 
reproduced dataset. 
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Figure 19. GDP per capita growth rates versus aid for different quartiles of state 
ineffectiveness and for different quartiles of political violence, 1993-2012 
Different quartiles of the state ineffectiveness index 
 
Different quartiles of the political violence index 
 
 
a. SI score below -0.194 b. SI score above -0.194 and below 1.246 
c. SI score above 1.246 and below 1.957 d. SI score above 1.957 
a. SI score below -0.845 b. SI score above -0.845 and below -0.01 
c. SI score above -0.01 and below 1.656 d. SI score above 1.656 
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In line with Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) model, and according to the modifications 
referred to above, 𝑋𝑖  includes the following as controls: 
 Initial level of per capita GDP: logarithm of per capita GDP in the beginning of 
the relevant period in both the cross-country and the panel datasets. This is used 
to capture convergence, which corresponds to a negative coefficient; 
 Trade policy: Sachs and Warner’s (1995) openness index in the beginning of the 
relevant period in the case of cross-country analysis, and averaged across the 5- 
or 10-year periods in the panel datasets. Based on the assumption that trade 
openness promotes economic growth, the coefficient is expected to be positive; 
 Initial level of life expectancy: life expectancy at birth in the beginning of the 
relevant period. The coefficient is expected to have a positive sign; 
 Measure of geography: time-invariant measure from Bosworth and Collins 
(2003) that averages the number of frost days and tropical land area. Standard 
deviates of the two measures are used and then assigned equal weights. Given 
that the first is positively correlated with growth, whereas the second has a 
negative correlation, the weights assigned are -0.5 and +0.5, respectively. Given 
that higher values of this measure, represent better geography, a positive 
coefficient is expected; 
 Indicator of institutional quality: arithmetic average of the ICRG indicator of 
quality of institutions over the period. A higher level of institutional quality is 
argued to be positively associated with a higher level of economic growth, and 
thus the expected sign of the coefficient is positive; 
 Inflation: logarithm of (1+inflation/100) in the beginning of the period in the 
case of cross-country analysis, and averaged across the 5-year or 10-year 
periods in the panel datasets. The coefficient is expected to be negative, given 
that high inflation has a detrimental effect on economic growth;  
 Initial level of M2 as a ratio of GDP: money and quasi money (M2) expressed as 
a percentage of GDP in the beginning of the period in the case of cross-country 
analysis, and averaged across the 5-year or 10-year periods in the panel 
datasets. This is a proxy for the level of depth of the financial system, and, thus, 
a positive sign is expected;  
 Budget balance: cash surplus or deficit (% of GDP) in the beginning of the period 
in the case of cross-country analysis, and averaged across the 5-year or 10-year 
periods in the panel datasets. In general, it is more challenging to raise funds to 
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finance expenditure if the country has a high budget deficit, so a negative 
coefficient is expected; 
 Revolutions: average number of revolutions, defined as “any illegal or forced 
change in the top government elite, any attempt at such change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the 
central government” (Banks and Wilson, 2016). It is expected to have a negative 
coefficient in the model; 
 Ethnic fractionalization: average of Alesina et al.’s (2003) measure of ethnic 
fractionalization over the period. This indicator reflects the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not share the same ethnicity, 
and it is expected to have a negative correlation with growth. 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) consider different time horizons for the period 1960-
2000. Given that the data for the two indices representing state fragility are available 
only from 1993, the results obtained using Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) original 
dataset correspond to the period 1990-2000. For the purpose of comparability, the first 
set of results compares the coefficients obtained for the period stemming from 1990 to 
2000 for the original dataset with the reproduced dataset. 
In order to maximise the use of the data available for the fragility indices, and to be 
consistent with the analysis in the previous chapters, the estimations with the dataset 
resulting from attempting to reproduce and extend Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) 
original dataset are carried out considering the period 1993-2012. The first set of results 
are obtained with cross-country data for 20- and 10-year horizons; panel data 
considering 5-year averages and 10-year averages are used later in the analysis.132 Table 
57 summarises the different time periods used, as well as the number of countries 
included in each sub-sample. Tables D1.6-D1.9 in Appendix D1 provide the descriptive 
statistics for the variables in each dataset. One observes a sizeable variation of aid flows 
as a percentage of GDP for the sample of countries considered in all the periods. The 
average values vary between 3.7% and 5.6%, but the maximum values range between 
around 19% and 30%. In terms of state ineffectiveness and political violence the values 
range approximately between -3.7 and 4 in the case of the former, and between -1.7 and 
7.6 in the case of the latter.133 
                                                             
132 In the case of panel data, trade policy, inflation, financial quality and budget balance are 
averages across the relevant periods. 
133 Tables D1.3 and D1.4 in Appendix D1 include the lists of countries for each sub-sample. 
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Table 57. Different time periods and number of countries 
 RS08 dataset  RS08 reproduced 
 Cross-country  Cross-country Panel 
Time horizon 10-year  10-year 10-year 20-year 5-year 10-year 
Sub-period(s) 1990-2000  1990-2000 
 
1993-2002 2003-2012 1993-2012 1993-1997 
1998-2002 
2003-2007 
2008-2012 
1993-2002 
2003-2012 
Nr countries 66  64 77 67 65 63 67 
 
 
5.4. DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS 
 
5.4.1. Multicollinearity 
Similarly to the strategy in Chapter 4, I use two procedures to examine the possibility of 
potential multicollinearity between the explanatory variables included in the analysis in 
this chapter. The first procedure consists simply in examining the pairwise correlations 
between the variables, and checking for very high values. The second follows the 
suggestion in Kennedy (2008: 199) and considers the variance inflation factors VIFi. 
These are the diagonal elements of the inverse of the correlation matrix, and can be used 
to detect multicollinearity. I recall here that the two indicators for this possibility are: i) 
any VIFi greater than 10; and ii) the mean value of all the VIFi considerably greater than 
1 (Kennedy, 2008: 199; StataCorp., 2013). The correlation matrices and the tables with 
the VIFs can be found in Appendix D2. The following paragraphs describe the 
conclusions derived from them. 
The correlation matrix for Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) original dataset with the two 
indices of fragility (Table D2.1 in Appendix D2) raised no reason for concern. Despite 
some higher values for the correlations between life expectancy and both aid and state 
ineffectiveness, none of these coefficients was greater than 0.8 in absolute value, which, 
as a rule of thumb, is usually considered as an indicator of potential collinearity. The 
analysis of the VIFs also did not indicate any considerable problems (see Table D2.8 in 
Appendix D2). None of the values was greater than 10, and the mean VIF is 3.13. 
Although greater than 1, this does not seem an alarming value. 
The same analysis was repeated for the datasets obtained by extending Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2008) data coverage using, as far as possible, the same data choices. The 
cross-country data consider three different 10-year periods (1990-2000; 1993-2002; 
and 2003-2012) and one 20-year period (1993-2012). The correlation matrices for all 
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the variables (not included here for matters of space and simplicity) indicate a high 
potential of collinearity between state ineffectiveness and the indicator for institutional 
quality. More specifically, the correlations for the four datasets described were, 
respectively: -0.9041, -0.9361, -0.9251, and -0.9272. This was already expected given 
that the indicators used in the construction of the state ineffectiveness index match some 
of the components that comprise the ICRG. Based on this, unlike Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2008) work, the analysis in this chapter does not include an indicator of 
institutional quality in the regressions. 
The same procedure was then applied to the remaining variables. The correlation 
matrices (Tables D2.2-D2.5 in Appendix D2) did not indicate any other potential for 
collinearity. The highest correlation coefficients obtained correspond to the 
relationships between life expectancy and the variables GDP per capita, aid, and the 
dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries. The coefficient for the pair life expectancy-
aid is higher than 0.8 in two of the datasets considered. Additionally, with the exception 
of life expectancy and the initial level of GDP per capita in two of the periods considered, 
the results of the analysis of the VIFs showed no alarming value (see Table D2.9 in 
Appendix D2). However, given the importance of including life expectancy as a control 
in this type of analysis, this variable was still included. 
When considering the two panel datasets, one obtained through 5-year averages and the 
second with 10-year averages, a high correlation between state ineffectiveness and 
institutional quality was again obtained, with values -0.9069 and -0.9195, respectively. 
After the latter of these variables was dropped from the analysis, the two procedures 
proposed here did not highlight any other problematic relationships. The correlation 
matrices (Tables D2.6 and D2.7 in Appendix D2) showed no coefficient with an absolute 
value greater than 0.8. Again, the analysis of the VIFs also did not raise the attention to 
any problematic variables. All the individual VIFs were lower than 10, and the mean VIFs 
were 2.77 and 2.84 for the 5-year and 10-year averaged datasets, respectively. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that, even though a high correlation between the 
political violence index and the variable revolutions included in the analysis was 
expected, the results discussed in this section showed no reason for concern. Despite the 
fact that the correlation coefficients between these variables are high in most datasets, 
they are frequently below 0.7, and never above 0.8. 
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5.4.2. Outliers 
The second aspect that deserves further examination is whether there is a potential for 
specific observations to influence the obtained results. The focus is on the main variables 
of interest, and thus, in addition to state ineffectiveness and political violence, aid is also 
considered. In line with Chapter 4, I use the Hadi (1992) procedure as implemented in 
Roodman (2007a) to examine the existence of outliers. The obtained results are 
represented in Table 58. 
Table 58. Outliers identified with the Hadi procedure  
 Cross-country Panel 
 10-year 20-year 
5-year 10-year 
 1990-2000 1993-2002 2003-2012 1993-2012 
State ineffect. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Political violence 0 0 0 
India 
Israel 
0 0 
Aid Nicaragua Nicaragua 0 Cape Verde Sierra Leone (93-97) Rwanda (93-02) 
       
Notes: 0.05 was used as the cut-off significance level for both when applying the Hadi procedure and using 
the bacon command. The latter did not identify any outliers across the different datasets. Periods 
represented in parenthesis for the results with panel data. 
Looking first at the results for state ineffectiveness, no influential observations were 
detected in any of the datasets considered. In the case of political violence, only when 
using data averaged for the 20-year period stemming from 1993 until 2012, the 
observations for India and Israel were identified as potential outliers. Considering the 
results for aid, the procedure used highlighted potential influential observations in 
almost all of the datasets used. The observations for Nicaragua were identified when the 
first decade was considered, and the observation for Cape Verde seems to be an outlier 
when the 20-year period is used. One observation for Sierra Leone and another for 
Rwanda were highlighted for panel data. 
Also similarly to Chapter 4, I consider the potential outliers among the values for the 
growth rates by: i) observing the leverage-versus-squared-residual plot134; and ii) 
following the rule of thumb that highlights as influential observations those with 
leverage higher than 2xK/N, where K is the number of parameters (including the 
intercept) and N is the sample size, which in the case of the datasets considered is 
approximately 0.5. The plots are not included here, but Table 59 lists the countries 
highlighted with this procedure. 
                                                             
134 This is a graph of leverage against the (normalized) residuals squared and includes two lines 
showing the average values for these two dimensions. Any points lying above the horizontal line 
have a leverage value which is higher than average, and any points lying to the right of the 
vertical line have residuals which are higher than average (StataCorp., 2013). The first of these 
groups of points causes the most concern. 
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Table 59. Outliers identified for economic growth 
 Cross-country Panel 
 10-year 20-year 
5-year 10-year 
 1990-2000 1993-2002 2003-2012 1993-2012 
Economic growth Nicaragua Angola India 
Congo, D.R. 
Cyprus 
Brazil (93-97) Angola (93-02) 
       
Notes: These countries were selected based on the observation of the leverage-versus-squared-residual 
plot and by considering levels of the leverage higher than 0.5. 
In what follows, the analysis will be made considering all the available observations in 
order to maximise the data used. However, in section 5.5.3 I revisit the results and 
compare them with those obtained after the exclusion of outliers.  
 
5.4.3. Endogeneity 
In Chapter 4, I considered the possibility that state ineffectiveness and political violence 
were endogenous to the model, and used a selection of different strategies to take this 
into account. In this chapter, however, I will assume that they are exogenous.135 Still, as 
cautioned by the aid-growth literature, the potential endogeneity of the aid variable 
warrants consideration in the discussion of its impact on growth. The following 
paragraphs discuss this issue in more detail. 
 
a) Endogeneity of aid 
One of the hardest problems to tackle in aid-growth regressions is the issue of 
endogeneity. The endogeneity problem can be a result of an omitted variable, which 
results from not accounting for the effect of a third variable that may affect aid and 
growth (Roodman, 2007b).  
Second, the possibility of endogenous causation can stem from reverse causality, i.e. it is 
not unlikely that aid levels are affected by economic growth (Roodman, 2007b). From a 
different perspective, if the correlation between aid and growth is negative in the 
allocation equation (as lower levels of growth are associated with higher inflows of aid), 
but positive in the impact equation (as an increase in aid inflows is associated with 
higher growth rates), then this leads to identification problems (Rajan and Subramanian, 
2008; Adamu, 2013). Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) argue that this would be a 
                                                             
135 This choice is supported by the fact that the results obtained in Chapter 4 after taking into 
account the potential endogeneity of these variables were not very different from the baseline 
results.  
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relatively inconsequential problem if one considered that aid allocations are based on 
past income levels, which are not necessarily good predictors of future growth in poor 
countries. However, with the transformation of a stylised system of equations for growth 
and aid into a time-averaged system, the latter becomes dependent on the average rate 
of growth - as long as the dependency is within the period over which the system is 
averaged (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2004). Also, they add, it is difficult to test for 
endogeneity given that all time varying regressors are possibly correlated with the time-
aggregation error term. 
 
b) Proposals to tackle endogeneity 
Endogeneity is frequently addressed by applying an appropriate instrumentation 
strategy, i.e. finding sources of exogenous variation that are uncorrelated with other 
possible determinants of income levels. For the case of the aid-growth link, this means 
finding a variable that is supposedly correlated with growth only through its 
relationship with aid. If this correlation exists, then aid must have worked (Roodman, 
2007b: 8). In the following paragraphs I distinguish between the studies making use of 
internal instruments from those employing alternative external instruments.136   
 
Internal instruments 
The use of internal instruments, based on the transformation of variables, is common in 
the literature. For instance, lagged policy is used in different studies, such as Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) or Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004a). However, it has been criticised 
for being based on the assumption that a policy shock (e.g. trade reform) in a certain 
period has a contemporaneous effect on growth, but does not affect it in the next period 
except through aid (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008: 648).  
In some cases, the authors use lagged aid as an instrument (e.g. Clemens et al., 2012). If 
one assumes that past aid inflows i) are a good predictor of current aid allocation, given 
that they are more or less persistent over time, ii) cannot be affected by current growth, 
                                                             
136 A recent group of studies have proposed to use time series analysis to assess the link 
between aid and growth. Given the scope of the analysis, these are not discussed at length here, 
but reference is made to Herzer and Morrissey (2013), Juselius, Moller and Tarp (2013), and to 
the dialogue between Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2012) and Herzer et al. (2015) with Lof, Mekasha 
and Tarp (2015a, b). Other approaches include the use of sample splitting methods (e.g. 
Kourtellos, Tan and Zhang, 2007; Kalyvitis, Stengos and Vlachaki, 2012), and of nonlinear panel 
thresholds (Alia and Anago, 2014). 
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and iii) do not affect growth in the current period, then they may be a good candidate for 
an instrument. However, it would be highly collinear with aid itself (Werker, Ahmed and 
Cohen, 2009: 225). Rajan and Subramanian (2008: 647-648) highlight that even if 
predetermined (i.e. influenced by random events in past growth rates but not by 
contemporaneous events), these variables may not be exogenous, especially if there is 
serial correlation in the dependent variable, which is likely when growth is measured 
over a rather short interval.  
Promising to overcome some of the problems of using OLS and 2SLS to estimate dynamic 
models137, GMM estimators, and especially the system GMM estimator, became popular 
in aid effectiveness studies138. The system GMM uses a system of equations that 
combines a regression in differences (using lagged values as instruments) and a 
regression in levels (using the additional instruments). Hansen and Tarp (2001) were 
the first to use this approach to estimate the impact of aid on growth, and the recent 
influential paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) also applies it. Other recent studies 
using GMM include Angeles and Neanidis (2009), Minoiu and Reddy (2010), Gyimah-
Brempong, Racine and Gyapong (2012), and Dreher and Langlotz (2016). 
However, similarly to the aforementioned instrumentation strategies, this has also been 
questioned. First, the problems resulting from weak instruments, namely the fact that 
they bias coefficient estimates, also applies to panel GMM (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010: 
3). Clemens et al. (2012: 597)139 and Bazzi and Clemens (2013: 175) found that the 
instrumentation by both lagged levels and lagged differences of Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2008) regressors is very weak. Frot and Perrotta (2012: 6) warn that 
the relevance of the instruments used within this procedure is never tested through the 
standard diagnostic methods to determine their strength, and highlight the problems for 
inference when using many weak instruments.  
Second, there are concerns about the assumption that both country fixed effects and 
omitted variables are orthogonal to the lagged differences of the right-hand side 
variables used as instruments for the level equation, which is an essential condition for 
                                                             
137 The use of dynamic models, which include lagged values of the dependent variable as 
regressors, allows one to model the process of economic growth more accurately. However, 
these are correlated with the fixed effect in the error term, which renders the OLS and 2SLS 
inconsistent (Frot and Perrotta, 2012: 6). 
138 See Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2009: 4) and Frot and Perrotta (2012: 6) for the advantages of 
applying these methods. 
139 These authors provide a close examination of four of the most influential studies in the 
literature, namely, Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), and 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
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the validity of the system GMM estimator (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010: 3-4). Third, there 
is the possibility that internal instruments appear valid according to the Hansen-Sargan 
tests, even if they are invalid, as a result of instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009). 
Lastly, the use of internal instruments is not sufficient to circumvent the bias stemming 
from systematic measurement error in the endogenous regressors (Arndt, Jones and 
Tarp, 2010: 4). 
 
External instruments 
One way of overcoming the problems discussed in the previous paragraphs is the use of 
external instruments. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) propose an instrument based on 
the supply of aid based on donor-related characteristics, namely history, captured 
through colonial links and commonality of language, and influence, captured by 
considering the relative size of donor and recipient, and its interaction with colonial 
links. Yet, given the high correlation of this instrument with population size140, their 
instrumentation strategy has been criticised, along with other studies using this 
approach, namely the prominent work by Boone (1996) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
(Bazzi and Clemens, 2013: 161).  
Deaton (2010: 434) argues that, despite determining aid, neither population, country-
specific dummies (such as a dummy for Egypt) nor colonial legacy variables (for 
example, a dummy for francophone countries)141 can be plausibly assumed to be 
exogenous, given that it is not reasonable to assume that either of these variables has 
any effect on growth other than through the effects on aid flows, which is a necessary 
condition for exogeneity. For instance, population size may have a direct effect on 
growth through other mechanisms, such as the extent of internal and external trade, the 
basket of goods exported by a country, or even the degree of political integration with 
neighbours (Clemens et al., 2012: 596-597; Bazzi and Clemens, 2013: 160). Frot and 
Perrotta (2012: 4) apply an analogous criticism to the fraction of land in the tropics, used 
by Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), maintaining that this variable is correlated with 
                                                             
140 Bazzi and Clemens (2013: 158) demonstrate that all the instrumentation power rests on the 
population instrument. 
141 The rationale for the use of population, a dummy for Egypt, or a dummy for francophone 
countries is as follows, as explained in Deaton (2010: 434). Given that the allocation of aid is 
made on a country basis, it is assumed that larger countries receive less aid per capita. A great 
part of American aid is disbursed to Egypt as part of the Camp David accords, in which it agreed 
to a partial reconcilement with Israel. Finally, due to their French colonial legacy, francophone 
countries receive additional aid from France.  
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institutions which, in turn, affect long-run development, as demonstrated in other 
studies (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001).142  
A series of validity checks run by Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010: 9) concur with Bazzi and 
Clemens’ (2013) concerns over the population ratio as the driving force behind the fitted 
aid instrument, and suggest that the validity of the exclusion restriction in terms of the 
population-based instruments is a fundamental issue. Building upon Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2008) specification, Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) propose a number of 
changes to their specification, given their concerns regarding the instrument used. First, 
the estimates are re-calculated considering missing values for bilateral aid indicators as 
zero, based on the claim that in most cases missing values in the OECD-DAC aid dataset 
represent unreported null values. Second, aid per capita is used as the dependent 
variable instead of aid/GDP, given that there is a chance that GDP is correlated with some 
of the variables included in the right-hand side independently of aid, which may lead to 
misinterpretation (or bias) in least squares regressions. Third, the coloniser-specific 
variables (and interactions) are dropped, and replaced by a single dummy for whether 
the country was ever a colony, because there are enough reasons to believe that these 
are not orthogonal to growth and should therefore be left out of the preliminary 
regression used to find the aid instrument. Finally, donor-specific fixed effects are 
included in order to account for the fact that there are different factors leading to donors’ 
attitudes to giving foreign aid. The authors apply a counterfactual model framework and 
use doubly robust estimators for evaluating aid’s impact, alongside the new obtained 
instrument.143  
Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) lend support to Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) 
strategy by proposing a similar set of instruments. After including the instruments used 
in Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Hansen and Tarp (2001) – i.e. Franc zone dummy, 
Central America dummy, log of population, arms imports as a share of total import, and 
lagged aid – combined with variables reflecting colonial relationships – namely the 
distance from equator, the share of population speaking a primary European language, 
a dummy for countries with a federal constitution and the country size, and the 
interaction between the last two variables – they conclude that standard instruments 
used in the literature are relatively poor predictors of aid, whereas they validate the 
                                                             
142 Werker, Ahmed and Cohen (2009: 226) add that the use of time-invariant variables, such as 
Egypt dummy, Africa Franc zone dummy, or population, limits the temporal analysis that can be 
done. 
143 I refer to Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) for more details about the specification proposed as 
well as the estimators employed. 
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newly introduced instruments (Lessmann and Markwardt, 2012: 1729-1731).144 
However, in addition to the concerns discussed in the previous paragraphs, doubts have 
also been raised about their assumption that historical variables are exogenous, given 
that it has been demonstrated that they are correlated with traditional growth 
determinants (Frot and Perrotta, 2012: 5).145 
In a similar vein, Angeles and Neanidis (2009) use one lag of the endogenous variables 
in their model along with the exogenous variables used as instruments in Hansen and 
Tarp (2001), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004a) and 
Tavares (2003). In addition, they include indicators of the recipient countries’ 
geographical and cultural proximity to the OECD-DAC member countries (namely, the 
inverse of bilateral distance, and three dummies for common land border, common 
official language, and common majority religion) interacted with the latter’s aid 
outflows. In line with the criticism described above, the exogeneity of this instrument 
has also been questioned given that it is based on the premise that geographical distance 
between recipient nations and donor countries only affects growth through foreign aid. 
It has been argued that geographical distance between countries influences, for instance, 
trade patterns as well as flows of people, which are both determinants of growth 
(Dalgaard and Hansen, 2010: 37). Additionally, they use arms imports (as a share of total 
imports) lagged one period, implying that this variable may affect growth in the current 
period, but not in the following period except through aid, which does not seem plausible 
(Frot and Perrotta, 2012: 5).  
On their study of the aid-growth relationship at the firm level, Chauvet and Ehrhart 
(2015) follow a similar line of reasoning based on the ‘supply-side’ determinants of aid. 
The authors propose to instrument aid using the total amount of fiscal revenue (as a 
share of donors’ GDP), in order to capture changes in donors’ economic environment, 
weighted by historic proximity between donors and receiving countries. The latter is 
represented by a dummy for whether the recipient country is a former colony of the 
donor country. 
                                                             
144 See Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring (2014: 3-4) for a list of studies using instruments that 
proxy for the geopolitical importance of recipient countries to donors. Still, Headey (2008) 
questions this strategy. The results obtained by the author suggest that geopolitical aid may be 
less effective than development aid, which means that the use of geopolitical factors as 
instruments could potentially lead to an underestimation of the effect of aid on growth. Dreher, 
Eichenauer and Gehring (2014) contribute to this argument by showing that geopolitical aid is 
less effective than other aid, and consequently that estimates of the effect of politically 
motivated aid only represent the lower bound of the true effect of overall aid. 
145 These instruments are also undermined by their limited variation since historical variables 
are simple dummies or have fixed values over time (Frot and Perrotta, 2012: 5). 
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In line with this proposal, Temple and Van Sijpe (2015) propose another instrument 
based on the supply of aid, in the form of a weighted average of donor budgets. This relies 
on the assumption that individual, time varying conditions of particular countries do not 
significantly affect the total aid budgets of the majority of donors. In a general case of 𝑁𝐷 
donors, the synthetic predictor of aid is 𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆 𝑌𝑖𝑡⁄ ≡  (∑ 𝑎𝑖0
𝑑 𝐷𝑑𝑡
𝑁𝐷
𝑑=1 )/𝑌𝑖𝑡, where 𝑎𝑖0
𝑑  is the 
share of donor 𝑑’s total aid disbursements that recipient 𝑖 receives, calculated over an 
initial period that is excluded from the estimation, and 𝐷𝑑𝑡 is the total aid disbursement 
made by donor 𝑑 in period 𝑡 (Temple and Van Sijpe, 2015: 7).  
Also focusing on the supply side of aid, Frot and Perrotta (2012) build upon the fact that 
donor-recipient partnerships formed earlier are associated with higher aid levels. The 
authors argue that this instrument is exogenous to growth, as they found no evidence of 
a relationship between the date of creation of a partnership and growth rates, and show 
that it is highly correlated with actual aid levels (Frot and Perrotta, 2012). Dreher and 
Langlotz (2016) use the interaction of government fractionalization in the donor country 
with a country’s probability of receiving aid as the instrument for aid146. The rationale 
for this choice is rooted in the insights from two strands of literature. The first indicates 
that government’s expenditures are augmented by legislature fragmentation, and the 
second that government budgets increase aid disbursements to recipient countries 
(Dreher and Langlotz, 2016: 5-6). 
On a different approach, Bruckner (2013) proposes a two-step procedure that first 
discounts the effect of growth on aid, and then uses the obtained residual variation in 
foreign aid that is not driven by GDP per capita growth as an instrument to determine 
the inverse effect. Given the use of a panel of 47 least developed countries covering the 
period 1960-2000, the author argues that rainfall and international commodity price 
shocks are suitable instruments to estimate the response of foreign aid to economic 
growth. A panel fixed-effects estimator is then applied to determine the effect running 
from aid to growth. Focusing on the aid-growth relationship at the regional level, Dreher 
and Lohmann (2015) build upon Bruckner’s (2013) approach, and propose to 
instrument for aid by interacting a variable that indicates whether or not a country 
crossed the IDA's income threshold with a recipient region’s probability of receiving aid. 
                                                             
146 The latter is proxied by the percentage of years the country received aid from a particular 
donor over the sample period, in line with Nunn and Qian (2014). This paper examines the 
causal effect of US food aid on conflict. The instrument used results from the interaction 
between last year’s US wheat production and the proportion of years that a country receives a 
positive amount of US food aid during the period considered in the study. 
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Following a similar two-step procedure, Jackson (2014) focuses instead on the effects of 
natural disasters on aid inflows. Defining as “aid neighbours” countries sharing common 
donors, the author examines the impact of natural disasters on foreign aid on both the 
countries exposed to disaster shocks and the aid neighbour countries. After analysing 
this effect, drought exposure to recipients’ aid neighbours is used as an instrument for 
own aid inflows. 
A different group of authors have drawn upon the insights derived from the methods 
using natural experiments and have applied them to purge endogeneity concerns in aid-
growth cross-country regressions. The idea is to focus on a specific episode of foreign 
aid and use a natural experiment approach to find the instrument. Werker, Ahmed and 
Cohen (2009) note that, following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, Gulf oil exporters 
distributed generous amounts of foreign aid to the developing world, greatly favouring 
Muslim countries. The authors then suggest the use of this windfall in unconditional 
foreign aid coincident with the rise in the price of oil as an instrument for the short-run 
impact of aid on the economy, by interacting the price of oil with whether the recipient 
country is Muslim. They find little measurable effect of this untied windfall of aid on 
growth. Galiani et al. (2014) contribute to the literature by proposing an instrument that 
considers the IDA income threshold level147. Based on the authors’ observation that total 
aid decreases significantly once a recipient country crosses the IDA income threshold 
from below, and that this threshold is not necessarily linked with any structural change 
in economic growth, it is argued that it can serve as a plausible instrument to assess the 
aid-growth relationship.148 
 
 
                                                             
147 The income threshold criterion is used for eligibility purposes. Once the country reaches an 
income level higher than the threshold, and remains over this level for a period of three 
consecutive years, lending volumes are usually reduced. Since this “graduation” from IDA is 
recognized as a signal that the recipient country is in less need for aid, it is also accompanied by 
a decrease in aid flows from other donors (Galiani et al., 2014: 9). 
148 Notwithstanding these improvements, the distrust in the use of instruments is kept by some 
authors. In Roodman (2008), the author provides evidence for the scepticism of the results 
found in the aid effectiveness literature, discussing autocorrelation, instrument proliferation 
and multicollinearity as common specification problems that undermine the use of instruments 
to tackle endogeneity. Using non-instrumental techniques, the author demonstrates that the aid 
growth-relationship is negative and runs from growth to aid. See Leon-Gonzalez and Montolio 
(2015) for an alternative approach that applies Bayesian model averaging to allow for 
uncertainty in the set of regressors, in the exogeneity restrictions, and in the choice of 
instruments commonly employed with panel data in growth regressions with fixed effects.   
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c) Addressing endogeneity 
Bearing in mind the possibilities advanced in the literature reviewed above, in this 
chapter, first, I follow the proposal in Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and apply their 
instrument in a 2SLS procedure. As mentioned before, Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) 
proposal consists of a zero-stage estimation of aid based on a model of the supply of aid 
obtained by estimating the following equation: 
                                                                𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡⁄ = 𝛿0 + 𝛿′𝑍𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜐𝑑𝑖𝑡,                                                         (6) 
where 𝑍𝑑𝑖𝑡  includes donor-related characteristics, namely, commonality of language, 
whether they are in a current colonial relationship, a dummy for pairs of countries which 
had a colonial relationship at some point, dummies for countries which have been a 
colony of the United Kingdom (UK), France, Spain, or Portugal, the ratio of the logarithm 
of the populations of donor and recipient, and the interactions between these variables 
and each of the colonial dummies. The second stage consists in the aggregation of the 
estimated results by recipient country, in order to obtain the level of fitted aid per capita 
for the given period. 
As highlighted before, this approach has been the subject of criticism in subsequent 
studies. One of the main concerns raised by Bazzi and Clemens (2013), and confirmed 
by Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010), was that this instrumentation strategy is mainly reliant 
on the population variable, which, it is argued, may have a direct effect on growth 
through other mechanisms, such as the extent of internal and external trade (Clemens et 
al., 2012; Bazzi and Clemens, 2013). Thus, in section 5.5.3, I use some alternative 
procedures to check the robustness of the results obtained with Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2008) instrument. More specifically, I first employ the alternative 
instrumentation procedure proposed by Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010). Second, I use the 
external instruments suggested by Lessmann and Markwardt (2012). More detail about 
these approaches will be provided later. 
 
5.5. RESULTS ANALYSIS 
 
The results derived from estimating the specifications described in section 5.3 are 
discussed at length in the following paragraphs. The analysis is split into cross-country 
evidence, in subsection 5.5.1, and panel evidence, in subsection 5.5.2. Within each 
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subsection, there is a subdivision according to the period of analysis and the method of 
estimation. The hypotheses tested, and respective coefficients of interest, as well as the 
variables included, and the time periods and horizons considered in each table are 
summarised in Table 60.149 
Table 60. Summary of the tables with the main results 
 Baseline 
 
Robustness checks 
 
 
Outliers Aid categories Endogeneity 
OLS 63 64 69  
74 75 
76 77 78 79   
IV 65 66 72      80 81 
Hypothesis, equation, coeff. 
H1.1 and H1.2, (4), β6 and β7 
H2, (5), β8 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
Variables 
Aid 
Bilateral/Multilateral aid 
Early/Late/Human. aid 
Aid* x SII 
Aid* x PVI 
Aid* x SII x PVI 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
Cross-country 
10-year: 1990-00 
20-year: 1993-12 
10-year: 1993-02/2003-02 
Panel 
5-year 
10-year 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
Notes: Aid* corresponds to Aid, Bilateral aid, Multilateral Aid, Early-impact aid, Late-impact aid, or Humanitarian aid 
depending on the specification considered. 
Section 5.5.1 starts by reporting the OLS results for period 1990-2000, comparing with 
those obtained by Rajan and Subramanian (2008), and then for the full period 1993-
2012. The second part of this section describes the coefficients obtained with IV 
methods. A similar structure is then used in section 5.5.2 to describe the estimated 
coefficients obtained after employing pooled OLS, FE methods and IV methods to 
estimate all the hypotheses using panel data, with 5-year averages and 10-year averages. 
In each table, the first set of results corresponds to estimating equation (4), i.e. before 
including any interaction terms. The second set of results adds the interaction between 
aid and each of the indices of state ineffectiveness and political violence, and, finally, the 
third set of results corresponds to the coefficients obtained after including the triple 
interaction to the analysis. 
The last part of this section (5.5.3) discusses the conclusions drawn from a set of 
robustness checks. More specifically, I consider the changes observed after excluding 
                                                             
149 I refer back to Table 56 for a summary of the hypotheses and coefficients of interest. 
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potential outliers, using different aid categories, and considering different approaches 
to overcome the endogeneity of aid. 
 
5.5.1. Cross-country evidence 
 a) OLS estimates 
The results in the following tables were obtained using simple OLS methods, and thus 
overlooking the potential endogeneity of aid for the moment. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 
61 correspond to the estimated coefficients for Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) original 
dataset (after adding the two fragility indices) for the period 1990-2000, whereas 
columns (4)-(6) report the coefficients obtained with the reconstructed dataset for the 
same period. 
Columns (1) and (4) were included to allow for the observation of any changes in the 
coefficient for aid when the interaction terms are included. Columns (2) and (5) 
represent the estimation of equation (5), thus testing H1.1 and H1.2, whereas columns 
(3) and (6) report the results from estimating equation (6), and hence testing H2. 
Starting with the coefficients obtained for Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) dataset, the 
signs for the control variables are generally in line with those obtained by these authors 
(with the exception of institutional quality), though the significance level has been 
reduced in some of them, namely, life expectancy and inflation. Focusing on the 
coefficients of interest, before the interaction terms between aid and the fragility 
variables are included, one finds a negative and significant effect of aid on growth, in 
contrast with the non-significant effect reported by Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
However, when the two interaction terms between this variable and state 
ineffectiveness and political violence are added to the specification (column (2)), there 
is a reduction in the value and significance level of aid. Still, despite being negative, none 
of the coefficients for the interaction terms is significant. The inclusion of the triple 
interaction does not lead to massive changes in the significance levels of the other 
variables, and the lack of significance of this term does not suggest that there is any 
interactive effect of state ineffectiveness and political violence on the impact of aid on 
economic growth. 
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Table 61. Cross-country OLS estimations, 1990-2000 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 RS08 original RS08 reproduced 
 1990-2000 1990-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(initial pc GDP) -1.661*** -1.519*** -1.408** -1.494*** -1.361*** -1.331*** 
 (0.519) (0.552) (0.547) (0.461) (0.457) (0.463) 
Initial policy -0.368 -0.393 -0.358 -0.0774 -0.262 -0.108 
 (0.481) (0.492) (0.476) (0.567) (0.573) (0.578) 
Initial life expectancy 0.0890 0.0833 0.0780 0.123 0.109 0.108 
 (0.0562) (0.0566) (0.0577) (0.0734) (0.0719) (0.0735) 
Geography 0.732* 0.696* 0.716* 0.141 0.0711 0.119 
 (0.389) (0.401) (0.395) (0.323) (0.328) (0.331) 
ICRG -0.778 -0.855 -0.621    
 (2.803) (3.017) (2.918)    
Inflation 0.000472 0.000393 0.000341 -0.289 -0.311 -0.272 
 (0.000497) (0.000526) (0.000564) (0.340) (0.337) (0.336) 
Initial M2/GDP -0.0131 -0.0139 -0.0125 -0.0320** -0.0354** -0.0323** 
 (0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0151) (0.0154) 
Initial budget balance 0.230*** 0.224*** 0.220*** 0.175** 0.160* 0.166* 
 (0.0602) (0.0631) (0.0614) (0.0867) (0.0892) (0.0883) 
Revolutions -1.629* -1.621* -1.494 -2.696* -2.721* -2.661 
 (0.885) (0.916) (0.921) (1.447) (1.543) (1.593) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.796 0.520 0.254 0.0372 -0.384 -0.443 
 (0.939) (1.031) (1.001) (1.232) (1.212) (1.150) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.306 -0.212 -0.0545 -1.701** -1.704** -1.598** 
 (0.944) (0.968) (0.966) (0.665) (0.649) (0.697) 
East Asia 1.548** 1.597** 1.563** 1.828* 2.120** 1.954* 
 (0.768) (0.779) (0.752) (0.951) (1.038) (1.066) 
Aid/GDP -0.0910* -0.0590 -0.0469 0.0403 0.102 0.0977 
 (0.0539) (0.0806) (0.0855) (0.0522) (0.0789) (0.0790) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.689*** -0.649** -0.628** -0.679*** -0.583*** -0.571*** 
 (0.217) (0.249) (0.249) (0.202) (0.200) (0.204) 
Political violence 0.401** 0.444** 0.389* 0.497** 0.442* 0.406* 
 (0.157) (0.193) (0.195) (0.227) (0.227) (0.241) 
SI x PV  0.00428 0.0532 0.122 -0.0823 -0.0596 -0.0180 
 (0.0673) (0.102) (0.122) (0.0759) (0.0920) (0.111) 
Aid x State ineffectiveness   -0.0182 -0.00789  -0.0485 -0.0334 
  (0.0464) (0.0481)  (0.0440) (0.0423) 
Aid x Political violence   -0.00869 0.0462  0.0178 0.0529 
  (0.0359) (0.0409)  (0.0285) (0.0494) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0262   -0.0166 
   (0.0180)   (0.0195) 
Constant 11.31** 10.57** 9.754* 8.806** 8.864** 8.431** 
 (4.507) (4.783) (4.892) (4.167) (4.306) (4.144) 
Observations 66 66 66 64 64 64 
R2 0.647 0.650 0.661 0.651 0.662 0.668 
Adj. R2 0.532 0.516 0.521 0.542 0.537 0.536 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Considering now the coefficients obtained for the reproduced dataset for period 1990-
2000, one notices some changes in the significance level of the controls. The results show 
a positive but non-significant coefficient for aid, both before and after including the 
interactions between this variable and the two indices of state fragility. None of the 
interaction terms with aid shows a significant effect, and their magnitudes are also fairly 
low. 
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When the main period of analysis is considered (Table 62), the first noticeable change is 
a general reduction in the significance level of the control variables included. Despite the 
drop in the explanatory power of the model, it remains relatively high, which indicates 
that the model is not capable of distinguishing the effects of the different variables. The 
results are presented in a similar order to that in Table 61, but consider now one 20-year 
period in columns (1)-(3), and two 10-year periods, 1993-2002 in columns (4)-(6) and 
2003-2012 in columns (7)-(9).  
Table 62. Cross-country OLS estimations, 1993-2012 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The results obtained before the interaction terms were included show a negative 
coefficient for aid for periods 1993-2012 and 1993-2002, but significant only for the 
latter, and a positive and non-significant effect for the decade 2003-2012. The changes 
in this coefficient after the inclusion of the terms aid x state ineffectiveness and aid x 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(in. pc GDP) -1.242*** -1.141*** -1.127*** -1.339*** -1.172*** -1.136*** -0.722 -0.712 -0.516 
 (0.363) (0.333) (0.337) (0.376) (0.401) (0.342) (0.566) (0.557) (0.580) 
Initial policy -0.186 -0.434 -0.324 0.643 0.502 0.710 0.221 0.0713 0.109 
 (0.503) (0.475) (0.495) (0.505) (0.513) (0.539) (0.618) (0.658) (0.669) 
Initial life exp. -0.0282 -0.0487 -0.000824 -0.0470 -0.0617 -0.0314 -0.00904 -0.0146 0.00477 
 (0.0482) (0.0341) (0.0490) (0.0663) (0.0655) (0.0537) (0.0564) (0.0558) (0.0558) 
Geography 0.155 0.0912 0.0968 0.244 0.159 0.217 -0.138 -0.154 -0.157 
 (0.237) (0.241) (0.237) (0.262) (0.276) (0.267) (0.283) (0.281) (0.287) 
Inflation -0.410 -0.270 -0.00146 -0.0813 -0.214 -0.154 12.88*** 11.70*** 10.84** 
 (0.507) (0.382) (0.350) (0.346) (0.323) (0.324) (3.880) (4.244) (4.208) 
Initial M2/GDP -0.00652 -0.00674 -0.00624 0.00471 0.00494 0.0113 -0.0163* -0.0177** -0.0184** 
 (0.00656) (0.00562) (0.00615) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0147) (0.00831) (0.00761) (0.00792) 
Initial budget bal. 0.0173 -0.00599 0.00178 0.0980 0.0677 0.0630 0.0811 0.0770 0.0875* 
 (0.0593) (0.0554) (0.0524) (0.0605) (0.0648) (0.0584) (0.0504) (0.0510) (0.0518) 
Revolutions -0.478 -0.0823 -0.0398 -0.992 -0.861 -0.498 -0.630 -0.584 -0.580 
 (0.689) (0.690) (0.718) (0.734) (0.754) (0.757) (0.557) (0.572) (0.535) 
Ethnic fract. -0.0286 -0.301 -0.317 -0.0438 -0.492 -0.869 -1.111 -0.671 -0.920 
 (0.782) (0.781) (0.799) (0.912) (0.914) (0.937) (1.103) (1.104) (1.162) 
Sub-Saharan Afr. -1.240* -1.470** -0.955 -1.137 -1.189 -0.689 -0.699 -0.951 -0.503 
 (0.655) (0.567) (0.679) (0.777) (0.783) (0.718) (1.222) (1.232) (1.251) 
East Asia 1.706** 1.811*** 1.722** 0.985 1.128 0.857 1.879*** 1.863*** 1.801*** 
 (0.682) (0.662) (0.668) (1.038) (1.084) (1.098) (0.648) (0.500) (0.525) 
Aid/GDP -0.0792 0.0199 0.0799 -0.132** -0.0574 -0.0266 0.0195 0.115 0.167** 
 (0.0703) (0.0377) (0.0648) (0.0639) (0.0803) (0.0831) (0.0855) (0.0699) (0.0813) 
State ineff. -0.618*** -0.532*** -0.451*** -0.539*** -0.475** -0.379* -0.629*** -0.569*** -0.503** 
 (0.160) (0.148) (0.144) (0.200) (0.202) (0.212) (0.194) (0.186) (0.206) 
Political violence 0.108 0.0513 0.0553 0.141 0.110 0.0217 0.454** 0.420** 0.410** 
 (0.153) (0.144) (0.151) (0.149) (0.139) (0.145) (0.181) (0.183) (0.184) 
SI x PV  0.0610 0.0875 0.140** -0.0262 0.0125 0.126 0.0452 0.0718 0.110* 
 (0.0823) (0.0681) (0.0660) (0.0774) (0.0720) (0.0767) (0.0682) (0.0579) (0.0593) 
Aid x SI   -0.0592*** -0.0640***  -0.0406 -0.0214  -0.0658* -0.0694** 
  (0.0213) (0.0228)  (0.0353) (0.0435)  (0.0333) (0.0334) 
Aid x PV  -0.0135 0.0351  -0.00177 0.0904**  0.0146 0.0744 
  (0.0207) (0.0326)  (0.0225) (0.0393)  (0.0333) (0.0460) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0244   -0.0442**   -0.0198* 
   (0.0158)   (0.0188)   (0.00995) 
Constant 16.16*** 16.71*** 12.98*** 16.86*** 16.50*** 13.57*** 10.41* 10.74** 7.634 
 (4.576) (2.820) (3.608) (4.882) (4.895) (4.465) (5.229) (4.822) (5.413) 
Observations 77 77 77 67 67 67 65 65 65 
R2 0.459 0.553 0.572 0.523 0.537 0.580 0.498 0.545 0.568 
Adj. R2 0.326 0.424 0.439 0.383 0.376 0.422 0.344 0.380 0.399 
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political violence vary depending on the period considered. When the 20-year horizon is 
used, there is a change in the sign for the aid term, and one obtains a small, but negative 
and significant effect of state ineffectiveness on the impact of aid. The coefficient for the 
second interaction term is also negative, but suggests no significant effect. With the 
dataset for period 1993-2002, one observes a loss of significance for the aid variable, but 
the coefficients for the interaction terms do not suggest any significant effect of either 
state ineffectiveness or political violence on aid effectiveness. Finally, when the last 
decade of the period is considered, the inclusion of the interaction terms leads to an 
increase in the magnitude of the coefficient for aid, which remains non-significant, but 
again one finds an indication of a negative, despite small, effect of state ineffectiveness 
on the impact of aid, and no effect for the interaction between aid and political violence. 
Observing now the results represented in columns (3), (6), and (9), one notices that, with 
the exception of period 1993-2002, the inclusion of the triple interaction term does not 
lead to major changes in the coefficients for the other interaction terms. Additionally, the 
coefficient shows a small, but negative and significant interactive effect of state 
ineffectiveness and political violence on the impact of aid on economic growth in both 
10-year periods used.150 
 
b) IV estimates 
Table 63 portrays the estimated coefficients resulting from the application of Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2008) instrumentation procedure (detailed in section 5.4.2). Following 
the same structure of Table 61, columns (1)-(3) correspond to the original dataset with 
the addition of the two fragility indices, whereas columns (4)-(6) show the results 
obtained for the reproduced dataset for the same period (1990-2000). 
Starting with the coefficients obtained with Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) original 
dataset, the results obtained before the interaction terms were added are in line with 
those reported by the authors. The results for the variables of interest are roughly 
similar to those obtained with OLS. The coefficient for aid remains negative and 
significant, but much higher in magnitude, and also loses significance when the 
interactions are included. Regarding the latter, the coefficient for aid x state  
                                                             
150 Bearing in mind the aforementioned remark made by Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010: 11-12) 
about the fact that the missing values in the bilateral aid flows should be set to zero, the analysis 
was repeated treating the missing values for aid as zeros. The obtained results were very 
similar to those reported here. 
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Table 63. Cross-country IV estimations, 1990-2000 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 RS08 original RS08 reproduced 
 1990-2000 1990-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(initial pc GDP) -2.106*** -1.785** -1.683** -1.744*** -1.643* -1.468* 
 (0.597) (0.794) (0.664) (0.569) (0.850) (0.752) 
Initial policy -0.310 -0.417 -0.390 -0.0814 -0.0595 0.120 
 (0.445) (0.463) (0.482) (0.482) (0.731) (0.980) 
Initial life expectancy 0.0596 0.0441 0.0382 0.0724 0.0811 0.0776 
 (0.0604) (0.0603) (0.0687) (0.0910) (0.100) (0.104) 
Geography 0.609* 0.495 0.500 0.0588 0.0652 0.113 
 (0.331) (0.360) (0.348) (0.305) (0.311) (0.337) 
ICRG -0.903 -0.0440 -0.0639    
 (2.520) (3.360) (3.190)    
Inflation 0.00107* 0.000937 0.000893 -0.155 -0.236 -0.234 
 (0.000613) (0.000737) (0.000636) (0.350) (0.442) (0.438) 
Initial M2/GDP -0.00906 -0.0135 -0.0122 -0.0234 -0.0234 -0.0198 
 (0.0114) (0.0139) (0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0211) (0.0256) 
Initial budget balance 0.215*** 0.199*** 0.194*** 0.159** 0.154* 0.153* 
 (0.0585) (0.0715) (0.0643) (0.0774) (0.0878) (0.0867) 
Revolutions -1.360 -1.438 -1.323 -2.073 -1.949* -1.767 
 (0.873) (0.914) (1.125) (1.274) (1.174) (1.316) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.315 -0.450 -0.708 -0.313 -0.365 -0.703 
 (0.885) (1.240) (1.568) (1.142) (1.489) (1.452) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.183 0.276 0.447 -1.527*** -1.484** -1.280 
 (0.930) (0.977) (1.287) (0.581) (0.582) (0.826) 
East Asia 1.611** 1.769*** 1.754*** 1.642* 1.526 1.311 
 (0.670) (0.665) (0.661) (0.979) (1.278) (1.619) 
Aid/GDP -0.223* -0.0616 -0.0623 -0.0613 -0.0530 -0.0274 
 (0.117) (0.248) (0.239) (0.136) (0.243) (0.210) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.774*** -0.493 -0.498 -0.707*** -0.756*** -0.723*** 
 (0.211) (0.450) (0.450) (0.191) (0.265) (0.235) 
Political violence 0.329* 0.349 0.332 0.351 0.441 0.413 
 (0.170) (0.231) (0.254) (0.233) (0.332) (0.354) 
SI x PV  0.0209 0.129 0.192 -0.0838 -0.0253 0.0928 
 (0.0616) (0.179) (0.303) (0.0660) (0.157) (0.274) 
AidxState ineffectiveness  -0.116 -0.102  0.0196 0.0344 
  (0.162) (0.190)  (0.114) (0.135) 
Aid x Political violence   0.0231 0.0524  -0.0287 0.0180 
  (0.0603) (0.160)  (0.0573) (0.119) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0182   -0.0272 
   (0.0957)   (0.0666) 
Constant 17.09*** 15.15* 14.62** 14.27* 12.69 11.07 
 (6.556) (7.937) (6.814) (8.331) (10.53) (9.423) 
Observations 66 66 66 64 64 64 
R2 0.618 0.588 0.599 0.633 0.617 0.614 
Adj. R2 0.493 0.430 0.434 0.518 0.475 0.460 
p-value of LM statistica 0.0237 0.111 0.178 0.0147 0.0672 0.116 
F-statistic for weak id. 7.129 0.766 0.292 4.267 0.821 0.528 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap 
LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified. 
ineffectiveness remains negative and non-significant, and the coefficient for aid x 
political violence is now positive but also non-significant. Thus, the results from using 
this dataset do not suggest any potential effect of either of these variables on the impact 
of aid. Additionally, the lack of significance of the triple interaction also shows no 
evidence of an interactive effect of the state fragility variables on aid effectiveness. 
219 
 
Turning now to the results derived from the reproduced dataset, in contrast with the 
OLS estimates, the coefficient for aid is also negative, but not significant both before and 
after the interaction terms are included. The lack of evidence of any effect of state 
ineffectiveness or political violence on the impact of aid on growth is corroborated when 
the reproduced dataset is used, and the triple interaction term also shows no significant 
effect. 
I then employed the same instrument and estimated equations (4) to (6) using the 
reproduced dataset for the remaining periods. The results are included in Table 64.  
Table 64. Cross-country IV estimations, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(in. pc GDP) -1.605*** -1.956*** -2.081* -1.430*** -0.805 -0.805 -2.391 -12.15 -8.826 
 (0.613) (0.732) (1.158) (0.389) (1.080) (1.138) (2.694) (18.95) (12.61) 
Initial policy -0.370 -1.412* -1.246 0.571 -0.153 -0.323 -0.316 -6.410 -3.929 
 (0.551) (0.786) (1.495) (0.466) (1.181) (1.429) (1.076) (10.77) (6.947) 
Initial life exp. -0.0564 -0.129* -0.000776 -0.0874 -0.160 -0.173 0.0511 0.235 -0.0573 
 (0.0679) (0.0678) (0.790) (0.109) (0.146) (0.148) (0.104) (0.418) (0.289) 
Geography 0.121 -0.0603 -0.125 0.222 -0.155 -0.202 -0.00443 0.336 0.114 
 (0.200) (0.259) (0.430) (0.215) (0.643) (0.745) (0.393) (1.437) (1.069) 
Inflation -0.312 0.172 1.332 -0.109 -0.533 -0.550 13.51*** -17.84 -0.968 
 (0.452) (0.395) (6.699) (0.331) (0.731) (0.778) (4.445) (55.01) (31.77) 
Initial M2/GDP -0.00446 -0.00355 0.000569 0.00659 0.00659 0.00108 -0.0162** -0.0689 -0.0476 
 (0.00656) (0.00571) (0.0274) (0.0139) (0.0150) (0.0306) (0.00747) (0.0998) (0.0637) 
Initial budget bal. 0.00685 -0.0667 -0.0625 0.0908* -0.0269 -0.0212 0.121 0.304 0.120 
 (0.0516) (0.0713) (0.0956) (0.0538) (0.183) (0.190) (0.0820) (0.420) (0.244) 
Revolutions -0.0290 1.322 2.257 -0.729 -0.117 -0.447 -0.262 -1.764 -2.454 
 (0.830) (0.930) (5.905) (0.845) (1.169) (2.029) (0.767) (3.565) (3.129) 
Ethnic fract. -0.206 -0.645 -1.298 -0.148 -1.969 -1.677 -0.338 5.656 3.255 
 (0.700) (0.986) (4.344) (0.877) (2.589) (2.797) (1.564) (10.64) (7.326) 
Sub-Saharan Afr. -1.277** -1.943** -0.222 -1.250** -1.506* -1.849 0.480 4.446 -1.313 
 (0.648) (0.768) (10.68) (0.629) (0.870) (1.770) (2.170) (9.823) (5.736) 
East Asia 1.664*** 2.252*** 1.757 0.948 1.643 1.887 1.804*** 6.537 6.433 
 (0.598) (0.743) (3.280) (0.937) (1.365) (1.970) (0.530) (9.684) (7.610) 
Aid/GDP -0.169 -0.0330 0.173 -0.195 0.114 0.117 -0.285 -0.804 -0.970 
 (0.146) (0.112) (1.181) (0.165) (0.499) (0.520) (0.486) (1.452) (1.394) 
State ineff. -0.710*** -0.540*** -0.305 -0.581*** -0.286 -0.332 -0.914* -1.517 -1.672 
 (0.204) (0.177) (1.408) (0.162) (0.461) (0.481) (0.503) (1.589) (1.456) 
Political violence -0.0204 -0.496 -0.544 0.0670 -0.150 -0.0816 0.292 -1.454 -0.592 
 (0.218) (0.316) (0.455) (0.212) (0.430) (0.626) (0.276) (3.247) (1.954) 
SI x PV  0.0375 -0.00811 0.226 -0.0351 0.0865 -0.00064 0.0324 -0.571 -0.881 
 (0.0862) (0.0936) (1.431) (0.0656) (0.216) (0.350) (0.0512) (1.209) (1.297) 
Aid x SI   -0.177** -0.220  -0.196 -0.219  -1.140 -0.617 
  (0.0736) (0.212)  (0.283) (0.328)  (1.898) (1.109) 
Aid x PV  0.0375 0.168  0.0171 -0.0456  0.880 0.148 
  (0.0460) (0.767)  (0.0550) (0.325)  (1.549) (0.764) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0892   0.0326   0.170 
   (0.531)   (0.152)   (0.202) 
Constant 21.50** 30.18*** 21.37 20.52** 20.61* 21.88*** 21.83 108.8 95.77 
 (9.429) (9.387) (55.61) (9.189) (11.16) (8.283) (19.42) (167.3) (124.8) 
Observations 77 77 77 67 67 67 65 65 65 
R2 0.436 0.253 -0.163 0.516 0.374 0.279 0.339 -13.485 -7.060 
Adj. R2 0.298 0.0380 -0.524 0.373 0.157 0.00911 0.136 -18.72 -10.21 
p-value LM stata 0.0119 0.0273 0.832 0.00310 0.170 0.206 0.158 0.568 0.487 
F-stat weak ident. 9.889 1.924 0.00879 8.847 0.532 0.351 1.698 0.0884 0.0979 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap 
LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified. 
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Starting with the coefficient of aid before adding any interaction terms, there are some 
changes in the sign and significance level when compared to the OLS estimates, but there 
is now no indication of a significant effect on economic growth in any of the time 
horizons and time periods considered. 
When the interaction between aid and each of the indicators of state fragility is added to 
the analysis, one notices that the negative and significant effect found in two of the time 
periods considered when using OLS methods only holds for the 20-year period. Despite 
being positive in most specifications, the lack of significance of the term aid x political 
violence does not suggest that there is an effect of the latter on the impact of aid. Finally, 
the sign of the triple interaction term changed and lost significance in both 10-year 
periods considered when compared to the OLS estimates. 
A remark is in order in terms of the weakness of this instrument. The last two rows of 
Tables 63 and 64 contain the results for the p-value of the Lagrange-Multiplier statistic 
and the first-stage F-statistics.151 Starting with Table 63, looking at columns (1) and (4), 
the instrument passes the first of these tests, but not the latter. Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008: 650) also note that the instrument they propose does not exceed the threshold of 
10 when considering the 1990-2000 period. Here I find that it is even weaker when the 
two indicators of fragility are included in the analysis.  
Additionally, the F-statistic suffers a noticeable reduction when the interaction terms are 
included. The instrumentation strategy used here follows the line of work exploring the 
potential interactive effect between aid and policy (and, namely, Burnside and Dollar, 
2000) and uses as instruments for aid, aid x state ineffectiveness and aid x political 
violence the following: fitted aid, fitted aid x state ineffectiveness, and fitted aid x 
political violence, where fitted aid is the estimated value of aid obtained from the zero-
stage regressions described in section 5.4.2. When the triple interaction is included, an 
additional instrument is considered, namely fitted aid x state ineffectiveness x political 
violence. Despite recognizing that this strategy is not ideal (as confirmed by the results 
for the tests for weak instrumentation), it was used as an attempt to consider the 
potential endogeneity of aid also when including the interaction with the two indicators 
of fragility. 
                                                             
151 I recall here that the p-value of the Lagrange-Multiplier statistic is obtained from an 
underidentification test using the rank-based statistic developed by Kleibergen and Paap 
(2006), which if lower than 0.05 leads one to reject the hypothesis that the equation is 
underidentified. As a rule of thumb, the F-statistic should be 10 at a minimum for weak 
identification not to be considered a problem (Staiger and Stock, 1999).  
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In the case of the estimations included in Table 64, they indicate that the instrument 
proposed by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) performs relatively well for periods 1993-
2012 and 1993-2002 before any interaction terms are included, but it is much weaker 
when the later 10-year period is considered (i.e. 2003-2012). Additionally, there is a 
significant loss in the overall explanatory power of the model when the interaction terms 
are added to the analysis. 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) perform a few additional estimations to assess the 
robustness of their instrument. I follow their guidelines and repeat the same robustness 
checks for the estimation of baseline equation (4). These tests are represented in Table 
65 for all the datasets considered. For simplicity, only the coefficients for the variables 
of interest were included. First, the authors assess whether the instrument is plausibly 
exogenous in order to address the concern that the colonial variables used in its 
construction may also be growth determinants. This is tested by re-estimating the 
growth equation with the addition of the colonial variables for the UK, France and Spain 
(results A in Table 65). Secondly, they check whether the instrument passes the 
overidentification tests by using the logarithm of area as an additional instrument. In the 
same light, I re-run regression (4) using both the estimated value for aid and the log of 
area as instruments (results B in Table 65). Finally, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) 
estimate the first-stage regression with log(area) as an instrument for aid, and their 
constructed instrument for aid is included as a regressor in the second-stage estimation 
directly (results C in Table 65). 
The first group of results (results A) shows that, apart from slight changes in magnitude, 
there are no other significant changes in the coefficients for aid in either of the datasets 
considered. Additionally, with the exception of the dummy for French colonies in two of 
the datasets considered, there appears to be no significant effect of any of the colonial 
variables on growth, which leads one to conclude that they pass the exclusion restriction, 
thus providing support to the use of the instrument proposed by Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008). 
Results B, obtained when the log of area is included as an additional instrument, are also 
similar to the coefficients obtained in the baseline regressions. Furthermore, the p-value 
for the Hansen J test suggests that Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) instrument passes 
the overidentification restrictions. Finally, when fitted aid is included as a control 
variable (results C), the obtained results show no significant independent effect of this 
variable on growth. 
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Table 65. Robustness checks to Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) instrument 
Results A: Addition of three colony dummies as controls 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 RS08 original RS08 reproduced 
 1990-2000 1990-2000 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aid/GDP -0.197* -0.0779 -0.0836 -0.209 -0.229 
 (0.101) (0.137) (0.104) (0.128) (0.228) 
Colony UK -0.402 0.621 -0.336 -0.260 -0.327 
 (0.613) (0.733) (0.528) (0.637) (0.885) 
Colony France -0.325 0.277 -1.852*** -0.440 -2.323* 
 (0.733) (0.584) (0.520) (0.613) (1.191) 
Colony Spain -0.221 0.182 -0.492 -0.795 -1.284 
 (0.832) (0.647) (0.475) (0.658) (0.782) 
Observations 66 64 77 67 65 
R2 0.630 0.632 0.558 0.523 0.503 
p-value of LM statistica 0.0189 0.00730 0.00521 0.00150 0.0325 
F-stat for weak ident. 8.425 4.531 14.72 9.771 5.898 
Results B: Fitted aid and log(area) as instruments (second-stage) 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 RS08 original RS08 reproduced 
 1990-2000 1990-2000 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aid/GDP -0.216** -0.0923 -0.169 -0.137 -0.183 
 (0.102) (0.123) (0.146) (0.166) (0.375) 
Observations 66 64 77 67 65 
R2 0.621 0.620 0.437 0.523 0.428 
p-valueb 0.901 0.664 0.527 0.210 0.520 
p-value of LM statistica 0.00614 0.0344 0.0144 0.00877 0.336 
F-stat for weak ident. 6.480 3.268 5.567 4.873 1.043 
Results C: Log(area) as instrument and fitted aid as control (second-stage) 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 RS08 original RS08 reproduced 
 1990-2000 1990-2000 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aid/GDP -0.197 -0.206 10.79 0.540 0.238 
 (0.182) (0.310) (419.9) (0.991) (0.751) 
Fitted aid/GDP -0.0152 0.0713 -7.651 -0.340 -0.138 
 (0.122) (0.178) (292.4) (0.445) (0.217) 
Observations 66 64 77 67 65 
R2 0.628 0.549 -263.166 -0.222 0.433 
p-value of LM statistica 0.00708 0.0523 0.979 0.354 0.466 
F-stat for weak ident. 6.823 3.012 0.000521 0.710 0.381 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified. bp-value of Hansen J statistic, which 
tests the overidentifying restrictions. 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) add that, when both the log of area and fitted aid are 
included as instruments, the fact that the coefficient for log of area is not significant in 
most regressions in the first-stage, as opposed to their preferred instrument, indicates 
that the latter contains more information than just the recipient size. In the analysis 
presented here, this is true for all the datasets considered apart from the one for period 
1990-2000 and Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) original data.152 However, this claim 
has been defied by Bazzi and Clemens (2013: 57) who argue that the instrument 
                                                             
152 The results are not included here for reasons of space and simplicity. 
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proposed by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) has barely any information other than the 
population size of the recipient country. 
Recognizing the pertinence of Bazzi and Clemens’ (2013) criticism, I run an additional 
set of regression specifications to assess whether Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) 
instrument holds when the logarithm of the initial level of population is considered.153 
When the log of population is included as an additional control in the baseline 
regression, one observes some changes in the sign, magnitude and significance of aid, 
but the coefficient for the additional variable is significant in only two of the 
specifications. Bazzi and Clemens (2013) report a significant reduction in the strength 
of the instrument, which I also find with the different datasets considered here. 
Secondly, when using the log of population as the sole instrument Bazzi and Clemens 
(2013) find similar results to those obtained when fitted aid is employed. In the analysis 
presented here, even though using the log of population as an instrument does not entail 
significant changes in the coefficients obtained for the variables of interest for the two 
datasets using period 1990-2000 and for the decade 2003-2012, the coefficient for aid 
becomes significant for periods 1993-2012 and 1993-2002. When looking at the results 
for the test of underidentification, one can reject the null hypothesis that the structural 
equation is underidentified in all the specifications when log of population is the only 
instrument, apart from period 2003-2012. Furthermore, the F-stat is below 10 in most 
regressions, but not by much, with the exception of period 1993-2002. Thus, the results 
reported here lend some support to Bazzi and Clemens’ (2013) argument when Rajan 
and Subramanian’s (2008) original dataset is considered, but they do not seem as 
alarming when different periods are used for the reproduced dataset. Still, the doubts 
cast on the strength of Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) proposed instrument are further 
explored in section 5.5.3. 
 
c) Summary of results 
The next section presents and discusses the estimated coefficients obtained with panel 
data. Before that, I take stock of the conclusions reached so far, summarised in Table 66. 
Firstly, there is no definite verdict about the effect of aid on growth before any 
interactive effects are considered, given that the sign of the coefficient changes 
depending on the data used, and it is significant in only some of the periods considered. 
                                                             
153 A table with the main results can be found in Table D3.1 in Appendix D3. 
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Table 66. Summary of results with cross-country data 
 OLS IV 
Aid* The sign varies depending on the period 
and time horizon considered. It is 
significant only when the original dataset is 
used and for period 1993-2002 using the 
reproduced dataset.  
The sign is negative in all specifications 
considered, but the coefficient is significant 
only when Rajan and Subramanian’s 
(2008) dataset is used. 
Aid x SI Negative sign in all specifications. However, 
it is significant only for periods 1993-2012 
and 2003-2012. 
Negative sign in most specifications. Still, 
with the exception of one specification for 
period 1993-2012, the coefficient is not 
significant. 
Aid x PV Positive effect in most specifications, but it 
is never significant, with the exception of 
one specification. 
Positive sign in most specifications, but the 
coefficient is never significant. 
Aid x SI x PV Negative sign in all specifications. It is 
significant when the reproduced dataset is 
used for the two 10-year periods (1993-
2002 and 2003-2012). 
The sign of the coefficient varies depending 
on the period considered, but it never 
shows a significant effect. 
Notes: *Aid refers to the coefficient for aid in the baseline estimations, i.e. before any interaction terms between this 
variable and the indicators of state fragility are included. 
In terms of the sign of the interactions between aid and the two indices, the results 
suggest that aid may be less effective in countries with higher levels of state 
ineffectiveness, but more effective in countries with higher levels of political violence. 
However, one rarely finds any significant coefficient, which indicates that neither of 
these symptoms appears to have an impact on aid effectiveness. Finally, a similar 
conclusion can be drawn for the interactive effect between the three variables. 
 
5.5.2. Panel evidence  
In line with other studies examining the link between aid and growth (e.g. Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Lessmann and Markwardt, 2012; or Clemens et al., 2012), this 
section explores the impact of state fragility on aid effectiveness using panel data.  The 
attention is now placed on the reproduced dataset and on the full period, 1993-2012. I 
consider 5-year averages (beginning with period 1993-1997) as well as 10-year 
averaged data (starting in 1993-2002). In line with the previous section, the results 
obtained with OLS are presented first, being followed by the FE estimates, and later by 
the coefficients obtained with IV methods. 
 
a) OLS estimates 
Table 67 contains the coefficients obtained from estimating equations (4) to (6) with 
OLS. Once again, the baseline results represented in Columns (1) and (4) are included 
for comparison of the coefficient for aid before and after the inclusion of any interaction  
225 
 
Table 67. Panel OLS estimations, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Log(initial pc GDP) -1.662*** -1.480*** -1.379***  -1.585*** -1.409*** -1.404*** 
 (0.531) (0.445) (0.417)  (0.277) (0.289) (0.293) 
Policy 0.0901 0.0272 0.0987  -0.532 -0.627 -0.602 
 (0.544) (0.584) (0.612)  (0.476) (0.461) (0.472) 
Initial life expectancy 0.0419 0.0210 0.0263  -0.0211 -0.0292 -0.0201 
 (0.0513) (0.0471) (0.0473)  (0.0389) (0.0362) (0.0398) 
Geography 0.289 0.209 0.210  0.0874 0.0443 0.0545 
 (0.234) (0.242) (0.243)  (0.201) (0.207) (0.206) 
Inflation -0.185 -0.392 -0.371  0.0666 -0.156 -0.129 
 (1.037) (1.061) (1.080)  (0.433) (0.471) (0.482) 
M2/GDP -0.0106 -0.0108 -0.00955  -0.0155** -0.0158** -0.0154** 
 (0.00730) (0.00745) (0.00737)  (0.00735) (0.00684) (0.00700) 
Budget balance 0.201*** 0.178*** 0.172***  0.0981** 0.0855** 0.0900** 
 (0.0655) (0.0574) (0.0562)  (0.0424) (0.0409) (0.0400) 
Revolutions -1.197*** -1.175*** -1.144**  -0.751 -0.683 -0.634 
 (0.449) (0.443) (0.433)  (0.460) (0.454) (0.432) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.615 0.247 0.0163  0.373 0.225 0.198 
 (0.780) (0.791) (0.797)  (0.773) (0.730) (0.738) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.154 -1.294* -1.094  -1.402** -1.456** -1.341* 
 (0.741) (0.719) (0.760)  (0.675) (0.674) (0.701) 
East Asia 1.018* 1.104* 1.055  1.687*** 1.754*** 1.700*** 
 (0.604) (0.650) (0.647)  (0.592) (0.572) (0.573) 
Aid/GDP -0.121 -0.0277 -0.000131  -0.124*** -0.0193 -0.00960 
 (0.0746) (0.0653) (0.0722)  (0.0368) (0.0402) (0.0457) 
State ineffectiveness -0.609*** -0.520*** -0.469**  -0.730*** -0.613*** -0.597*** 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.183)  (0.140) (0.129) (0.134) 
Political violence 0.270** 0.296** 0.272**  0.170 0.144 0.131 
 (0.126) (0.138) (0.128)  (0.113) (0.115) (0.111) 
SI x PV -0.00237 0.0577 0.106  0.0207 0.0495 0.0686 
 (0.0581) (0.0529) (0.0697)  (0.0536) (0.0539) (0.0586) 
Aid x SI  -0.0547 -0.0539   -0.0602*** -0.0575** 
  (0.0353) (0.0351)   (0.0218) (0.0221) 
Aid x PV  -0.0198 0.0211   0.0103 0.0297 
  (0.0307) (0.0459)   (0.0191) (0.0306) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0215    -0.00851 
   (0.0208)    (0.0123) 
Constant 14.91*** 16.96*** 15.53***  20.42*** 19.42*** 18.67*** 
 (4.150) (4.048) (3.987)  (2.627) (2.473) (2.752) 
Observations 179 179 179  132 132 132 
R2 0.418 0.442 0.449  0.491 0.520 0.523 
Adj. R2 0.356 0.375 0.379  0.420 0.444 0.442 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
terms. The two interaction terms between aid and each of the symptoms of state fragility 
are then added in order to test hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2, and the corresponding results 
are portrayed in columns (2) and (5). Finally, hypothesis H2 is tested with the addition 
of the triple interaction term and the obtained coefficients are reported in columns (3) 
and (6). 
Overall, even if the values for the explanatory power of the model are slightly lower than 
those obtained with cross-country data, one observes that it captures the individual 
effects of the variables more easily. As concerns the variables of interest, the results 
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obtained before including the interaction terms indicate that the coefficient for aid is 
negative, but significant only when 10-year averages are used.  
The inclusion of the interaction between the aid variable and the fragility indices leads 
to a reduction in the absolute value of the coefficient for aid and to a loss of significance 
in the case of the dataset with 10-year averages. In line with the cross-country results, 
the sign of the coefficient for the interaction between aid and state ineffectiveness is 
negative in both datasets, but one finds a significant effect only when the second dataset 
is considered. 
Also similarly to the results obtained in the previous section, the interaction term 
between aid and political violence has a positive coefficient in almost all specifications, 
but it is non-significant. Finally, the small negative coefficients obtained for the triple 
interaction are similar to those obtained with the cross-country dataset, but do not show 
a significant effect.154 
 
b) FE estimates 
In using OLS methods, the analysis so far did not consider the panel structure of the data. 
Similarly to Chapter 4, I run a battery of tests to understand whether fixed-effects or 
random effects methods would be more appropriate than pooled OLS. The results are 
summarised in Table 68. The first test is the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1980), which has a null hypothesis that the variances across entities 
are zero. The results from this test indicate that one cannot reject the null hypothesis, 
thus suggesting that random effects is not more appropriate than pooled OLS. 
Table 68. Diagnostic tests for panel data estimators 
 p-values 
 5-year averages 10-year averages 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 0.0657 0.0625 
F-test of 𝑢𝑖 = 0 0.0000 0.0010 
Hausman test 0.0000 0.1037 
 
The second row of Table 68 corresponds to the F-test that the observed and unobserved 
fixed effects are equal to zero. The results show that one rejects the null hypothesis, 
which points to the use of the fixed effects estimator. Finally, the Hausman test is used 
                                                             
154 Similarly to the cross-country analysis, the estimations were repeated setting missing entries 
in the bilateral aid flows as zero to obtain the value for total aid, as recommended by Arndt, 
Jones and Tarp (2010: 11-12). Again, this led to very similar results. 
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to compare fixed effects with random effects. The results for the 5-year averaged data 
lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient with random 
effects is efficient, and thus suggest the use of fixed effects. However, the same does not 
hold when 10-year averaged data are used.155 In light of these results, I include in Table 
69 the results obtained when the fixed effects estimator is employed. 
Table 69. Panel FE estimations, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Log(initial pc GDP) -12.85*** -13.13*** -13.17***  -6.332*** -6.039*** -6.170*** 
 (1.500) (1.661) (1.614)  (0.907) (0.948) (0.987) 
Policy -1.208 -0.911 -1.044  -1.053 -0.975 -1.163 
 (0.877) (0.954) (0.978)  (0.769) (0.774) (0.757) 
Initial life expectancy 0.0181 0.0357 0.0230  -0.0205 -0.0266 -0.0233 
 (0.0625) (0.0665) (0.0673)  (0.0574) (0.0554) (0.0556) 
Inflation -1.567 -1.547 -1.631  -0.886 -1.076* -1.067* 
 (1.391) (1.398) (1.409)  (0.628) (0.618) (0.610) 
M2/GDP -0.00495 -0.00532 -0.000743  -0.0294 -0.0252 -0.0227 
 (0.0140) (0.0142) (0.0140)  (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Budget balance 0.0705 0.0582 0.0638  0.0964 0.0859 0.0829 
 (0.0800) (0.0797) (0.0812)  (0.0821) (0.0799) (0.0758) 
Revolutions -1.091* -1.111* -1.104*  0.123 -0.121 -0.279 
 (0.580) (0.578) (0.585)  (0.518) (0.501) (0.556) 
Aid/GDP 0.0949 -0.0222 -0.0302  0.0709 0.337 0.370 
 (0.0872) (0.153) (0.148)  (0.124) (0.218) (0.231) 
State ineffectiveness -0.680 -0.975* -0.946*  -0.241 0.553 0.603 
 (0.496) (0.530) (0.521)  (0.457) (0.597) (0.596) 
Political violence 0.402 0.556* 0.626**  0.270 0.219 0.350 
 (0.283) (0.289) (0.289)  (0.343) (0.358) (0.396) 
SI x PV -0.137 -0.110 -0.275  -0.0550 -0.000869 -0.110 
 (0.0911) (0.0948) (0.170)  (0.130) (0.124) (0.178) 
Aid x SI  0.0699 0.0616   -0.149* -0.193** 
  (0.0823) (0.0775)   (0.0756) (0.0969) 
Aid x PV  -0.0648 -0.158**   0.0200 -0.0691 
  (0.0481) (0.0629)   (0.0349) (0.0995) 
Aid x SI x PV   0.0661    0.0456 
   (0.0446)    (0.0500) 
Constant 112.2*** 113.5*** 114.7***  58.57*** 55.65*** 56.67*** 
 (13.47) (14.22) (13.90)  (8.121) (8.427) (8.715) 
Observations 222 222 222  165 165 165 
R2 0.726 0.730 0.734  0.723 0.740 0.744 
Adj. R2 0.709 0.710 0.713  0.701 0.716 0.718 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
There are some differences in the obtained coefficients when compared to those 
obtained with pooled OLS. The term aid x state ineffectiveness holds a positive sign now 
                                                             
155 The Mundlak (1978) approach was used to confirm the results obtained. This alternative to 
the Hausman test estimates random effect regressions adding group-means of independent 
variables to the model. The results of the test for both the 5-year and 10-year averaged datasets 
rejected the null hypothesis that the panel-level means are jointly zero, lending support to the 
use of fixed effects. 
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when 5-year averaged data are used, but remains non-significant, whereas the negative 
and significant result is maintained for the dataset obtained with 10-year averages.  
The sign of the coefficient for the interaction between aid and political violence is now 
negative in most specifications, but significant in only one of them. Finally, despite still 
being small in magnitude, there is a change in the sign of the coefficient for the triple 
interaction, which is now positive, but not significant.156 
 
c) IV estimates 
In order to account for endogeneity, and in line with the analysis in previous sections, 
fitted aid is used as an instrument to obtain the results presented in Table 70 [following 
Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) strategy]. 
Before discussing the results, it is important to highlight that there is again a dramatic 
drop in the explanatory power of the model, especially when the interaction terms are 
added, and in particular when the dataset for the 10-year averages is used. Additionally, 
the concerns over the strength of the instrument raised in the previous section are 
heightened here. Thus, I will discuss the results obtained for the main variables of 
interest, but the following comments should still be read with caution. 
The main conclusions for the coefficients of interest do not differ greatly from the results 
estimated with OLS. The coefficient for aid before the interaction terms are included 
shows a negative effect of this variable on growth, but significant only when 10-year 
averaged data are used.  
Aid x state ineffectiveness maintains the negative sign, but it is significant in only one of 
the specifications. There is still no indication of a significant interactive effect between 
aid and political violence. Despite the change in sign and magnitude for the 10-year 
averaged dataset, the triple interaction term remains non-significant in both of the 
datasets used. 
 
  
                                                             
156 Additional estimations were run using the Least Squares Dummy Variable method, which 
corresponds to including country dummies in the regressions. None of the coefficients for the 
variables of interest showed a significant effect. 
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Table 70. Panel IV estimations, 1993-2012 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages  10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Log(initial pc GDP) -2.110** -3.753 -2.568  -1.951*** -2.278** -6.595 
 (1.009) (4.813) (1.869)  (0.438) (0.904) (77.99) 
Policy -0.0975 -3.462 -2.314  -0.847 -2.055* -5.571 
 (0.620) (6.178) (2.131)  (0.538) (1.083) (68.90) 
Initial life expectancy 0.0233 -0.221 -0.153  -0.0476 -0.137* -1.696 
 (0.0598) (0.415) (0.174)  (0.0492) (0.0769) (25.15) 
Geography 0.257 -0.680 -0.501  0.0443 -0.209 -1.262 
 (0.217) (1.597) (0.829)  (0.194) (0.314) (17.51) 
Inflation -0.0328 1.049 0.525  0.132 0.0610 4.249 
 (0.891) (3.051) (1.375)  (0.406) (0.729) (67.83) 
M2/GDP -0.00889 -0.00799 -0.00523  -0.0141* -0.0146* -0.130 
 (0.00865) (0.0198) (0.0216)  (0.00719) (0.00770) (1.904) 
Budget balance 0.198*** 0.159 0.127  0.0752* 0.0163 -0.178 
 (0.0592) (0.110) (0.143)  (0.0418) (0.0620) (3.218) 
Revolutions -0.944 0.248 -0.0671  -0.436 0.194 -14.95 
 (0.628) (2.174) (1.063)  (0.498) (0.684) (236.9) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.817 -1.096 -1.842  0.349 0.166 12.31 
 (0.753) (3.529) (4.758)  (0.777) (1.248) (206.6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.118 -2.248 -1.472  -1.261* -1.444* -26.55 
 (0.742) (2.069) (2.369)  (0.648) (0.855) (404.0) 
East Asia 0.877 1.808 1.566  1.535*** 1.944** 16.84 
 (0.638) (1.797) (1.264)  (0.580) (0.813) (241.0) 
Aid/GDP -0.242 -0.0746 0.133  -0.241** -0.0582 -2.879 
 (0.250) (0.508) (0.719)  (0.122) (0.191) (45.36) 
State ineffectiveness -0.687*** -0.269 -0.0760  -0.795*** -0.434* -4.664 
 (0.189) (0.612) (1.059)  (0.148) (0.222) (67.47) 
Political violence 0.171 -1.034 -0.714  0.0564 -0.467 1.324 
 (0.204) (2.305) (0.962)  (0.144) (0.352) (24.96) 
SI x PV -0.0124 -0.169 0.101  0.0229 -0.000435 -5.583 
 (0.0579) (0.524) (0.589)  (0.0474) (0.130) (89.51) 
Aid x SI  -0.611 -0.507   -0.299* -0.463 
  (0.952) (0.489)   (0.168) (4.316) 
Aid x PV  0.253 0.296   0.139 -2.925 
  (0.533) (0.600)   (0.109) (48.26) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0698    1.679 
   (0.246)    (27.00) 
Constant 22.61** 58.21 41.25*  25.77*** 35.88*** 199.4 
 (11.24) (76.26) (22.58)  (5.990) (11.62) (2,721) 
Observations 179 179 179  132 132 132 
R2 0.399 -1.539 -0.730  0.454 -0.110 -137.815 
Adj. R2 0.335 -1.842 -0.949  0.379 -0.286 -161.4 
p-value of LM statistica 0.0109 0.500 0.282  0.00128 0.0394 0.951 
F-stat for weak ident. 7.007 0.137 0.260  12.25 1.455 0.000802 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified. 
 
d) Summary of results 
This section ends with a brief overview of the insights provided by the panel datasets 
(see Table 71). These are restricted to the variables of interest in this chapter and thus 
refer to the coefficients obtained with the estimation of equations (4) to (6). Table 71 
offers more detail, but the overall conclusion from this section is that there is no 
evidence supporting the hypotheses that aid is less effective in countries with high levels 
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of state ineffectiveness or political violence. There is also no support to the view that aid 
will be even less effective when countries have high levels of both dimensions of fragility.  
Table 71. Summary of results with panel data 
 OLS IV 
Aid* Negative effect, but significant only when 
10-year averaged data are used. 
Negative effect, but significant only when 
10-year averaged data are used. 
Aid x SI Negative and significant effect with 10-year 
averaged data, but loses significance when 
5-year averages are used. 
Negative sign in all specifications, but the 
coefficient is significant in only one of them. 
Aid x PV Positive sign in most specifications, but it is 
not significant in any of them. 
Positive sign in most specification, 
although the coefficient is never significant. 
Aid x SI x 
PV 
The sign is negative, but the coefficient is 
not significant in any of the datasets used. 
The effect is not significant, and the sign of 
the coefficient changes with the dataset 
used. 
Notes: *Aid refers to the coefficient for aid in the baseline estimations, i.e. before any interaction terms between this 
variable and the indicators of state fragility are included. 
 
5.5.3. Robustness checks 
In this section, the results obtained previously in the chapter are subjected to further 
scrutiny. I will focus now on the results obtained with the reproduced dataset and use 
the main period of analysis, i.e. 1993-2012, and allow for three changes.  
Firstly, I examine the consequences of excluding from the analysis the observations 
identified as outliers in section 5.4.2. As described in the literature review in section 
5.2.4, recent studies have highlighted the fact that aid flows are not homogeneous, and 
that different types of aid may entail diverse expected effects on growth. This 
proposition is explored in the second part of this section. Finally, in the last part I use 
alternative approaches to overcoming the endogeneity of aid. To be specific, I explore 
two different avenues: a) employ Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010) instrument, which 
follows the tradition of Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) zero-stage approach; and b) 
use as instruments the list of exogenous variables proposed by Lessmann and 
Markwardt (2012). 
 
a) Excluding outliers 
This first part takes into account the insights offered by the preliminary analysis 
included in section 5.4.2 to identify potential outliers. I recall here that the results 
revealed as potential influential observations for the cross-country datasets: a) India, 
Israel, Cape Verde, Congo (Democratic Republic) and Cyprus for period 1993-2012; b) 
Nicaragua and Angola for period 1993-2002; and c) India for period 2003-2012. The 
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results in Table 72 correspond to the coefficients obtained with OLS and IV for the main 
variables of interest, after dropping these observations. 
Table 72. Cross-country OLS and IV estimations after excluding outliers, 1993-2012 
Results A: OLS estimates 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year1 10-year2 10-year3 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Aid/GDP -0.102* 0.00952 0.0158 -0.168** -0.112 -0.0779 0.0354 0.130* 0.198** 
 (0.0576) (0.0714) (0.0760) (0.0663) (0.0810) (0.0809) (0.0892) (0.0720) (0.0847) 
Aid x SI   -0.0479* -0.0445  -0.0408 -0.0223  -0.0684** -0.0740** 
  (0.0255) (0.0288)  (0.0343) (0.0413)  (0.0331) (0.0334) 
Aid x PV  -0.00228 0.0332  0.0104 0.0975**  0.0188 0.0905* 
  (0.0211) (0.0454)  (0.0217) (0.0380)  (0.0343) (0.0497) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0171   -0.0424**   -0.0230** 
   (0.0231)   (0.0178)   (0.0105) 
Observations 72 72 72 65 65 65 64 64 64 
R2 0.522 0.547 0.551 0.543 0.552 0.592 0.477 0.526 0.557 
Adj. R2 0.394 0.405 0.399 0.403 0.390 0.432 0.314 0.350 0.379 
Results B: IV estimates 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year1 10-year2 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (7) (8) (9) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Aid/GDP -0.406* -0.117 0.148 -0.279* 0.0825 0.0846 -0.316 -4.793 -6.017 
 (0.214) (0.298) (0.219) (0.166) (0.527) (0.547) (0.671) (27.47) (28.95) 
Aid x SI   -0.165* -0.225*  -0.205 -0.219  -2.914 -1.414 
  (0.0944) (0.129)  (0.244) (0.315)  (15.94) (7.186) 
Aid x PV  0.0187 -0.723  0.0250 -0.00376  1.879 -0.467 
  (0.0508) (0.530)  (0.0581) (0.325)  (10.51) (2.940) 
Aid x SI x PV   0.342   0.0154   0.581 
   (0.251)   (0.153)   (2.651) 
Observations 72 72 72 65 65 65 64 64 64 
R2 0.301 0.092 -1.348 0.525 0.369 0.323 0.270 -160.540 -93.428 
Adj. R2 0.114 -0.194 -2.146 0.379 0.141 0.0585 0.0414 -220.2 -131.2 
p-value LM stata 0.0417 0.00700 0.209 0.00095 0.119 0.218 0.309 0.859 0.832 
F-stat weak id 4.300 3.107 0.549 10.46 0.682 0.320 0.893 0.00763 0.00796 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, 
geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, ethnic fractionalization, the 
three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, and the interaction between the latter two variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1Considers the original sample of countries and 
excludes India, Israel, Cape Verde, Congo, D. R. and Cyprus. 2Considers the original sample of countries and excludes 
Nicaragua and Angola. 3Considers the original sample of countries and excludes India. 
The coefficients entail some differences when compared to those obtained with the full 
dataset. Starting with the OLS estimates, the baseline results for the aid coefficient show 
a negative and significant effect of this variable, now in two of the periods. Still, with the 
exception of period 2003-2012, the significance level of the coefficient drops when the 
interaction terms are included. The negative coefficient for the interaction between aid 
and state ineffectiveness is maintained in all periods considered. There is reduction in 
the significance level for the 20-year period, but it increases for the decade 2003-2012. 
In the case of aid x political violence, there is only a minor change in its significance level 
when the triple interaction term is included for period 2003-2012. Finally, the results 
for the triple interaction suggest the same as before. 
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Looking at results B, similarly to the OLS estimates, one now observes a negative and 
significant effect for the coefficient of aid in two of the specifications considered. The 
results for the interaction term between this variable and the two symptoms of fragility 
are similar to those obtained before. The negative and significant effect for the triple 
interaction term obtained with OLS does not survive the application of the 
instrumentation strategy. Again, the tests for instrument strength raise doubts about 
Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) instrument, especially for the period 2003-2012. 
I now discuss the coefficients obtained after dropping the outliers in the panel datasets 
and using the same methods as before. The preliminary analysis described in section 
5.4.2 highlighted as potential outliers the observations for Sierra Leone and Brazil in 
1993-1997 when using 5-year averages; and for Rwanda and Angola in 1993-2002 when 
using panel data with 10-year averages. The results for the main variables of interest 
obtained after dropping these observations are portrayed in Table 73.  
Table 73. Panel OLS and IV estimations after excluding outliers, 1993-2012  
Results A: OLS estimates 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages1  10-year averages2 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Aid/GDP -0.0294 0.0319 0.0263  -0.138*** -0.0356 -0.0250 
 (0.0536) (0.0620) (0.0666)  (0.0456) (0.0432) (0.0494) 
Aid x SI   -0.0468 -0.0466   -0.0564** -0.0549** 
  (0.0324) (0.0323)   (0.0227) (0.0225) 
Aid x PV  0.0150 0.00522   0.00185 0.0185 
  (0.0238) (0.0413)   (0.0237) (0.0369) 
Aid x SI x PV   0.00632    -0.00676 
   (0.0212)    (0.0125) 
Observations 177 177 177  130 130 130 
R2 0.401 0.410 0.411  0.484 0.516 0.518 
Adj. R2 0.337 0.339 0.335  0.411 0.437 0.434 
Results B: IV estimates 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year averages1  10-year averages2 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Aid/GDP -0.0987 -0.172 0.0610  -0.258* -0.0742 7.413 
 (0.311) (0.837) (0.562)  (0.136) (0.198) (251.6) 
Aid x SI   -0.594 -0.496   -0.293* 0.791 
  (0.888) (0.454)   (0.168) (33.27) 
Aid x PV  0.259 0.298   0.128 7.232 
  (0.566) (0.620)   (0.113) (240.2) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0724    -4.044 
   (0.261)    (135.4) 
Observations 177 177 177  130 130 130 
R2 0.395 -2.036 -1.034  0.453 -0.102 -783.896 
Adj. R2 0.330 -2.403 -1.295  0.375 -0.281 -919.5 
p-value of LM statistica 0.0359 0.530 0.308  0.00108 0.0396 0.976 
F-stat for weak ident. 4.478 0.121 0.251  13.54 1.446 0.000189 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, 
geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, ethnic fractionalization, the 
three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, and the interaction between the latter two variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1Considers the original sample of countries and 
excludes the observations for Sierra Leone and Brazil in 1993-1997. 2Considers the original sample of countries and 
excludes the observations for Rwanda and Angola in 1993-2002. 
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In general, the estimates entail very similar conclusions to the ones drawn before. 
Similarly to the findings with the full dataset, the conclusions that can be derived from 
the same dataset using IV methods are limited, as suggested by the warning levels of the 
R2.  
One finds no significant effect for any of the variables of interest when the dataset 
obtained with 5-year averages is used. Looking at the results from the 10-year averaged 
data, the negative and significant impact of aid on growth before any interactive effects 
are considered is maintained, independent of the method used. In line with the 
coefficients obtained with the full dataset, there appears to be a negative and significant 
interactive effect between aid and state ineffectiveness. Finally, there is no indication of 
a significant interactive effect between aid and political violence, or between these two 
variables and state ineffectiveness. 
 
b) Disaggregation of aid 
In an influential paper in the aid effectiveness literature, Clemens et al. (2012) argue that 
development assistance is heterogeneous, and thus, different categories of development 
assistance may have distinct effects on growth. The proposals have varied, and authors 
have used several criteria to distinguish between aid flows, for instance, based on the 
channel through which it reaches the donor (bilateral vs. multilateral), the timing of the 
expected results (early-impact vs. long-term impact), or even the sector it is intended to 
contribute to (e.g. education, health, or infrastructure).157 In the following paragraphs I 
focus on the first two of these criteria [in line with Rajan and Subramanian (2008), who 
also consider Clemens et al.’s (2012) division], a choice made on the basis of data 
availability.  
In Besley and Persson’s (2011a) approach, the effects of different categories of aid are 
based on a distinction between cash aid and non-cash aid. The latter is then subdivided 
into technical assistance, military assistance, and post-conflict assistance. Despite 
recognizing the pertinence of this disaggregation for the purposes of the present 
analysis, the aid categories provided by the OECD-DAC dataset do not allow for a direct 
correspondence with Besley and Persson’s (2011a) distinction. Additionally, available 
data on military assistance are still rather limited. Thus, in order to prevent 
measurement problems in the flows of aid by category, and to enable the comparison 
                                                             
157 See the review in section 5.2.4 for more details. 
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with previous studies, I consider, first, a distinction between bilateral and multilateral 
flows, and afterwards between early-impact, late-impact and humanitarian aid. 
The results in Table 74 were derived from the distinction between two categories of aid: 
bilateral and multilateral. According to the OECD-DAC’s (2016) definition, the first 
includes flows provided directly by a donor country to an aid recipient country, whereas 
multilateral flows are channeled via an international organization active in development 
(e.g. World Bank, UNDP). I consider the cross-country data for the two time horizons, 20 
years (1993-2012) and 10 years (1993-2002 and 2003-2012), and use OLS methods. 
Table 74. Cross-country OLS estimations with bilateral and multilateral aid, 1993-2012 
Results A: Bilateral aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Bilateral aid/GDP -0.0936 0.0139 0.133 -0.153 -0.0690 -0.0201 0.0278 0.164 0.303** 
 (0.127) (0.0613) (0.100) (0.102) (0.131) (0.141) (0.133) (0.111) (0.139) 
Bilateral aid x SI  -0.0859** -0.103***  -0.0467 -0.0355  -0.0836* -0.103** 
  (0.0344) (0.0321)  (0.0526) (0.0680)  (0.0490) (0.0480) 
Bilateral aid x PV  -0.0449 0.0493  -0.00827 0.149*  0.00798 0.127* 
  (0.0340) (0.0462)  (0.0362) (0.0757)  (0.0486) (0.0755) 
Bil. aid x SI x PV   -0.0450**   -0.0776**   -0.0357** 
   (0.0217)   (0.0369)   (0.0170) 
Observations 77 77 77 67 67 67 65 65 65 
R2 0.452 0.563 0.590 0.507 0.514 0.556 0.498 0.545 0.574 
Adj. R2 0.317 0.437 0.462 0.362 0.346 0.389 0.344 0.381 0.407 
Results B: Multilateral aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Multilateral aid /GDP -0.205* 0.112 0.192 -0.319*** -0.106 -0.0530 0.0373 0.301* 0.310* 
 (0.111) (0.126) (0.174) (0.119) (0.174) (0.168) (0.168) (0.155) (0.170) 
Multilateral aid x SI  -0.147** -0.144**  -0.106 -0.0241  -0.213** -0.201** 
  (0.0561) (0.0630)  (0.102) (0.104)  (0.0927) (0.0945) 
Multilateral aid x PV  -0.00315 0.0804  0.00401 0.213**  0.0713 0.200* 
  (0.0462) (0.0985)  (0.0589) (0.0851)  (0.0856) (0.113) 
Mult. aid x SI x PV   -0.0433   -0.101**   -0.0514* 
   (0.0472)   (0.0396)   (0.0277) 
Observations 77 77 77 67 67 67 65 65 65 
R2 0.465 0.528 0.535 0.535 0.551 0.593 0.498 0.542 0.560 
Adj. R2 0.334 0.391 0.391 0.399 0.395 0.440 0.344 0.376 0.388 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, 
geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, ethnic fractionalization, the 
three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, and the interaction between the latter two variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The disaggregation of aid into the two categories suggests that, without considering any 
effects from the symptoms of state fragility, there is no significant effect of bilateral aid, 
whereas multilateral aid entails a negative and significant effect in two of the periods 
considered. The results also suggest that both bilateral aid and multilateral aid are less 
effective in countries with high levels of state ineffectiveness when considering periods 
1993-2012 and 2003-2012. Furthermore, this result survives the inclusion of the triple 
interaction term between aid the two symptoms of fragility. The sign and significance 
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level of the coefficient for aid x political violence changes depending on the period 
considered and on whether the triple interaction term is included. Regarding the effect 
of the latter, one finds a negative and significant effect when bilateral aid (independent 
of the period used), and in two of the periods when multilateral aid is used. 
The same analysis is held for the case of panel data. The obtained coefficients are 
represented in Table 75, with Results A corresponding to bilateral aid and Results B to 
multilateral aid. With the exception of coefficients for the triple interaction term, the 
results are roughly in line with those obtained for the cross-country data. 
Table 75. Panel OLS estimations with bilateral and multilateral aid 
Results A: Bilateral aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bilateral aid/GDP -0.104 -0.0120 0.0217 -0.155** -0.0206 -0.0113 
 (0.0826) (0.0919) (0.107) (0.0592) (0.0644) (0.0752) 
Bilateral aid x SI  -0.0743 -0.0794  -0.0779** -0.0769** 
  (0.0454) (0.0496)  (0.0312) (0.0312) 
Bilateral aid x PV  -0.0340 0.0212  0.0113 0.0241 
  (0.0598) (0.0749)  (0.0281) (0.0449) 
Bilateral aid x SI x PV   -0.0367   -0.00541 
   (0.0472)   (0.0171) 
Observations 179 179 179 132 132 132 
R2 0.404 0.420 0.425 0.474 0.497 0.498 
Adj. R2 0.341 0.351 0.353 0.401 0.417 0.413 
Results B: Multilateral aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Multilateral aid /GDP -0.354** -0.0518 0.000862 -0.312*** 0.0160 0.0313 
 (0.168) (0.183) (0.182) (0.0827) (0.101) (0.0965) 
Multilateral aid x SI  -0.137 -0.123  -0.187*** -0.162** 
  (0.109) (0.102)  (0.0633) (0.0646) 
Multilateral aid x PV  -0.0174 0.0764  0.0366 0.144** 
  (0.0582) (0.102)  (0.0468) (0.0724) 
Multilateral aid x SI x PV   -0.0443   -0.0480 
   (0.0402)   (0.0307) 
Observations 179 179 179 132 132 132 
R2 0.436 0.456 0.461 0.504 0.539 0.551 
Adj. R2 0.377 0.391 0.393 0.435 0.466 0.475 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, 
geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, ethnic fractionalization, the 
three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, and the interaction between the latter two variables. 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In a nutshell, the disintegration of aid into bilateral and multilateral aid is in line with 
the conclusion that aid may be less effective in countries where the performance of the 
state is lower in terms of its effectiveness. In line with the previous section, one fails to 
find a significant effect for either the interaction of aid and political violence or the triple 
interaction. Even though the cross-country evidence now lends some support to the idea 
that, despite being small in magnitude, there might be an interactive effect between aid 
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– independent of its origin – and the two symptoms of state fragility, the evidence from 
panel data does not concur with this.158  
Moving now to the results obtained using Clemens et al.’s (2004a, b; 2012) 
categorisation of aid, the main coefficients of interest are represented in Table 76. These 
authors distinguish between: a) early-impact aid, which could be reasonably expected 
to have a causal effect on growth over a four-year period (e.g. budget support, 
investment in infrastructure); b) late-impact aid, which, if having an impact on growth, 
it will be over a long period of time (e.g. democratic support, investment in health and 
education); and, finally, c) emergency and humanitarian aid. Although in their work 
Clemens et al. (2012) focus on the first effect, given the time horizons considered in this 
chapter, I discuss the results obtained with the three different categories. In line with 
their approach, I add ODA repayments to the list of control variables.159 
If early-impact aid is expected to have an impact on growth within the first four years, 
one may fail to observe this short-term effect with the time horizons considered. In fact, 
the coefficients in columns (1), (4) and (7) in Table 76, Results A, suggest that there is 
no significant effect of aid on economic growth. However, the same holds for late-impact 
aid (Results B) and humanitarian aid (Results C), whose coefficients see changes in sign 
when different time periods are considered, and are not significant in most 
specifications. Additionally, the inclusion of the interaction terms leads to changes in the 
sign and significance of the coefficient for aid, in all the types of aid used. 
Looking now at the interaction terms, at face value the effect of aid seems to depend on 
the level of state ineffectiveness in the country. There is evidence of a negative and 
significant effect (independent of the type of aid considered) in the period 1993-2012. 
However, this result is not robust to using a different time horizon. In the case of the 
interaction between aid and political violence, the sign of the coefficient for political 
violence varies depending on the specification considered, and it is rarely significant. 
                                                             
158 The same procedure followed previously to build an instrument for fitted aid was employed 
to obtain an instrument for each bilateral and multilateral aid. The results are included in 
Appendix D3, Table D3.2, and show a loss in the significance level of the coefficients for all the 
interaction terms. However, the tests for instrumental weakness do not support the use of this 
instrument and the explanatory power of the models is very low when the interaction terms are 
included. 
159 According to Clemens et al. (2012: 599), any flow of aid disaggregated by purpose, by 
definition, is not a net flow, given that repayments on aid are not divided by purpose. Thus, in 
order for the results obtained for different categories of aid to be comparable with those 
derived with total net aid, gross repayments must be included as a covariate. On the basis of this 
is the assumption that repayments on aid can affect growth, which is corroborated by the 
significant coefficient obtained for this variable in most regressions. 
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Table 76. Cross-country OLS estimations with early-impact, late-impact, and 
humanitarian aid, 1993-2012 
Results A: Early-impact aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Early-imp. aid/GDP -0.104 0.155 0.219* 0.0459 0.103 -0.0273 -0.121 0.147 0.303 
 (0.141) (0.101) (0.121) (0.146) (0.206) (0.225) (0.141) (0.159) (0.189) 
Early-imp. aid x SI  -0.129** -0.132**  -0.0416 0.0448  -0.116 -0.132 
  (0.0559) (0.0574)  (0.0871) (0.106)  (0.0796) (0.0833) 
Early-imp. aid x PV  -0.0480 0.0418  -0.00527 0.130  0.0168 0.183 
  (0.0450) (0.0648)  (0.0670) (0.128)  (0.0612) (0.113) 
Early aid x SI x PV   -0.0364   -0.0897   -0.0459 
   (0.0236)   (0.0691)   (0.0285) 
Observations 73 73 73 63 63 63 57 57 57 
R2 0.557 0.642 0.653 0.520 0.522 0.540 0.549 0.589 0.609 
Adj. R2 0.431 0.523 0.529 0.353 0.327 0.337 0.368 0.394 0.408 
Results B: Late-impact aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Late-imp. aid /GDP -0.120 0.0628 0.0867 -0.121 0.155 0.147 0.0916 0.162* 0.173 
 (0.123) (0.0921) (0.126) (0.139) (0.176) (0.168) (0.100) (0.0927) (0.103) 
Late-imp. aid x SI  -0.123*** -0.127***  -0.156** -0.132*  -0.118 -0.124 
  (0.0410) (0.0460)  (0.0612) (0.0672)  (0.0866) (0.0830) 
Late-imp. aid x PV  -0.0184 0.00988  -0.0384 0.163*  0.0425 0.121* 
  (0.0389) (0.0827)  (0.0588) (0.0843)  (0.0548) (0.0716) 
Late aid x SI x PV   -0.0156   -0.106***   -0.0420 
   (0.0439)   (0.0378)   (0.0257) 
Observations 73 73 73 63 63 63 57 57 57 
R2 0.560 0.633 0.635 0.525 0.575 0.625 0.545 0.569 0.586 
Adj. R2 0.435 0.511 0.504 0.359 0.401 0.460 0.363 0.364 0.374 
Results C: Humanitarian aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Human. aid /GDP -0.287 0.427 0.412 -0.469** 0.823 -0.132 0.268 1.780** 1.477* 
 (0.189) (0.389) (0.458) (0.211) (0.999) (1.010) (0.527) (0.764) (0.803) 
Human. aid x SI  -0.292* -0.293*  -0.496 -0.256  -1.234** -0.947 
  (0.158) (0.151)  (0.409) (0.390)  (0.567) (0.659) 
Human. aid x PV  -0.00994 -0.0397  -0.00580 0.852*  0.517 0.652 
  (0.107) (0.312)  (0.203) (0.463)  (0.476) (0.484) 
Human. aid x SI x PV   0.0144   -0.276*   -0.0993 
   (0.140)   (0.142)   (0.0847) 
Observations 73 73 73 63 63 63 57 57 57 
R2 0.565 0.599 0.599 0.554 0.576 0.606 0.542 0.610 0.617 
Adj. R2 0.441 0.466 0.456 0.399 0.403 0.432 0.359 0.425 0.420 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, 
geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, ethnic fractionalization, the 
three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, the interaction between the latter two variables, and ODA 
loan repayments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Finally, the coefficient for the triple interaction term holds a negative sign in almost all 
specifications considered, independent of the type of aid and the time period used (with 
the exception of the results for humanitarian aid in period 1993-2012). Still, it is 
significant in only two specifications, which does not suggest much support to the 
hypothesis of aid being even less effective when both levels of state ineffectiveness and 
political violence are high. 
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Table 77 represents the coefficients obtained when the same analysis was repeated for 
the two panel datasets. Overall, the results indicate that using this data structure does 
not seem to influence the main conclusions that can be drawn.  
Table 77. Panel OLS estimations with early-impact, late-impact, and humanitarian aid, 
1993-2012 
Results A: Early-impact aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Early-impact aid/GDP -0.108 0.0270 0.0335 -0.108 0.123 0.117 
 (0.0893) (0.128) (0.115) (0.0770) (0.0946) (0.0996) 
Early-impact aid x SI  -0.115 -0.0939  -0.137*** -0.140*** 
  (0.0760) (0.0673)  (0.0463) (0.0456) 
Early-impact aid x PV  -0.0244 0.0799  0.0541 0.0405 
  (0.0532) (0.0887)  (0.0370) (0.0618) 
Early-impact aid x SI x PV   -0.0622   0.00499 
   (0.0474)   (0.0167) 
Observations 160 160 160 120 120 120 
R2 0.451 0.467 0.476 0.518 0.541 0.542 
Adj. R2 0.381 0.390 0.396 0.438 0.454 0.449 
Results B: Late-impact aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Late-impact aid /GDP -0.0523 0.169* 0.198* -0.159** 0.0419 0.0730 
 (0.0757) (0.0947) (0.108) (0.0740) (0.0689) (0.0760) 
Late-impact aid x SI  -0.152*** -0.162***  -0.148*** -0.147*** 
  (0.0456) (0.0508)  (0.0345) (0.0350) 
Late-impact aid x PV  0.0279 0.0861  0.0110 0.0990* 
  (0.0288) (0.0672)  (0.0403) (0.0536) 
Late-impact aid x SI x PV   -0.0433   -0.0469* 
   (0.0492)   (0.0269) 
Observations 160 160 160 120 120 120 
R2 0.446 0.475 0.480 0.526 0.573 0.588 
Adj. R2 0.375 0.400 0.401 0.447 0.492 0.505 
Results C: Humanitarian aid 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Humanitarian aid /GDP -0.264 0.496 0.482 -0.418** 1.314** 0.735* 
 (0.276) (0.671) (0.692) (0.171) (0.536) (0.429) 
Humanitarian aid x SI  -0.616* -0.609*  -0.777*** -0.605*** 
  (0.353) (0.363)  (0.235) (0.222) 
Humanitarian aid x PV  0.270 0.321  0.0901 0.593** 
  (0.194) (0.306)  (0.198) (0.296) 
Humanitarian aid x SI x PV   -0.0182   -0.174** 
   (0.0967)   (0.0854) 
Observations 160 160 160 120 120 120 
R2 0.447 0.460 0.460 0.541 0.590 0.608 
Adj. R2 0.377 0.382 0.378 0.465 0.512 0.529 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life 
expectancy, geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, 
ethnic fractionalization, the three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, the interaction 
between the latter two variables, and ODA loan repayments. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
While when 5-year averaged data are used, one finds no significant effect for any of the 
types of aid considered, late-impact aid and humanitarian aid are negative and 
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significant when 10-year averages are used. The coefficients estimated for the 
interaction between aid and state ineffectiveness are now negative and significant in 
almost all specifications, even when different time periods are considered. There is again 
no evidence that there may be an interactive effect between aid and political violence. 
Finally, the results for the triple interaction show a negative effect in almost all 
regressions, but it is significant in only two of them. 
In sum, the results in this section concur with the line of argument that fails to find a 
robust significant effect of development assistance on growth, even when considering 
different categories of aid flows. The evidence suggests that the level of state 
ineffectiveness in a country may negatively affect the impact of aid, even though this 
result is not robust to considering different time periods. Once again, it is not possible to 
observe a significant effect of political violence on aid effectiveness. Finally, and in line 
with the results in the previous section, in general one finds no significant effect for the 
triple interaction term.160 
 
c) Alternative approaches to overcoming endogeneity 
As described in section 5.4.4, the task of finding an appropriate instrument for aid has 
proven notoriously difficult. In order to address the doubts raised before about Rajan 
and Subramanian’s (2008) proposal, in this section I explore the results obtained with 
two alternative approaches (described in detail in section 5.4.4.c). Results A in Table 78 
were obtained by using a modified version of Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) fitted aid, 
as suggested in Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010)161, whereas Results B in the same table 
correspond to the coefficients derived from applying the set of exogenous instruments 
selected by Lessmann and Markwardt (2012), namely, a Franc zone dummy, a Central 
America dummy, the log of population, lagged aid, distance from equator, the share of 
population speaking a primary European language (English, French, German,  
                                                             
160 Similarly to before, an instrument for each early-impact, late-impact and humanitarian aid 
was obtained following the same procedure as before. The results are included in Appendix D3, 
Table D3.3, for completion, but they were not considered in the analysis given that the tests for 
instrumental weakness and for overall fit of the model raise serious concerns about their 
validity. 
161 As a reminder, Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) use a specification similar to equation (6) to 
obtain fitted aid, but: a) treat missing values of aid as zeros; b) use aid per capita as a dependent 
variable; c) the independent variables are dummies for whether the country is a current colony 
of the donor, whether it was ever a colony, commonality of language, the ratio of the logarithm 
of the populations of donor and recipient, and the interactions between the latter two variables; 
d) add donor-specific fixed effects.  
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Table 78. Cross-country IV estimations with alternative approaches, 1993-2012 
Results A: Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010) instrument 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Aid/GDP -0.251** 0.126 0.219 -0.220 0.413 0.585 -0.524 -0.193 -0.143 
 (0.125) (0.304) (0.314) (0.152) (1.160) (2.421) (0.643) (1.008) (1.025) 
Aid x SI  -0.240 -0.193  -0.516 -0.830  1.186 1.202 
  (0.167) (0.243)  (0.896) (2.700)  (2.953) (3.114) 
Aid x PV  0.0494 0.194  0.129 -0.0508  -0.886 -0.799 
  (0.0723) (0.294)  (0.274) (1.090)  (2.185) (2.035) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.116   0.136   -0.0503 
   (0.243)   (0.812)   (0.195) 
Observations 77 77 77 67 67 67 65 65 65 
R2 0.375 0.048 -0.219 0.508 -0.810 -3.270 -0.009 -11.285 -11.708 
p-value LM stata 0.00521 0.101 0.547 0.00169 0.492 0.740 0.216 0.675 0.690 
F-stat weak id. 10.68 0.702 0.0697 10.50 0.119 0.0204 1.199 0.0381 0.0254 
Results B: Lessmann and Markwardt’s (2012) proposal 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Aid/GDP -0.197** -0.196* -0.0981 -0.192** -0.185* -0.0816 0.0306 0.0995 0.0797 
 (0.0916) (0.112) (0.111) (0.0925) (0.107) (0.0847) (0.0791) (0.0798) (0.0749) 
Aid x SI  -0.0233 -0.0329  -0.0231 0.0231  -0.0537 -0.0265 
  (0.0377) (0.0365)  (0.0436) (0.0423)  (0.0343) (0.0298) 
Aid x PV  0.0317 0.125**  -0.00524 0.124***  0.0244 0.0994** 
  (0.0283) (0.0506)  (0.0254) (0.0364)  (0.0346) (0.0449) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0512**   -0.0673***   -0.0273*** 
   (0.0242)   (0.0160)   (0.0105) 
Observations 73 73 73 65 65 65 62 62 62 
R2 0.452 0.447 0.476 0.514 0.513 0.556 0.407 0.434 0.466 
p-value 0.158 0.304 0.460 0.345 0.336 0.454 0.00767 0.0126 0.0267 
p-value LM stata 0.0638 0.143 0.0897 0.0246 0.0832 0.0702 0.0157 0.0360 0.510 
F-stat weak id. 1.910 1.918 2.513 2.486 3.703 3.019 9.591 3.551 0.858 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, 
geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, ethnic fractionalization, the 
three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, and the interaction between the latter two variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test 
is that the structural equation is underidentified. 
Portuguese, and Spanish), a dummy for countries with a federal constitution, the country 
size, and the interaction between the last two variables.162 
In general, in comparison to Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010) fitted aid, one notices that 
the specifications obtained by using Lessmann and Markwardt’s instrumentation 
strategy show better results in the tests for instrument strength when the regressions 
with interaction terms are considered. However, both proposals fail to pass the tests of 
instrumentation weakness in the majority of regressions. Additionally, the explanatory 
power of the models is very weak when Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010) proposal is used, 
and especially for the 10-year period 2003-2012. 
                                                             
162 Despite being used by these authors, arms imports is not considered in the analysis due to 
data availability, and the fact that this variable is not significant in any of the first-stage 
regressions in Lessmann and Markwardt (2012: 1729-1730). 
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Given these concerns, I will briefly discuss the obtained results, but these should be 
regarded with caution. Looking at the coefficient for aid before any interactions are 
considered, the weight of the evidence is toward a negative effect, which is significant 
for period 1993-2012, independent of the instrumentation strategy used. Results A do 
not lend support to any significant effect of neither state ineffectiveness nor political 
violence on the impact of aid on growth. Results B show that political violence has a 
significant positive effect on aid effectiveness, but only when the interaction between 
these two variables and state ineffectiveness is considered. With regards to the latter, 
the coefficient holds a negative and significant effect in the three time periods 
considered when Lessmann and Markwardt’s (2012) proposal is followed. 
Similarly to before, I repeat the analysis for the two panel datasets. The results for the 
main coefficients of interest are included in Table 79.   
Table 79. Panel IV estimations with alternative approaches, 1993-2012 
Results A: Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010) instrument 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 1993-2012 
 5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Aid/GDP -0.373 -0.303 0.0973 -0.246* -0.00439 -0.0324 
 (0.235) (0.983) (0.782) (0.132) (0.397) (0.623) 
Aid x SI  -0.832 -0.470  -0.435 -0.658 
  (1.708) (0.600)  (0.415) (0.873) 
Aid x PV  0.434 0.449  0.219 -0.169 
  (1.014) (0.683)  (0.234) (0.542) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.147   0.242 
   (0.274)   (0.412) 
Observations 179 179 179 132 132 132 
R2 0.335 -4.169 -0.936 0.451 -0.845 -4.281 
p-value of LM stata 0.00601 0.612 0.339 0.00239 0.235 0.486 
F-stat for weak ident. 8.068 0.0758 0.213 10.52 0.387 0.109 
Results B: Lessmann and Markwardt’s (2012) proposal 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 1993-2012 
 5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Aid/GDP -0.0928 -0.0632 -0.0451 -0.162** -0.0914 -0.0590 
 (0.0608) (0.0716) (0.0701) (0.0734) (0.0760) (0.0724) 
Aid x SI  -0.0330 -0.0204  -0.0582** -0.0473* 
  (0.0410) (0.0369)  (0.0295) (0.0279) 
Aid x PV  0.00136 0.0501  0.00826 0.0839** 
  (0.0280) (0.0424)  (0.0242) (0.0380) 
Aid x SI x PV   -0.0268   -0.0381** 
   (0.0185)   (0.0171) 
Observations 174 174 174 127 127 127 
R2 0.420 0.434 0.447 0.452 0.447 0.387 
p-value 0.186 0.159 0.182 0.0175 0.0735 0.245 
p-value of LM stata 0.00965 0.00571 0.00584 0.0104 0.0122 0.0597 
F-stat for weak ident. 15.91 3.892 3.827 5.260 2.640 4.860 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified. 
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In terms of instrumentation strength, again Lessmann and Markwardt’s (2012) proposal 
proves more adequate. This is more evident when the interaction terms are included in 
the regressions, as seen by the negative values for the R2 obtained in columns (2), (3), 
(5), and (6) of Results A. 
I discuss the obtained coefficients with the same reservations as before. The coefficient 
for aid in the baseline regressions shows a negative and significant effect of this variable 
on growth, but only when the 10-year averaged data are used. In line with the cross-
country results, one finds no indication of an interactive effect between aid and any of 
the symptoms of state fragility when Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010) instrument is 
employed. The same applies for the results obtained with the 5-year averaged datasets 
and the set of instruments proposed by Lessmann and Markwardt (2012). However, the 
coefficients obtained with the same instrumentation strategy for the 10-year averaged 
data are similar to those obtained for the cross-country data, the main difference being 
the negative and significant coefficient for aid x state ineffectiveness.163 
 
d) Summary of results 
The main results of this section are compiled in Table 80. Firstly, when the outliers were 
removed, one observed a few changes when comparing with the results with the full 
dataset. Yet, the conclusions remain similar. There is some evidence of a negative sign of 
the effect of aid on growth when one uses OLS methods, but the significance level drops 
when IV methods are employed. The interactive effect between this variable and state 
ineffectiveness also appears negative and significant in some of the regressions 
estimated with OLS and IV, but the significance level depends on the period considered. 
The results for the term aid x political violence show a positive sign, but the coefficient 
is not significant in most specifications. Finally, there is also no support for an interactive 
effect between aid and the two symptoms of fragility. 
Allowing for the differentiated effects for different types of aid suggested that the 
negative effect of aid on growth is more visible when aid is disaggregated. However, this 
effect was only significant in most cases when multilateral aid was considered. The most  
                                                             
163 Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010: 11-12) remark about the fact that missing bilateral aid flows 
should be set as zeros was taken into account when calculating fitted aid, but not when 
obtaining the value for total aid. However, the same analysis was repeated considering the 
missing values as zeros also when calculating total aid/GDP. This change did not influence the 
results obtained for the variables of interest. 
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Table 80. Summary of results from robustness checks 
 Outliers 
 OLS IV 
Aid* Negative and significant coefficient in most 
regressions.  
Negative term in all specifications, but 
significance level drops depending on the time 
period and data specification considered. 
Aid x SI Negative coefficient, significant in a few 
regressions, namely with cross-country for 
periods 1993-2012 and 2003-2012, and for 
two regressions with panel data (10-year 
averages). 
Negative coefficient in all specifications, but 
significant only for period 1993-2012 and in 
one specification for panel data. 
Aid x PV Positive term in most specifications, but 
significant in only two of them when cross-
country data are used. 
Variation in the sign of the estimated 
coefficient, which is not significant in any of the 
regressions. 
Aid x SI x PV Negative and significant coefficient with 
cross-country data, but the sign changes and it 
is not significant with panel data. 
The sign of the term varies and it is not 
significant in any of the regressions estimated. 
 Disaggregation of aid 
 
Bilateral vs. multilateral aid 
Early-impact, late-impact and        
humanitarian aid 
Aid* Bilateral aid has a negative coefficient in most 
specifications, but it is significant in only one 
of them. Multilateral aid shows a negative and 
significant effect in most regressions. 
Most of the obtained coefficients are not 
significant, and this disaggregation of aid into 
categories does not seem to lead to differences 
in the obtained results. 
Aid x SI With the exception of period 1993-2002 and 
panel data with 5-year averages, the 
coefficient is negative and significant in all 
specifications for both bilateral and 
multilateral aid. 
With the exception of the results for two of the 
periods considered, there is no indication of a 
significant result for early-impact aid. Negative 
and significant term for most specifications 
when late-impact aid and humanitarian aid are 
used. 
Aid x PV Mostly positive term, but the sign and 
significance level vary across the 
specifications for both types of aid. 
Sign varies depending mainly on the time 
period considered and on whether the triple 
interaction term is included, but it is not 
significant in most specifications. 
Aid x SI x PV Negative and significant coefficient for both 
categories of aid when cross-country data are 
used, but it loses significance for panel data.  
The coefficient is negative in most 
specifications, but significant in only some of 
them. 
 Different strategies to overcoming endogeneity 
 Arndt, Jones and Tarp’s (2010) approach Lessmann and Markwardt’s (2012) approach 
Aid* Negative term, but significant in only two of 
the regressions estimated. 
The weight of the evidence suggests a negative 
and significant effect. 
Aid x SI Negative in most specifications, but it is non-
significant in all regressions. 
Negative sign in most specifications, but the 
coefficient is significant only with 10-year 
averaged panel data. 
Aid x PV Sign varies depending on the time periods 
used, but the term is never significant. 
Positive term, which is significant only when 
the triple interaction term is included. 
Aid x SI x PV Sign varies depending on the time periods 
considered, but the term is non-significant in 
all regressions. 
Negative and significant effect in most of the 
estimated regressions. 
Notes: *Aid refers to the coefficient for aid in the baseline estimations, i.e. before any interaction terms between this 
variable and the indicators of state fragility are included. 
noticeable difference in comparison with the results obtained when using total aid is 
that the negative and significant effect of the interaction with state ineffectiveness is now 
more robust across specifications. With the exception of early-impact aid, one finds that 
aid appears to be less effective in countries with high levels of state ineffectiveness. Even 
when disaggregating aid into different categories, one fails to find a significant effect for 
the interaction between aid and political violence, and for the triple interaction term. 
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Finally, the use of alternative instrumentation approaches did not lead to great 
improvements in terms of instrument strength, and the obtained results are not at odds 
with the ones presented before. The following section discusses these results in relation 
to those obtained previously and compares them with the insights from existing 
literature. 
 
5.6. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
 
This chapter has revisited the evidence on aid effectiveness by exploring whether its 
effect on economic growth depends on the level of state ineffectiveness and/or political 
violence. Table 81 encapsulates the main conclusions from using different datasets, 
different estimation methods, and allowing for further changes in the specifications. 
Each column shows the variation in the obtained estimates for the four coefficients of 
interest. 
The results represented in the column for ‘Aid’, obtained without considering any 
interactive effects, echo the longstanding disagreement that characterises the aid 
effectiveness literature. The coefficient is negative in several specifications, but there is 
some variation in both sign and significance level depending on the time period, time 
horizon, method, and sample of countries considered. Similarly, allowing for diverse 
effects depending on the aid category did not suggest that we find significantly dissimilar 
results when considering different types of aid. If anything, the results vary more when 
one distinguishes aid flows by channel (bilateral vs. multilateral) rather than the timing 
of their effect. 
The second column of Table 81 suggests that there seems to be a negative interactive 
effect between aid and state ineffectiveness, which, according to the theoretical 
predictions, could mean that aid is less effective in countries with higher levels of state 
ineffectiveness. However, the coefficient is only significant in a few of the specifications 
considered, and mostly when one distinguishes between different categories of aid. The 
results for the interaction between aid and political violence show a positive sign in 
some of the specifications considered, but there is some variation, and the lack of 
significance of the coefficient points to the existence of no interactive effect between 
these variables. 
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Table 81. Review of the empirical results 
 Aid1 Aid x SI Aid x PV Aid x SI x PV 
 BASELINE RESULTS 
 Cross-country data 
OLS The sign and 
significance level 
vary depending on 
the time period 
considered. 
Negative sign in 
all specifications, 
but the coefficient 
is significant only 
for periods 1993-
2012 and 2003-
2012. 
Positive effect in 
most 
specifications, but 
it is never 
significant, with 
the exception of 
one specification. 
Negative sign in all 
specifications. The 
coefficient is 
significant only for 
periods 1993-2012 
and 2003-2012. 
IV Negative sign in all 
specifications, but the 
coefficient is 
significant only 
when the original 
dataset is used. 
Negative term in 
all specifications, 
but it is not 
significant in 
most of them. 
Positive sign in 
most 
specifications, but 
the coefficient is 
never significant. 
 
The sign of the 
coefficient varies 
depending on the 
period considered, 
but it never shows a 
significant effect. 
 Panel data 
OLS2 Negative coefficient, 
but significant only 
with 10-year 
averages. 
Negative 
coefficient, but 
significant only 
with 10-year 
averages. 
Positive sign in 
most 
specifications, but 
the coefficient is 
never significant. 
Negative coefficient, 
but it is never 
significant. 
IV Negative coefficient, 
but significant only 
with 10-year 
averages. 
Negative 
coefficient, but 
significant only in 
one specification. 
Positive sign in 
most 
specifications, but 
the coefficient is 
never significant. 
The sign of the 
coefficient varies, 
but it is never 
significant. 
 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Outliers 
excluded3 
Negative and 
significant coefficient 
in most regressions. 
Negative 
coefficient, but 
significant only in 
a few regressions. 
Positive term in 
most 
specifications, but 
significant only 
in two of them. 
The sign and 
significance level of 
the coefficient vary 
depending on the 
data structure 
considered. 
Aid 
categories4 
Negative sign 
independent of the 
type of aid considered, 
but significant only 
for multilateral aid. 
Negative and 
significant in 
most 
specifications, 
with the exception 
of early-impact 
aid. 
Sign and 
significance level 
vary across the 
specifications 
considered. 
There is some 
evidence of a 
negative and 
significant effect, but 
this result changes 
across specifications.  
Alternative 
IV5 
The weight of the 
evidence suggests a 
negative and 
significant effect 
mainly when 
Lessmann and 
Markwardt’s (2012) 
instruments are used. 
Negative sign in 
most 
specifications, but 
the coefficient is 
not significant in 
most of them. 
Positive in most 
specifications, but 
the sign and 
significance level 
vary across 
specifications. 
Negative sign in 
most specifications, 
but the coefficient is 
significant only 
when Lessmann and 
Markwardt’s (2012) 
instruments are 
used. 
Notes: 1This column refers to the results obtained for the coefficient of aid in the baseline regressions, i.e. before any 
interaction terms were included. 2These results do not include the FE estimates. 3These results refer to OLS estimates. 
When IV methods were used, overall there were no dramatic changes in the sign of the coefficients, but there was an 
overall loss of significance. 4This refers to the differentiation between bilateral and multilateral aid, and between the 
different categories proposed by Clemens et al. (2012). 5This refers to the application of the instrumentation strategies 
suggested in Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) and in Lessmann and Markwardt (2012).  
Finally, even if significant in some of the regressions considered, the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction between aid, state ineffectiveness and political violence 
sees a lot of variation in sign and it loses significance when one considers different time 
periods and uses different estimation methods. 
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These results can be compared with the insights provided by the different strands of 
literature reviewed in section 5.2. I will start with a brief note on the comparison with 
the results obtained in studies using the CPIA to understand whether aid is less effective 
in countries with lower scores. Given that the dimensions captured by the CPIA are 
similar to some of those used in the construction state ineffectiveness index164, I will 
focus on this variable. The negative and significant interactive effect between aid and the 
index of state ineffectiveness concurs to the line of argument in the aforementioned 
literature. However, as portrayed in Table 81, this result is not robust to using different 
time periods and different estimations methods.   
I focus now on the studies explicitly looking at the impact of aid in fragile states. Starting 
with McGillivray and Feeny (2008), they found no evidence that fragility per se matters 
for aid effectiveness. The results in this chapter are in line with this claim. 
However, the conclusions from the analysis presented here are slightly at odds with 
those obtained by Carment, Samy and Prest (2008). I recall that these authors find a 
positive and significant coefficient for aid, and its magnitude increases when considering 
samples of countries restricted to more fragile states (i.e. scoring higher in their measure 
of state fragility), thus suggesting that aid has a larger effect on growth in more fragile 
countries, ceteris paribus. Still, the estimated coefficient for the interaction between aid 
and fragility shows a negative and significant effect in all specifications, which also sees 
an increase in magnitude when the restricted sample of countries is used. 
Finally, I refer back to the working paper by Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma and Devarajan 
(2011). I focus here on their results for the overall sample of countries, as this chapter 
does not consider how the effects of fragility may differ depending on the region 
considered. Similarly to the conclusion drawn from the estimations in this chapter, the 
authors fail to find a significant effect of state fragility on the impact of aid on growth. 
The initial calculations used dummies for fragile and non-fragile countries, as well as 
African fragile and non-fragile countries, and the obtained coefficient for aid*dummy 
fragile states was positive but non-significant. Additionally, its inclusion did not cause 
any changes to the positive and significant coefficient estimated for aid. 
 
 
                                                             
164 Considering the data available for the CPIA index, the correlation between this variable and 
the state ineffectiveness index for period 2005-2012 is -0.7139. 
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5.7. CONCLUSION 
 
The main goal of this chapter was simple: to examine whether the evidence concurs to 
the view derived from the aid effectiveness literature that aid is less effective in 
promoting growth in fragile states, when considering a multidimensional approach to 
state fragility. This goal was pursued by analysing the results obtained after adding two 
interaction terms between aid and both an index of state ineffectiveness and another for 
political violence to a standard growth regression.  
Overall, the results do not suggest that there is any significant effect of either state 
ineffectiveness or political violence on the impact of aid on growth. There is wide 
variation in the size, magnitude and coefficient of the two variables of interest depending 
on the specifications considered. Additionally, I also failed to find a significant indication 
that the effects of these two variables on aid effectiveness interact with one another. 
These conclusions were drawn after considering different time periods and horizons, 
data structures, estimation techniques, samples of countries, and aid categories. 
These findings contribute to two strands of literature. The main contribution of this 
chapter is towards the empirical literature on the impact of aid in fragile states. Given 
the relative scarcity and the limitations of the empirical work explicitly examining this 
relationship, the results presented here fill in a gap in knowledge by providing a 
thorough examination of the relationship between state fragility, aid, and economic 
growth using different data specifications and estimation techniques. 
Although modest, the secondary contribution is towards the already large body of 
studies testing the aid-growth nexus. In line with Temple (2010) and others (e.g. Arndt, 
Jones and Tarp, 2010), this chapter used as a starting point Rajan and Subramanian’s 
(2008) study. By using a dataset that attempted to, as far as possible, replicate the 
original dataset in their paper, the results presented here also serve as robustness check 
to their work. The conclusions drawn are in line with their overall claim that there is 
little evidence suggesting a robust positive correlation between aid and growth, holding 
everything else constant. I reach a similar conclusion when introducing additional 
covariates, and varying the empirical specifications.  
At face value, the results obtained for the coefficient of aid before introducing any 
interaction effects do not seem very optimistic. Yet, this claim should be regarded with 
care. First, as suggested in Rajan and Subramanian (2008), it may be that the noise in the 
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data is precluding one to establish the relationship between the variables of interest and 
growth. This is not the case in their study, they argue, but it is a possibility for some of 
the estimations in this chapter, especially when using IV methods.  
I acknowledge this as a limitation in the present analysis. In most of the model 
specifications considered, especially when using cross-country data, the regression 
models show a good explanatory power (between around 30% and 60%). However, the 
majority of the coefficients were not significant, which indicates that the model failed to 
distinguish between the effects of different growth determinants. One explanation for 
this is the limited sample size, due in particular to the lack of data availability for the two 
fragility indices, which results, in turn, from the limitations in the data available for the 
indicators used to build them. 
Still, the first of the aforementioned contributions has important implications for the 
allocation of aid to fragile states. If there is no evidence that, on average, aid will be less 
effective in fragile states, then the fears implicit in the aforementioned conundrum that 
aid will be squandered in these countries can be eased. However, it also highlights a 
limitation of this analysis, as development entails more than economic growth. The 
examination of the links between state fragility, aid, and other development outcomes 
(e.g. poverty reduction) is suggested as the object of future work. 
Two other extensions of this chapter follow naturally from the analysis. The first is 
suggested by the study by Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma and Devarajan (2011) and 
consists in examining whether the effects change when distinguishing between different 
samples of countries depending on their regions. Finally, as suggested in Figure 18 (in 
Section 5.3), there may be potential indirect effects of aid on growth, for instance, 
through the promotion of state effectiveness or political violence. I propose the 
examination of these links as another avenue for further research. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of state fragility is one that has proved extremely resonant in the policy 
discourse of development organisations over the last decade. Despite the profusion of – 
and lack of agreement in – the definitions used, this ubiquitous term is usually employed 
to describe situations in which the state lacks the capacity and/or willingness to fulfil 
what are perceived to be its core functions. According to these accounts, fragile states 
show a lagging performance in the achievement of development goals, and, more 
specifically, in reducing their high levels of poverty. They not only bear higher internal 
economic and human costs, but also impose a threat to international security and 
economic stability. These characteristics have been used as reasons to justify assistance 
to these countries.  
However, ensuring that development assistance is effective is particularly challenging in 
contexts where there is a deficiency in the performance of the state and/or high levels 
of political violence. According to a strand of the empirical literature examining the 
enduring question of aid effectiveness, the role of aid in promoting economic 
development is conditional on certain factors, namely the quality of institutions and the 
type of policies in the country, as well as the level of political violence. This is the 
quandary of development assistance to fragile states: it is perceived to be less effective 
in these countries, but they are also those in the greatest need. 
This thesis has engaged with this dilemma by examining the nexus between state 
fragility, development aid and economic growth. It started by throwing some light on the 
definition and operationalisation of the concept of state fragility; it then explored the 
links between state fragility, economic growth and aid effectiveness through the use of 
quantitative analysis. The following paragraphs highlight the main contributions and 
suggest some avenues for further research. 
The first part of this thesis engaged with the definition and measurement of state 
fragility, surveying the most commonly used conceptualisations and measures in order 
to identify the reasons behind the obscurity and murkiness of the term. In so doing, it 
unravelled a lack of theoretical grounding that undermines most of the existing 
approaches and found support to the claim that they muddle the distinction between 
causes and outcomes of state fragility. This is the first contribution of this thesis. 
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The second contribution of the thesis is that it suggests an alternative way of measuring 
the concept of state fragility. Against the backdrop set by the review of existing 
measures, the measurement approach proposed here does not make claims to be better 
in all aspects. Still, it is argued that it overcomes some of the criticisms that have been 
pointed to current measures of state fragility. More specifically, it is based on a sound 
theoretical framework, which establishes a normative standpoint for the role of the state 
and draws on Besley and Persson’s (2011a) model of state fragility to derive the two 
core dimensions of fragility: state ineffectiveness and political violence. This distinction 
follows a recent call for the use of multidimensional approaches to unpack the 
complexity of the term. Additionally, it found support in the exploratory cluster analysis 
in Chapter 3, which reveals the existence of patterns of countries according to the two 
dimensions.  
Furthermore, it helps make the concept of fragile states operational for further analysis 
by providing a continuous measure for both state ineffectiveness and political violence. 
This approach departs from previous studies adopting a dichotomous distinction 
between fragile and non-fragile states, and avoids the use of cut-off points which lack 
clear justification. The usefulness of this measurement approach is then demonstrated 
in two empirical exercises in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Part II of this thesis responds to the challenge of understanding the links between state 
fragility, development aid and economic development. The review of the empirical 
literature on the fragility-growth link highlighted that, despite the multitude of studies 
exploring similar relationships, only a handful of studies explicitly engaged with the 
cross-country evidence on the effects of state fragility on growth. In particular, most of 
these accounts were based on the CPIA as a proxy measure of state fragility and none of 
them considered the effects of distinct dimensions of fragility. The third contribution of 
this thesis is filling this gap in the literature by providing an empirical examination of 
this link with the use of cross-country and panel data for different periods. The results 
concurred to the view that one should look at the two dimensions separately. Not only 
do we observe distinct effects for each of the two dimensions, but one also fails to find 
any significant impact of state fragility on growth when employing a single index 
(obtained with the same variables employed in the construction of the two indices). 
The fourth contribution of the thesis is towards the empirical analysis of growth 
determinants and follows from the examination of the distinct effects of state 
ineffectiveness and political violence. Concerning the former, the results suggested that 
there is a negative and statistically significant effect of state ineffectiveness on economic 
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growth, which is robust to excluding outliers, adding new control variables, and taking 
the potential endogeneity of the two dimensions of state fragility into account. This has 
important implications for development policy. The recently published World 
Development Report 2017 (World Bank, 2017a) argues that improving governance is 
essential to overcome the challenges currently faced by developing countries. This 
analysis finds support to this view and contributes to a better understanding of the link 
between two of these challenges – state ineffectiveness and political violence – and one 
of the development objectives identified – promoting prosperity. Regarding political 
violence, the variation in the sign and significance level observed for the coefficient 
across specifications suggests that the complexity of its link with growth requires 
further investigation. 
The fifth and final contribution of the thesis is to add to our understanding of the 
effectiveness of aid in fragile states, and to whether donors really do face a quandary in 
these countries, due to higher levels of need but lower levels of effectiveness. Inspired 
in the tradition of cross-country studies on the impact of foreign aid on growth rates, 
Chapter 5 tested the proposition that aid is less effective in promoting growth in 
countries with higher levels of state ineffectiveness or with higher levels of political 
violence. The estimated coefficients for these interactions showed no evidence for any 
of these effects. To a certain degree, these results can help mitigate the concerns over 
aid towards these countries.  
However, the lack of significance of the coefficient for aid when no interaction effects are 
considered can also be discouraging for the aid donors. A secondary contribution offered 
by the analysis in Chapter 5 of this thesis is that it tests the robustness of the conclusions 
drawn by Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) study. The results presented here are in line 
with those obtained by this study, as I fail to find evidence of a positive and significant 
correlation between aid and growth. Still, this should not be taken as evidence that this 
effect does not exist. 
As pointed out by Rajan and Subramanian (2008), one explanation is that the 
background noise in the data prevents one from finding the effects predicted by theory, 
especially if they are small in magnitude. This is a possibility for some of the estimations 
presented in Chapter 5, and in particular when employing IV methods. As described in 
detail in that chapter, the instrumentation strategy pursued is not perfect, especially 
when considering interaction terms. I recognise this as a limitation of the analysis and 
suggest that future analysis with improved instrumentation techniques or alternative 
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approaches to overcoming endogeneity could help to a better understanding of these 
relationships. 
A further limitation of the empirical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 is their temporal 
restriction. Given that the construction of the indices for state ineffectiveness and 
political violence uses indicators that are only available from mid-1990s, the time 
horizon for the analysis is rather limited. For instance, if the effects of aid are only 
discernible in the long-run (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2015b), then this can explain why 
one fails to find evidence of any effect in this analysis. 
An additional gap in the empirical work in Chapters 4 and 5 is their exclusive focus on 
growth as the outcome of economic development. This simplification was useful for 
comparative purposes, as it allowed one to address the topic of state fragility within the 
empirical literature using cross-country growth regressions. Additionally, it is standard 
in the empirical literature that examining aid effectiveness equates to determining the 
effect of this variable on growth rates. Still, the exploration of the links between state 
fragility, aid, and other development outcomes, such as poverty reduction or the 
progress towards achieving other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is suggested 
as another possible object of future work. 
Three other avenues of research became apparent throughout the analysis in this thesis. 
Firstly, an interesting extension to Chapter 3 would be to investigate the causes of state 
fragility. This has been the object of study in other work (e.g. Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 
2012; Kodila-Tedika and Simplice, 2016), but in terms of the operationalisation of the 
concept suggested here, it has only been partially examined in Besley and Persson 
(2011c).  
Second, the analysis in Chapter 5 focused on the direct effects of aid on growth, but 
mentioned the existence of potential indirect effects through investments in state 
capacity and political violence. Even though I find no evidence of a direct effect of aid on 
growth, there might still be indirect effects which also depend on fragility. Thus, 
examining these links would further add to the understanding of the aid-fragility nexus.  
Finally, and also drawing from the analysis in Chapter 5, I suggest that the robustness 
check performed with the disaggregation of aid into different categories could be further 
explored. Due to data limitations and for comparability purposes, the two 
categorisations of aid employed in the chapter did not follow Besley and Persson’s 
(2011a) theoretical model. However, the hypotheses laid in their paper regarding the 
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distinct effects of cash aid, technical assistance, military assistance, and post-conflict 
assistance are an interesting starting point for further empirical investigation. 
The parallel between state fragility and the Anna Karenina principle described in Leo 
Tolstoy’s 1880s novel has been drawn in several accounts (namely in Besley and 
Persson, 2011a), and the quote “All happy families resemble each other; every unhappy 
family is unhappy in its own way” is often used to illustrate the concept of fragile states. 
This thesis has thrown some further light on this point by highlighting the 
multidimensionality of fragility and by suggesting, as well as applying, an alternative 
way of operationalising the definition empirically. Moreover, even if the policy dilemma 
of development assistance remains unsolved, this thesis has taken some further steps 
towards unravelling the effects of aid towards countries with higher levels of state 
fragility.    
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APPENDIX A. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2 
 
Appendix A1. Definitions of state fragility 
Table A1.1. Definitions used by selected major institutions within the donor community 
Institution Concept Definition 
World Bank Fragile states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragile and 
conflict affected 
situations (FCS) 
The World Bank adopted the term fragile states “in the interests of harmonization” (World Bank, 2005: 1) as corresponding to their definitions of Low Income 
Countries Under Stress (LICUS). “The Bank identifies fragile states by weak performance on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). They share 
a common fragility, in two particular aspects: 
 State policies and institutions are weak in these countries: making them vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to their citizens, to control 
corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability. 
 They face risks of conflict and political instability. (…)” (World Bank, 2005: 1). 
The CPIA considers 16 criteria, group in 4 clusters (economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector 
management and institutions) for rating countries on a scale from 1 to 6. A country is considered fragile if its score is equal to or below 3.2.  
Fragile situations are “[p]eriods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and 
between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence.” (World Bank, 2011b: xvi) "Fragile Situations" have: either a) a harmonized average CPIA 
country rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. (World Bank, 
2017b) 
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
Weakly 
performing 
countries (WPCs) 
“Many of the region’s poor people live in DMCs [developing member countries] that have weak governance, ineffective public administration and rule of law, 
and civil unrest. These countries have been referred to variously as WPCs, fragile states, low-income countries under stress (LICUS), and difficult partnership 
countries. Service delivery systems in such countries seldom function well, and the government’s ability to guarantee the basic security of its people is often 
limited. WPCs are more likely to experience large-scale and civil conflict than other low-income countries.” (Asian Development Bank, 2007: 1) 
“While WPCs may exhibit aspects of fragility, the primary focus on weak performance is consistent with the performance-based allocation systems of ADB, 
African Development Bank, and the LICUS approach of the World Bank.” (Asian Development Bank, 2007: 1) 
African 
Development 
Bank 
Fragile states “Fragility is an imbalance between the strains and challenges (internal and external) faced by a state and society and their ability to manage them. At the extreme, 
fragility is expressed as conflict or collapse of state functions. (…) Fragility is thus the opposite side of the coin to state resilience, which is the ability of the state 
to manage such strains through effective institutions, processes and capacities that build legitimacy and societal cohesion.” (African Development Bank, 2014: 
2) 
European 
Commission 
Situations of 
fragility 
“Fragility refers to weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken due to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its 
basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security 
and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens’ rights and freedoms.” (European Commission, 2007: 5) 
OECD Fragile states “A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with 
society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the 
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Table A1.1. Definitions used by selected major institutions within the donor community 
Institution Concept Definition 
capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and 
other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum.” [OECD (2012a) in 
OECD (2012: 15)] 
g7+ Fragile states “A state of fragility can be understood as a period of time during nationhood when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on 
complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of 
resources, and accountable and fair service delivery.” (g7+, 2013: 1) 
DFID Fragile states “Although most developing countries are fragile in some ways, DFID’s working definition of fragile states covers those where the government cannot or will not 
deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, 
safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people 
sustain themselves. DFID does not limit its definition of fragile states to those affected by conflict.” (DFID, 2005: 7) More  recently, the expression Fragile and 
Conflict Affected States (FCAS) has also been used. 
USAID Fragile states “USAID uses the term fragile states to refer generally to a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states. However, the distinction among them is not always 
clear in practice, as fragile states rarely travel a predictable path of failure and recovery, and the labels may mask substate and regional conditions (insurgencies, 
factions, etc.) that may be important factors in conflict and fragility. It is more important to understand how far and quickly a country is moving from or toward 
stability than it is to categorize a state as failed or not. Therefore, the strategy distinguishes between fragile states that are vulnerable from those that are already 
in crisis. 
USAID is using vulnerable to refer to those states unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of 
their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. 
USAID is using crisis to refer to those states where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to 
assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict 
is a reality or a great risk.” (USAID, 2005: 1) 
Canadian 
International 
Development 
Agency (CIDA) 
Fragile states “According to CIFP’s [Country Indicators for Foreign Policy] conceptualisation, the state is the primary unit of analysis and needs to exhibit the three fundamental 
properties of authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) to function properly (or to use the World Bank’s language – security, justice and jobs). Fragility measures 
the extent to which the actual characteristics of a state differ from their ideal situation; states are constrained by both internal and external forces that are 
constantly changing over time. Consequently, all states are, to some extent, fragile; weakness in one or more of the ALC dimensions will negatively impact the 
fragility of a particular country. In that sense, we need to consider not only the extreme cases of failing, failed and collapsed states but also the ones that have 
the potential to fail.” (Carment and Samy, 2012: 4) 
Notes: See Box 1 in Cammack et al. (2006: 17) for a more comprehensive list of working definitions of fragile states used by donor organisations. 
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Appendix B1. Data description 
 
Table B1.1. List of definitions, measures and data sources for the variables used in the analysis 
Symptom Dimension Proxy Definition Measure Data source 
St
at
e 
in
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
Contract 
enforcement 
Rule of law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules in society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
The aggregate measure ranges from around -
2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better outcomes. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank, 2015a) 
Regulatory quality Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. 
The aggregate measure ranges from around -
2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better outcomes. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank, 2015a) 
Enforcing contracts 
 
Measures the efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a 
commercial dispute. 
Represents the number of days to resolve a 
commercial sale dispute through the courts (in 
calendar days). 
Doing business 
(World Bank, 
2015b) 
Independence of 
the judiciary 
Captures the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control 
from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the 
military. 
A score of 0 indicates ‘not independent’, 1 
represents ‘partially independent’, while 2 
indicates ‘generally independent’. 
CIRI (Cingranelli, 
Richards and Clay, 
2014) 
Control of 
corruption 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
The aggregate measure ranges from around -
2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better outcomes. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank, 2015a) 
Protection of 
property 
Property rights 
enforcement 
Measures the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows 
individuals to freely accumulate private property, secured by clear 
laws that are enforced effectively by the government. 
The scale is formed by scores ranging from 0 to 
100 (0, 10, 20… 100), with the possibility of 
assigning intermediate scores, such as 75 or 45. 
Higher scores correspond to a more effective 
system of legal protection.  
Index of Economic 
Freedom (Miller et 
al., 2015) 
Public goods 
provision 
Government 
effectiveness 
 
Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
The aggregate measure ranges from around -
2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better outcomes. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank, 2015a) 
Government 
expenditure on 
education 
General government expenditure (current, capital, and transfers). It 
includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources 
to government. Measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP in that year. World Bank (World 
Bank, 2016) 
Public health 
expenditure  
Consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central 
and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP in that year. World Bank (World 
Bank, 2016) 
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Symptom Dimension Proxy Definition Measure Data source 
donations from international agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. 
Measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Access to improved 
water 
Percentage of the population using an improved drinking water 
source. The improved drinking water source includes piped water 
on premises (piped household water connection located inside the 
user’s dwelling, plot or yard), and other improved drinking water 
sources (public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, 
protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collection). 
Expressed as a percentage to the total 
population. 
World Bank (World 
Bank, 2016) 
Raising revenues Tax revenue Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central 
government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such 
as fines, penalties, and most social security contributions are 
excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax 
revenue are treated as negative revenue. Measured as a percentage 
of GDP. 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP in that year. World Bank (World 
Bank, 2016) 
Political authority Failure of state 
authority 
Refers to situations in which the institutions of the central state are 
weakened to the point that they can no longer maintain authority or 
political order in significant parts of the country. Examples of 
evidence include shut-downs of routine government services, failure 
of security forces and administrators to carry out any government 
directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the country, with 
attempts from rival militias, warlords, or local or regional authorities 
to establish autonomous zones of government, 
The scale ranges from 1 (adverse regime 
change with no significant weakening of state 
institutions or persistent collapse of public 
order) to 4 (complete collapse or near-total 
collapse of public order). A score of 0 was 
assigned a posteriori to periods with no regime 
change. 
Armed Conflict and 
Intervention, PITF 
(Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff, 2015) 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l v
io
le
n
ce
 
Repression Physical integrity The physical integrity rights index results from the addition of the 
scores for torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and 
disappearance indicators. 
Ranges from 0 (no government respect for 
these rights) to 8 (full government respect for 
these rights). 
CIRI (Cingranelli, 
Richards and Clay, 
2014) 
Empowerment 
rights 
The empowerment rights index results from the addition of the 
scores for foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers’ rights, 
electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion indicators. 
Ranges from 0 (no government respect for 
these rights) to 14 (full government respect for 
these rights). 
CIRI (Cingranelli, 
Richards and Clay, 
2014) 
Political terror 
scale 
Measures the level of political violence that a country experiences in 
a given year, based on the amount of violations of physical or 
personal integrity rights carried out by a state (or its agents). 
Uses a 5-point coding scheme, with higher 
levels representing higher levels of “terror”. 
Average value of the scores provided by 
Amnesty International, the U.S. State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, and Human Rights Watch’s World 
Reports.  
Political Terror Scale 
(Gibney et al., 2013) 
Civil conflict Major episodes of 
civil violence 
Total summed magnitudes of all societal major episodes of political 
violence involving the state in a certain year, namely episodes of civil 
violence, of civil warfare, of ethnic violence and of ethnic warfare. 
Total summed magnitudes of the four 
magnitude scores, each scaled from 1 (lowest) 
to 10 (highest) for each episode. A value of 0 
Armed Conflict and 
Intervention, MEPV 
(Marshall, 2015) 
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Symptom Dimension Proxy Definition Measure Data source 
was assigned a posteriori to periods with no 
episodes of civil violence. 
Armed conflict Number of armed conflicts defined as contested incompatibilities 
that concern government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of 
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. 
The number of internal and internationalised 
conflict events was considered, and a value of 0 
was assigned a posteriori to periods with no 
armed conflict. 
UCDP/PRIO 
(Gleditsch et al., 
2002; Petterson and 
Wallensteen, 2015) 
Coups d’état Total sum of successful coups and attempted (but ultimately 
unsuccessful coups d’état). 
Sum of the number of successful coups and of 
attempted coups d’état that occurred in the 
year of record. A value of 0 was assigned a 
posteriori to periods with no coups. 
Polity IV, Coups 
d’état  (Marshall and 
Ramsey Marshall, 
2015) 
Revolutionary wars Measures the annual magnitude of episodes of violent conflict 
between governments and politically organised groups (political 
challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to 
replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region. It is based on the 
average scores of number of rebel combatants or activists, annual 
number of fatalities related to fighting, and portion of country 
affected by fighting. 
Each of the magnitude scores ranges from 0 to 
4. All decimal averages are assigned to decimal 
scores of “0.5”. A score of -0.5 was assigned a 
posteriori to periods with no regime change. 
Higher vales correspond to higher magnitudes. 
Armed Conflict and 
Intervention, PITF 
(Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff, 2015) 
Ethnic wars Measures the annual magnitude of episodes of violent conflict 
between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other 
communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers 
seek major changes in their status. It is based on the average scores 
of number of rebel combatants or activists, annual number of 
fatalities related to fighting, and portion of country affected by 
fighting. 
Each of the magnitude scores ranges from 0 to 
4. All decimal averages are assigned to decimal 
scores of “0.5”. A score of -0.5 was assigned a 
posteriori to periods with no regime change. 
Higher vales correspond to higher magnitudes. 
Armed Conflict and 
Intervention, PITF 
(Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff, 2015) 
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Table B1.2. Correlation matrix 
 Rule law  Reg qual Enf cont Ind jud C corr Prop rig Gov eff Educ Health A water Tax rev Fail state Phys int Emp rig Pol terror Ep viol Ar conf Coups Rev war Eth war 
Rule law 1                    
Reg qual 0.8893 1                   
Enf cont -0.2485 -0.2443 1                  
Ind jud 0.7304 0.6089 -0.1085 1                 
C corr 0.9332 0.868 -0.2595 0.6612 1                
Prop rig 0.8922 0.8662 -0.1875 0.71 0.8651 1               
Gov eff 0.9294 0.9328 -0.2581 0.623 0.9324 0.8743 1              
Educ 0.2903 0.177 -0.0529 0.2561 0.3234 0.2703 0.27 1             
Health 0.5525 0.4128 -0.1142 0.499 0.516 0.5116 0.4548 0.5252 1            
A water 0.6352 0.5969 -0.1584 0.4124 0.5769 0.4832 0.6331 0.2457 0.4157 1           
Tax rev 0.3663 0.3488 -0.0703 0.3954 0.3642 0.3528 0.3677 0.4742 0.3648 0.3013 1          
Fail state -0.2229 -0.2279 0.0252 -0.1026 -0.1785 -0.11 -0.2288 0.0012 -0.0928 -0.2728 -0.0883 1         
Phys int 0.6364 0.5606 -0.128 0.5894 0.6034 0.5437 0.5444 0.2912 0.5112 0.3713 0.3889 -0.1124 1        
Emp rig 0.5482 0.5733 0.0412 0.6675 0.5241 0.5581 0.5077 0.1759 0.4677 0.2896 0.3937 -0.0736 0.6006 1       
Pol terror -0.6745 -0.6087 0.228 -0.5526 -0.6493 -0.5693 -0.6181 -0.2935 -0.5045 -0.4334 -0.3469 0.2565 -0.8456 -0.5462 1      
Ep civ viol -0.264 -0.2543 0.2408 -0.1662 -0.2565 -0.1195 -0.2453 -0.1934 -0.2651 -0.2673 -0.2263 0.3486 -0.527 -0.2148 0.5764 1     
Arm conf -0.1858 -0.2051 0.2093 -0.1187 -0.2027 -0.1178 -0.1717 -0.1663 -0.2381 -0.1912 -0.211 0.1332 -0.4778 -0.1828 0.4807 0.6948 1    
Coups -0.1372 -0.1159 0.113 -0.0867 -0.114 -0.0945 -0.1289 -0.0528 -0.1083 -0.1216 -0.0279 0.1982 -0.0861 -0.0493 0.1072 0.0733 0.0277 1   
Rev war -0.1756 -0.1305 0.2828 -0.1267 -0.148 -0.0861 -0.143 -0.0721 -0.1434 -0.1548 -0.1673 0.2395 -0.3005 -0.0995 0.3596 0.4479 0.3347 0.0627 1  
Eth war -0.2343 -0.2351 0.1261 -0.1423 -0.2262 -0.0877 -0.2174 -0.1619 -0.2289 -0.2371 -0.1718 0.3439 -0.4599 -0.2342 0.5284 0.7834 0.6007 0.0455 0.1354 1 
Notes: Values over 0.8 highlighted in bold. 
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Table B1.3. List of countries used in cluster analysis 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Un. Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
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Appendix B2. Alternatives tested with cluster analysis 
 
This section includes the main conclusions from a battery of alternatives tested with 
cluster analysis. The referred baseline dataset included: 
Table B2.1. Baseline dataset 
Symptom Elements Proxies 
State 
(in)effectiveness 
Contract enforcement Rule of law 
Regulatory quality 
Enforcing contracts 
Control of corruption 
Protection of property Property rights enforcement 
Public goods provision Government effectiveness 
Public spending on education 
Public health expenditure 
Access to improved water 
Raising revenue Tax revenue 
Political institutions Executive constraints 
Checks and balances 
Magnitude of regime change 
Political 
violence 
Repression Physical integrity 
Civil liberties 
Political terror scale 
Civil conflict Major episodes of civil violence 
Armed conflict 
Coups d’état 
Revolutionary wars 
Ethnic wars 
 
There are three main differences to the dataset used in the chapter: i) impendence of 
judiciary is not included; ii) executive constrains and checks and balances were added 
as proxies for the quality of political institutions; iii) magnitude of regime change is used 
instead of failure of state authority; and, finally, iv) civil liberties is included instead of 
empowerment rights. The sources of the remaining variables are described in Table B1.2 
in Appendix B1, but the sources for the remaining variables are: 
Table B2.2. List of definitions, measures and data sources for the additional variables 
Variable Definition Measure Data source 
Executive 
constraints 
Captures the extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-making 
powers of chief executives, whether 
individuals or collectivities. 
Seven-category scale, with higher values 
representing more constraints to 
executive authority.  
Polity IV  
(Marshall and 
Ramsey Marshall, 
2015) 
Checks and 
balances 
Captures the extent of which legislatures 
are competitively elected. 
Unitary increments are made according 
to different assessment criteria. Higher 
values correspond to higher levels of 
checks and balances. 
Database of 
Political 
Institutions 
(Keefer, 2013) 
Magnitude 
of regime 
change 
General score of the magnitude of a regime 
change, based on the scores of failure of 
state authority, collapse of democratic 
Each of the magnitude scores ranges 
from 1 to 4. All decimal averages are 
assigned to decimal scores of “0.5”. A 
score of 0 was assigned a posteriori to 
Armed Conflict 
and Intervention, 
PITF (Marshall, 
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Table B2.2. List of definitions, measures and data sources for the additional variables 
Variable Definition Measure Data source 
institutions, and violence associated with 
adverse regime changes. 
periods with no regime change. Higher 
vales correspond to higher magnitudes. 
Gurr and Harff, 
2015) 
Civil 
liberties 
Measures the score of a country in 15 civil 
liberties indicators, grouped into four 
subcategories: freedom of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy 
and individual rights. 
A country or territory is assigned a rating 
of 1 (highest) through 7 (lowest degree of 
freedom), based on the scores for each of 
the individual indicators.   
Freedom House 
(2015) 
  
The results presented in Table B2.3 were obtained by introducing different changes to 
the baseline dataset described above, and which ultimately lead to the dataset used in 
the cluster analysis included in the chapter. There were two main goals, which are 
represented by lines A and B: 
 Line ‘A) Preliminary analysis: inclusion of property rights’ examines the 
differences verified in the results obtained with cluster analysis including the 
variable ‘property rights’ and excluding from the dataset. 
 Line ‘B) Exclusion of political institutions variables’ examines the changes 
observed after dropping the variables ‘executive constraints’ and ‘checks and 
balances’. Line 1) discusses the results obtained after excluding these two 
variables from the baseline dataset (which includes property rights). The 
comparison between the dataset with and without these two variables is then 
applied at the same time as considering different modifications of the baseline 
dataset, namely: 1.1) ‘Empowerment rights’ replaces ‘civil liberties’ because the 
data source is more reliable; 1.2) ‘Failure of state authority’ replaces ‘magnitude 
of regime change’ because it better captures the degree of state authority, 
whereas the magnitude of regime change also includes violence; 1.3) 
‘Independence of judiciary’ is added to the analysis; 2) Baseline dataset with the 
substitutions in 1.1 and 1.2 made simultaneously; 3) Dataset used in 2 plus 
‘independence of judiciary’. 
In all the hypotheses considered, the initial steps followed to obtain balanced datasets 
(as described in section 3.4 of the chapter) led to the exclusion of the variables enforcing 
contracts, public spending on education and tax revenue. The criteria considered for the 
comparison of the results comprises: a) the optimum number of countries identified; b) 
the list of countries included in the clusters representing ‘more fragile states’; c) whether 
the observation of the mean values for each variable indicates that there is a 
differentiation between a cluster of countries that are ‘more fragile’ in terms of state 
effectiveness, and another for countries ‘more fragile’ in terms of political violence. 
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Table B2.3. Summary of conclusions from different alternatives considered in cluster analysis 
 Periods Conclusions 
1993-2002 2002-2003 Within group Overall 
A) Preliminary 
analysis: 
inclusion of 
property rights 
Dataset with and 
without property 
rights (‘Baseline 
dataset’) 
- Keeping property rights means losing seven countries (Bhutan, Comoros, Eritrea, Iraq, Liberia, Solomon Islands, and Sudan). 
- Differences in the position of countries. 
- Differentiation between the symptoms is less clear. 
- Same number of clusters. 
 
CONCLUSION: Keep property rights because loss in the number of countries is not significant, and it is closer to the design of the analysis. 
B) Exclusion of 
executive 
constraint an 
checks and 
balances 
1) Baseline 
dataset with and 
without the two 
variables   
4 clusters with PI and 3 without PI; 
roughly the same countries 
belonging to the clusters of more 
fragile states; no clear differentiation 
between the two dimensions. 
3 clusters in both cases; similar 
group of more fragile states; 
differentiation between the two 
dimensions visible with PI, but not as 
visible without PI. 
- Some alterations in 
terms of the optimum 
number of clusters. 
- Some changes in the 
clusters of more fragile 
states. 
- Variances in the 
differentiation between 
the dimensions. 
 
CONCLUSION: The 
substitution of variables 
leads to some changes in 
the obtained results. 
- Some alterations in terms of the 
optimum number of clusters. 
- In only 2 out of the 12 alternatives 
excluding the PI variables lead to 
very different clusters of countries. 
- The distinction between the two 
symptoms is not related to the 
inclusion or not of the PI variables. 
- Overall, the groups of countries 
belonging to the clusters of ‘more 
fragile’ and ‘less fragile’ are roughly 
the same. 
 
CONCLUSION: The optimum 
number of clusters is not fixed, and 
should be taken with caution. The 
clustering of countries does not 
suffer significant changes in most of 
the cases. The distinction of the two 
symptoms can only be seen in some 
cases, and is not linked with the 
inclusion or not of the PI variables. 
The groups of countries identified 
as ‘more fragile’ remains roughly 
the same across all the alternatives. 
1.1) Baseline 
dataset with 
‘empowerment 
rights’ 
4 clusters in both cases; roughly the 
same countries belonging to the 
cluster of more fragile states; no 
differentiation between the two 
dimensions in either case. 
3 clusters in both cases; roughly the 
same cluster with more fragile states; 
differentiation between the two 
dimensions visible with PI, but not as 
visible without PI. 
1.2) Baseline 
dataset with 
‘failure of state 
authority’ 
4 clusters with PI, but 3 without PI; 
roughly the same countries 
belonging to the cluster of more 
fragile states; no differentiation 
between the two dimensions. 
3 clusters in both cases; roughly the 
same cluster with more fragile states; 
differentiation visible in both cases. 
1.3) Baseline 
dataset plus 
‘independence of 
judiciary’ 
3 clusters with PI, but 4 without PI; 
some differences in the clusters of 
countries; no clear differentiation 
between the two dimensions. 
3 clusters in both cases; roughly the 
same cluster with more fragile states; 
differentiation visible in both cases. 
2) Baseline 
dataset with 
substitutions 1.1 
and 1.2 
4 clusters with PI, but 3 without PI; 
similar clusters of more fragile states, 
although with some differences 
(more countries without PI); 
differentiation between the two 
symptoms is not visible in either 
case. 
4 clusters with PI, but 3 without PI; 
different clusters of countries; 
differentiation between the two 
symptoms is clear with PI, but not 
without PI. 
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Table B2.3. Summary of conclusions from different alternatives considered in cluster analysis 
 Periods Conclusions 
1993-2002 2002-2003 Within group Overall 
3) Dataset in 2) 
plus 
‘independence of 
judiciary’ 
3 clusters with PI and 4 clusters 
without PI; similar lists of more 
fragile includes more countries with 
PI; differentiation between the two 
symptoms is not visible in either 
case. 
3 clusters in both cases; similar list in 
the cluster of more fragile countries; 
differentiation between the two 
symptoms is visible in both cases. 
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Appendix B3. Scores obtained with PCA: additional tables 
 
Table B3.1. Annual scores for the state effectiveness index 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
American Samoa 
Andorra 
Angola 
Anguilla 
Antigua & Bermuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Islands 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Cook Islands 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
French Guiana 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Greenland 
Grenada 
Guam 
 
-1.40 
-1.38 
 
 
-3.95 
 
 
1.17 
-0.93 
 
4.49 
5.05 
-3.11 
 
0.36 
-2.67 
 
-1.57 
4.44 
 
-0.47 
 
 
-0.16 
 
2.23 
-0.08 
 
-0.48 
-1.79 
 
 
-3.13 
4.99 
 
 
 
 
3.02 
-1.82 
-0.43 
 
 
 
 
2.10 
-1.03 
0.07 
-2.35 
2.79 
3.10 
5.38 
 
 
-1.25 
-0.85 
-0.35 
-0.78 
 
 
2.65 
-3.39 
1.11 
5.15 
4.00 
 
-0.84 
 
-2.71 
5.04 
-0.29 
2.40 
 
 
 
 
-1.55 
-1.49 
 
 
-3.54 
 
 
1.03 
-0.89 
 
4.56 
4.83 
-2.82 
 
0.55 
-1.99 
 
-2.16 
4.23 
 
-0.40 
 
 
0.28 
 
2.12 
0.01 
 
-0.06 
-1.72 
-3.44 
-3.34 
-2.91 
5.06 
 
 
 
-3.33 
2.65 
-1.99 
-0.14 
 
 
-3.35 
 
2.45 
-1.41 
-0.39 
-2.09 
2.70 
2.80 
5.42 
 
 
-1.29 
-0.85 
-0.28 
-0.15 
 
 
2.92 
-3.00 
0.87 
5.33 
3.95 
 
-0.62 
-0.23 
-2.59 
5.05 
-0.39 
2.67 
 
 
 
 
-1.53 
-1.37 
 
 
-3.57 
 
 
0.83 
-0.94 
 
4.77 
4.80 
-2.99 
 
0.60 
-2.33 
 
-2.17 
4.39 
 
-0.40 
 
 
-0.35 
 
2.24 
-0.01 
 
0.04 
-1.39 
-3.17 
-3.02 
-3.01 
4.99 
 
 
 
-3.02 
3.41 
-2.28 
-0.26 
 
 
-2.96 
 
2.29 
-2.65 
0.69 
-1.88 
2.95 
2.47 
5.45 
 
 
-0.98 
-1.83 
-0.70 
0.00 
 
 
3.03 
-2.41 
-0.88 
5.40 
4.03 
 
-0.62 
-0.91 
-1.61 
5.04 
-0.22 
2.69 
 
 
 
 
-1.02 
-1.38 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.37 
-0.56 
 
4.58 
4.93 
-2.72 
 
1.06 
-2.62 
 
-2.43 
4.51 
 
-1.11 
 
 
-0.58 
-1.07 
2.29 
0.07 
 
0.89 
-1.80 
 
-2.68 
-2.87 
4.94 
 
 
-2.38 
-2.90 
3.74 
-2.49 
-0.50 
 
 
-2.60 
 
2.29 
-2.40 
0.78 
-1.91 
3.26 
3.03 
5.53 
 
 
-0.93 
-1.84 
-1.04 
-0.10 
 
 
2.84 
-3.04 
0.43 
5.44 
3.94 
 
-0.57 
-0.74 
-2.03 
4.85 
-0.59 
2.16 
 
 
 
 
-1.09 
-1.59 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.41 
-0.44 
 
4.67 
4.88 
-2.74 
 
1.15 
-3.21 
 
-2.26 
4.63 
 
-1.13 
 
 
-1.00 
-0.82 
2.39 
0.07 
 
0.77 
-1.47 
 
-2.94 
-2.76 
5.05 
1.09 
 
-3.51 
-3.28 
3.19 
-2.33 
-0.50 
 
 
-2.62 
 
2.33 
-2.79 
0.81 
-1.99 
3.11 
3.10 
5.71 
-1.99 
 
-1.25 
-1.78 
-1.03 
-0.33 
-3.93 
 
3.12 
-2.89 
0.28 
5.47 
4.01 
 
-0.57 
-0.29 
-1.68 
4.62 
-0.28 
2.10 
 
 
 
 
-0.72 
-1.26 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.55 
-0.56 
 
4.97 
4.94 
-2.69 
 
1.11 
-3.28 
 
-2.52 
4.57 
 
-1.04 
 
 
-0.97 
-0.69 
2.31 
-0.05 
 
0.56 
-1.35 
 
-2.90 
-2.75 
5.01 
1.18 
 
-3.28 
-3.73 
3.60 
-2.31 
-0.59 
 
 
-2.26 
 
1.90 
-2.97 
0.98 
-2.11 
3.08 
2.76 
5.83 
-1.51 
 
-1.36 
-1.52 
-1.10 
-0.13 
-4.25 
 
3.12 
-2.79 
0.18 
5.53 
4.12 
 
-1.09 
-0.55 
-1.38 
4.59 
-0.21 
2.25 
 
 
 
 
-0.86 
-1.98 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.15 
-0.70 
 
4.73 
4.93 
-2.57 
 
0.84 
-3.15 
 
-2.38 
4.45 
 
-1.54 
 
 
-1.16 
-0.75 
2.48 
-0.24 
 
0.52 
-1.24 
 
-3.07 
-3.23 
4.82 
0.92 
 
-3.51 
-3.59 
3.64 
-2.39 
-0.44 
 
 
-2.65 
 
2.05 
-3.56 
0.98 
-1.91 
3.15 
2.48 
5.59 
-1.67 
 
-1.05 
-1.88 
-0.95 
-0.21 
-4.27 
 
3.14 
-3.04 
0.28 
5.35 
4.14 
 
-1.25 
-1.04 
-1.65 
4.78 
-0.06 
1.73 
 
 
 
 
-1.15 
-2.24 
 
 
-3.38 
 
 
-0.19 
-0.72 
 
4.85 
4.97 
-2.57 
 
0.73 
-3.02 
 
-2.66 
4.35 
 
-1.66 
 
 
-1.55 
-0.64 
2.14 
-0.34 
 
0.30 
-1.55 
-2.94 
-3.07 
-3.05 
4.97 
1.84 
 
-3.32 
-4.05 
3.58 
-2.12 
-0.82 
 
 
-3.22 
 
1.90 
-3.93 
1.07 
-1.85 
3.31 
2.52 
5.86 
-1.64 
 
-1.36 
-2.42 
-1.56 
-0.47 
-4.18 
 
3.20 
-2.53 
-0.55 
5.39 
4.14 
 
-1.79 
-1.29 
-0.83 
4.92 
0.01 
1.58 
 
 
 
 
-0.98 
-1.98 
 
 
-3.80 
 
 
-0.11 
-1.38 
 
4.92 
5.07 
-2.75 
 
0.71 
-3.54 
 
-2.48 
4.25 
 
-1.60 
 
 
-1.16 
-0.77 
2.18 
-0.22 
 
0.35 
-1.20 
-2.91 
-3.08 
-2.84 
4.85 
1.78 
 
-3.68 
-3.82 
3.70 
-2.25 
-0.54 
 
 
-3.34 
 
1.90 
-3.66 
1.44 
-1.14 
3.42 
2.11 
5.68 
-1.41 
 
-1.27 
-1.93 
-1.61 
-0.71 
 
 
3.39 
-2.21 
-1.44 
5.16 
4.11 
 
-1.82 
-1.17 
-1.05 
4.90 
0.26 
1.49 
 
 
 
 
-0.65 
-1.61 
 
 
-3.68 
 
 
-0.77 
-1.43 
 
4.86 
5.03 
-2.47 
 
1.17 
-2.95 
 
-2.45 
4.20 
 
-1.81 
 
 
-1.88 
-0.83 
2.07 
-0.63 
 
0.36 
-1.07 
-3.06 
-2.95 
-3.31 
4.85 
1.67 
 
-3.39 
-4.61 
3.42 
-2.10 
-0.44 
 
 
-3.32 
 
1.86 
-3.41 
1.24 
-1.51 
3.58 
2.26 
5.68 
-0.62 
 
-1.99 
-1.95 
-1.66 
-0.46 
 
 
3.71 
-2.52 
-1.44 
5.22 
4.05 
 
-2.08 
-1.54 
-0.47 
4.75 
-0.05 
1.40 
 
 
 
 
-0.55 
-1.47 
 
 
-3.72 
 
 
-0.94 
-1.28 
 
4.91 
4.82 
-2.63 
 
1.28 
-2.95 
 
-2.51 
4.38 
 
-1.72 
 
0.51 
-1.54 
-0.40 
2.26 
-0.47 
 
0.41 
-1.11 
-2.71 
-2.92 
-2.84 
5.30 
1.71 
 
-3.39 
-3.93 
3.50 
-2.12 
-0.42 
-2.22 
-4.25 
-3.16 
 
2.15 
-3.28 
1.28 
-1.38 
3.60 
2.83 
5.82 
-0.63 
 
-2.01 
-2.02 
-1.52 
-0.25 
 
 
3.80 
-2.53 
-1.88 
5.47 
4.24 
 
-1.91 
-1.62 
-0.70 
4.94 
0.04 
1.51 
 
 
 
 
-0.50 
-1.66 
 
 
-3.57 
 
 
-0.91 
-1.45 
 
4.86 
5.00 
-2.88 
 
0.84 
-2.92 
 
-2.58 
4.37 
 
-1.45 
 
0.68 
-1.66 
-0.40 
2.37 
-0.16 
 
0.01 
-0.86 
-2.78 
-2.82 
-2.95 
5.16 
1.59 
 
-3.33 
-3.64 
3.78 
-2.13 
-0.30 
-1.77 
-4.53 
-2.99 
 
2.36 
-3.62 
1.61 
-1.53 
3.52 
2.75 
5.82 
-0.74 
 
-1.89 
-2.21 
-1.64 
-0.18 
 
 
3.63 
-2.60 
-1.78 
5.36 
4.33 
 
-1.48 
-1.73 
-0.43 
4.85 
0.00 
1.70 
 
 
 
 
-0.69 
-1.75 
 
 
-3.64 
 
 
-0.48 
-1.24 
 
5.07 
4.83 
-2.81 
 
0.26 
-2.78 
 
-2.55 
4.54 
 
-1.24 
 
0.77 
-1.70 
-0.18 
2.34 
0.16 
 
-0.13 
-1.25 
-2.70 
-2.66 
-2.79 
5.07 
1.72 
 
-3.06 
-3.84 
3.52 
-2.17 
0.37 
 
-4.82 
-2.60 
 
1.78 
-3.40 
1.86 
-1.52 
3.31 
3.16 
5.79 
-1.63 
 
-1.98 
-2.30 
-1.39 
-0.41 
 
 
3.62 
-2.23 
-1.36 
5.38 
4.24 
 
-0.99 
-1.61 
-0.01 
4.85 
-0.01 
1.20 
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Table B3.1. Annual scores for the state effectiveness index 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jersey, Channel Isl. 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Martinique 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
N. Antilles 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
-1.16 
-3.37 
 
0.36 
-3.26 
-1.13 
 
3.04 
 
0.65 
-2.05 
-3.05 
-4.54 
4.50 
3.40 
2.87 
1.25 
3.58 
 
1.09 
 
-2.15 
 
 
1.32 
 
0.87 
 
-2.76 
0.83 
 
0.14 
 
-3.96 
 
1.81 
5.06 
 
 
-1.17 
-1.04 
1.25 
 
-1.01 
 
 
 
-1.36 
 
-0.57 
 
1.05 
 
0.72 
 
-0.35 
-2.20 
-3.73 
 
 
-0.83 
5.15 
 
 
5.26 
-1.12 
-3.39 
-3.47 
 
5.40 
0.50 
-1.35 
 
0.52 
-0.86 
-1.17 
-0.22 
0.74 
 
3.77 
 
-0.85 
-2.92 
 
0.40 
-3.38 
-0.73 
 
3.01 
 
0.50 
-2.01 
-3.15 
-4.73 
4.61 
2.63 
2.93 
1.05 
3.72 
 
0.81 
-1.84 
-2.17 
 
 
1.51 
 
1.14 
-1.26 
-3.11 
1.12 
 
 
 
-4.14 
 
1.95 
4.98 
 
 
-1.37 
-0.62 
0.81 
 
-1.33 
 
 
 
-1.49 
 
-0.24 
 
0.73 
 
0.26 
 
-0.23 
-2.17 
-3.88 
1.40 
 
-0.95 
5.23 
 
 
5.28 
-1.15 
-2.54 
-3.18 
 
5.52 
0.30 
 
 
1.04 
-0.95 
-1.91 
-0.08 
0.91 
 
3.65 
 
-0.97 
-2.99 
-3.25 
0.09 
-3.92 
-0.72 
 
2.99 
 
0.66 
-1.83 
-2.97 
-5.29 
4.60 
2.49 
3.04 
0.92 
4.00 
 
0.58 
-2.35 
-2.24 
 
 
1.68 
 
1.00 
-1.92 
-3.81 
1.22 
 
0.49 
 
-3.84 
 
1.67 
5.30 
 
 
-0.91 
-0.55 
0.79 
 
-1.00 
 
 
 
-1.38 
2.16 
-0.28 
 
-0.36 
 
0.03 
 
-0.72 
-2.15 
-3.81 
1.34 
 
-1.24 
5.29 
 
 
5.13 
-1.04 
-2.17 
-3.33 
 
5.16 
0.46 
-2.71 
 
0.85 
-0.91 
-2.38 
-0.48 
0.17 
 
3.53 
 
-1.20 
-2.79 
-2.75 
-0.08 
-4.15 
-0.88 
 
2.98 
 
0.25 
-2.49 
-2.91 
-5.13 
4.62 
2.76 
2.90 
0.27 
3.19 
 
0.21 
-2.39 
-2.38 
 
 
1.76 
 
1.20 
-1.83 
-3.82 
1.43 
-0.66 
0.61 
 
 
 
2.06 
5.43 
 
-0.17 
-1.35 
-1.19 
0.71 
 
-0.81 
 
 
 
-0.86 
2.31 
-0.14 
 
-0.52 
 
0.24 
 
-0.92 
-1.81 
-4.00 
0.98 
 
-2.03 
5.13 
 
 
5.10 
-1.05 
-2.03 
-3.32 
 
5.32 
0.94 
-2.66 
 
0.80 
 
-1.98 
-0.85 
-0.03 
 
3.71 
 
-1.24 
-2.65 
-3.34 
-0.24 
-4.28 
-0.92 
 
3.06 
 
0.48 
-2.64 
-2.67 
 
4.43 
2.78 
2.94 
0.15 
3.60 
 
0.60 
-2.17 
-2.21 
 
 
2.11 
 
1.01 
-2.46 
-4.25 
1.71 
-0.87 
0.41 
 
 
 
2.23 
5.15 
 
0.10 
-0.94 
-0.95 
0.82 
 
-0.80 
 
 
 
-1.55 
2.50 
-0.17 
 
-0.81 
 
-0.20 
 
-1.38 
-2.00 
-4.47 
1.33 
 
-1.46 
5.18 
 
 
5.18 
-0.91 
-2.07 
-3.19 
 
5.40 
0.77 
-2.70 
 
0.39 
 
-1.91 
-0.91 
-0.20 
 
3.67 
 
-1.09 
-2.81 
-2.70 
-0.28 
-4.15 
-1.17 
 
2.95 
 
0.50 
-2.41 
 
 
4.36 
2.65 
2.87 
0.34 
3.85 
 
0.50 
-2.25 
-1.77 
 
 
2.15 
 
0.72 
-2.03 
-3.94 
1.69 
-0.82 
0.40 
 
 
 
2.25 
5.29 
 
0.47 
-0.98 
-0.60 
0.74 
 
-0.69 
 
 
 
-1.46 
2.20 
-0.15 
 
-0.78 
 
-0.44 
 
-1.33 
-2.39 
-4.70 
1.12 
 
-1.88 
5.23 
 
 
5.34 
-0.76 
-2.01 
-2.84 
 
5.47 
1.03 
-2.21 
 
0.51 
 
-1.81 
-0.45 
-0.93 
 
3.64 
 
-1.34 
-2.91 
-2.83 
-0.41 
-4.09 
-1.23 
 
3.01 
 
0.38 
-2.26 
-2.88 
 
4.60 
2.42 
2.66 
0.21 
3.95 
 
0.43 
-1.63 
-2.42 
 
 
2.37 
 
0.93 
-1.95 
-3.72 
1.56 
-0.70 
0.36 
 
 
 
2.10 
4.98 
 
-0.16 
-1.50 
-0.24 
0.31 
 
-1.43 
 
 
 
-2.64 
2.19 
-0.30 
 
-0.63 
 
-0.60 
 
-1.81 
-1.75 
-4.22 
0.59 
 
-2.15 
5.23 
 
 
5.15 
-0.95 
-2.17 
-3.46 
 
5.24 
0.02 
-2.25 
 
0.07 
 
-1.80 
-0.52 
-0.70 
 
3.64 
 
-1.75 
-3.67 
-3.04 
-0.51 
-3.40 
-1.63 
 
3.10 
 
0.53 
-1.70 
 
 
4.75 
2.75 
2.03 
0.02 
4.18 
 
0.44 
-1.98 
-2.20 
 
 
2.30 
 
0.65 
-2.45 
-3.86 
1.81 
-1.34 
0.30 
 
 
 
2.05 
5.00 
 
-0.45 
-1.42 
-0.26 
0.72 
 
-1.49 
 
 
 
-2.45 
2.06 
-0.24 
 
-0.90 
 
-0.96 
 
-1.53 
-2.17 
-4.45 
0.55 
 
-1.88 
5.39 
 
 
5.21 
-1.40 
-2.17 
-3.12 
 
5.29 
0.65 
-1.94 
 
0.26 
 
-2.33 
-0.48 
-1.16 
 
3.33 
 
-1.55 
-3.74 
-2.77 
-0.11 
-3.34 
-1.54 
 
2.85 
 
0.37 
-1.94 
-3.24 
 
4.65 
2.45 
1.67 
0.44 
3.98 
 
0.48 
-2.26 
-2.63 
 
 
2.55 
 
0.50 
-1.85 
-3.34 
1.66 
-1.58 
0.07 
 
 
 
2.14 
4.98 
 
-0.03 
-1.16 
-0.38 
0.30 
 
-0.92 
 
 
 
-1.97 
2.02 
0.07 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.97 
 
-1.67 
-2.28 
-4.47 
0.58 
 
-1.89 
5.41 
 
 
5.22 
-1.31 
-2.01 
-2.95 
 
5.27 
0.87 
-1.95 
 
0.52 
 
-2.15 
-0.15 
-1.13 
 
3.35 
 
-1.44 
-3.76 
-3.52 
0.11 
-3.18 
-1.70 
 
2.81 
 
0.28 
-2.02 
-3.36 
 
4.71 
2.22 
1.81 
0.29 
4.01 
 
0.43 
-1.97 
-2.69 
 
 
2.18 
 
0.47 
-1.60 
-2.84 
1.43 
-1.15 
0.37 
 
 
 
2.05 
5.07 
 
0.27 
-1.56 
-0.20 
0.01 
 
-1.55 
 
 
 
-3.50 
2.13 
-0.49 
 
-0.86 
 
-1.11 
 
-1.60 
-2.28 
-4.40 
0.95 
 
-2.14 
5.31 
 
 
5.43 
-1.78 
-2.15 
-2.84 
 
5.07 
0.97 
-2.12 
 
0.60 
 
-1.97 
-0.11 
-1.24 
 
3.39 
 
-1.39 
-3.95 
-3.54 
0.01 
-3.20 
-2.03 
 
2.70 
 
0.31 
-2.19 
-3.38 
 
4.77 
2.17 
1.54 
-0.04 
4.10 
 
0.09 
-1.89 
-2.69 
 
 
2.49 
 
0.73 
-1.95 
-2.93 
1.74 
-1.42 
0.18 
-2.45 
 
 
2.17 
5.11 
 
0.38 
-2.65 
0.38 
0.23 
 
-1.46 
 
 
 
-2.63 
2.20 
-0.38 
 
-1.10 
 
-0.83 
0.38 
-1.38 
-2.14 
-4.38 
0.97 
 
-2.05 
5.37 
 
 
5.68 
-1.71 
-2.10 
-2.83 
 
5.30 
1.19 
-2.15 
 
0.40 
-2.12 
-1.45 
-0.33 
-1.19 
 
3.48 
 
-0.87 
-3.24 
-3.12 
0.11 
-3.78 
-1.66 
 
2.55 
 
-0.29 
-2.01 
-3.41 
 
4.63 
2.31 
1.86 
-0.31 
4.18 
 
-0.20 
-1.98 
-2.62 
 
 
2.73 
 
0.51 
-1.89 
-2.67 
2.00 
-1.31 
0.64 
-2.41 
 
 
2.31 
5.05 
 
-0.02 
-2.95 
0.19 
0.48 
 
-1.56 
 
 
 
-2.46 
2.28 
-0.40 
 
-0.99 
 
-0.74 
0.56 
-1.24 
-2.18 
-4.58 
0.83 
 
-2.38 
5.46 
 
 
5.63 
-1.88 
-2.26 
-3.28 
 
5.32 
1.16 
-2.26 
 
0.06 
-2.02 
-1.43 
-0.26 
-1.23 
 
3.27 
 
-1.31 
-3.63 
-2.95 
-0.37 
-4.03 
-1.51 
 
2.52 
 
-0.57 
-2.08 
-3.27 
 
4.46 
2.49 
1.69 
-0.07 
4.24 
 
0.25 
-1.99 
-2.54 
 
 
2.67 
 
0.28 
-1.92 
-2.65 
1.47 
-1.55 
0.92 
-1.53 
 
 
2.25 
5.13 
 
-0.17 
-2.59 
0.01 
0.46 
 
-1.39 
 
 
 
-2.69 
2.26 
-0.30 
 
-0.82 
 
-0.68 
0.14 
-1.45 
-2.24 
-4.27 
0.79 
 
-1.83 
5.57 
 
 
5.71 
-1.93 
-1.74 
-3.18 
 
5.36 
0.22 
-2.29 
 
0.87 
-1.78 
-1.28 
-0.36 
-0.80 
 
3.21 
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Table B3.1. Annual scores for the state effectiveness index 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Qatar 
Réunion 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
San Marino 
S. Tome & Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent &  Gren. 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Un. Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Virgin Islands 
West Bank & Gaza 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
-0.39 
-0.57 
 
 
 
 
-0.37 
-0.18 
 
 
-3.43 
3.54 
1.68 
 
 
 
1.49 
 
3.46 
-0.03 
 
 
 
-3.62 
 
-0.55 
4.94 
4.68 
-2.15 
 
 
-1.77 
0.80 
 
 
 
2.25 
-0.39 
0.26 
 
 
-1.03 
-1.00 
1.77 
4.91 
4.53 
2.54 
 
 
-1.43 
-2.40 
 
 
-2.63 
-1.49 
 
 
 
-0.57 
-1.45 
-3.08 
 
 
 
-0.38 
-0.79 
 
 
 
3.72 
1.67 
3.61 
 
 
0.95 
 
3.72 
0.02 
 
 
 
-3.48 
 
-1.01 
4.89 
5.17 
-2.37 
 
-3.46 
-1.79 
0.80 
 
 
 
2.31 
-0.61 
0.20 
-2.98 
 
-0.85 
-1.68 
1.28 
4.92 
4.58 
2.44 
-2.85 
 
-1.20 
-2.45 
 
 
-2.89 
-1.21 
 
 
 
-0.63 
-0.99 
-3.03 
 
 
 
-0.64 
-0.39 
 
 
 
3.62 
1.42 
2.98 
 
 
1.20 
 
3.73 
0.09 
 
 
 
-3.55 
 
-1.22 
4.90 
5.16 
-2.42 
 
-3.47 
-1.84 
0.70 
 
-2.79 
 
2.23 
-0.67 
0.10 
-3.18 
 
-1.52 
-1.61 
1.38 
4.78 
4.67 
2.56 
-2.75 
 
-1.03 
-2.57 
 
 
-3.28 
-1.14 
 
 
 
-0.36 
-0.88 
-2.39 
 
 
 
-0.43 
-0.21 
 
 
 
3.43 
1.52 
2.97 
 
 
1.21 
 
3.48 
0.59 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.19 
5.31 
5.03 
-1.87 
 
-3.45 
-1.96 
0.62 
 
-2.96 
 
1.77 
-0.14 
-0.43 
-3.51 
 
-1.41 
-1.38 
1.45 
4.75 
4.63 
2.69 
-3.02 
 
-2.45 
-2.60 
 
 
-3.24 
-0.94 
 
1.21 
 
-0.17 
-1.12 
-2.30 
 
 
 
-0.43 
-0.37 
 
 
-2.95 
3.52 
1.86 
2.91 
 
 
1.21 
 
3.45 
0.51 
 
 
 
 
0.19 
-1.42 
5.35 
4.91 
-2.15 
 
-3.17 
-2.09 
0.59 
 
-3.12 
 
1.72 
-0.45 
-0.08 
-3.80 
 
-1.33 
-1.44 
1.25 
4.84 
4.55 
2.46 
-3.01 
 
 
-2.55 
 
 
-3.22 
-0.95 
 
1.17 
 
-0.33 
-1.18 
-2.24 
 
 
 
-0.67 
-0.12 
 
 
-2.63 
3.52 
2.16 
3.04 
 
 
1.29 
 
3.42 
0.23 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
-1.62 
5.44 
5.03 
-2.18 
 
-3.10 
-1.99 
0.30 
 
-3.28 
 
1.46 
-0.37 
0.23 
-3.99 
 
-1.31 
-1.28 
1.25 
4.88 
4.30 
2.15 
-2.98 
 
-2.64 
-2.69 
 
 
-3.34 
-1.41 
 
1.04 
 
-0.27 
-1.21 
-2.11 
 
 
 
-0.88 
-0.35 
 
 
-2.83 
3.80 
2.40 
2.88 
 
 
1.20 
 
3.33 
-0.03 
 
 
 
 
0.54 
-1.61 
5.08 
4.88 
-2.31 
 
-3.11 
-2.01 
-0.01 
 
-4.03 
 
1.28 
-0.52 
0.31 
-4.38 
 
-1.83 
-1.39 
0.85 
4.44 
4.15 
2.40 
-3.82 
 
-2.63 
-2.34 
 
 
-3.16 
-1.68 
 
1.16 
 
-0.19 
-1.42 
-1.55 
 
 
 
-0.59 
-1.09 
 
 
-2.86 
3.43 
2.01 
2.93 
 
 
1.16 
 
2.93 
0.09 
 
 
 
 
-0.05 
-1.10 
5.12 
4.89 
-3.04 
 
-3.03 
-1.78 
-0.77 
 
-3.33 
 
0.73 
-0.40 
0.41 
-4.51 
 
-1.55 
-1.39 
0.89 
4.88 
4.14 
2.65 
-3.29 
 
-2.81 
-2.33 
 
 
-2.94 
-1.40 
 
0.71 
 
-0.17 
-1.63 
-1.05 
 
 
 
-1.02 
-1.02 
 
 
-2.82 
3.37 
1.87 
2.93 
 
 
0.29 
 
2.88 
-0.17 
 
 
 
 
-0.08 
-1.31 
5.21 
4.82 
-3.02 
 
-3.18 
-1.74 
-0.09 
 
-3.25 
 
1.21 
-0.52 
0.10 
-4.45 
 
-1.96 
-1.60 
0.71 
4.69 
4.21 
2.77 
-3.13 
 
-3.07 
-2.24 
 
 
-2.92 
-1.50 
 
1.36 
 
-0.23 
-1.98 
-0.86 
 
 
 
-1.05 
-0.77 
 
 
-2.80 
3.43 
1.95 
3.07 
 
 
0.40 
 
3.05 
-0.66 
 
 
 
 
0.52 
-1.17 
5.24 
4.86 
-3.08 
 
-3.20 
-2.05 
-0.08 
 
-2.87 
 
0.87 
-0.71 
-0.02 
-4.38 
 
-2.09 
-1.66 
0.41 
4.68 
4.36 
2.80 
-2.58 
 
 
-2.48 
 
 
-3.20 
-1.44 
 
1.82 
 
 
-1.96 
-0.80 
 
 
 
-1.28 
-1.44 
0.01 
 
 
3.40 
1.61 
3.56 
-0.44 
 
0.42 
 
3.15 
-0.86 
 
 
 
 
0.06 
-1.13 
5.41 
4.94 
-2.86 
 
-3.11 
-1.87 
-0.39 
-1.72 
-2.78 
 
1.01 
-0.57 
0.31 
-4.38 
 
-2.45 
-1.62 
0.52 
4.65 
4.22 
2.89 
-3.30 
 
 
-2.14 
 
 
-3.50 
-1.72 
 
1.87 
 
 
-2.08 
-0.49 
 
 
 
-1.02 
-1.58 
0.05 
 
-2.51 
3.37 
1.64 
3.26 
-0.06 
 
0.43 
 
3.33 
-1.92 
 
 
 
 
0.30 
-1.00 
5.43 
5.07 
-2.94 
 
-2.96 
-2.04 
-0.36 
-1.76 
-2.99 
 
0.84 
-0.72 
0.81 
-4.47 
 
-2.28 
-1.51 
0.44 
4.82 
4.28 
2.94 
-3.32 
 
 
-2.12 
 
 
-3.74 
-2.22 
 
1.48 
 
 
-2.15 
-0.41 
 
 
 
-1.52 
-1.31 
0.45 
 
-2.32 
3.78 
1.56 
3.27 
0.14 
 
0.99 
 
3.29 
-1.81 
 
 
 
 
0.30 
-1.52 
5.39 
4.98 
-2.38 
 
-2.90 
-2.19 
-0.10 
-2.20 
-2.80 
 
0.82 
-0.48 
0.76 
-4.52 
 
-1.65 
-1.65 
0.70 
4.79 
4.21 
2.58 
-3.44 
 
 
-2.08 
 
 
-3.79 
-1.48 
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Table B3.2. Annual scores for the political violence index 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
American Samoa 
Andorra 
Angola 
Anguilla 
Antigua & Bermuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Islands 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Cook Islands 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
French Guiana 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Greenland 
Grenada 
Guam 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
 
-0.31 
4.57 
 
 
5.81 
 
 
-0.65 
-0.54 
 
-1.34 
-1.54 
2.16 
 
0.06 
-0.26 
 
-0.42 
-1.53 
 
-1.49 
 
 
-1.08 
 
-1.30 
-0.03 
 
-0.36 
-0.99 
 
 
-0.17 
-1.54 
 
 
 
 
-0.68 
2.43 
4.57 
 
 
 
 
-1.30 
-0.15 
-0.75 
-0.07 
-1.09 
-1.55 
-1.58 
 
 
-0.31 
-0.62 
2.45 
-0.66 
 
 
-1.25 
1.65 
-1.32 
-1.54 
-1.35 
 
-0.88 
 
-0.11 
-1.57 
-1.10 
-0.87 
 
 
 
3.10 
-0.17 
 
-0.99 
-0.56 
 
-0.91 
4.73 
 
 
9.50 
 
 
-0.35 
-0.29 
 
-1.35 
-1.22 
0.37 
 
-0.07 
-0.06 
 
-0.32 
-1.37 
 
-1.09 
 
 
-0.62 
 
-1.10 
-0.04 
 
-0.50 
-0.61 
6.12 
1.19 
0.41 
-1.39 
 
 
 
1.23 
-0.23 
2.88 
4.75 
 
 
4.40 
 
-1.47 
-0.24 
-0.42 
-0.08 
-1.11 
-1.22 
-1.58 
 
 
-0.02 
-0.62 
2.01 
-1.00 
 
 
-1.42 
1.59 
-1.35 
-1.52 
-1.20 
 
-0.92 
-0.90 
0.82 
-1.56 
-1.02 
-1.16 
 
 
 
-0.33 
-0.16 
 
-1.28 
-0.30 
 
-0.25 
3.99 
 
 
7.89 
 
 
-0.52 
-0.39 
 
-1.36 
-1.07 
-0.26 
 
-0.05 
0.11 
 
-0.20 
-1.50 
 
-1.08 
 
 
-0.49 
 
-1.28 
0.12 
 
-0.35 
-0.60 
5.18 
-0.77 
0.58 
-1.39 
 
 
 
0.82 
-0.56 
0.56 
5.28 
 
 
0.15 
 
-1.35 
0.93 
-1.25 
-0.23 
-1.21 
-1.22 
-1.46 
 
 
-0.45 
-0.77 
-0.07 
-0.65 
 
 
-1.53 
3.39 
-1.01 
-1.51 
-1.19 
 
-1.00 
-0.41 
-0.51 
-1.56 
-0.70 
-1.18 
 
 
 
-0.03 
2.26 
-1.35 
-0.87 
-0.72 
 
-0.60 
4.13 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.56 
-0.43 
 
-1.21 
-1.09 
-0.28 
 
-0.84 
0.41 
 
-0.42 
-1.38 
 
-1.03 
 
 
-0.97 
-0.93 
-1.02 
-0.04 
 
-0.92 
-0.33 
 
-0.48 
0.12 
-1.25 
 
 
0.97 
0.48 
-1.14 
0.71 
5.02 
 
 
1.48 
 
-1.48 
3.99 
-1.11 
-0.40 
-0.89 
-1.35 
-1.47 
 
 
-0.60 
-0.39 
0.39 
-1.12 
 
 
-1.07 
1.88 
-1.05 
-1.53 
-1.20 
 
-0.85 
-0.91 
-0.34 
-1.25 
-0.53 
-1.00 
 
 
 
-0.30 
-0.32 
-0.77 
-0.72 
-0.18 
 
-0.71 
4.22 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.85 
-0.67 
 
-1.06 
-0.94 
-0.08 
 
-1.12 
0.58 
 
-0.44 
-1.43 
 
-0.90 
 
 
-0.33 
-0.97 
-0.94 
0.00 
 
-0.76 
-0.79 
 
-0.27 
0.19 
-1.41 
-1.40 
 
0.27 
0.65 
-0.70 
0.71 
5.30 
 
 
0.31 
 
-1.46 
4.16 
-1.07 
-0.38 
-0.88 
-1.26 
-1.63 
-0.29 
 
-0.29 
-0.15 
0.35 
-0.49 
-0.27 
 
-1.37 
2.00 
-1.09 
-1.39 
-0.91 
 
-0.88 
-0.84 
-0.18 
-1.11 
-0.74 
-0.74 
 
 
 
-0.45 
-0.74 
-0.92 
-0.41 
0.01 
 
-0.75 
2.99 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.55 
-0.29 
 
-1.21 
-1.10 
-0.11 
 
-0.99 
0.56 
 
-0.02 
-1.29 
 
-1.05 
 
 
-0.77 
-1.02 
-0.99 
-0.02 
 
-0.78 
-0.81 
 
-0.28 
0.05 
-1.41 
-1.42 
 
-0.09 
0.21 
-1.10 
0.71 
5.36 
 
 
-0.66 
 
-1.14 
4.25 
-1.10 
-0.38 
-0.89 
-0.93 
-1.63 
-0.72 
 
-0.38 
-0.47 
0.41 
-0.62 
0.00 
 
-1.19 
2.02 
-1.08 
-1.55 
-1.03 
 
-0.71 
-0.83 
0.63 
-1.09 
-0.76 
-0.90 
 
 
 
-0.60 
-0.60 
-1.00 
-0.40 
1.58 
 
-0.87 
0.84 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.00 
-0.60 
 
-1.22 
-1.25 
0.96 
 
-0.75 
1.47 
 
-0.44 
-1.41 
 
-0.73 
 
 
-0.79 
-1.06 
-1.02 
-0.01 
 
-0.77 
-0.84 
 
-0.22 
0.02 
-1.24 
-1.09 
 
1.42 
2.27 
-1.21 
0.86 
5.20 
 
 
-0.42 
 
-1.44 
3.35 
-1.10 
-0.41 
-0.81 
-1.05 
-1.61 
-0.74 
 
-0.24 
-0.25 
0.21 
-0.63 
0.13 
 
-1.19 
2.19 
-1.22 
-1.41 
-1.18 
 
-0.23 
-0.83 
-0.43 
-1.39 
-0.89 
-0.87 
 
 
 
-0.44 
-0.52 
-0.80 
-0.67 
0.69 
 
-0.74 
1.37 
 
 
-0.30 
 
 
-0.86 
-0.59 
 
-1.37 
-1.12 
-0.10 
 
-0.77 
1.35 
 
-0.13 
-1.39 
 
-0.63 
 
 
-0.77 
-1.09 
-0.85 
0.24 
 
-0.75 
-0.49 
1.23 
-0.13 
-0.03 
-1.27 
-1.37 
 
4.03 
3.41 
-1.09 
0.67 
5.24 
 
 
-0.45 
 
-1.43 
0.52 
-1.27 
-0.24 
-0.90 
-1.18 
-1.64 
-0.62 
 
-0.12 
-0.29 
0.35 
-0.51 
-0.02 
 
-1.28 
1.89 
-0.97 
-1.41 
-1.18 
 
-0.28 
-0.15 
-0.19 
-1.54 
-0.58 
-0.59 
 
 
 
-0.18 
-0.51 
-0.77 
-0.58 
0.18 
 
-0.86 
0.76 
 
 
0.97 
 
 
-1.01 
-0.15 
 
-1.37 
-1.12 
0.19 
 
-0.69 
0.45 
 
-0.34 
-1.40 
 
-0.73 
 
 
-0.77 
-0.94 
-0.96 
-0.03 
 
-0.78 
-0.72 
0.09 
0.20 
-0.20 
-1.13 
-1.06 
 
2.54 
3.42 
-1.12 
0.57 
5.04 
 
 
-0.40 
 
-1.29 
0.32 
-1.64 
-0.20 
-0.92 
-1.23 
-1.29 
-0.65 
 
-0.32 
-0.32 
0.22 
-0.30 
 
 
-0.98 
3.82 
-0.36 
-1.38 
-1.18 
 
-0.59 
-0.39 
-0.14 
-1.53 
-0.65 
-0.58 
 
 
 
-0.47 
0.41 
-1.06 
-0.73 
0.06 
 
-1.06 
0.50 
 
 
-0.10 
 
 
-0.83 
0.10 
 
-1.33 
-1.28 
0.72 
 
-0.73 
0.56 
 
-0.20 
-1.31 
 
-0.64 
 
 
-0.58 
-1.10 
-0.78 
0.05 
 
-0.91 
-0.68 
1.27 
-0.09 
0.38 
-1.11 
-1.05 
 
2.40 
3.99 
-0.66 
1.50 
5.20 
 
 
-0.29 
 
-1.11 
0.18 
-1.32 
-0.36 
-1.03 
-1.35 
-1.45 
-1.08 
 
0.07 
-0.42 
0.39 
-0.62 
 
 
-1.19 
3.57 
-0.78 
-1.38 
-1.14 
 
-0.38 
-0.67 
0.57 
-1.39 
-0.56 
-0.44 
 
 
 
-0.72 
-0.35 
-1.54 
-0.81 
-0.64 
 
-1.04 
0.18 
 
 
1.02 
 
 
-0.77 
-0.06 
 
-1.25 
-1.15 
-0.07 
 
-0.99 
0.55 
 
-0.15 
-1.33 
 
-0.70 
 
-0.23 
-1.13 
-0.99 
-0.85 
0.11 
 
-0.88 
-0.78 
-0.18 
-0.07 
-0.26 
-1.61 
-1.06 
 
3.36 
4.12 
-0.68 
1.85 
4.48 
-1.40 
4.86 
-0.82 
 
-1.17 
0.18 
-1.32 
-0.40 
-1.10 
-1.40 
-1.34 
-1.09 
 
0.05 
-0.46 
0.39 
-0.66 
 
 
-1.37 
3.78 
-0.74 
-1.37 
-1.36 
 
-0.40 
-0.24 
-0.94 
-1.57 
-0.57 
-0.65 
 
 
 
-0.60 
0.75 
-0.58 
-0.53 
-0.67 
 
-1.02 
0.49 
 
 
-0.24 
 
 
-0.73 
-0.06 
 
-1.23 
-1.33 
0.05 
 
-0.36 
0.40 
 
-0.02 
-1.32 
 
-0.55 
 
-0.54 
-0.86 
-0.99 
-1.27 
-0.05 
 
-0.77 
-0.87 
0.07 
-0.21 
-0.09 
-1.32 
-1.07 
 
3.50 
3.12 
-1.15 
1.85 
4.56 
-1.39 
4.24 
-0.76 
 
-1.50 
0.33 
-1.09 
-0.35 
-1.11 
-1.53 
-1.66 
-1.08 
 
-0.14 
-1.05 
0.41 
-0.69 
 
 
-1.37 
3.61 
-0.73 
-1.37 
-1.29 
 
-0.78 
-0.25 
-0.18 
-1.42 
-0.30 
-0.96 
 
 
 
-0.61 
-0.25 
-1.06 
-0.92 
-0.74 
 
-0.84 
0.62 
 
 
-0.22 
 
 
-0.73 
-0.13 
 
-1.42 
-1.45 
0.03 
 
0.56 
0.25 
 
-0.28 
-1.59 
 
-0.73 
 
-0.57 
-0.83 
-1.11 
-1.26 
0.10 
 
-0.73 
-0.50 
0.03 
-0.26 
-0.18 
-1.42 
-1.06 
 
3.90 
-0.01 
-0.68 
1.51 
4.39 
 
3.57 
-0.63 
 
-1.03 
4.08 
-1.56 
-0.35 
-1.08 
-1.53 
-1.62 
-0.29 
 
-0.08 
-0.43 
3.27 
-0.54 
 
 
-1.36 
3.61 
-0.55 
-1.50 
-1.29 
 
-0.81 
-0.11 
-0.22 
-1.44 
-0.29 
-0.76 
 
 
 
-0.59 
-0.51 
-1.24 
-0.93 
-0.54 
295 
 
Table B3.2. Annual scores for the political violence index 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jersey, Channel Isl. 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Martinique 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
N. Antilles 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
Réunion 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
-0.80 
 
-1.42 
 
10.46 
0.55 
1.15 
6.77 
-1.33 
4.32 
-1.24 
-1.06 
-1.11 
 
-0.48 
 
-0.05 
 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.01 
 
-1.46 
-1.14 
 
-1.25 
 
0.23 
 
-1.26 
-1.52 
 
 
-1.16 
-0.63 
-0.77 
 
-1.63 
 
 
 
-1.17 
 
1.54 
 
-0.73 
 
-1.28 
 
-0.04 
-0.41 
5.93 
 
 
2.25 
-1.53 
 
 
-1.53 
-0.54 
-0.56 
0.24 
 
-1.60 
-0.74 
3.13 
 
-0.94 
2.07 
-1.11 
3.50 
5.39 
 
-1.42 
 
 
 
-1.03 
4.71 
 
-0.69 
 
-1.25 
 
9.62 
5.75 
0.50 
4.87 
-1.47 
3.72 
-1.40 
-0.61 
-1.40 
 
-0.45 
-0.52 
0.06 
 
 
-0.76 
 
-0.53 
-0.97 
-0.55 
-0.93 
 
 
 
0.28 
 
-1.43 
-1.51 
 
 
-1.18 
-1.05 
-0.17 
 
-0.99 
 
 
 
-0.89 
 
-0.13 
 
-1.23 
 
-0.98 
 
-0.66 
-0.40 
5.46 
-0.67 
 
3.22 
-1.51 
 
 
-1.55 
-0.51 
-0.20 
0.33 
 
-1.64 
-0.75 
 
 
-1.23 
-1.06 
-0.45 
0.50 
4.19 
 
-1.42 
 
 
 
-0.90 
0.36 
4.63 
-0.71 
 
-1.21 
 
10.31 
3.61 
1.32 
1.18 
-1.50 
3.86 
-1.30 
-0.73 
-1.42 
 
-0.28 
-0.23 
0.15 
 
 
-0.59 
 
-0.59 
-0.58 
-0.18 
-1.36 
 
-1.07 
 
-0.16 
 
-1.38 
-1.56 
 
 
-1.15 
-1.06 
-0.03 
 
-1.15 
 
 
 
-0.77 
-0.85 
0.03 
 
-0.75 
 
-1.29 
 
-0.19 
-0.14 
6.73 
-0.65 
 
3.45 
-1.51 
 
 
-1.56 
-0.84 
-0.97 
0.66 
 
-1.59 
-0.92 
0.47 
 
-1.01 
-1.06 
-0.74 
-0.27 
6.46 
 
-1.32 
 
 
 
-0.63 
5.23 
1.17 
-0.64 
 
-1.04 
 
11.48 
3.57 
0.52 
1.02 
-1.50 
4.62 
-1.13 
-0.56 
-1.16 
 
-0.46 
-0.40 
0.44 
 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.65 
-0.63 
-0.32 
-1.33 
-0.38 
-1.13 
 
 
 
-1.41 
-1.59 
 
-0.55 
-0.07 
-0.63 
-0.47 
 
-1.27 
 
 
 
-0.67 
-1.14 
0.03 
 
-0.87 
 
-1.12 
 
-0.45 
-0.60 
4.86 
-0.29 
 
3.92 
-1.51 
 
 
-1.42 
-0.67 
-1.10 
1.98 
 
-1.63 
-1.21 
0.95 
 
-1.62 
 
-0.49 
-0.34 
4.20 
 
-1.16 
 
 
 
-0.78 
3.91 
1.06 
-0.37 
 
-1.10 
 
11.26 
3.32 
0.23 
 
-1.34 
4.46 
-1.14 
-0.27 
-1.16 
 
-0.60 
-0.38 
0.17 
 
 
-0.66 
 
-0.62 
-0.74 
0.26 
-1.33 
-0.17 
-0.99 
 
 
 
-1.38 
-1.56 
 
-0.82 
-0.79 
-0.38 
-0.31 
 
-1.10 
 
 
 
-0.79 
-1.27 
-0.07 
 
-0.52 
 
-0.78 
 
-0.33 
-0.71 
4.67 
-0.76 
 
3.94 
-1.55 
 
 
-1.41 
-0.56 
-0.78 
1.96 
 
-1.66 
-0.95 
1.13 
 
-1.16 
 
-0.73 
-0.16 
4.50 
 
-1.17 
 
-1.31 
 
-0.96 
4.26 
0.23 
-0.36 
 
-0.94 
 
11.51 
3.18 
 
 
-1.22 
4.49 
-1.16 
-0.29 
-1.31 
 
-0.44 
-0.24 
-0.22 
 
 
-0.66 
 
-0.63 
-0.49 
-0.03 
-1.20 
-0.18 
-1.14 
 
 
 
-1.36 
-1.58 
 
-0.95 
-0.91 
-0.71 
-0.18 
 
-1.26 
 
 
 
-0.67 
-0.98 
-0.10 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.63 
 
-0.30 
-0.31 
4.52 
-0.87 
 
4.21 
-1.54 
 
 
-1.42 
-0.86 
-0.76 
3.73 
 
-1.64 
-1.27 
4.40 
 
-1.18 
 
-0.74 
-0.33 
4.69 
 
-1.18 
 
-1.32 
 
-0.59 
4.77 
0.27 
-0.49 
 
-1.12 
 
10.21 
3.01 
1.30 
 
-1.37 
4.05 
-1.11 
-0.41 
-1.47 
 
-0.44 
-0.25 
0.08 
 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.47 
-0.64 
0.00 
-1.02 
-0.23 
-0.97 
 
 
 
-1.31 
-1.55 
 
-0.80 
-0.57 
-0.58 
-0.28 
 
-1.14 
 
 
 
-0.46 
-0.98 
-0.07 
 
-0.53 
 
-0.73 
 
0.02 
-0.54 
6.89 
-0.97 
 
4.46 
-1.59 
 
 
-1.44 
-0.71 
-0.94 
0.84 
 
-1.60 
-0.67 
4.19 
 
-1.29 
 
-0.73 
-0.60 
4.68 
 
-1.19 
 
-0.95 
 
-0.73 
4.28 
-0.39 
-0.50 
 
-1.11 
 
10.19 
-0.16 
 
 
-1.37 
4.84 
-1.33 
-0.42 
-1.60 
 
-0.18 
-0.27 
0.47 
 
 
-0.83 
 
-0.78 
-0.23 
-0.13 
-1.20 
-0.49 
-0.98 
 
 
 
-1.20 
-1.58 
 
-0.81 
-0.78 
-0.43 
-0.17 
 
-1.00 
 
 
 
-0.58 
-0.68 
1.61 
 
-0.58 
 
-0.50 
 
-0.18 
-0.52 
6.40 
-0.80 
 
4.02 
-1.65 
 
 
-1.45 
-0.84 
-0.82 
1.43 
 
-1.62 
-1.13 
5.09 
 
-1.47 
 
-0.27 
-0.47 
4.78 
 
-1.18 
 
-0.82 
 
-0.59 
3.61 
-0.49 
-0.36 
 
-0.95 
 
10.01 
-0.04 
1.48 
 
-1.21 
4.11 
-1.00 
-0.42 
-1.46 
 
-0.17 
-0.05 
0.69 
 
 
-0.80 
 
-0.63 
-0.26 
-0.11 
-1.05 
0.38 
-0.75 
 
 
 
-1.34 
-1.55 
 
-0.81 
-0.97 
-0.52 
-0.17 
 
-0.07 
 
 
 
-0.48 
-0.83 
2.32 
 
-0.71 
 
-0.51 
 
-0.12 
-0.33 
6.89 
-0.92 
 
0.12 
-1.62 
 
 
-1.45 
-1.12 
0.46 
1.62 
 
-1.60 
-1.27 
6.62 
 
-1.40 
 
-0.44 
-0.29 
4.41 
 
-1.18 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.60 
2.16 
-0.47 
-0.44 
 
-1.19 
 
10.51 
0.01 
1.62 
 
-1.22 
4.37 
-1.16 
-0.24 
-1.45 
 
0.14 
-0.24 
2.10 
 
 
-0.64 
 
-0.72 
-0.91 
-0.73 
-0.78 
0.14 
-1.04 
 
 
 
-1.30 
-1.57 
 
-1.06 
-0.76 
-0.53 
-0.27 
 
-0.01 
 
 
 
-0.63 
-0.80 
3.02 
 
-0.53 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.11 
-0.43 
5.57 
-1.04 
 
0.42 
-1.49 
 
 
-1.62 
-0.71 
0.66 
2.20 
 
-1.44 
-1.11 
7.34 
 
-1.13 
 
-0.40 
-0.01 
4.73 
 
-1.15 
 
-1.06 
 
-0.43 
2.23 
-0.59 
0.29 
 
-1.19 
 
10.48 
0.17 
1.60 
 
-1.41 
4.46 
-0.70 
-0.29 
-1.48 
 
-0.03 
-0.26 
1.96 
 
 
-0.70 
 
-0.72 
-0.38 
-0.59 
-1.03 
-0.45 
-1.36 
-0.65 
 
 
-1.22 
-1.56 
 
-1.08 
0.26 
-0.89 
-0.48 
 
0.66 
 
 
 
-0.43 
-0.82 
3.24 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.80 
-1.02 
-0.26 
-0.48 
6.59 
-1.24 
 
0.32 
-1.49 
 
 
-1.61 
-0.63 
-0.40 
5.39 
 
-1.62 
-1.09 
7.80 
 
-1.46 
-0.57 
-0.94 
0.19 
4.69 
 
-1.17 
 
-1.05 
 
 
3.15 
0.47 
-0.19 
 
-1.08 
 
9.73 
-0.01 
1.61 
 
-1.38 
3.49 
-1.16 
0.02 
-1.18 
 
0.01 
-0.10 
-0.04 
 
 
-1.00 
 
-0.65 
0.93 
-0.72 
-0.97 
-0.34 
-1.09 
-0.64 
 
 
-1.20 
-1.53 
 
-0.92 
-0.36 
-0.74 
-0.45 
 
-0.97 
 
 
 
0.15 
-0.84 
3.52 
 
-0.41 
 
-0.82 
-1.22 
-0.13 
-0.32 
5.96 
-0.95 
 
0.23 
-1.52 
 
 
-1.62 
-0.43 
-0.76 
4.62 
 
-1.60 
-1.09 
7.14 
 
-0.56 
-0.57 
-0.80 
0.23 
4.69 
 
-1.15 
 
-1.14 
 
 
2.83 
0.59 
-0.33 
 
-1.06 
 
7.90 
0.04 
1.61 
 
-1.21 
3.80 
-1.04 
-0.33 
-1.32 
 
0.00 
0.19 
-0.31 
 
 
-0.83 
 
-0.53 
0.05 
-0.54 
-0.84 
-0.18 
-1.31 
-0.89 
 
 
-1.15 
-1.54 
 
-0.63 
-0.11 
-0.55 
-0.01 
 
-1.15 
 
 
 
0.62 
-0.95 
3.62 
 
-0.58 
 
-0.81 
-1.19 
0.02 
-0.45 
6.60 
-0.71 
 
-0.11 
-1.66 
 
 
-1.62 
-0.43 
-0.60 
3.79 
 
-1.60 
-0.39 
7.59 
 
-1.30 
-0.75 
-0.81 
-0.55 
4.71 
 
-1.15 
 
-0.83 
 
 
2.98 
0.74 
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Table B3.2. Annual scores for the political violence index 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Samoa 
San Marino 
S. Tome & Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent &  Gren. 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Un. Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Virgin Islands 
West Bank & Gaza 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
0.11 
1.39 
 
 
3.34 
-0.58 
-1.28 
 
 
 
2.77 
 
-0.67 
5.75 
 
 
 
6.66 
 
-0.79 
-1.62 
-1.53 
0.08 
 
 
-0.33 
-0.39 
 
 
 
-1.13 
-0.62 
4.75 
 
 
3.19 
-0.85 
-0.81 
-1.32 
-1.36 
-1.49 
 
 
0.45 
-0.54 
 
 
0.05 
-0.35 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
2.91 
 
 
 
-0.76 
-1.43 
-1.57 
 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.96 
5.49 
 
 
 
6.97 
 
-0.77 
-1.62 
-1.50 
0.07 
 
3.51 
-0.27 
-0.68 
 
 
 
-1.27 
-0.12 
4.51 
-0.46 
 
2.82 
-0.51 
-0.51 
-0.22 
-1.35 
-1.09 
-0.24 
 
-0.12 
-0.36 
 
 
0.05 
-0.17 
 
 
 
 
-0.17 
0.34 
 
 
 
-0.72 
-1.07 
-1.26 
 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.81 
5.72 
 
 
 
7.14 
 
-0.59 
-1.47 
-1.36 
0.22 
 
0.87 
0.00 
-0.45 
 
-0.50 
 
-1.27 
0.02 
2.13 
-0.29 
 
2.92 
-0.36 
-0.75 
-1.04 
-1.35 
-1.12 
0.86 
 
-0.38 
-0.22 
 
 
0.15 
-0.57 
 
 
 
 
-0.18 
-0.59 
 
 
 
-0.69 
-1.10 
-1.59 
 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.48 
3.73 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.91 
-1.43 
-1.20 
-0.09 
 
-0.17 
-0.72 
-0.48 
 
-0.61 
 
-1.04 
-0.32 
1.05 
-0.39 
 
3.25 
-0.50 
-0.37 
-1.06 
-0.15 
-1.28 
0.22 
 
-0.23 
-0.22 
 
 
-0.26 
-0.54 
 
 
 
 
0.28 
0.07 
 
 
-0.41 
-0.82 
-1.26 
-1.28 
 
 
-0.32 
 
-0.33 
3.73 
 
 
 
 
-1.05 
-0.91 
-1.44 
-1.09 
0.05 
 
-0.43 
-0.27 
1.07 
 
-0.38 
 
-0.89 
-0.09 
0.78 
0.06 
 
3.40 
-0.08 
-0.81 
-1.11 
-0.16 
-1.10 
0.37 
 
 
-0.07 
 
 
0.15 
-0.51 
 
 
 
 
0.43 
-1.07 
 
 
-0.83 
-0.66 
-1.15 
-1.46 
 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.67 
3.34 
 
 
 
 
-0.80 
-0.79 
-1.57 
-1.08 
0.07 
 
-0.45 
-0.19 
2.20 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.74 
-0.12 
2.54 
0.02 
 
3.38 
-0.22 
-0.51 
-1.12 
0.43 
-1.05 
1.19 
 
0.09 
0.09 
 
 
1.87 
-0.35 
 
 
 
 
0.29 
-0.73 
 
 
-0.71 
-0.53 
-1.57 
-1.44 
 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.62 
4.56 
 
 
 
 
-0.90 
-0.53 
-1.43 
-1.22 
0.09 
 
-0.31 
-0.05 
2.84 
 
0.24 
 
-0.60 
-0.12 
3.66 
-0.09 
 
3.51 
-0.57 
-0.53 
-0.67 
0.43 
-1.20 
0.70 
 
0.09 
-0.19 
 
 
1.58 
-0.30 
 
 
 
 
0.43 
-0.46 
 
 
-0.62 
-0.54 
-1.09 
-1.43 
 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.49 
5.65 
 
 
 
 
-0.89 
-0.61 
-1.43 
-1.20 
0.23 
 
-0.21 
-0.58 
2.59 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.71 
0.03 
2.66 
0.02 
 
3.45 
-0.56 
-0.68 
-1.14 
0.42 
-1.53 
0.07 
 
0.21 
-0.22 
 
 
1.43 
-0.38 
 
 
 
 
0.73 
-0.38 
 
 
-0.73 
-0.84 
-1.10 
-1.44 
 
 
0.18 
 
-0.34 
5.90 
 
 
 
 
-0.88 
-0.42 
-1.40 
-1.03 
0.41 
 
-0.16 
-0.62 
2.65 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.72 
-0.06 
3.15 
-0.08 
 
1.09 
-0.25 
-0.55 
-1.09 
0.28 
-1.55 
-0.04 
 
0.25 
-0.10 
 
 
1.56 
-0.58 
 
 
 
 
0.34 
-0.53 
 
 
-0.71 
-0.95 
-1.18 
-1.55 
 
 
0.02 
 
-0.51 
6.15 
 
 
 
 
-1.16 
-0.28 
-1.41 
-1.05 
0.72 
 
-0.27 
-0.41 
2.51 
 
-0.58 
 
-0.64 
0.10 
3.21 
-0.21 
 
1.02 
-0.25 
-0.68 
-1.10 
0.12 
-1.55 
-0.04 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
1.90 
-0.32 
 
 
 
 
0.59 
-0.36 
-0.99 
 
 
-0.99 
-1.23 
-1.64 
-1.75 
 
0.01 
 
-0.68 
6.36 
 
 
 
 
-1.21 
-0.28 
-1.43 
-1.22 
0.57 
 
-0.42 
-0.75 
2.39 
-1.14 
-0.47 
 
-0.70 
-0.03 
3.08 
-0.22 
 
1.12 
-0.44 
-0.85 
-1.02 
0.23 
-1.42 
0.09 
 
 
-0.24 
 
 
2.05 
-0.31 
 
 
 
 
0.30 
-0.37 
-1.09 
 
-0.63 
-0.86 
-1.21 
-1.49 
-1.72 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.98 
0.85 
 
 
 
 
-1.05 
-0.30 
-1.41 
-1.40 
0.57 
 
0.36 
-0.59 
2.81 
-1.24 
-0.25 
 
-0.74 
0.10 
2.81 
-0.09 
 
1.08 
-0.47 
-0.69 
-1.44 
0.08 
-1.26 
-0.06 
 
 
-0.10 
 
 
2.37 
-0.04 
 
 
 
 
0.61 
0.35 
-1.08 
 
-0.91 
-1.01 
-1.21 
-1.61 
-1.74 
 
-0.31 
 
-0.96 
0.95 
 
 
 
 
-0.91 
-0.31 
-1.42 
-1.37 
6.75 
 
0.46 
-0.44 
2.59 
-1.21 
-0.45 
 
-0.72 
-0.23 
2.96 
0.05 
 
1.00 
-0.33 
-0.71 
-1.46 
0.10 
-1.43 
0.05 
 
 
-0.09 
 
 
3.02 
-0.35 
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Table B3.3. Comparison of the rankings obtained with different applications of PCA 
 1993-2002 2003-2012 
Country 
State effectiveness 
ranks 
Political violence 
ranks 
State effectiveness 
ranks 
Political violence 
ranks 
PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
.. 
50 
51 
3 
99 
69 
137 
147 
20 
106 
32 
39 
135 
63 
.. 
76 
59 
118 
92 
94 
35 
10 
17 
24 
140 
101 
26 
18 
129 
48 
81 
.. 
.. 
13 
117 
43 
96 
47 
125 
123 
150 
40 
60 
49 
82 
72 
2 
.. 
122 
15 
95 
148 
134 
68 
70 
29 
146 
73 
121 
.. 
70 
9 
2 
71 
64 
127 
120 
33 
51 
42 
56 
135 
113 
.. 
92 
104 
114 
43 
72 
80 
5 
46 
38 
132 
.. 
27 
30 
82 
21 
8 
.. 
.. 
20 
134 
25 
98 
50 
110 
130 
141 
.. 
57 
77 
24 
96 
.. 
.. 
128 
19 
116 
142 
122 
103 
89 
48 
138 
94 
107 
4 
47 
11 
3 
58 
147 
114 
141 
29 
130 
62 
152 
132 
129 
138 
80 
109 
128 
43 
83 
76 
8 
36 
64 
125 
139 
65 
31 
67 
33 
10 
134 
2 
27 
111 
45 
35 
116 
135 
126 
112 
150 
54 
70 
28 
63 
137 
74 
99 
24 
146 
123 
96 
145 
154 
37 
143 
86 
110 
.. 
48 
47 
4 
97 
65 
132 
135 
22 
96 
28 
37 
130 
69 
.. 
81 
57 
112 
83 
85 
43 
11 
16 
19 
136 
.. 
29 
13 
124 
35 
78 
.. 
.. 
20 
114 
40 
89 
39 
120 
118 
145 
.. 
55 
49 
70 
80 
.. 
.. 
119 
21 
91 
143 
129 
66 
68 
31 
137 
77 
115 
.. 
78 
50 
7 
83 
71 
145 
147 
26 
113 
17 
29 
141 
58 
108 
61 
80 
125 
90 
102 
68 
23 
21 
20 
148 
117 
9 
5 
137 
33 
84 
42 
1 
22 
121 
8 
115 
51 
133 
129 
155 
65 
53 
41 
62 
86 
4 
.. 
134 
28 
76 
153 
139 
59 
69 
74 
144 
94 
118 
.. 
67 
55 
7 
77 
75 
144 
149 
28 
114 
23 
37 
140 
48 
111 
50 
80 
125 
98 
103 
59 
24 
19 
21 
147 
115 
10 
6 
136 
62 
85 
22 
2 
13 
120 
8 
112 
69 
133 
128 
155 
61 
56 
38 
78 
84 
5 
.. 
132 
27 
73 
154 
139 
54 
64 
79 
146 
95 
121 
.. 
108 
22 
33 
105 
57 
135 
130 
34 
88 
26 
54 
144 
100 
71 
101 
118 
114 
36 
103 
96 
30 
45 
39 
141 
128 
14 
15 
111 
23 
4 
146 
7 
73 
139 
18 
136 
63 
112 
138 
151 
99 
48 
68 
27 
79 
40 
.. 
134 
10 
106 
147 
127 
80 
74 
44 
145 
82 
97 
13 
90 
26 
33 
57 
113 
115 
111 
56 
160 
32 
147 
126 
104 
162 
80 
155 
130 
38 
84 
74 
23 
60 
86 
122 
101 
19 
17 
103 
36 
5 
148 
7 
67 
127 
24 
145 
158 
119 
143 
139 
123 
49 
63 
39 
50 
108 
55 
121 
14 
149 
135 
107 
133 
76 
46 
157 
66 
97 
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Table B3.3. Comparison of the rankings obtained with different applications of PCA 
 1993-2002 2003-2012 
Country 
State effectiveness 
ranks 
Political violence 
ranks 
State effectiveness 
ranks 
Political violence 
ranks 
PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
64 
21 
11 
85 
5 
61 
126 
78 
36 
28 
1 
136 
128 
124 
100 
130 
107 
33 
37 
.. 
114 
.. 
112 
41 
9 
103 
75 
90 
.. 
6 
113 
143 
83 
46 
62 
108 
45 
52 
119 
87 
89 
86 
.. 
79 
31 
4 
111 
57 
144 
145 
56 
22 
14 
149 
104 
38 
98 
54 
34 
32 
35 
109 
105 
66 
86 
121 
1 
13 
28 
12 
136 
10 
125 
90 
126 
65 
61 
39 
.. 
68 
.. 
67 
87 
79 
117 
59 
111 
.. 
40 
131 
144 
74 
99 
95 
58 
124 
97 
106 
36 
100 
112 
.. 
55 
62 
4 
73 
15 
140 
139 
81 
85 
31 
145 
101 
22 
118 
45 
84 
22 
46 
48 
81 
53 
59 
104 
1 
19 
38 
18 
131 
12 
88 
55 
95 
142 
144 
51 
52 
72 
.. 
153 
149 
158 
105 
75 
98 
26 
100 
127 
121 
61 
73 
90 
148 
42 
122 
93 
39 
66 
103 
.. 
140 
56 
7 
68 
21 
123 
118 
57 
44 
41 
136 
162 
32 
97 
34 
71 
58 
15 
18 
87 
5 
63 
122 
94 
36 
14 
1 
131 
117 
121 
101 
127 
98 
34 
32 
.. 
108 
.. 
103 
44 
9 
104 
67 
92 
.. 
2 
110 
140 
82 
53 
64 
102 
59 
50 
113 
79 
88 
90 
.. 
71 
38 
3 
106 
51 
142 
141 
56 
26 
10 
144 
95 
30 
100 
62 
41 
63 
10 
16 
91 
6 
57 
130 
99 
36 
14 
.. 
142 
127 
122 
96 
138 
101 
39 
30 
.. 
126 
.. 
107 
40 
11 
119 
70 
104 
37 
.. 
123 
149 
95 
49 
89 
106 
67 
31 
124 
87 
77 
79 
103 
56 
35 
2 
112 
45 
152 
154 
60 
38 
19 
151 
109 
34 
105 
43 
48 
53 
12 
9 
86 
4 
58 
129 
82 
41 
30 
.. 
141 
131 
124 
100 
138 
110 
47 
34 
.. 
127 
.. 
107 
44 
11 
118 
70 
101 
29 
.. 
122 
145 
94 
45 
88 
108 
46 
31 
123 
91 
81 
74 
97 
65 
36 
1 
105 
49 
151 
153 
51 
33 
18 
150 
106 
35 
99 
32 
40 
77 
55 
117 
90 
38 
62 
122 
1 
24 
21 
.. 
140 
6 
123 
60 
143 
52 
51 
28 
.. 
102 
.. 
85 
61 
59 
119 
50 
121 
98 
.. 
137 
152 
107 
78 
81 
56 
92 
66 
109 
19 
76 
89 
125 
46 
72 
2 
110 
17 
153 
150 
94 
70 
11 
154 
116 
3 
132 
84 
87 
51 
116 
156 
62 
34 
47 
96 
1 
28 
29 
10 
134 
8 
91 
43 
110 
131 
137 
31 
48 
94 
146 
161 
85 
150 
128 
65 
88 
40 
37 
154 
141 
93 
102 
61 
153 
41 
75 
82 
20 
105 
69 
100 
89 
77 
2 
87 
22 
136 
132 
79 
54 
16 
144 
164 
4 
118 
53 
70 
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Table B3.3. Comparison of the rankings obtained with different applications of PCA 
 1993-2002 2003-2012 
Country 
State effectiveness 
ranks 
Political violence 
ranks 
State effectiveness 
ranks 
Political violence 
ranks 
PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 PCA1 PCA2 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Un. Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
77 
88 
.. 
131 
105 
71 
66 
25 
93 
74 
.. 
16 
133 
110 
127 
.. 
109 
.. 
132 
91 
8 
80 
67 
139 
141 
42 
.. 
7 
44 
102 
.. 
19 
115 
84 
97 
12 
58 
53 
116 
142 
138 
120 
27 
55 
30 
23 
65 
.. 
29 
7 
.. 
129 
.. 
93 
11 
18 
47 
26 
.. 
14 
83 
119 
137 
.. 
34 
.. 
88 
6 
3 
.. 
91 
143 
133 
41 
.. 
23 
53 
69 
.. 
75 
115 
52 
16 
60 
17 
76 
78 
102 
108 
123 
37 
49 
54 
44 
63 
.. 
23 
5 
117 
101 
160 
92 
15 
13 
151 
25 
.. 
16 
159 
119 
133 
40 
30 
.. 
60 
9 
6 
78 
155 
115 
120 
107 
108 
20 
106 
85 
102 
91 
89 
82 
14 
156 
17 
113 
161 
69 
77 
94 
79 
49 
157 
50 
84 
87 
75 
93 
.. 
128 
.. 
72 
61 
25 
73 
76 
.. 
8 
125 
109 
123 
.. 
105 
.. 
126 
86 
6 
.. 
60 
138 
139 
33 
.. 
7 
42 
99 
.. 
23 
111 
74 
84 
12 
52 
46 
107 
134 
133 
116 
24 
45 
27 
17 
54 
.. 
85 
72 
.. 
135 
116 
88 
52 
66 
73 
75 
97 
25 
136 
120 
131 
92 
111 
.. 
132 
82 
.. 
98 
64 
150 
146 
27 
.. 
18 
44 
93 
46 
15 
114 
81 
100 
3 
47 
55 
110 
143 
140 
128 
13 
24 
32 
12 
54 
.. 
83 
66 
.. 
134 
117 
90 
63 
72 
89 
71 
93 
17 
137 
119 
130 
76 
113 
.. 
135 
87 
.. 
92 
68 
152 
148 
39 
.. 
14 
43 
102 
25 
15 
109 
96 
104 
3 
52 
60 
116 
143 
142 
126 
20 
26 
42 
16 
57 
.. 
53 
5 
.. 
126 
115 
86 
9 
37 
29 
67 
120 
93 
104 
133 
149 
155 
49 
.. 
83 
8 
.. 
113 
75 
148 
129 
25 
.. 
47 
69 
13 
131 
58 
95 
41 
12 
42 
16 
65 
91 
124 
32 
142 
31 
35 
43 
20 
64 
.. 
35 
6 
125 
78 
165 
106 
12 
44 
71 
45 
112 
95 
163 
129 
138 
117 
42 
11 
58 
9 
3 
91 
140 
142 
120 
30 
159 
72 
114 
18 
81 
98 
59 
109 
15 
151 
21 
73 
166 
83 
27 
124 
99 
52 
152 
25 
64 
68 
Notes: PCA1 corresponds to the rankings obtained when PCA was applied separately to the variables for state 
effectiveness and the proxies for political violence. PCA2 lists the rankings obtained with the first two principal 
components derived from applying PCA to all the variables used in the analysis. 
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Table B3.4. Comparison of rankings obtained with cluster analysis and PCA (sample 
restricted), 1993-2002 
Cluster – main 
characteristic 
Country 
State effectiveness scores Political violence scores 
Rank Score Rank Score 
Cluster 3 
Lowest SE + 
Highest PV 
Azerbaijan 
Guinea-Bissau 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Burundi 
Sierra Leone 
Angola 
19 
15 
37 
8 
5 
2 
-2.909 
-2.999 
-1.874 
-3.307 
-3.429 
-3.688 
31 
106 
23 
4 
12 
2 
0.499 
-1.059 
1.134 
5.651 
3.340 
7.733 
Cluster 2 
High levels of 
repression and 
civil conflict 
Uganda 
Indonesia 
Russian Federation 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
Senegal 
Guatemala 
Peru 
China 
Rwanda 
Congo, Rep. 
Nepal 
Egypt 
Sri Lanka 
Philippines 
Tajikistan 
Israel 
Myanmar 
Algeria 
Colombia 
India 
49 
33 
58 
81 
27 
73 
55 
72 
32 
22 
17 
48 
67 
83 
90 
4 
114 
1 
44 
75 
91 
-1.201 
-2.096 
-0.973 
0.032 
-2.239 
-0.393 
-1.042 
-0.409 
-2.147 
-2.829 
-2.972 
-1.263 
-0.593 
0.165 
0.449 
-3.462 
2.820 
-3.855 
-1.406 
-0.333 
0.516 
15 
11 
10 
14 
20 
24 
30 
27 
19 
16 
18 
13 
22 
5 
6 
21 
9 
3 
8 
7 
1 
3.042 
3.373 
3.552 
3.112 
1.518 
1.015 
0.607 
0.847 
1.645 
2.286 
2.012 
3.209 
1.195 
5.175 
5.060 
1.403 
4.131 
5.745 
4.355 
4.906 
10.467 
Cluster 1 
Intermediate 
levels 
Ghana 
Bolivia 
Gabon 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Nicaragua 
Malawi 
Moldova 
El Salvador 
Ecuador 
Lebanon 
Ukraine 
Dominican Rep. 
Guyana 
Tanzania 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Honduras 
Albania 
Morocco 
Argentina 
Tunisia 
Kazakhstan 
Benin 
Panama 
Burkina Faso 
Venezuela 
Bangladesh 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mongolia 
Latvia 
Jamaica 
74 
78 
63 
69 
82 
53 
61 
85 
77 
46 
64 
43 
52 
84 
39 
41 
60 
45 
68 
94 
71 
31 
66 
97 
40 
42 
25 
76 
80 
87 
101 
98 
-0.371 
-0.202 
-0.662 
-0.488 
0.101 
-1.091 
-0.850 
0.224 
-0.257 
-1.341 
-0.656 
-1.418 
-1.112 
0.191 
-1.842 
-1.671 
-0.863 
-1.376 
-0.554 
0.666 
-0.453 
-2.195 
-0.596 
0.801 
-1.675 
-1.529 
-2.403 
-0.305 
-0.002 
0.314 
1.152 
0.875 
91 
89 
100 
90 
69 
78 
92 
97 
93 
74 
56 
73 
54 
102 
50 
84 
83 
67 
52 
68 
49 
58 
110 
115 
77 
46 
39 
34 
40 
109 
114 
87 
-0.838 
-0.788 
-0.912 
-0.834 
-0.532 
-0.642 
-0.842 
-0.894 
-0.860 
-0.600 
-0.375 
-0.556 
-0.346 
-0.967 
-0.330 
-0.726 
-0.708 
-0.521 
-0.336 
-0.521 
-0.259 
-0.384 
-1.174 
-1.202 
-0.634 
-0.068 
0.049 
0.367 
0.002 
-1.166 
-1.193 
-0.741 
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Table B3.4. Comparison of rankings obtained with cluster analysis and PCA (sample 
restricted), 1993-2002 
Cluster – main 
characteristic 
Country 
State effectiveness scores Political violence scores 
Rank Score Rank Score 
Lesotho 
Georgia 
Armenia 
Jordan 
Bahrain 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Mauritania 
Zambia 
Mali 
Madagascar 
Kenya 
Saudi Arabia 
Malaysia 
Paraguay 
Togo 
Uzbekistan 
Namibia 
Macedonia 
Cameroon 
Croatia 
Niger 
Belarus 
Yemen 
Mozambique 
Kuwait 
Slovak Rep. 
Oman 
Guinea 
Central African Rep. 
Turkmenistan 
Vietnam 
Fiji 
Papua New Guinea 
South Africa 
Gambia 
Lao 
Haiti 
Cuba 
Nigeria 
Un. Arab Emirates 
Chad 
Iran 
Cambodia 
Ethiopia 
Bosnia 
89 
28 
62 
95 
93 
57 
30 
47 
51 
56 
50 
29 
70 
99 
38 
20 
21 
103 
79 
16 
86 
23 
34 
14 
35 
100 
106 
92 
12 
26 
9 
24 
88 
59 
102 
65 
6 
3 
36 
7 
104 
10 
11 
13 
18 
54 
0.412 
-2.237 
-0.831 
0.672 
0.643 
-0.993 
-2.203 
-1.277 
-1.193 
-1.039 
-1.201 
-2.236 
-0.454 
0.888 
-1.861 
-2.873 
-2.870 
1.241 
-0.169 
-2.980 
0.289 
-2.532 
-2.081 
-3.008 
-2.080 
1.053 
1.572 
0.552 
-3.016 
-2.385 
-3.221 
-2.507 
0.385 
-0.907 
1.212 
-0.629 
-3.375 
-3.680 
-2.058 
-3.324 
1.470 
-3.082 
-3.022 
-3.012 
-2.958 
-1.070 
108 
45 
61 
62 
48 
88 
38 
94 
60 
121 
96 
37 
44 
55 
81 
72 
35 
70 
71 
36 
95 
82 
53 
41 
59 
64 
116 
98 
33 
25 
57 
51 
113 
42 
32 
86 
76 
63 
47 
29 
75 
28 
26 
43 
17 
101 
-1.152 
-0.036 
-0.414 
-0.418 
-0.223 
-0.766 
0.071 
-0.876 
-0.406 
-1.260 
-0.889 
0.151 
-0.034 
-0.360 
-0.696 
-0.555 
0.282 
-0.538 
-0.550 
0.237 
-0.886 
-0.705 
-0.341 
-0.001 
-0.387 
-0.445 
-1.220 
-0.905 
0.401 
0.970 
-0.381 
-0.335 
-1.181 
-0.015 
0.475 
-0.738 
-0.626 
-0.439 
-0.195 
0.804 
-0.609 
0.846 
0.874 
-0.021 
2.132 
-0.929 
Cluster 4 
Highest SE + 
Lowest PV 
Thailand 
Singapore 
Korea, Rep. 
Mauritius 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Lithuania 
Costa Rica 
Chile 
Botswana 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Uruguay 
Germany 
Norway 
96 
122 
105 
110 
108 
107 
111 
121 
109 
117 
112 
113 
134 
141 
0.731 
3.578 
1.565 
2.239 
2.144 
1.872 
2.283 
3.205 
2.219 
2.925 
2.477 
2.556 
4.996 
5.351 
66 
80 
65 
103 
112 
128 
131 
79 
111 
107 
104 
120 
135 
142 
-0.500 
-0.686 
-0.447 
-0.997 
-1.178 
-1.370 
-1.398 
-0.654 
-1.176 
-1.074 
-1.053 
-1.243 
-1.488 
-1.615 
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Table B3.4. Comparison of rankings obtained with cluster analysis and PCA (sample 
restricted), 1993-2002 
Cluster – main 
characteristic 
Country 
State effectiveness scores Political violence scores 
Rank Score Rank Score 
France 
Estonia 
Denmark 
Czech Rep. 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Italy 
Sweden 
Finland 
Austria 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
United Kingdom 
Switzerland 
Luxembourg 
Canada 
Japan 
Portugal 
Ireland 
United States 
Australia 
Belgium 
126 
116 
142 
115 
120 
123 
118 
135 
140 
132 
119 
139 
138 
131 
136 
137 
133 
124 
125 
128 
130 
129 
127 
3.979 
2.859 
5.447 
2.849 
3.189 
3.594 
2.938 
5.008 
5.328 
4.900 
3.004 
5.201 
5.193 
4.840 
5.012 
5.190 
4.994 
3.621 
3.662 
4.582 
4.603 
4.598 
4.392 
119 
125 
138 
127 
134 
85 
122 
140 
139 
117 
118 
137 
136 
99 
130 
141 
129 
123 
126 
133 
105 
124 
132 
-1.234 
-1.315 
-1.521 
-1.332 
-1.474 
-0.731 
-1.267 
-1.536 
-1.527 
-1.227 
-1.230 
-1.514 
-1.514 
-0.908 
-1.394 
-1.545 
-1.393 
-1.272 
-1.330 
-1.449 
-1.053 
-1.314 
-1.444 
Notes: Total number of countries: 148. For consistency in the presentation of the results, countries are 
ranked from 1-148 from the lowest to the highest levels of state effectiveness (i.e. from the highest to 
the lowest levels of state ineffectiveness) in the third column, and from the highest to the lowest levels 
of political violence in the fifth column. 
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Table B3.5. Comparison of rankings obtained with cluster analysis and PCA (sample 
restricted), 2003-2012 
Cluster – main 
characteristic 
Country 
State effectiveness scores Political violence scores 
Rank Score Rank Score 
Cluster 2 
Low levels of 
state 
effectiveness + 
Highest levels of 
political violence 
Sri Lanka 
Russian Federation 
Philippines 
Pakistan 
Turkey 
Thailand 
Israel 
Myanmar 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
India 
79 
49 
69 
34 
95 
89 
120 
2 
1 
94 
-0.512 
-1.635 
-0.955 
-2.207 
0.314 
-0.101 
2.471 
-4.437 
-4.531 
0.223 
8 
9 
5 
3 
12 
13 
6 
2 
7 
1 
4.165 
3.364 
4.653 
5.700 
2.761 
2.406 
4.230 
6.011 
4.221 
10.200 
Cluster 1 
Low levels of 
state 
effectiveness 
Gambia 
Dominican Rep. 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Ukraine 
Lebanon 
Bolivia 
Paraguay 
Benin 
Morocco 
Gabon 
Guatemala 
Kazakhstan 
Senegal 
Mongolia 
Djibouti 
Armenia 
Burkina Faso 
Moldova 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Ecuador 
Congo, Rep. 
Cameroon 
Albania 
El Salvador 
Romania 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Azerbaijan 
Zambia 
Peru 
Tajikistan 
Indonesia 
Cambodia 
Tanzania 
Fiji 
Venezuela 
Rwanda 
Vietnam 
Swaziland 
Guyana 
Macedonia 
Tunisia 
Argentina 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Kenya 
Egypt 
Sierra Leone 
66 
50 
54 
57 
52 
67 
58 
45 
55 
53 
56 
60 
38 
72 
76 
62 
68 
65 
74 
39 
40 
22 
20 
75 
83 
85 
71 
90 
26 
51 
82 
18 
36 
21 
42 
73 
24 
63 
32 
61 
88 
91 
78 
80 
29 
97 
30 
59 
25 
-1.206 
-1.576 
-1.488 
-1.402 
-1.505 
-1.193 
-1.401 
-1.794 
-1.467 
-1.489 
-1.443 
-1.332 
-2.013 
-0.894 
-0.724 
-1.314 
-1.024 
-1.235 
-0.816 
-2.010 
-2.000 
-2.907 
-2.945 
-0.797 
-0.349 
-0.228 
-0.909 
-0.034 
-2.680 
-1.532 
-0.395 
-3.085 
-2.139 
-2.934 
-1.973 
-0.856 
-2.790 
-1.312 
-2.331 
-1.322 
-0.189 
0.044 
-0.529 
-0.502 
-2.490 
0.351 
-2.418 
-1.384 
-2.713 
73 
48 
62 
93 
65 
50 
99 
86 
98 
46 
79 
76 
51 
67 
88 
97 
57 
95 
75 
61 
68 
72 
39 
106 
78 
85 
44 
81 
34 
64 
53 
47 
24 
45 
69 
104 
35 
37 
43 
74 
89 
105 
41 
103 
54 
101 
28 
27 
92 
-0.477 
-0.161 
-0.307 
-0.701 
-0.352 
-0.169 
-0.758 
-0.651 
-0.740 
-0.154 
-0.563 
-0.519 
-0.177 
-0.385 
-0.658 
-0.729 
-0.273 
-0.719 
-0.506 
-0.295 
-0.428 
-0.457 
-0.013 
-0.877 
-0.561 
-0.649 
-0.121 
-0.595 
0.178 
-0.350 
-0.222 
-0.161 
1.058 
-0.149 
-0.433 
-0.835 
0.157 
0.041 
-0.077 
-0.494 
-0.665 
-0.874 
-0.045 
-0.815 
-0.226 
-0.790 
0.545 
0.667 
-0.694 
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Table B3.5. Comparison of rankings obtained with cluster analysis and PCA (sample 
restricted), 2003-2012 
Cluster – main 
characteristic 
Country 
State effectiveness scores Political violence scores 
Rank Score Rank Score 
Lao 
Mozambique 
Brazil 
Togo 
Jamaica 
Algeria 
Suriname 
Uzbekistan 
Bosnia 
Niger 
Malawi 
Saudi Arabia 
Jordan 
Panama 
Bangladesh 
Angola 
Madagascar 
South Africa 
Burundi 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Namibia 
Uganda 
Turkmenistan 
China 
Equatorial Guinea 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Lesotho 
Croatia 
Iran 
Nepal 
Cuba 
Mali 
Cape Verde 
Papua New Guinea 
Guinea 
Mauritania 
Nigeria 
Central African Rep. 
Yemen 
Mexico 
Ethiopia 
Chad 
Haiti 
Colombia 
Guinea-Bissau 
Côte d’Ivoire 
11 
35 
87 
15 
92 
47 
93 
13 
77 
37 
86 
70 
96 
99 
17 
7 
46 
104 
23 
27 
105 
44 
3 
33 
4 
107 
98 
108 
14 
43 
48 
64 
110 
41 
10 
31 
19 
9 
12 
84 
28 
5 
6 
81 
16 
8 
-3.356 
-2.158 
-0.209 
-3.160 
0.115 
-1.725 
0.210 
-3.209 
-0.608 
-2.076 
-0.227 
-0.941 
0.334 
0.410 
-3.090 
-3.633 
-1.750 
0.822 
-2.848 
-2.663 
0.855 
-1.827 
-4.320 
-2.214 
-4.158 
1.105 
0.405 
1.252 
-3.176 
-1.962 
-1.659 
-1.254 
1.500 
-1.974 
-3.374 
-2.373 
-3.077 
-3.385 
-3.311 
-0.263 
-2.593 
-3.834 
-3.717 
-0.410 
-3.090 
-3.403 
59 
71 
36 
58 
60 
22 
111 
31 
116 
70 
80 
29 
52 
127 
26 
33 
77 
49 
30 
25 
108 
16 
42 
23 
40 
94 
118 
131 
21 
17 
63 
91 
124 
83 
55 
66 
11 
14 
20 
19 
10 
15 
38 
4 
115 
18 
-0.288 
-0.455 
0.045 
-0.273 
-0.294 
1.329 
-0.983 
0.258 
-1.030 
-0.438 
-0.594 
0.445 
-0.189 
-1.216 
0.685 
0.189 
-0.555 
-0.166 
0.419 
1.050 
-0.918 
2.116 
-0.060 
1.138 
-0.042 
-0.716 
-1.070 
-1.274 
1.350 
1.957 
-0.342 
-0.671 
-1.176 
-0.630 
-0.257 
-0.362 
2.843 
2.370 
1.770 
1.901 
2.941 
2.353 
-0.008 
4.975 
-0.998 
1.932 
Cluster 3 
Highest levels of 
state 
effectiveness + 
Lowest levels of 
political violence 
Un. Arab Emirates 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Kuwait 
Bahrain 
Oman 
Qatar 
United States 
Denmark 
Greece 
Slovak Rep. 
Latvia 
Mauritius 
Finland 
103 
100 
129 
101 
106 
102 
109 
133 
148 
111 
113 
112 
117 
146 
0.780 
0.453 
3.513 
0.644 
0.899 
0.763 
1.313 
4.271 
5.754 
1.662 
1.895 
1.674 
2.205 
5.370 
90 
56 
102 
84 
87 
114 
113 
32 
145 
96 
128 
117 
107 
141 
-0.667 
-0.259 
-0.800 
-0.640 
-0.651 
-0.997 
-0.994 
0.213 
-1.539 
-0.721 
-1.223 
-1.045 
-0.906 
-1.418 
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Table B3.5. Comparison of rankings obtained with cluster analysis and PCA (sample 
restricted), 2003-2012 
Cluster – main 
characteristic 
Country 
State effectiveness scores Political violence scores 
Rank Score Rank Score 
New Zealand 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Korea, Rep. 
Germany 
Austria 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Canada 
Botswana 
Switzerland 
Lithuania 
Cyprus 
Australia 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Czech Rep. 
Uruguay 
France 
Ireland 
Belgium 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Japan 
Portugal 
147 
145 
144 
143 
115 
142 
119 
137 
140 
130 
114 
141 
118 
139 
116 
126 
138 
125 
136 
122 
121 
132 
135 
134 
124 
127 
123 
131 
128 
5.395 
5.349 
5.302 
5.296 
2.119 
5.084 
2.395 
4.799 
4.942 
3.548 
2.025 
5.010 
2.284 
4.931 
2.171 
3.342 
4.871 
3.205 
4.740 
2.663 
2.626 
4.153 
4.595 
4.415 
3.095 
3.414 
2.839 
4.012 
3.442 
144 
147 
148 
142 
120 
146 
100 
140 
126 
109 
134 
136 
112 
125 
132 
110 
130 
82 
121 
133 
137 
123 
135 
139 
143 
129 
119 
138 
122 
-1.516 
-1.569 
-1.596 
-1.439 
-1.088 
-1.560 
-0.768 
-1.388 
-1.194 
-0.932 
-1.285 
-1.323 
-0.991 
-1.186 
-1.274 
-0.970 
-1.273 
-0.621 
-1.128 
-1.275 
-1.344 
-1.174 
-1.305 
-1.385 
-1.482 
-1.256 
-1.083 
-1.382 
-1.169 
Notes: Total number of countries: 148. For consistency in the presentation of the results, countries are 
ranked from 1-148 from the lowest to the highest levels of state effectiveness (i.e. from the highest to the 
lowest levels of state ineffectiveness) in the third column, and from the highest to the lowest levels of 
political violence in the fifth column. 
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Appendix B4. Scores comparison: additional tables 
Table B4.1. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and CPIA (full sample), 
2005-2012 
Country SE index PV index CPIA 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
.. 
78 
49 
6 
83 
70 
145 
147 
27 
113 
19 
31 
141 
56 
109 
61 
81 
125 
88 
100 
69 
23 
22 
21 
148 
118 
10 
5 
137 
33 
85 
41 
1 
20 
122 
9 
116 
59 
134 
128 
155 
68 
.. 
52 
37 
62 
84 
4 
.. 
135 
30 
71 
152 
139 
54 
63 
80 
144 
.. 
110 
27 
33 
107 
53 
139 
133 
31 
80 
25 
56 
142 
92 
72 
104 
119 
116 
36 
102 
95 
30 
48 
40 
137 
124 
12 
13 
111 
23 
4 
143 
7 
81 
136 
22 
141 
64 
115 
140 
150 
101 
.. 
47 
73 
24 
83 
37 
.. 
135 
9 
100 
144 
132 
76 
67 
55 
148 
8 
.. 
.. 
11 
.. 
79 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
47 
.. 
.. 
54 
74 
63 
58 
.. 
.. 
.. 
67 
25 
36 
29 
.. 
78 
7 
6 
.. 
.. 
.. 
5 
15 
18 
.. 
13 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
26 
71 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
3 
.. 
46 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
35 
80 
.. 
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Table B4.1. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and CPIA (full sample), 
2005-2012 
Country SE index PV index CPIA 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
95 
117 
.. 
65 
8 
16 
91 
7 
55 
130 
97 
40 
13 
142 
126 
121 
96 
138 
101 
45 
29 
.. 
127 
.. 
107 
47 
15 
119 
66 
106 
36 
123 
149 
94 
42 
93 
102 
.. 
64 
.. 
28 
124 
87 
.. 
77 
76 
103 
60 
34 
3 
112 
39 
153 
154 
57 
38 
17 
150 
111 
35 
105 
82 
94 
.. 
78 
50 
118 
99 
57 
61 
123 
1 
29 
19 
138 
8 
122 
62 
147 
43 
49 
26 
.. 
103 
.. 
89 
52 
69 
114 
51 
121 
98 
134 
152 
108 
74 
85 
60 
.. 
79 
.. 
58 
106 
16 
.. 
77 
88 
126 
46 
71 
3 
112 
20 
153 
151 
96 
65 
14 
154 
113 
2 
131 
76 
.. 
61 
.. 
21 
9 
43 
20 
59 
.. 
68 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
60 
24 
.. 
49 
.. 
55 
30 
.. 
.. 
52 
22 
.. 
.. 
.. 
50 
41 
.. 
51 
56 
10 
33 
.. 
.. 
12 
65 
45 
.. 
.. 
57 
.. 
.. 
40 
.. 
.. 
65 
42 
44 
.. 
.. 
39 
.. 
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Table B4.1. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and CPIA (full sample), 
2005-2012 
Country SE index PV index CPIA 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
São Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
43 
50 
86 
73 
133 
115 
90 
51 
75 
.. 
.. 
74 
72 
98 
26 
136 
120 
131 
92 
110 
.. 
132 
79 
.. 
.. 
.. 
99 
67 
151 
146 
25 
18 
46 
89 
48 
14 
.. 
114 
82 
104 
2 
.. 
44 
58 
108 
143 
140 
129 
12 
.. 
24 
32 
11 
53 
.. 
87 
86 
54 
5 
127 
109 
84 
11 
38 
.. 
.. 
28 
66 
120 
97 
105 
130 
149 
155 
45 
.. 
90 
6 
.. 
.. 
.. 
117 
68 
145 
129 
21 
41 
75 
15 
128 
59 
.. 
93 
39 
10 
42 
.. 
18 
70 
91 
125 
32 
146 
35 
.. 
34 
44 
17 
63 
.. 
34 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
64 
77 
23 
.. 
61 
.. 
28 
.. 
.. 
.. 
17 
.. 
2 
.. 
53 
75 
70 
4 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
37 
72 
.. 
19 
14 
31 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
16 
73 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
32 
38 
.. 
69 
27 
48 
1 
Notes: The rankings for the indices of state effectiveness and political violence consider 155 
countries, whereas the ranking for the CPIA only considers 80 countries. The CPIA rankings were 
obtained after calculating the average of the scores for the period considered. Data for CPIA from the 
World Databank (World Bank, 2016). 
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Table B4.2. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and FSI (full sample), 
2006-2012 
Country SE index PV index FSI 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Antigua & Bermuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
.. 
79 
50 
7 
.. 
82 
68 
145 
147 
26 
.. 
112 
19 
.. 
30 
141 
.. 
57 
110 
58 
83 
125 
89 
.. 
100 
71 
25 
23 
21 
148 
119 
10 
5 
137 
34 
85 
43 
1 
15 
122 
8 
116 
62 
134 
128 
155 
73 
52 
35 
60 
84 
4 
.. 
136 
31 
64 
152 
139 
54 
61 
80 
.. 
111 
26 
32 
.. 
105 
52 
139 
134 
33 
.. 
77 
27 
.. 
56 
142 
.. 
91 
72 
106 
118 
114 
34 
.. 
102 
92 
29 
48 
42 
138 
124 
10 
12 
110 
21 
4 
143 
7 
83 
135 
22 
140 
64 
117 
141 
149 
103 
47 
76 
23 
82 
39 
.. 
136 
9 
94 
144 
133 
80 
63 
55 
8 
115 
79 
52 
127 
150 
107 
172 
169 
63 
135 
134 
21 
137 
68 
166 
113 
98 
50 
56 
58 
121 
123 
120 
131 
36 
19 
49 
30 
171 
84 
10 
4 
157 
66 
42 
62 
5 
31 
141 
9 
133 
81 
114 
153 
173 
65 
79 
71 
41 
95 
48 
34 
142 
18 
77 
178 
160 
99 
82 
50 
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Table B4.2. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and FSI (full sample), 
2006-2012 
Country SE index PV index FSI 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
144 
95 
117 
.. 
67 
6 
14 
91 
9 
53 
129 
.. 
97 
44 
12 
.. 
142 
126 
120 
96 
138 
101 
41 
29 
.. 
127 
.. 
107 
47 
17 
118 
66 
105 
36 
.. 
124 
149 
94 
39 
93 
103 
.. 
65 
.. 
28 
123 
87 
.. 
78 
76 
102 
63 
33 
3 
111 
40 
153 
154 
55 
38 
18 
148 
75 
90 
.. 
79 
44 
119 
100 
69 
59 
123 
.. 
1 
37 
18 
.. 
137 
8 
121 
61 
145 
40 
49 
25 
.. 
101 
.. 
93 
51 
74 
113 
54 
122 
99 
.. 
132 
151 
108 
73 
86 
60 
.. 
71 
.. 
57 
104 
14 
.. 
78 
88 
125 
50 
70 
3 
112 
24 
153 
152 
96 
58 
11 
159 
125 
149 
118 
69 
13 
27 
103 
11 
87 
143 
170 
96 
55 
44 
7 
175 
61 
152 
122 
165 
89 
109 
22 
17 
156 
85 
128 
39 
47 
138 
37 
70 
28 
110 
147 
168 
101 
72 
32 
119 
83 
86 
148 
45 
151 
100 
106 
59 
132 
130 
90 
75 
14 
104 
25 
167 
174 
66 
24 
16 
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Table B4.2. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and FSI (full sample), 
2006-2012 
Country SE index PV index FSI 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
São Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
150 
113 
37 
106 
45 
51 
88 
72 
.. 
133 
115 
90 
49 
77 
.. 
.. 
74 
70 
98 
.. 
27 
135 
121 
132 
92 
.. 
109 
.. 
131 
75 
.. 
99 
69 
151 
146 
24 
16 
46 
86 
48 
20 
114 
81 
104 
2 
42 
59 
108 
143 
140 
130 
13 
22 
32 
11 
56 
.. 
154 
115 
2 
131 
87 
85 
53 
5 
.. 
126 
109 
81 
15 
35 
.. 
.. 
28 
62 
120 
.. 
98 
107 
127 
150 
155 
.. 
43 
.. 
89 
6 
.. 
116 
67 
146 
130 
19 
41 
84 
16 
128 
66 
97 
38 
13 
45 
20 
68 
95 
129 
31 
147 
36 
30 
46 
17 
65 
.. 
179 
145 
12 
136 
53 
108 
92 
54 
146 
164 
139 
129 
73 
35 
111 
94 
92 
102 
78 
116 
29 
163 
144 
158 
40 
1 
126 
6 
154 
26 
2 
105 
64 
177 
176 
38 
43 
74 
88 
23 
46 
124 
117 
97 
57 
20 
112 
140 
162 
161 
155 
33 
76 
91 
15 
60 
3 
Notes: The rankings for the indices of state effectiveness and political violence consider 155 
countries, whereas the ranking for the FSI considers 178 countries. Rankings were obtained after 
calculating the average of the scores for the period considered. Data for FSI from Fund for Peace 
and Foreign Policy (2015). 
312 
 
Table B4.3. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and SFI (full sample), 2003-
2012 
Country 
SE index PV index SFI 
Rank Rank Rank 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
.. 
78 
50 
7 
83 
71 
145 
147 
26 
113 
17 
29 
141 
58 
108 
61 
80 
125 
90 
102 
68 
23 
21 
20 
148 
117 
9 
5 
137 
33 
84 
42 
1 
22 
121 
8 
115 
51 
133 
129 
155 
65 
53 
41 
62 
86 
4 
.. 
134 
28 
76 
153 
139 
59 
69 
74 
144 
94 
118 
.. 
108 
22 
33 
105 
57 
135 
130 
34 
88 
26 
54 
144 
100 
71 
101 
118 
114 
36 
103 
96 
30 
45 
39 
141 
128 
14 
15 
111 
23 
4 
146 
7 
73 
139 
18 
136 
63 
112 
138 
151 
99 
48 
68 
27 
79 
40 
.. 
134 
10 
106 
147 
127 
80 
74 
44 
145 
82 
97 
4 
119 
34 
16 
130 
97 
136 
156 
43 
114 
48 
118 
139 
59 
73 
56 
105 
123 
108 
125 
22 
12 
49 
21 
156 
114 
10 
5 
132 
85 
59 
45 
2 
28 
141 
24 
125 
105 
125 
146 
156 
37 
109 
66 
52 
99 
55 
36 
146 
7 
100 
156 
141 
69 
42 
90 
156 
53 
145 
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Table B4.3. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and SFI (full sample), 2003-
2012 
Country 
SE index PV index SFI 
Rank Rank Rank 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
63 
10 
16 
91 
6 
57 
130 
99 
36 
14 
.. 
142 
127 
122 
96 
138 
101 
39 
30 
.. 
126 
.. 
107 
40 
11 
119 
70 
104 
37 
.. 
123 
149 
95 
49 
89 
106 
67 
31 
124 
87 
77 
79 
103 
56 
35 
2 
112 
45 
152 
154 
60 
38 
19 
151 
109 
34 
105 
43 
48 
77 
55 
117 
90 
38 
62 
122 
1 
24 
21 
.. 
140 
6 
123 
60 
143 
52 
51 
28 
.. 
102 
.. 
85 
61 
59 
119 
50 
121 
98 
.. 
137 
152 
107 
78 
81 
56 
92 
66 
109 
19 
76 
89 
125 
46 
72 
2 
110 
17 
153 
150 
94 
70 
11 
154 
116 
3 
132 
84 
87 
64 
13 
18 
65 
35 
87 
156 
51 
75 
43 
8 
156 
89 
149 
125 
154 
100 
84 
49 
76 
153 
97 
124 
63 
40 
149 
81 
61 
11 
80 
139 
149 
122 
53 
33 
109 
27 
26 
138 
117 
77 
92 
119 
102 
31 
9 
102 
32 
156 
137 
74 
17 
14 
135 
116 
28 
105 
61 
77 
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Table B4.3. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and SFI (full sample), 2003-
2012 
Country 
SE index PV index SFI 
Rank Rank Rank 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
85 
72 
.. 
135 
116 
88 
52 
66 
73 
75 
97 
25 
136 
120 
131 
92 
.. 
111 
.. 
132 
82 
.. 
98 
64 
150 
146 
27 
.. 
18 
44 
93 
46 
15 
114 
81 
100 
3 
47 
55 
110 
143 
140 
128 
13 
24 
32 
12 
54 
.. 
53 
5 
.. 
126 
115 
86 
9 
37 
29 
67 
120 
93 
104 
133 
149 
155 
.. 
49 
.. 
83 
8 
.. 
113 
75 
148 
129 
25 
.. 
47 
69 
13 
131 
58 
95 
41 
12 
42 
16 
65 
91 
124 
32 
142 
31 
35 
43 
20 
64 
.. 
82 
56 
155 
156 
113 
112 
90 
14 
77 
66 
104 
6 
134 
141 
156 
72 
2 
85 
20 
148 
47 
1 
94 
88 
156 
141 
66 
156 
46 
56 
95 
39 
38 
121 
96 
82 
69 
23 
109 
129 
149 
132 
131 
40 
69 
92 
25 
28 
19 
Notes: The rankings for the indices of state effectiveness and political violence consider 155 countries, 
whereas the ranking for the SFI considers 167 countries (though ranked from 1 to 156). Rankings were 
obtained after calculating the average of the scores for the period considered. Data for SFI from 
Marshall and Cole (2014b). 
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Table B4.4. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and CIFP (full sample), 
2006-2012 
Country 
SE index PV index CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Angola 
Antigua & Bermuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
.. 
79 
50 
.. 
7 
.. 
82 
68 
.. 
145 
147 
26 
.. 
112 
19 
.. 
30 
141 
.. 
57 
110 
58 
83 
125 
89 
.. 
100 
71 
25 
23 
21 
148 
119 
10 
5 
137 
34 
85 
43 
1 
15 
122 
8 
116 
62 
134 
128 
155 
73 
.. 
52 
35 
60 
84 
4 
.. 
136 
31 
64 
.. 
111 
26 
.. 
32 
.. 
105 
52 
.. 
139 
134 
33 
.. 
77 
27 
.. 
56 
142 
.. 
91 
72 
106 
118 
114 
34 
.. 
102 
92 
29 
48 
42 
138 
124 
10 
12 
110 
21 
4 
143 
7 
83 
135 
22 
140 
64 
117 
141 
149 
103 
.. 
47 
76 
23 
82 
39 
.. 
136 
9 
94 
3 
126 
59 
196 
28 
133 
148 
105 
150 
181 
189 
83 
149 
103 
44 
160 
115 
172 
118 
48 
72 
85 
84 
128 
138 
138 
147 
38 
6 
63 
34 
183 
110 
9 
7 
159 
90 
88 
43 
4 
27 
152 
10 
153 
130 
157 
171 
198 
39 
146 
95 
100 
71 
116 
35 
12 
161 
8 
89 
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Table B4.4. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and CIFP (full sample), 
2006-2012 
Country 
SE index PV index CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
152 
139 
54 
61 
80 
144 
95 
117 
.. 
67 
6 
14 
91 
9 
53 
.. 
129 
.. 
97 
44 
12 
.. 
142 
126 
120 
96 
138 
101 
41 
29 
.. 
.. 
127 
.. 
107 
47 
17 
118 
66 
105 
36 
.. 
.. 
124 
149 
.. 
94 
39 
93 
103 
.. 
65 
.. 
.. 
28 
123 
87 
.. 
78 
144 
133 
80 
63 
55 
148 
75 
90 
.. 
79 
44 
119 
100 
69 
59 
.. 
123 
.. 
1 
37 
18 
.. 
137 
8 
121 
61 
145 
40 
49 
25 
.. 
.. 
101 
.. 
93 
51 
74 
113 
54 
122 
99 
.. 
.. 
132 
151 
.. 
108 
73 
86 
60 
.. 
71 
.. 
.. 
57 
104 
14 
.. 
78 
192 
174 
78 
37 
98 
184 
73 
155 
145 
64 
17 
16 
74 
18 
69 
188 
162 
191 
55 
76 
47 
19 
182 
143 
168 
98 
185 
81 
109 
24 
111 
58 
166 
53 
121 
60 
41 
156 
68 
70 
13 
65 
193 
170 
178 
179 
119 
36 
42 
137 
93 
31 
168 
107 
15 
151 
129 
87 
117 
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Table B4.4. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and CIFP (full sample), 
2006-2012 
Country 
SE index PV index CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
São Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
.. 
76 
102 
63 
33 
3 
111 
40 
153 
.. 
154 
55 
38 
18 
150 
113 
37 
.. 
106 
45 
51 
88 
72 
.. 
133 
.. 
115 
90 
49 
77 
.. 
.. 
74 
70 
98 
.. 
27 
135 
121 
132 
92 
.. 
109 
.. 
131 
75 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
99 
69 
151 
146 
24 
.. 
16 
46 
86 
.. 
88 
125 
50 
70 
3 
112 
24 
153 
.. 
152 
96 
58 
11 
154 
115 
2 
.. 
131 
87 
85 
53 
5 
.. 
126 
.. 
109 
81 
15 
35 
.. 
.. 
28 
62 
120 
.. 
98 
107 
127 
150 
155 
.. 
43 
.. 
89 
6 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
116 
67 
146 
130 
19 
.. 
41 
84 
16 
180 
102 
92 
97 
40 
30 
108 
32 
186 
144 
187 
67 
22 
19 
195 
113 
14 
135 
131 
62 
112 
125 
76 
165 
173 
154 
134 
142 
75 
29 
124 
54 
96 
51 
104 
141 
23 
162 
164 
176 
61 
2 
114 
1 
175 
79 
140 
132 
122 
5 
120 
49 
197 
194 
50 
190 
46 
45 
106 
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Table B4.4. Comparison of rankings obtained with PCA and CIFP (full sample), 
2006-2012 
Country 
SE index PV index CIFP 
Rank Rank Rank 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
West Bank and Gaza 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
48 
20 
.. 
114 
81 
104 
2 
42 
59 
108 
143 
140 
130 
13 
.. 
22 
32 
.. 
11 
56 
.. 
128 
66 
.. 
97 
38 
13 
45 
20 
68 
95 
129 
31 
147 
36 
.. 
30 
46 
.. 
17 
65 
.. 
52 
33 
91 
127 
123 
100 
57 
26 
94 
136 
177 
158 
167 
56 
86 
82 
80 
21 
11 
65 
25 
Notes: The rankings for the indices of state effectiveness and political violence consider 155 
countries, whereas the ranking for the SFI considers 198 countries. Rankings were obtained after 
calculating the average of the scores for the period considered. Data for CIFP from Carment, Langlois-
Bertrand, and Samy (2015). 
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APPENDIX C. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 4 
 
Appendix C1. Data description 
 
Table C1.1. Variables description 
Variable Data source Notes 
GDP per capita growth Penn World Tables v9.0 
(Feenstra et al., 2015) 
Compound annual growth rate of the ratio between real GDP at 
constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011US$) and population 
(in millions) over the relevant period. 
GDP per capita, log Penn World Tables v9.0 
(Feenstra et al., 2015) 
Logarithm of the ratio between real GDP at constant 2011 national 
prices (in mil. 2011US$) and population (in millions) in the first 
year of the period for cross-country data and in the beginning of 
the relevant period for panel data. 
Education Barro and Lee (2013) Percentage of the population aged 15 and over for whom the 
secondary level is the highest level of education completed, 
averaged across the relevant period. 
Terms of trade World Bank (2016) Change in and variability (measured by the standard deviation) 
across the relevant period of the net barter terms of trade index 
(measured relative to the base year 2000). 
Geography Clemens et al. (2012) Time-invariant measure developed by Bosworth and Collins 
(2003), which averages the number of frost days and tropical land 
area. 
Inflation World Bank (2016) Logarithm of (1+inflation/100), with inflation measured by the 
consumer price index. Average in the first five years of the period 
in cross-country datasets, and across the relevant period in panel 
datasets. 
Budget balance World Bank (2016) Average of the levels of cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) in first five 
years of the period for cross-country data, and across the relevant 
period in panel data. 
Trade policy Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003); Clemens et al. 
(2012) 
Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index of openness, updated until 2001 
by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), and then until 2005 by Clemens et 
al. (2012). Data for the first year available for the relevant period 
in the cross-country datasets, and average across the relevant 
period in panel data. 
State ineffectiveness Author’s calculation Index of state ineffectiveness, with higher levels representing 
more ineffective states. Averages across the relevant period. 
Political violence Author’s calculation Index of political violence, with higher levels representing more 
violent states. Averages across the relevant period. 
Life expectancy World Bank (2016) Level of life expectancy at birth, total (years). Data for the first 
year available for the relevant period in the cross-country 
datasets, and average across the relevant period in panel data. 
Financial depth World Bank (2016) Average of the levels of money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP 
in first five years of the period for cross-country data, and across 
the relevant period in panel data. 
Revolutions Aisen and Veiga (2013) Average number of revolutions per year in the relevant time 
horizon from Databanks International (2009). (Data available 
only until 2005.) 
Ethnic fractionalization Teorell et al. (2016) Arithmetic average of Alesina et al.’s (2003) measure of ethnic 
fractionalization over the period. Reflects the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not share the 
same ethnicity (which involves a combination of racial and 
linguistic characteristics). The higher the number the lower the 
probability. 
ICRG Teorell et al. (2016) Arithmetic average of the ICRG indicator of quality of government 
over the period. This indicator is the mean value of the ICRG 
variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy 
Quality”, scaled 0-1. 
Settler mortality, log Teorell et al. (2016) Time-invariant variable representing the settler mortality rate 
faced by European settlers obtained by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001). 
Distance to equator Hall and Jones (1999) Time-invariant variable obtained by taking the absolute value of 
latitude in degrees and dividing it by 90 to obtain a 0-1 scale. 
Population speaking an 
European language 
Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002) 
Time-invariant variable that represents the fraction of a country’s 
population speaking one of the five primary Western European 
languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish) as 
a mother tongue in the present (considering 1999 as the present 
year). 
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Table C1.1. Variables description 
Variable Data source Notes 
Population speaking 
English 
Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002) 
Time-invariant variable that captures the percentage of the 
population speaking English as a mother tongue in the present 
(considering 1999 as the present year). 
Frankel and Romer’s log 
of predicted trade share 
Hall and Jones (1999) Time-invariant variable constructed by Frankel and Romer 
(1996) based on a gravity model of international trade that 
considers only the population of a country and its geographical 
characteristics. 
Domestic food price 
index 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization (2016) 
Level of the domestic food price index averaged across the 
relevant time period. 
Notes: ‘Relevant period’ corresponds to the full period in the case of cross-country datasets, and to 5-year 
or 10-year averages in the case of panel datasets. 
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Table C1.2. Samples of countries 
Cross-country data  Panel data 
1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  1993-2012 
5-year averages 
1993-2012 
10-year averages 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Algeria 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
 Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
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Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
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Table C1.3. Descriptive statistics, cross-country data 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
 1993-2012  1993-2002  2003-2012 
Real GDP per capita growth 92 2.136641 1.576926 -2.011328 8.653811  87 1.882072 1.845489 -3.612879 7.208185  80 2.417622 1.887718 -1.072815 10.11893 
Log(initial pc GDP) 92 8.827087 1.173076 5.831714 10.9823  87 8.92795 1.111673 6.469967 10.9823  80 8.915889 1.187617 5.831714 10.9823 
Education 92 21.76891 11.98971 1.201902 50.53092  87 20.15492 11.9177 1.311274 53.82947  80 25.1612 12.97448 1.647901 52.95671 
Change in terms of trade 92 3.73645 24.72288 -42.45064 103.2097  87 -.967539 2.791307 -9.782608 5.849472  80 -5.425709 33.85301 -130.7658 115.33 
St. dev. of terms of trade 92 16.7738 15.06852 .9890673 75.80861  87 7.227754 8.076818 .0896293 40.78114  80 12.25825 12.95037 .9912537 56.95029 
Geography 92 -.0422727 .9944857 -1.04 1.783878  87 .0092951 .9977092 -1.04 1.783878  80 .0206035 1.010335 -1.04 1.783878 
Log(1+inflation) 92 .2156044 .5059478 .0074228 4.007075  87 .1716055 .3184602 .0074228 2.217585  80 .0559338 .0438649 .00037 .191469 
Initial budget balance 92 -2.124591 3.350551 -8.871235 13.66614  87 -2.15153 3.430725 -8.871235 13.66614  80 -1.104589 3.795847 -8.528645 13.15924 
Initial trade policy 92 .75 .4353854 0 1  87 .7816092 .4155492 0 1  80 .8625 .3465472 0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 92 .2391304 .4288898 0 1  87 .2068966 .407429 0 1  80 .225 .4202169 0 1 
East Asia 92 .1195652 .3262303 0 1  87 .1264368 .3342676 0 1  80 .125 .3328055 0 1 
Latin America and Caribbean 92 .2282609 .4220114 0 1  87 .2298851 .4231979 0 1  80 .1875 .3927749 0 1 
State ineffectiveness 92 -.4387873 2.643555 -5.382778 4.168341  87 -.6817894 2.524259 -5.094729 3.856543  80 -.7292272 2.706384 -5.5108 4.306918 
Political violence 92 .000762 1.850667 -2.053569 7.550156  87 -.0178419 1.978693 -2.096025 7.658358  80 -.0328353 1.894972 -2.03281 7.429932 
 
Table C1.4. Descriptive statistics, panel data 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
 5-year periods  10-year periods 
Real GDP per capita growth 198 2.612477 2.235379 -4.319879 12.29542  167 2.138623 1.879454 -3.612879 10.11893 
Log(initial pc GDP) 198 8.945407 1.071635 6.238213 11.22593  167 8.941128 1.147029 6.157898 11.15617 
Education 198 21.69387 12.33916 1.508707 57.03806  167 22.55314 12.64861 1.311274 53.82947 
Terms of trade 198 -.9735745 12.18255 -88.2172 71.92255  167 -3.10319 23.54622 -130.7658 115.33 
Geography 198 -.0684408 .9732804 -1.04 1.783878  167 .0147123 1.000762 -1.04 1.783878 
Log(1+inflation) 198 .0876239 .1745852 -.0110155 2.217585  167 .0951365 .1729159 -.0008251 1.633731 
Budget balance 198 -1.252692 3.46125 -10.95463 13.66614  167 -1.874662 3.393525 -9.621738 14.80713 
Trade policy 198 .8558923 .33265 0 1  167 .8518962 .3390988 0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 198 .1919192 .3948081 0 1  167 .2155689 .4124531 0 1 
East Asia 198 .1363636 .3440442 0 1  167 .1257485 .3325629 0 1 
Latin America and Caribbean 198 .2575758 .4384076 0 1  167 .2095808 .4082336 0 1 
State ineffectiveness 198 -.5386637 2.425426 -5.440109 4.314941  167 -.7045141 2.605269 -5.5108 4.306918 
Political violence 198 .0869463 2.000104 -2.096025 7.70021  167 -.0250243 1.933225 -2.096025 7.658358 
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Appendix C2. Diagnostic tests 
 
Table C2.1. Correlation matrix, cross-country data, 1993-2012 
 
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
T
er
m
s 
o
f 
tr
ad
e 
St
d
. d
ev
. 
T
er
m
s 
o
f 
tr
ad
e 
G
eo
gr
ap
h
y 
In
fl
at
io
n
 
B
u
d
ge
t 
b
al
an
ce
 
T
ra
d
e 
p
o
li
cy
 
SS
A
 
E
as
t 
A
si
a 
L
at
in
 A
m
er
ic
a 
St
at
e 
in
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
v
io
le
n
ce
 
GDP per capita 1             
Education 0.7481 1            
Terms of trade 0.1334 0.1310 1           
St. dev. terms of trade -0.3035 -0.2898 0.3129 1          
Geography 0.6183 0.5970 0.1411 -0.3325 1         
Inflation -0.1704 -0.1014 0.0859 0.1390 -0.0648 1        
Budget balance -0.0362 -0.0103 0.1053 0.0601 -0.2595 -0.1412 1       
Trade policy 0.4701 0.4144 -0.0786 -0.4902 0.2441 -0.1912 0.0598 1      
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.6009 -0.5102 -0.1092 0.2394 -0.3986 0.1289 0.0495 -0.2648 1     
East Asia 0.0855 0.1501 0.0130 0.0017 -0.0149 -0.1109 0.3182 0.0580 -0.2066 1    
Latin America -0.0026 -0.0524 0.0181 0.0889 -0.3603 0.0467 0.1842 0.1346 -0.3049 -0.2004 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.8349 -0.7085 -0.0291 0.4664 -0.6466 0.2775 0.0154 -0.5526 0.3934 -0.0914 0.1826 1  
Political violence -0.5107 -0.3909 0.0052 0.3399 -0.3312 0.3027 -0.1426 -0.4983 0.0905 0.0780 -0.1176 0.5957 1 
Notes: Coefficients higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 92 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table C2.2. Correlation matrix, cross-country data, 1993-2002  
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GDP per capita 1             
Education 0.6832 1            
Terms of trade 0.2013 0.1719 1           
St. dev. terms of trade -0.5766 -0.4684 -0.1678 1          
Geography 0.6061 0.5593 0.0811 -0.4819 1         
Inflation -0.0487 -0.0670 -0.1300 0.0624 0.0346 1        
Budget balance 0.0051 0.0413 -0.0387 0.1098 -0.2280 -0.1818 1       
Trade policy 0.3956 0.3278 0.3105 -0.3884 0.1986 -0.0718 0.0862 1      
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.5462 -0.4357 0.0556 0.3713 -0.3685 -0.0461 0.0104 -0.1421 1     
East Asia 0.0584 0.1824 0.0215 0.1585 -0.0352 -0.1291 0.3701 0.0337 -0.1943 1    
Latin America -0.0348 -0.1265 -0.0896 -0.0027 -0.3806 0.1563 0.1862 0.0904 -0.2791 -0.2079 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.8478 -0.6662 -0.3073 0.5241 -0.6130 0.2318 -0.0186 -0.5265 0.3652 -0.0664 0.1854 1  
Political violence -0.5572 -0.3926 -0.2117 0.4714 -0.3614 0.1424 -0.1721 -0.5384 0.1223 0.0707 -0.0987 0.6139 1 
Notes: Coefficients higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 87 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table C2.3. Correlation matrix, cross-country data, 2003-2012 
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GDP per capita 1             
Education 0.7370 1            
Terms of trade 0.1742 0.2419 1           
St. dev. terms of trade -0.1993 -0.2007 -0.2923 1          
Geography 0.6285 0.5798 0.2754 -0.2742 1         
Inflation -0.4379 -0.2953 -0.1608 0.2318 -0.3666 1        
Budget balance 0.0237 -0.0625 0.1111 0.4141 0.0388 -0.0386 1       
Trade policy 0.2577 0.2524 0.3200 -0.4838 0.1488 -0.3736 -0.1078 1      
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.6105 -0.4736 -0.2043 0.2675 -0.4117 0.1378 0.1140 -0.1326 1     
East Asia 0.0976 0.0736 0.0968 -0.0706 -0.0916 -0.0846 0.0493 0.0412 -0.2037 1    
Latin America -0.0326 -0.0338 -0.0776 0.1065 -0.3694 0.3005 0.0340 0.0988 -0.2588 -0.1816 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.8292 -0.6753 -0.2343 0.3727 -0.6547 0.5698 0.0470 -0.4412 0.3942 -0.0821 0.1689 1  
Political violence -0.4734 -0.3479 -0.0792 0.1519 -0.3166 0.3721 -0.1209 -0.4584 0.0145 0.0733 -0.0904 0.5969 1 
Notes: Coefficients higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 80 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table C2.4.  Correlation matrix, panel data, 5-year periods 
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GDP per capita 1            
Education 0.6635 1           
Terms of trade 0.0224 0.1253 1          
Geography 0.5469 0.5400 0.1340 1         
Inflation -0.0883 -0.1753 -0.0281 -0.0957 1        
Budget balance 0.1318 0.0341 0.0567 0.0433 -0.1433 1       
Trade policy 0.2945 0.2224 0.1417 0.0720 -0.0641 0.0098 1      
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.4938 -0.3702 -0.0334 -0.2806 -0.0216 0.1144 0.0029 1     
East Asia 0.0356 0.0950 0.0670 -0.1072 -0.0519 0.1758 -0.0492 -0.1936 1    
Latin America -0.0255 -0.1333 -0.0536 -0.3689 0.1989 -0.0080 0.1096 -0.2871 -0.2341 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.8381 -0.6547 -0.1534 -0.5844 0.1854 -0.1149 -0.4280 0.2903 -0.0282 0.1754 1  
Political violence -0.4833 -0.3173 -0.0247 -0.2864 0.1372 -0.2559 -0.4885 -0.0099 0.1379 -0.1476 0.5372 1 
Notes: Coefficients higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 85 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table C2.5.  Correlation matrix, panel data, 10-year periods 
 
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
T
er
m
s 
o
f 
tr
ad
e 
G
eo
gr
ap
h
y
 
In
fl
at
io
n
 
B
u
d
ge
t 
b
al
an
ce
 
T
ra
d
e 
p
o
li
cy
 
SS
A
 
E
as
t 
A
si
a 
L
at
in
 A
m
er
ic
a 
St
at
e 
in
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
v
io
le
n
ce
 
GDP per capita 1            
Education 0.7099 1           
Terms of trade 0.1399 0.1609 1          
Geography 0.6158 0.5591 0.1947 1         
Inflation -0.0846 -0.1280 -0.0326 -0.0283 1        
Budget balance 0.0166 0.0011 -0.0089 -0.0586 -0.0873 1       
Trade policy 0.3340 0.2713 0.1836 0.1417 -0.1241 -0.0478 1      
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.5836 -0.4413 -0.1411 -0.3894 -0.0188 0.1134 -0.1365 1     
East Asia 0.0745 0.1250 0.0678 -0.0623 -0.0955 0.1660 0.0059 -0.1988 1    
Latin America -0.0297 -0.0902 -0.0518 -0.3748 0.1578 0.0763 0.1124 -0.2699 -0.1953 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.8366 -0.6594 -0.1839 -0.6336 0.2353 0.0287 -0.4720 0.3794 -0.0741 0.1773 1  
Political violence -0.5149 -0.3634 -0.0660 -0.3401 0.1586 -0.1577 -0.5282 0.0709 0.0719 -0.0947 0.6047 1 
Notes: Coefficients higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 92 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table C2.6. Variance inflation factors, cross-country data 
1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
State ineffectiveness 
GDP per capita 
SSA 
Geography 
Education 
LAC 
Political violence 
Trade policy 
Terms trade std. 
East Asia 
Budget balance 
Terms of trade 
Inflation 
5.95 
5.76 
3.31 
3.03 
2.67 
2.60 
2.36 
1.87 
1.85 
1.56 
1.41 
1.27 
1.27 
State ineffectiveness 
GDP per capita 
Geography 
SSA 
LAC 
Political violence 
Education 
Terms of trade std. 
Trade policy 
East Asia 
Budget balance 
Inflation 
Terms trade 
6.31 
5.64 
2.87 
2.56 
2.38 
2.35 
2.24 
1.90 
1.80 
1.71 
1.48 
1.30 
1.21 
GDP per capita 
State ineffectiveness 
SSA 
Geography 
LAC 
Education 
Political violence 
Trade policy 
Terms trade std. 
Inflation 
Budget balance 
East Asia 
Terms trade 
6.25 
6.14 
3.49 
3.47 
2.61 
2.53 
2.36 
1.97 
1.96 
1.75 
1.48 
1.46 
1.34 
Mean VIF 2.69 Mean VIF 2.60 Mean VIF 2.83 
 
Table C2.7. Variance inflation factors, panel data 
5-year periods 10-year periods 
Variable VIF Variable VIF 
GDP per capita 
State ineffectiveness 
SSA 
Geography 
LAC 
Political violence 
Education 
Trade policy 
East Asia 
Budget balance 
Inflation 
Terms of trade 
5.28 
5.21 
2.53 
2.50 
2.34 
2.16 
2.12 
1.56 
1.52 
1.26 
1.14 
1.12 
GDP per capita 
State ineffectiveness 
Geography 
SSA 
Political violence 
LAC  
Education 
Trade policy 
East Asia 
Budget balance 
Inflation 
Terms trade 
5.71 
5.59 
3.06 
2.90 
2.37 
2.35 
2.22 
1.66 
1.45 
1.20 
1.19 
1.09 
Mean VIF 2.40 Mean VIF 2.57 
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Appendix C3. State fragility indices: additional tables 
 
Table C3.1. Eigenvectors of the first principal component for state ineffectiveness and 
political violence 
State ineffectiveness  Political violence 
Variable Eigenvectors  Variable Eigenvectors 
Rule of law 0.3932  Physical integrity -0.4193 
Regulatory quality 0.3793  Empowerment rights -0.2607 
Independence of judiciary 0.3161  Political terror scale 0.4289 
Control of corruption 0.3848  Episodes of civil violence 0.4316 
Property rights protection 0.3655  Armed conflict 0.3891 
Government effectiveness 0.3909  Coups d’état 0.0909 
Public health expenditure 0.2987  Revolutionary wars 0.2882 
Access to water 0.2737  Ethnic wars 0.3784 
Failure of state authority -0.0542    
Notes: The eigenvectors in the first column were obtained from applying PCA to the variables used to proxy for 
state ineffectiveness, whereas those in the second column were obtained from applying PCA to the variables 
proxying for political violence. 
 
Table C3.2. Eigenvectors of the first principal component for the two versions of the 
single index of state fragility 
State fragility (version 1)  State fragility (version 2) 
Variable Eigenvectors  Variable Eigenvectors 
State ineffectiveness -0.7071  Rule of law 0.3326 
Political violence 0.7071  Regulatory quality 0.3234 
   Independence of judiciary 0.2751 
   Control of corruption 0.3271 
   Property rights protection 0.3053 
   Government effectiveness 0.3262 
   Public health expenditure 0.2675 
   Access to water 0.2228 
   Failure of state authority -0.0489 
   Physical integrity 0.2783 
   Empowerment rights 0.2379 
   Political terror scale -0.2846 
   Episodes of civil violence -0.1474 
   Armed conflict -0.1311 
   Coups d’état -0.0507 
   Revolutionary wars -0.0859 
   Ethnic wars -0.1225 
Notes: The eigenvectors for version 1 were obtained from applying PCA to the two indices obtained before, 
whereas those in version 2 result from applying PCA to all the variables used in the analysis. 
 
Table C3.3. Standard deviation decomposition, panel data, 1993-2012 
 State ineffectiveness Political violence 
 Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
-1.51e-09 
2.470355 
2.462491 
0.3274105 
N=1878 
n= 158 
T=11.8861 
-.0875184 
1.835623 
1.67571 
0.794168 
N=3106 
n= 166 
T=18.7108 
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Figure C3.1. Histograms for state ineffectiveness and political violence, cross-country 
data, 1993-2012 
 
 
Figure C3.2. Histograms for state ineffectiveness and political violence, cross-country 
data, 1993-2002 
 
 
Figure C3.3. Histograms for state ineffectiveness and political violence, cross-country 
data, 2003-2012 
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Figure C3.4. Histograms for state ineffectiveness and political violence, panel data, 5-
year averages 
 
 
Figure C3.5. Histograms for state ineffectiveness and political violence, panel data, 10-
year averages 
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Appendix C4. Additional results 
 
Table C4.1. Results obtained with the different dimensions of state fragility 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 Cross-country  Panel 
 20-year 10-year  5-year 
averages 
10-year 
averages  1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Log(initial pc GDP) -1.402*** -0.913*** -1.183***  -0.984*** -0.991*** 
 (0.298) (0.341) (0.392)  (0.307) (0.336) 
Education 0.0165 0.0121 0.0485**  0.0217 0.0117 
 (0.0198) (0.0169) (0.0182)  (0.0182) (0.0174) 
Terms of trade -0.00137 -0.102 0.00581  -0.00258 -0.105 
 (0.00590) (0.0682) (0.00746)  (0.0186) (0.0686) 
St. dev. terms of trade 0.00950 0.0474 0.00969    
 (0.00958) (0.0319) (0.0153)    
Geography 0.344 0.422 -0.206  0.587*** 0.369 
 (0.241) (0.288) (0.292)  (0.208) (0.264) 
Log(1+inflation) 0.164 -0.719 17.79***  0.277 -0.555 
 (0.337) (0.523) (4.798)  (0.644) (0.621) 
Initial budget balance 0.0313 -0.0454 0.0597  0.0681 -0.0318 
 (0.0556) (0.0552) (0.0434)  (0.0454) (0.0598) 
Initial trade policy 0.0180 0.604 0.581  0.0918 0.574 
 (0.534) (0.561) (0.714)  (0.586) (0.734) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.197 -0.937 -0.461  -0.829 -0.843 
 (0.639) (0.756) (0.734)  (0.593) (0.660) 
East Asia 1.187* 0.427 0.846  0.908 0.527 
 (0.678) (0.711) (0.549)  (0.681) (0.740) 
Latin America & Caribbean 1.341** 0.0636 0.265  0.354 0.0410 
 (0.631) (0.880) (0.728)  (0.603) (0.805) 
Rule of law 0.719 0.795 -0.117  0.369 0.618 
 (1.010) (0.983) (1.027)  (0.784) (1.006) 
Regulatory quality 0.424 0.786 0.206  0.907 0.494 
 (0.698) (0.777) (0.868)  (0.793) (0.969) 
Independence of judiciary 0.515 -0.261 0.390  0.222 -0.296 
 (0.563) (0.496) (0.508)  (0.388) (0.491) 
Control of corruption -0.371 0.114 1.142  -0.0836 0.334 
 (0.652) (0.765) (0.854)  (0.685) (0.826) 
Property rights enforcement -0.0284 -0.0172 -0.0145  -0.0242 -0.00751 
 (0.0268) (0.0235) (0.0295)  (0.0187) (0.0222) 
Government effectiveness 0.723 -0.00462 -0.442  -0.166 -0.0409 
 (1.108) (0.711) (1.150)  (0.744) (0.729) 
Public expenditure in health -0.110 -0.436*** -0.132  -0.363** -0.386** 
 (0.108) (0.157) (0.128)  (0.154) (0.158) 
Access to water 0.0180 0.00490 0.00401  0.0223 -0.000824 
 (0.0190) (0.0203) (0.0263)  (0.0201) (0.0179) 
Failure state authority -2.184 -1.287* -0.805**  -0.584 -1.700** 
 (1.360) (0.753) (0.360)  (0.667) (0.814) 
Physical integrity rights 0.0363 0.322 -0.255  0.366* 0.338 
 (0.273) (0.229) (0.283)  (0.187) (0.239) 
Empowerment rights -0.174 -0.0728 -0.131  -0.149* -0.0634 
 (0.109) (0.102) (0.0877)  (0.0830) (0.0965) 
Political terror scale -0.225 0.0142 -0.656  0.133 0.0766 
 (0.554) (0.516) (0.662)  (0.417) (0.474) 
Episodes of civil violence 0.0689 0.273 -0.195  0.403 0.246 
 (0.413) (0.408) (0.302)  (0.274) (0.388) 
Armed conflict 0.516 0.200 0.751  0.609 0.253 
 (0.586) (0.495) (0.473)  (0.438) (0.487) 
Coups d’état 0.678 -3.409* -4.332  -5.388*** -3.106 
 (5.275) (1.783) (3.667)  (1.758) (1.870) 
Revolutionary wars -0.115 0.0299 0.354  -0.434 0.0561 
 (0.487) (0.426) (0.511)  (0.356) (0.427) 
Ethnic wars -0.0172 -0.322 0.291  -0.592 -0.209 
 (0.396) (0.423) (0.433)  (0.421) (0.410) 
Constant 15.14*** 10.15*** 14.72***  10.69*** 10.66*** 
 (3.212) (3.510) (3.433)  (3.385) (3.775) 
Observations 92 88 80  203 88 
R-squared 0.624 0.720 0.736  0.486 0.706 
r2_a 0.457 0.587 0.591  0.400 0.574 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
334 
 
Table C4.2. LIML results, cross-country and panel data 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 Cross-country  Panel 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.599*** -1.627*** -1.667*** -1.635*** -0.992** -1.333***  -1.842*** -1.726*** -1.863*** -1.936*** 
 (0.403) (0.384) (0.518) (0.487) (0.463) (0.322)  (0.604) (0.563) (0.492) (0.450) 
Education 0.0286 0.0280 0.0124 0.0128 0.0554*** 0.0525***  0.0348* 0.0363* 0.0380*** 0.0373*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0167) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0160)  (0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00365 0.00362 -0.137** -0.136** 0.000588 -0.000469  -0.0169 -0.0151 -0.00918 -0.00941 
 (0.00528) (0.00535) (0.0683) (0.0674) (0.00706) (0.00624)  (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.00784) (0.00777) 
St. dev. TOT growth 0.00699 0.00748 0.0316 0.0321 0.00452 0.00941      
 (0.0101) (0.00995) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0148) (0.0135)      
Geography 0.158 0.151 -0.106 -0.0995 -0.0966 -0.230  -0.0442 -0.0211 -0.271 -0.293 
 (0.275) (0.271) (0.300) (0.294) (0.292) (0.241)  (0.281) (0.268) (0.259) (0.252) 
Inflationa -0.529 -0.520 0.246 0.220 16.02*** 17.93***  1.375* 1.302* 0.848 0.946 
 (0.443) (0.444) (0.424) (0.411) (5.394) (4.525)  (0.766) (0.721) (0.741) (0.712) 
Budget balancea 0.0651 0.0648 0.0570 0.0571 0.0824** 0.0911***  0.117*** 0.116*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0478) (0.0473) (0.0344) (0.0318)  (0.0451) (0.0443) (0.0357) (0.0359) 
Policya 0.187 0.174 0.659 0.684 0.581 0.465  -0.480 -0.412 0.0421 -0.0129 
 (0.486) (0.480) (0.540) (0.523) (0.664) (0.563)  (0.847) (0.817) (0.708) (0.683) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.399*** -1.415*** -2.554*** -2.550*** -0.905 -1.156**  -2.195*** -2.153*** -2.334*** -2.370*** 
 (0.483) (0.479) (0.684) (0.680) (0.596) (0.516)  (0.572) (0.548) (0.603) (0.600) 
East Asia 1.112* 1.110 0.491 0.485 1.241*** 1.130***  0.974 0.975 0.661 0.646 
 (0.675) (0.677) (0.733) (0.733) (0.383) (0.365)  (0.662) (0.654) (0.538) (0.540) 
Latin America 0.337 0.352 -1.005* -1.019* -0.217 -0.230  -0.341 -0.379 -0.513 -0.494 
 (0.438) (0.435) (0.553) (0.543) (0.577) (0.519)  (0.462) (0.439) (0.397) (0.390) 
State ineffectiveness  -0.435* -0.456** -0.716** -0.694** 0.0463 -0.202  -0.605* -0.531 -0.509* -0.561** 
 (0.247) (0.231) (0.336) (0.310) (0.291) (0.191)  (0.355) (0.333) (0.300) (0.270) 
Political violence 0.191* 0.194** -0.0456 -0.0483 0.169 0.217**  0.0754 0.0689 0.0683 0.0763 
 (0.0982) (0.0977) (0.0993) (0.0983) (0.125) (0.0988)  (0.101) (0.101) (0.104) (0.101) 
Constant 15.53*** 15.79*** 15.94*** 15.65*** 8.626** 11.56***  19.65*** 18.57*** 18.45*** 19.14*** 
 (3.593) (3.423) (4.756) (4.482) (4.121) (2.869)  (5.887) (5.469) (4.822) (4.417) 
Exogenous instruments Dist. equator 
European lang. 
English lang. 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
English lang. 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
English lang. 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
English lang. 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
English lang. 
FR trade share 
Dist. equator 
European lang. 
Observations 91 91 86 86 79 79  196 196 165 165 
R2 0.452 0.449 0.411 0.416 0.601 0.655  0.298 0.307 0.322 0.316 
p-value of LM statisticb 0.000141 1.75e-05 0.000506 0.000123 0.00341 0.000503  0.000447 7.72e-05 0.000335 6.61e-05 
F-stat for weak ident. 8.632 15.22 8.296 11.88 7.235 11.50  9.348 12.97 10.38 13.77 
Notes: The regressions were estimated using Fuller’s version of LIML (Fuller, 1977; Baum et al., 2007), and the Fuller 4 version was considered (Fuller, 1977). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel 
estimates include time dummies. aThe initial level of these three variables is considered when in the cross-country regressions. bThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange Multiplier test is that the structural equation is 
underidentified. 
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APPENDIX D. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Appendix D1. Data description 
 
Table D1.1. Variables description 
 RS08 dataset  
(1990-2000) 
 Reproduced and expanded dataset  
(1990-2010; 1993-2012) 
Variable Data source Notes  Data source Notes 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Penn World 
Tables v6.1 
Annual average growth rate 
of real GDP (PPP) per 
capita over the relevant 
time period. 
 Penn World 
Tables v9.0 
(Feenstra et 
al., 2015) 
Compound annual growth rate of 
the ratio between real GDP at 
constant 2011 national prices (in 
mil. 2011US$) and population (in 
millions) over the relevant 
period. 
GDP per capita, 
log 
Penn World 
Tables v6.1 
Log of per capita (PPP) GDP 
at the beginning of the 
relevant time period. 
 Penn World 
Tables v9.0 
(Feenstra et 
al., 2015) 
Logarithm of the ratio between 
real GDP at constant 2011 
national prices (in mil. 2011US$) 
and population (in millions) in 
the first year of the period for 
cross-country data and in the 
beginning of the relevant period 
for panel data. 
Trade policy Wacziarg 
and Welch 
(2003) 
Sachs-Warner trade policy 
index as updated by 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) 
and prevailing at the 
beginning of the relevant 
time horizon or the year 
closest to it.  
 Wacziarg 
and Welch 
(2003); 
Clemens et 
al. (2012) 
Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index 
of openness, updated until 2001 
by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), 
and then until 2005 by Clemens et 
al. (2012). Data for the first year 
available for the relevant period 
for cross-country data and 
average value for panel data. 
Life expectancy WDI (World 
Bank) 
Life expectancy at birth at 
the beginning of the 
relevant time period. 
 World Bank 
(2016) 
Level of life expectancy at birth, 
total (years) in the first year of 
the period. 
Geography Bosworth 
and Collins 
(2003)  
Average of number of frost 
days and tropical land area.  
 Rajan and 
Subramanian 
(2008) 
Time-invariant measure 
developed by Bosworth and 
Collins (2003), which averages 
the number of frost days and 
tropical land area. 
Institutional 
quality 
Bosworth 
and Collins 
(2003) 
ICRGE index averaged over 
the period 1986-1995. 
 Teorell et al. 
(2016) 
Arithmetic average of the ICRG 
indicator of quality of 
government over the period. It is 
the mean value of the ICRG 
variable “Corruption”, “Law and 
Order” and “Bureaucracy 
Quality”, scale 0-1. Higher values 
indicate higher quality of 
government.  
Inflation Easterly’s 
Web site  
Average annual rate of 
growth of CPI-based 
inflation for the first five 
years of the relevant time 
horizon. 
 Easterly 
(2009) 
Logarithm of (1+inflation/100) in 
the first five years of the period 
(consumer prices) for cross-
country data and average over the 
relevant period for panel data. 
Financial depth WDI (World 
Bank) 
Ratio of M2/GDP for the 
first five years of the 
relevant time period. 
 Easterly 
(2009) 
Average of the levels of money 
and quasi money (M2) as % of 
GDP in the first five years of the 
period for cross-country data and 
average over the relevant period 
for panel data. 
Budget balance WDI (World 
Bank) 
Ratio of general 
government budget balance 
to GDP for the first five 
years of the relevant time 
period. 
 World Bank 
(2016) 
Average of the levels of cash 
surplus/deficit (% of GDP) in first 
five years of the period for cross-
country data and average over the 
relevant period for panel data. 
Revolutions Arthur S. 
Banks 
Average number of 
revolutions per year in the 
relevant time horizon. 
 Aisen and 
Veiga (2013) 
Average number of revolutions 
per year in the relevant time 
horizon from Databanks 
International (2009). (Data 
available only until 2005.) 
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Table D1.1. Variables description 
 RS08 dataset  
(1990-2000) 
 Reproduced and expanded dataset  
(1990-2010; 1993-2012) 
Variable Data source Notes  Data source Notes 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Easterly and 
Levine1 
Measure of the probability 
that two randomly selected 
individuals in a country 
belong to different 
ethnolinguistic groups. 
 Teorell et al. 
(2016) 
Arithmetic average of Alesina et 
al.’s (2003) measure of ethnic 
fractionalization over the period. 
Reflects the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a 
given country will not share the 
same ethnicity (which involves a 
combination of racial and 
linguistic characteristics). The 
higher the number the lower the 
probability. 
Aid/GDP OECD-DAC Ratio of aggregate net 
development assistance 
that is disbursed in current 
U.S. dollars to GDP in 
current U.S. dollars 
averaged over the relevant 
time period. 
 OECD-DAC 
(2017), 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Arithmetic average of the annual 
ratios between total net ODA 
disbursements (current prices) 
and GDP (current US$) over the 
period. 
Bilateral 
aid/GDP 
OECD-DAC Aid from 22 countries 
defined in the OECD’s DAC, 
averaged over the relevant 
period. 
 OECD-DAC 
(2017), 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Arithmetic average of the annual 
ratios between bilateral total net 
ODA disbursements (current 
prices) and GDP (current US$) 
over the period. 
Multilateral 
aid/GDP 
OECD-DAC Assistance from the World 
Bank, and the regional 
development banks, 
averaged over the relevant 
period. 
 OECD-DAC 
(2017), 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Arithmetic average of the annual 
ratios between multilateral total 
net ODA disbursements (current 
prices) and GDP (current US$) 
over the period. 
Colony Rose (2004) Dummy that takes a value 
of 1 if donor and recipient 
country were ever in 
colonial relationship. 
 Rose (2004) Dummy that takes a value of 1 if 
donor and recipient country were 
ever in colonial relationship. 
Current colony Rose (2004) Dummy that takes a value 
of 1 if donor and recipient 
country enjoy a current 
colonial relationship. 
 Rose (2004) Dummy that takes a value of 1 if 
donor and recipient country enjoy 
a current colonial relationship. 
Common 
language 
   Rose (2004) Dummy that takes a value of 1 if 
donor and recipient country have 
a common language. 
Population, log    World Bank 
(2016) 
Arithmetic average of the 
logarithm of “Population, total” 
over the period. 
Notes: 1Information obtained from the Appendix in Clemens et al. (2012) and from Easterly and Levine 
(1997), as there is no reference of the data source for this variable in Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
‘Relevant period’ corresponds to the full period in the case of cross-country datasets, and to 5-year or 10-
year averages in the case of panel datasets. 
 
  
Table D1.2. Description of additional variables 
Variable Data source Notes 
State ineffectiveness Author’s calculation Index of state ineffectiveness, with higher levels 
representing more ineffective states. Averages across the 
relevant period. 
Political violence Author’s calculation Index of political violence, with higher levels 
representing more violent states. Averages across the 
relevant period. 
Early-impact 
aid/GDP 
OECD-DAC (2017), World 
Bank (2016) 
Arithmetic average of the ratios between early-impact aid 
and GDP (current US$) over the period. Early-impact aid 
corresponds to the aid disbursements aggregated by 
purpose and matched with Clemens et al.’s (2012) 
criteria.  
Late-impact aid/GDP OECD-DAC (2017), World 
Bank (2016) 
Arithmetic average of the ratios between late-impact aid 
and GDP (current US$) over the period. Late-impact aid 
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Table D1.2. Description of additional variables 
Variable Data source Notes 
corresponds to the aid disbursements aggregated by 
purpose and matched with Clemens et al.’s (2012) 
criteria. 
Humanitarian 
aid/GDP 
OECD-DAC (2017), World 
Bank (2016) 
Arithmetic average of the ratios between humanitarian 
aid and GDP (current US$) over the period. Humanitarian 
aid corresponds to the aid disbursements aggregated by 
purpose and matched with Clemens et al.’s (2012) 
criteria. 
Distance from 
equator 
Hall and Jones (1999) Absolute value of “latitude” divided by 90. Time invariant. 
European language Hall and Jones (1999) Fraction of the population speaking one of the primary 
languages of Western Europe: English, French, German, 
Portuguese, and/or Spanish. Time invariant. 
Federal Treisman (2002) Dummy that takes the value of 1 for federal countries. 
Area World Bank (2016) Land area in a country’s total area in square kilometres. 
Time invariant.  
Notes: ‘Relevant period’ corresponds to the full period in the case of cross-country datasets, and to 5-year 
or 10-year averages in the case of panel datasets.
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Table D1.3. Samples of countries, cross-country data 
RS original + 
fragility indices1 Reproduced dataset 
1990-2000 1990-2000 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Haiti 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Haiti 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Algeria 
Angola 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Dominican Rep. 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
 
Notes: 1Compared to the original sample, this leaves out the Congo, D.R., Mauritius, Poland, and Zimbabwe. 
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Table D1.4. Sample of countries, panel data 
Reproduced dataset, 1993-2012 
10-year 5-year 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
 Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
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Table D1.5. Correlation between the variables in RS08’s original dataset and the 
reproduced dataset, 1990-2000 
Variables Cross-country 
GDP per capita growth 0.8742 
GDP per capita, log 0.9446 
Trade policy 0.9414 
Life expectancy 0.9680 
Geography 1.0000 
Institutional quality 0.8973 
Inflation 0.8746 
Financial depth 0.9522 
Budget balance 1.0000 
Revolutions 0.9132 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.7263 
Aid/GDP 0.9685 
Notes: Depending on the variable, the number of 
observations varies between 63 and 69. 
Table D1.6. Descriptive statistics, RS08’s original dataset with fragility indices, 1990-
2000 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real GDP per capita growth 66 1.24214 2.38867 -5.536778 7.407498 
Log(initial pc GDP) 66 8.028449 .8329109 6.352316 9.79439 
Initial policy 66 .4090909 .4954337 0 1 
Initial life expectancy 66 61.61091 9.988963 35.2 76.54 
Geography 66 -.4329688 .813743 -1.04 1.527951 
ICRG 66 .5484697 .1188759 .236 .859 
Log(1+inflation) 66 107.6684 378.4882 1.114526 2096.274 
Initial M2/GDP 66 35.13948 21.22671 3.862385 117.1367 
Initial budget balance 66 -1.661999 3.630742 -10.5306 12.70568 
Revolutions 66 .280303 .4073251 0 1.6 
Ethnic fractionalization 66 .4164578 .2980697 .0041175 .8994653 
Sub-Saharan Africa 66 .3181818 .4693397 0 1 
East Asia 66 .1363636 .345804 0 1 
Aid/GDP 66 4.699653 6.127432 .0295344 26.94649 
State ineffectiveness 66 .4614557 1.723084 -3.807462 3.531245 
Political violence 66 .5492936 1.899655 -1.841866 7.290517 
 
Table D1.7. Descriptive statistics, reproduced dataset, 1990-2000 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real GDP per capita growth 64 1.293641 2.385084 -7.773154 6.218605 
Log(initial pc GDP) 64 8.384289 .9460043 6.449125 10.25989 
Initial policy 64 .4375 .5 0 1 
Initial life expectancy 64 62.31443 9.609758 33.48512 76.60732 
Geography 64 -.3748638 .8567415 -1.04 1.527951 
Log(1+inflation) 64 .3323517 .640733 .0110836 3.089347 
Initial M2/GDP 64 38.62677 22.74804 9.878743 119.4378 
Initial budget balance 64 -1.528535 3.588863 -7.993786 12.70568 
Revolutions 64 .2550347 .3361867 0 1.2 
Ethnic fractionalization 64 .4932778 .2537445 .001998 .930175 
Sub-Saharan Africa 64 .328125 .4732424 0 1 
East Asia 64 .109375 .3145764 0 1 
Aid/GDP 64 5.637919 7.112306 -.006786 29.75717 
State ineffectiveness 64 .5149051 1.671475 -3.807462 3.531245 
Political violence 64 .6034927 1.892444 -1.841866 7.290517 
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Table D1.8. Descriptive statistics, reproduced dataset, 1993-2012, cross-country data 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 1993-2012  1993-2002  2003-2012 
Real GDP pc growth 77 2.350472 1.72037 -2.011328 8.653811  67 1.556851 1.88065 -3.612879 6.492055  65 3.128478 1.791093 -1.072815 10.11893 
Log(initial pc GDP) 77 8.308417 1.001024 5.876279 10.41507  67 8.434273 .931777 6.340054 10.41507  65 8.539157 1.02714 6.319989 10.67923 
Initial policy 77 .6363636 .4842001 0 1  67 .6716418 .4731602 0 1  65 .8153846 .3910046 0 1 
Initial life expectancy 77 61.85402 10.56143 27.0789 77.15366  67 62.61973 10.38658 27.0789 77.15366  65 64.71609 10.14917 43.82476 79.64878 
Geography 77 -.4220614 .851626 -1.04 1.783878  67 -.3604415 .8842396 -1.04 1.783878  65 -.4074492 .8645372 -1.04 1.783878 
Log(1+inflation) 77 .2980229 .6257046 .0105376 4.007075  67 .2558634 .4874906 .0105376 2.982069  65 .0731004 .0540953 .0083783 .3224911 
Initial M2/GDP 77 40.0761 28.28284 9.52279 186.1762  67 39.70128 23.26884 11.45173 117.0675  65 50.8794 33.32756 5.184048 186.1762 
Initial budget balance 77 -1.464987 3.177833 -8.79525 13.66614  67 -1.444747 3.500704 -8.79525 13.66614  65 -.9352023 3.542243 -8.528645 8.619019 
Revolutions 77 .2691475 .3837773 0 1.538462  67 .2638474 .3881539 0 1.4  65 .2641026 .4990375 0 2.333333 
Ethnic fractionalization 77 .50066 .2517501 .001998 .930175  67 .488718 .2486682 .001998 .930175  65 .5043528 .2455052 .001998 .930175 
Sub-Saharan Africa 77 .3766234 .4877165 0 1  67 .3283582 .4731602 0 1  65 .3692308 .4863522 0 1 
East Asia 77 .1038961 .3071266 0 1  67 .1044776 .3081877 0 1  65 .1076923 .3124038 0 1 
Aid/GDP 77 4.933385 6.490668 -.0206947 24.97945  67 4.753773 6.551538 -.0171153 30.84536  65 3.946254 5.294242 -.1209145 19.12287 
State ineffectiveness 77 .7878289 1.780522 -3.691642 4.168341  67 .5354028 1.673504 -3.756652 4.029685  65 .6511097 1.847289 -3.662749 4.306918 
Political violence 77 .4985314 1.826155 -1.690894 7.550156  67 .5628192 1.998819 -1.786807 7.658358  65 .5015755 1.891399 -1.793778 7.429932 
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Table D1.9. Descriptive statistics, reproduced dataset, 1993-2012, panel data 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 10-year averages (1993-2012)  5-year averages (1993-2012) 
Real GDP pc growth 179 2.427099 2.529156 -10.00383 8.715956  132 2.330758 1.992804 -3.612879 10.11893 
Log(initial pc GDP) 179 8.540899 .9069486 6.238213 10.64337  132 8.406227 .9575756 6.157898 10.58642 
Initial policy 179 .8115456 .3692835 0 1  132 .7967172 .3780863 0 1 
Initial life expectancy 179 64.20347 9.161249 37.4122 78.9239  132 62.35798 9.715595 38.8038 78.27317 
Geography 179 -.3236858 .8925682 -1.04 1.783878  132 -.3835892 .8715702 -1.04 1.783878 
Log(1+inflation) 179 .1266329 .2406075 -.0110155 2.217585  132 .1350666 .2757063 .0098659 2.425354 
Initial M2/GDP 179 47.52405 29.8158 11.45173 206.8786  132 47.66349 29.92461 7.762822 186.1762 
Initial budget balance 179 -1.370396 3.481877 -10.95463 13.66614  132 -1.489066 3.269502 -8.051939 14.80713 
Revolutions 179 .2457169 .4332652 0 2.333333  132 .2639731 .4444935 0 2.333333 
Ethnic fractionalization 179 .4826888 .2484842 .001998 .930175  132 .496417 .2462961 .001998 .930175 
Sub-Saharan Africa 179 .2905028 .4552679 0 1  132 .3484848 .4783057 0 1 
East Asia 179 .1117318 .3159199 0 1  132 .1060606 .3090882 0 1 
Aid/GDP 179 3.662953     5.044175 -.1789361 22.90228  132 4.356131          5.956756 -.1209145 30.84536 
State ineffectiveness 179 .4240124 1.677747 -3.77715 4.05592  132 .5923797 1.75543 -3.756652 4.306918 
Political violence 179 .4479939 1.94087 -1.883422 7.70021  132 .5326613 1.939476 -1.793778 7.658358 
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Figure D1.1. GDP per capita growth rates versus aid for different quartiles of state 
ineffectiveness and for different quartiles of political violence, 1993-2002 
Different quartiles of the state ineffectiveness index 
 
Different quartiles of the political violence index 
 
 
a. SI score below -0.43 b. SI score above -0.43 and below 0.609 
c. SI score above 0.609 and below 1.648 d. SI score above 1.648 
a. SI score below -0.949 b. SI score above -0.949 and below -0.093 
c. SI score above -0.093 and below 1.649 d. SI score above 1.649 
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Figure D1.2. GDP per capita growth rates versus aid for different quartiles of state 
ineffectiveness and for different quartiles of political violence, 2003-2012 
Different quartiles of the state ineffectiveness index 
 
Different quartiles of the political violence index 
 
a. SI score below -0.384 b. SI score above -0.384 and below 1.109 
c. SI score above 1.109 and below 1.937 d. SI score above 1.937 
a. SI score below -0.794 b. SI score above -0.794 and below -0.238 
c. SI score above -0.238 and below 1.692 d. SI score above 1.692 
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Appendix D2. Diagnostic tests 
 
Table D2.1. Correlation matrix, RS08s’s original dataset with fragility indices, 1990-2000  
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GDP per capita 1              
 
Trade policy 0.3639 1             
 
Life expectancy 0.8120 0.3916 1            
 
Geography 0.3376 0.1429 0.3713 1           
 
Inst. quality 0.6362 0.2843 0.4776 0.3308 1           
Inflation 0.0620 -0.1946 0.1046 -0.0632 -0.0036 1         
 
M2 0.3715 0.2380 0.4633 0.3253 0.4260 -0.1973 1        
 
Budget balance 0.3185 0.2784 0.2592 -0.0343 0.2332 -0.2129 0.1589 1       
 
Revolutions -0.1156 -0.0281 -0.1479 -0.1567 -0.2332 0.1288 -0.2893 -0.1789 1      
 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.2256 -0.1716 -0.3986 -0.3029 -0.0565 -0.1258 -0.1499 -0.0744 0.0126 1     
 
SSA -0.5553 -0.3037 -0.7883 -0.2781 -0.1312 -0.1685 -0.4131 -0.0864 -0.0552 0.4770 1    
 
East Asia 0.2084 0.2082 0.2103 -0.0224 0.3083 -0.1070 0.3737 0.2495 -0.0025 0.1155 -0.2714 1   
 
Aid -0.7180 -0.2822 -0.7371 -0.3750 -0.3809 0.1956 -0.3674 -0.2419 0.1267 0.1396 0.6072 -0.2100 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.7611 -0.5206 -0.7059 -0.3187 -0.6767 -0.0074 -0.4482 -0.3754 0.2294 0.1473 0.3855 -0.1972 0.5039 1  
Political violence -0.2846 -0.1941 -0.2461 -0.0875 -0.2617 -0.0095 -0.0876 -0.4007 0.6535 0.1899 0.0139 0.0055 0.0863 0.3574 1 
Notes: Values higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 66 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table D2.2. Correlation matrix, reproduced dataset, cross-country data, 1990-2000  
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GDP per capita 1              
Trade policy 0.3283 1             
Life expectancy 0.8108 0.3654 1            
Geography 0.2921 0.1077 0.3514 1           
Inflation 0.1410 -0.2242 0.1337 0.0274 1          
M2 0.4210 0.2004 0.5477 0.3231 -0.1015 1         
Budget balance 0.2936 0.4051 0.3083 -0.1109 -0.2320 0.1756 1        
Revolutions -0.2676 -0.0868 -0.2800 -0.2734 0.1366 -0.2618 -0.2423 1       
Ethnic fractionalization -0.2737 -0.2941 -0.4476 -0.4317 -0.0182 -0.2407 -0.1777 -0.0011 1      
SSA -0.5629 -0.2138 -0.7531 -0.3043 -0.2188 -0.5022 -0.0888 0.0144 0.4893 1     
East Asia 0.1763 0.2964 0.2571 0.0178 -0.1462 0.4312 0.3306 0.0172 -0.1424 -0.2449 1    
Aid -0.7650 -0.2797 -0.8105 -0.3309 0.0203 -0.3721 -0.2452 0.2553 0.2792 0.6131 -0.2508 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.6622 -0.5423 -0.6932 -0.2927 -0.0447 -0.4735 -0.3857 0.2667 0.3163 0.4258 -0.2387 0.5243 1  
Political violence -0.2790 -0.2424 -0.2822 -0.1101 -0.0425 -0.0727 -0.4402 0.7428 0.0640 0.0029 0.0520 0.1023 0.3283 1 
 Notes: Values higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 64 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table D2.3. Correlation matrix, reproduced dataset, cross-country data, 1993-2012 
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GDP per capita 1              
Trade policy 0.4211 1             
Life expectancy 0.7898 0.4545 1            
Geography 0.3781 0.1166 0.3666 1           
Inflation -0.0314 -0.1793 -0.1839 0.0431 1          
M2 0.4529 0.1872 0.5342 0.2408 -0.1605 1         
Budget balance 0.1967 0.1720 0.1426 -0.1488 -0.1263 0.1386 1        
Revolutions -0.1830 -0.2008 -0.2366 -0.2032 0.2040 -0.2519 -0.1724 1       
Ethnic fractionalization -0.4001 -0.1893 -0.5249 -0.4522 0.1728 -0.3124 -0.1210 0.0956 1      
SSA -0.6239 -0.2482 -0.7686 -0.3490 0.1117 -0.4023 -0.0201 -0.0188 0.5335 1     
East Asia 0.1432 0.0804 0.2229 0.0058 -0.1183 0.3591 0.3479 0.0945 -0.1297 -0.2647 1    
Aid -0.7624 -0.3107 -0.7635 -0.3423 0.0117 -0.3517 -0.1301 0.1355 0.2984 0.6476 -0.2447 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.6720 -0.5790 -0.6375 -0.3507 0.2489 -0.5391 -0.2530 0.3105 0.4431 0.3379 -0.1265 0.4017 1  
Political violence -0.2437 -0.4210 -0.2410 -0.0427 0.2954 -0.1307 -0.2992 0.7117 0.1502 -0.0522 0.1390 -0.0216 0.4080 1 
Notes: Values higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 77 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table D2.4. Correlation matrix, reproduced dataset, cross-country data, 1993-2002 
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GDP per capita 1              
Trade policy 0.3445 1             
Life expectancy 0.7864 0.3899 1            
Geography 0.3314 0.0684 0.3364 1           
Inflation 0.1492 -0.1007 -0.1158 0.1397 1          
M2 0.3993 0.1086 0.5151 0.2010 -0.0896 1         
Budget balance 0.2143 0.1359 0.1788 -0.1475 -0.0206 0.2090 1        
Revolutions -0.1741 -0.1729 -0.2541 -0.2011 0.1122 -0.2799 -0.1564 1       
Ethnic fractionalization -0.3288 -0.0838 -0.4490 -0.4395 0.0660 -0.1948 -0.0773 0.0606 1      
SSA -0.6078 -0.1879 -0.7623 -0.3128 0.0168 -0.4260 -0.0333 0.0161 0.4797 1     
East Asia 0.2141 0.1349 0.2447 0.0112 -0.1373 0.5291 0.3784 -0.0059 -0.1353 -0.2388 1    
Aid -0.7617 -0.2811 -0.8548 -0.3359 -0.0835 -0.4170 -0.1861 0.1870 0.3292 0.6418 -0.2284 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.6625 -0.5615 -0.6632 -0.2733 0.1817 -0.4750 -0.2428 0.3095 0.3274 0.3576 -0.2234 0.5100 1  
Political violence -0.2265 -0.4230 -0.3168 -0.0664 0.2399 -0.0918 -0.2567 0.7224 0.0902 0.0261 0.0200 0.1054 0.3944 1 
Notes: Values higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 67 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table D2.5. Correlation matrix, reproduced dataset, cross-country data, 2003-2012 
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GDP per capita 1              
Trade policy 0.1339 1             
Life expectancy 0.7356 0.1606 1            
Geography 0.3903 -0.0023 0.2729 1           
Inflation -0.1353 -0.3761 -0.2167 -0.1098 1          
M2 0.5840 0.1909 0.5955 0.2752 -0.4151 1         
Budget balance 0.1144 -0.1939 -0.1625 0.0622 0.0798 -0.1562 1        
Revolutions -0.1333 -0.1466 -0.0603 -0.1335 -0.0716 -0.1568 -0.0834 1       
Ethnic fractionalization -0.5036 -0.0937 -0.6311 -0.4304 0.1628 -0.4230 0.0553 0.0842 1      
SSA -0.6432 -0.0468 -0.8559 -0.3538 0.0877 -0.4237 0.0957 -0.0862 0.6043 1     
East Asia 0.2200 0.0374 0.2212 -0.1001 -0.0937 0.3429 0.0655 0.2156 -0.0899 -0.2658 1    
Aid -0.8012 -0.0563 -0.6084 -0.3090 -0.0020 -0.4039 -0.0412 0.0120 0.4193 0.7015 -0.2495 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.6842 -0.4373 -0.5546 -0.3483 0.4048 -0.6489 0.1166 0.1955 0.5275 0.3001 -0.1170 0.3623 1  
Political violence -0.2192 -0.3798 -0.0969 -0.0223 0.1836 -0.1449 -0.1565 0.6697 0.1845 -0.1520 0.1405 -0.0637 0.4159 1 
Notes: Values higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 65 countries for which all necessary data were available. 
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Table D2.6. Correlation matrix, reproduced dataset, panel data, 1993-2012 (5-year periods) 
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GDP per capita 1              
Trade policy 0.1248 1             
Life expectancy 0.7756 0.2036 1            
Geography 0.3094 -0.0935 0.2858 1           
Inflation 0.1444 -0.1139 -0.0211 0.1635 1          
M2 0.4342 0.0928 0.5295 0.1890 -0.1580 1         
Budget balance 0.1306 -0.0841 -0.0650 -0.0557 -0.1258 -0.0271 1        
Revolutions -0.0741 -0.1074 -0.0886 -0.1398 0.0300 -0.1825 -0.1325 1       
Ethnic fractionalization -0.3914 -0.0506 -0.5661 -0.4292 -0.0146 -0.2676 0.0023 0.0623 1      
SSA -0.5878 -0.0267 -0.7891 -0.2855 -0.0586 -0.3798 0.1250 -0.0905 0.5314 1     
East Asia 0.2222 0.0852 0.2409 -0.0361 -0.1150 0.4874 0.1861 0.0965 -0.1143 -0.2269 1    
Aid -0.7451 -0.0497 -0.6841 -0.2957 -0.0738 -0.3454 -0.0377 -0.0132 0.4133 0.6082 -0.2350 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.6549 -0.4258 -0.6229 -0.2586 0.0892 -0.5243 -0.0355 0.1838 0.3778 0.3189 -0.2238 0.3980 1  
Political violence -0.1788 -0.4012 -0.1925 -0.0292 0.0983 -0.0811 -0.2079 0.6912 0.1241 -0.0671 0.0475 -0.0483 0.3138 1 
Notes: Values higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for 179 observations. 
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Table D2.7.  Correlation matrix, reproduced dataset, panel data, 1993-2012 (10-year periods) 
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GDP per capita 1              
Trade policy 0.1702 1             
Life expectancy 0.7820 0.2871 1            
Geography 0.3502 -0.0147 0.3301 1           
Inflation 0.1253 -0.1775 -0.1209 0.0814 1          
M2 0.4734 0.1696 0.5793 0.2534 -0.1749 1         
Budget balance 0.1406 -0.0852 -0.0330 -0.0429 0.0560 -0.0170 1        
Revolutions -0.1302 -0.1993 -0.1449 -0.1624 0.0700 -0.2022 -0.0954 1       
Ethnic fractionalization -0.3830 -0.0630 -0.5546 -0.4356 0.0638 -0.3199 0.0339 0.0729 1      
SSA -0.6062 -0.0949 -0.7792 -0.3336 0.0171 -0.4134 0.0991 -0.0410 0.5420 1     
East Asia 0.1673 0.0553 0.2387 -0.0435 -0.1026 0.4483 0.1779 0.1169 -0.1127 -0.2519 1    
Aid -0.7490 -0.1808 -0.7402 -0.3201 -0.0440 -0.4133 -0.1058 0.0963 0.3635 0.6586 -0.2361 1   
State ineffectiveness -0.6314 -0.4800 -0.6389 -0.3117 0.1571 -0.5721 0.0009 0.2427 0.4302 0.3282 -0.1676 0.4203 1  
Political violence -0.2076 -0.4601 -0.2186 -0.0451 0.2061 -0.1295 -0.2065 0.6858 0.1344 -0.0609 0.0779 0.0343 0.4032 1 
Notes: Values higher than 0.7 highlighted in bold. Correlations are calculated for the 66 countries for 132 observations. 
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Table D2.8. Variance inflation factors, RS08’s original dataset 
1990-00, 70 obs. With fragility, 1990-00, 66 obs. 
Variable VIF Variable VIF 
Life expectancy 
GDP per capita 
SSA 
Institutional quality 
Aid 
Ethnic fractionalization 
M2 
East Asia 
Geography 
Budget balance 
Inflation 
Trade policy 
Revolutions 
 
7.19 
4.94 
4.23 
2.96 
2.70 
1.78 
1.70 
1.58 
1.47 
1.45 
1.33 
1.32 
1.29 
Life expectancy 
SSA 
GDP per capita 
State ineffectiveness 
Aid 
Inst. quality 
Political violence 
Revolutions 
M2 
Ethnic fractionalization 
Inflation 
East Asia 
Trade policy 
Budget balance 
Geography 
7.92 
5.54 
5.37 
4.28 
3.86 
2.99 
2.71 
2.41 
2.06 
1.82 
1.67 
1.64 
1.63 
1.58 
1.46 
Mean VIF 2.61 Mean VIF 3.13 
 
Table D2.9. Variance inflation factors, reproduced dataset, cross-country data 
1990-2000, 64 obs.  1993-2012, 77 obs.  1993-2002, 67 obs.  2003-2012, 65 obs. 
Variable VIF  Variable VIF  Variable VIF  Variable VIF 
Life exp. 
Aid 
Pol. violence 
GDP per capita 
Revolutions 
SSA 
State ineffec. 
M2 
Budget balance 
Trade policy 
Ethnic frac. 
Geography 
Inflation 
East Asia 
8.42 
5.10 
4.27 
3.82 
3.71 
3.26 
2.86 
2.46 
1.99 
1.84 
1.82 
1.69 
1.59 
1.53 
 
Life exp. 
GDP per capita 
Aid 
Pol. violence 
State ineffec. 
SSA 
Revolutions 
M2 
Trade policy 
Ethnic frac. 
Geography 
East Asia 
Inflation 
Budget balance 
6.66 
5.31 
4.72 
4.01 
3.96 
3.66 
2.87 
1.98 
1.94 
1.94 
1.65 
1.54 
1.52 
1.28 
 Life exp. 
Aid 
GDP per capita 
Pol. violence 
State ineffec. 
SSA 
Revolutions 
M2 
Trade policy 
East Asia 
Ethnic frac. 
Geography 
Budget balance 
Inflation 
11.72 
6.09 
4.27 
4.06 
3.68 
3.40 
3.03 
2.45 
1.91 
1.77 
1.66 
1.55 
1.51 
1.47 
 
GDP per capita 
SSA 
Life exp. 
State ineffec. 
Aid 
Pol. violence 
M2 
Ethnic frac. 
Revolutions 
Trade policy 
Geography 
Inflation 
Budget balance 
East Asia 
10.34 
8.55 
8.48 
5.56 
5.08 
3.50 
2.85 
2.54 
2.46 
1.79 
1.69 
1.65 
1.48 
1.44 
Mean VIF 3.17  Mean VIF 3.08  Mean VIF 3.47  Mean VIF 4.10 
 
Table B2.10. Variance inflation factors, reproduce dataset, panel data 
5-year, 179 obs.  10-year, 132 obs. 
Variable VIF  Variable VIF 
Life expectancy 
GDP per capita 
SSA 
State ineffec. 
Pol. violence 
Aid 
Revolutions 
M2 
Ethnic frac. 
Trade policy 
East Asia 
Geography 
Budget balance 
Inflation 
6.68 
5.32 
3.60 
3.20 
3.17 
3.01 
2.45 
2.24 
1.85 
1.71 
1.55 
1.42 
1.35 
1.25 
 
Life expectancy 
GDP per capita 
SSA 
State ineffec. 
Pol. violence 
Aid 
Revolutions 
M2 
Ethnic frac. 
Trade policy 
East Asia 
Geography 
Budget balance 
Inflation 
6.72 
4.95 
3.69 
3.49 
3.41 
3.36 
2.38 
2.30 
1.93 
1.88 
1.51 
1.45 
1.33 
1.31 
Mean VIF 2.77  Mean VIF 2.84 
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Appendix D3. Additional estimations 
Table D3.1. Robustness checks to Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) instrument using the 
logarithm of population, cross-country data 
Results A: Addition of log(pop) as control 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 RS08 original RS08 reconstructed 
 1990-2000 1990-2000 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aid/GDP 0.171 -0.000907 -0.0688 -0.00133 -0.287 
 (1.154) (0.164) (0.146) (0.203) (1.011) 
Log(pop) 0.615 1.56e-09 2.49e-09* 3.20e-09** 0 
 (1.693) (1.58e-09) (1.29e-09) (1.43e-09) (6.31e-09) 
Observations 66 64 77 67 65 
R2 0.592 0.655 0.494 0.542 0.337 
p-value of LM statistica 0.674 0.0634 0.0451 0.0194 0.523 
F-stat for weak ident. 0.134 2.471 5.757 5.095 0.341 
Results B: Log(pop) as instrument (second-stage) 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 RS08 original RS08 reconstructed 
 1990-2000 1990-2000 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aid/GDP -0.241** -0.224 -0.507** -0.674* -0.284 
 (0.116) (0.179) (0.221) (0.403) (0.194) 
Observations 66 64 77 67 65 
R2 0.610 0.529 -0.058 -0.049 0.340 
p-value of LM statistica 0.00560 0.0124 0.0236 0.0297 0.0838 
F-stat for weak ident. 8.640 9.353 10.61 3.791 8.402 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-
Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified. bp-value of Hansen J statistic, whish tests the 
overidentifying restrictions. 
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Table D3.2. IV results with bilateral and multilateral aid, cross-country and panel data 
 CROSS-COUNTRY DATA  PANEL DATA 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth  Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
                                                                                                                      Results A: Bilateral aid 
 20-year 10-year  1993-2012 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Bilateral aid/GDP -0.349* 0.0818 0.254 -0.367* -0.730 5.073 -4.425 -2.765 -1.349  -0.517 -0.530 -0.277 -0.526** -0.343 -0.246 
 (0.183) (0.301) (0.585) (0.197) (1.689) (205.5) (14.43) (3.773) (2.538)  (0.452) (0.729) (0.497) (0.240) (0.373) (0.830) 
Bilateral aid x SI  -0.323* -0.231  0.266 -7.517  -0.358 -0.909   -0.293 -0.144  -0.418 -0.821 
  (0.175) (0.379)  (1.143) (292.0)  (0.758) (1.100)   (0.570) (0.527)  (0.278) (1.175) 
Bilateral aid x PV  0.0325 0.185  -0.0345 -3.135  0.425 -0.281   0.179 0.254  0.204 -0.437 
  (0.0805) (0.459)  (0.131) (124.1)  (0.698) (0.834)   (0.250) (0.230)  (0.171) (1.092) 
Bilateral aid x SI x PV   -0.156   2.712   0.402    -0.120   0.432 
   (0.468)   (107.3)   (0.489)    (0.127)   (0.839) 
Observations 77 77 77 67 67 67 65 65 65  179 179 179 132 132 132 
R2 0.376 0.177 0.104 0.473 0.256 -179.642 -16.057 -7.492 -8.212  0.319 -0.034 0.273 0.335 -0.341 -4.751 
p-value of LM statistica 0.00176 0.0369 0.724 0.000399 0.493 0.980 0.749 0.350 0.357  0.0121 0.207 0.197 0.00500 0.0385 0.600 
F-stat for weak ident. 12.13 1.492 0.0236 13.26 0.107 0.000115 0.0774 0.209 0.153  6.015 0.524 0.410 9.477 1.707 0.0616 
                                                                                                                      Results B: Multilateral aid 
 20-year 10-year  1993-2012 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year 10-year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Multilateral aid /GDP -0.858* 0.375 -3.464 -0.773* 0.703 -0.615 1.974 3.355 2.801  -0.950 -8.497 -1.790 -1.048** -1.585 -0.191 
 (0.440) (1.192) (135.9) (0.410) (18.81) (1.099) (2.017) (5.105) (3.853)  (1.025) (47.54) (4.036) (0.525) (3.027) (2.420) 
Multilateral aid x SI  -0.699 14.67  -1.992 -0.273  0.254 0.675   -0.772 -0.156  -2.266 2.645 
  (0.529) (576.3)  (24.96) (1.814)  (1.575) (1.686)   (7.623) (1.649)  (3.659) (10.35) 
Multilateral aid x PV  0.149 16.91  0.897 0.249  -1.188 -0.649   2.368 1.017  1.740 0.972 
  (0.243) (629.3)  (10.53) (0.524)  (1.228) (1.618)   (15.04) (2.338)  (2.944) (1.884) 
Multilateral aid x SI x PV   -12.67   -0.0327   -0.278    -0.237   -1.144 
   (476.9)   (0.250)   (0.802)    (0.319)   (2.672) 
Observations 77 77 77 67 67 67 65 65 65  179 179 179 132 132 132 
R2 0.224 -0.373 -1,161.12 0.443 -3.646 0.326 -0.537 -5.152 -5.500  0.330 -22.133 -0.823 0.206 -10.923 -12.505 
p-value of LM statistica 0.0136 0.122 0.979 0.00814 0.927 0.578 0.209 0.318 0.265  0.204 0.869 0.644 0.0333 0.525 0.714 
F-stat for weak ident. 5.963 0.760 0.000131 7.787 0.00202 0.0477 1.228 0.228 0.206  1.372 0.00812 0.0507 4.455 0.112 0.0284 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, 
revolutions, ethnic fractionalization, the three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, and the interaction between the latter two variables. Robust and cluster robust standard errors in 
parentheses for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified.
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Table D3.3. IV results with early-impact, long-impact and humanitarian aid, cross-country and panel data 
 CROSS-COUNTRY DATA  PANEL DATA 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth  Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
                                                                                                                                      Results A: Early-impact aid 
 20-year 10-year  1993-2012 
 1993-2012 (73 obs.) 1993-2002 (63 obs.) 2003-2012 (57 obs.)  5-year (160 obs.) 10-year (120 obs.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Early-impact aid/GDP -0.260 -0.0969 -0.0177 -0.531 -2.744 0.624 -0.804 0.775 1.783  -0.708 -0.449 2.675 -1.248 -1.214 0.674 
 (0.619) (0.635) (0.503) (0.671) (6.814) (1.262) (0.842) (6.093) (2.950)  (0.934) (2.099) (13.56) (1.278) (1.614) (0.694) 
Early-impact aid x SI  -0.134 -0.151  1.209 -0.572  -1.017 -1.524   -0.525 -3.000  -0.460 -0.707 
  (0.152) (0.155)  (3.670) (0.564)  (3.269) (1.764)   (1.754) (10.81)  (0.488) (0.434) 
Early-impact aid x PV  -0.0842 -0.0964  0.291 -0.259  0.271 0.294   0.193 -0.464  0.160 -0.187 
  (0.127) (0.148)  (0.980) (0.266)  (1.212) (1.553)   (0.319) (3.228)  (0.283) (0.236) 
Early-impact aid x SI x PV   0.0461   0.284   0.0423    0.635   0.179** 
   (0.151)   (0.394)   (0.369)    (3.610)   (0.0902) 
R2 0.545 0.596 0.575 0.434 -2.185 0.121 0.242 -2.178 -4.434  0.259 -0.298 -6.431 -0.219 -1.665 -0.020 
p-value of LM statistica 0.168 0.179 0.553 0.0323 0.651 0.0815 0.0751 0.750 0.346  0.166 0.559 0.784 0.296 0.224 0.0573 
F-stat for weak ident. 1.538 0.467 0.0671 3.383 0.0485 0.626 2.109 0.0231 0.169  1.714 0.102 0.0161 0.960 0.458 0.839 
                                                                                                                                     Results B: Late-impact aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Late-impact aid /GDP -0.173 0.164 -0.852 -0.521 -2.773 0.377 -0.472 1.831 1.555  -0.451 0.405 0.544 -0.412* 0.512 1.019 
 (0.290) (0.470) (29.08) (0.557) (9.552) (0.549) (0.434) (1.546) (1.467)  (0.507) (1.879) (19.06) (0.232) (0.710) (0.851) 
Late-impact aid x SI  -0.258 0.977  1.188 -0.460  -1.420 -1.955   -0.750 -0.887  -0.836 -1.169* 
  (0.253) (36.93)  (4.680) (0.333)  (1.071) (2.110)   (1.193) (18.06)  (0.508) (0.702) 
Late-impact aid x PV  0.0590 4.147  -0.189 -0.150  0.393 1.282   0.307 0.294  0.312 0.0989 
  (0.0982) (121.2)  (0.689) (0.304)  (0.553) (2.078)   (0.347) (1.323)  (0.241) (0.521) 
Late-impact aid x SI x PV   -3.373   0.113   -0.308    0.0482   0.182 
   (100.5)   (0.187)   (0.694)    (5.915)   (0.413) 
R2 0.559 0.560 -96.218 0.468 -2.268 0.251 0.313 -2.889 -5.563  0.361 -0.273 -0.599 0.489 -0.459 -1.838 
p-value of LM statistica 0.0126 0.188 0.974 0.0284 0.698 0.0715 0.0271 0.181 0.530  0.0356 0.431 0.962 0.00554 0.0910 0.404 
F-stat for weak ident. 6.324 0.495 0.000197 3.536 0.0355 0.608 3.579 0.401 0.0650  3.831 0.178 0.000483 9.488 0.975 0.169 
                                                                                                                                 Results C: Humanitarian aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Humanitarian aid /GDP -4.829 -24.34 -24.18 -1.922 -5.425 -43.44 1.295 0.743 2.491  10.94 0.573 -1,465 -2.625 3.832 -10.17 
 (14.50) (82.53) (67.79) (1.687) (13.50) (186.0) (1.847) (2.742) (4.201)  (36.95) (12.86) (654,181) (2.811) (13.64) (17.03) 
Humanitarian aid x SI  4.000 4.014  -8.587 4.505  0.646 1.988   2.868 63.42  5.231 0.246 
  (10.44) (10.91)  (28.32) (22.11)  (4.777) (9.046)   (5.235) (27,642)  (10.85) (3.399) 
Humanitarian aid x PV  1.966 1.904  6.772 32.72  0.366 1.008   -1.884 439.7  -4.841 5.507 
  (6.485) (9.157)  (18.28) (149.2)  (2.736) (3.688)   (2.803) (196,648)  (10.43) (9.626) 
Humanitarian aid x SI x PV   0.0336   -8.961   -1.644    -73.80   -1.285 
   (4.298)   (41.54)   (2.835)    (32,906)   (1.911) 
R2 -2.781 -28.625 -27.860 0.221 -15.203 -38.351 0.494 -0.196 -2.893  -4.669 -0.266 -31,229.81 -0.288 -4.391 -1.988 
p-value of LM statistica 0.724 0.814 0.695 0.154 0.710 0.830 0.116 0.368 0.569  0.756 0.414 0.998 0.327 0.635 0.511 
F-stat for weak ident. 0.0948 0.0132 0.0252 1.536 0.0326 0.00783 1.999 0.172 0.0574  0.0853 0.203 1.07e-06 0.788 0.0628 0.0881 
Notes: The control variables included are: logarithm of the initial level of income per capita, policy, and life expectancy, geography, inflation, the initial level of financial depth and of budget balance, revolutions, 
ethnic fractionalization, the three regional dummies, state ineffectiveness, political violence, the interaction between the latter two variables, and ODA loan repayments. Robust and cluster robust standard 
errors in parentheses for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aThe null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified. 
